2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* Generic SSH public-key handling operations. In particular,
|
|
|
|
* reading of SSH public-key files, and also the generic `sign'
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
* operation for SSH-2 (which checks the type of the key and
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* dispatches to the appropriate key-type specific function).
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <errno.h>
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-02-01 12:54:40 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "putty.h"
|
Complete rewrite of PuTTY's bignum library.
The old 'Bignum' data type is gone completely, and so is sshbn.c. In
its place is a new thing called 'mp_int', handled by an entirely new
library module mpint.c, with API differences both large and small.
The main aim of this change is that the new library should be free of
timing- and cache-related side channels. I've written the code so that
it _should_ - assuming I haven't made any mistakes - do all of its
work without either control flow or memory addressing depending on the
data words of the input numbers. (Though, being an _arbitrary_
precision library, it does have to at least depend on the sizes of the
numbers - but there's a 'formal' size that can vary separately from
the actual magnitude of the represented integer, so if you want to
keep it secret that your number is actually small, it should work fine
to have a very long mp_int and just happen to store 23 in it.) So I've
done all my conditionalisation by means of computing both answers and
doing bit-masking to swap the right one into place, and all loops over
the words of an mp_int go up to the formal size rather than the actual
size.
I haven't actually tested the constant-time property in any rigorous
way yet (I'm still considering the best way to do it). But this code
is surely at the very least a big improvement on the old version, even
if I later find a few more things to fix.
I've also completely rewritten the low-level elliptic curve arithmetic
from sshecc.c; the new ecc.c is closer to being an adjunct of mpint.c
than it is to the SSH end of the code. The new elliptic curve code
keeps all coordinates in Montgomery-multiplication transformed form to
speed up all the multiplications mod the same prime, and only converts
them back when you ask for the affine coordinates. Also, I adopted
extended coordinates for the Edwards curve implementation.
sshecc.c has also had a near-total rewrite in the course of switching
it over to the new system. While I was there, I've separated ECDSA and
EdDSA more completely - they now have separate vtables, instead of a
single vtable in which nearly every function had a big if statement in
it - and also made the externally exposed types for an ECDSA key and
an ECDH context different.
A minor new feature: since the new arithmetic code includes a modular
square root function, we can now support the compressed point
representation for the NIST curves. We seem to have been getting along
fine without that so far, but it seemed a shame not to put it in,
since it was suddenly easy.
In sshrsa.c, one major change is that I've removed the RSA blinding
step in rsa_privkey_op, in which we randomise the ciphertext before
doing the decryption. The purpose of that was to avoid timing leaks
giving away the plaintext - but the new arithmetic code should take
that in its stride in the course of also being careful enough to avoid
leaking the _private key_, which RSA blinding had no way to do
anything about in any case.
Apart from those specific points, most of the rest of the changes are
more or less mechanical, just changing type names and translating code
into the new API.
2018-12-31 13:53:41 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "mpint.h"
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "ssh.h"
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "misc.h"
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fairly arbitrary size limit on any public or private key blob.
|
|
|
|
* Chosen to match AGENT_MAX_MSGLEN, on the basis that any key too
|
|
|
|
* large to transfer over the ssh-agent protocol is probably too large
|
|
|
|
* to be useful in general.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* MAX_KEY_BLOB_LINES is the corresponding limit on the Public-Lines
|
|
|
|
* or Private-Lines header field in a key file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_KEY_BLOB_SIZE 262144
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_KEY_BLOB_LINES (MAX_KEY_BLOB_SIZE / 48)
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Corresponding limit on the size of a key _file_ itself, based on
|
|
|
|
* base64-encoding the key blob and then adding a few Kb for
|
|
|
|
* surrounding metadata.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (MAX_KEY_BLOB_SIZE * 4 / 3 + 4096)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const ptrlen rsa1_signature =
|
|
|
|
PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n\0");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define BASE64_TOINT(x) ( (x)-'A'<26 ? (x)-'A'+0 :\
|
|
|
|
(x)-'a'<26 ? (x)-'a'+26 :\
|
|
|
|
(x)-'0'<10 ? (x)-'0'+52 :\
|
|
|
|
(x)=='+' ? 62 : \
|
|
|
|
(x)=='/' ? 63 : 0 )
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-09 21:53:11 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf_new(size_t max_size)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = snew_plus(LoadedFile, max_size);
|
|
|
|
lf->data = snew_plus_get_aux(lf);
|
|
|
|
lf->len = 0;
|
|
|
|
lf->max_size = max_size;
|
|
|
|
return lf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void lf_free(LoadedFile *lf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
smemclr(lf->data, lf->max_size);
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
smemclr(lf, sizeof(LoadedFile));
|
|
|
|
sfree(lf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-09 21:53:11 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadFileStatus lf_load_fp(LoadedFile *lf, FILE *fp)
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
lf->len = 0;
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
while (lf->len < lf->max_size) {
|
|
|
|
size_t retd = fread(lf->data + lf->len, 1, lf->max_size - lf->len, fp);
|
|
|
|
if (ferror(fp))
|
|
|
|
return LF_ERROR;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (retd == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lf->len += retd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadFileStatus status = LF_OK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (lf->len == lf->max_size) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The file might be too long to fit in our fixed-size
|
|
|
|
* structure. Try reading one more byte, to check. */
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fgetc(fp) != EOF)
|
|
|
|
status = LF_TOO_BIG;
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_INIT(lf, lf->data, lf->len);
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-09 21:53:11 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadFileStatus lf_load(LoadedFile *lf, const Filename *filename)
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FILE *fp = f_open(filename, "rb", false);
|
|
|
|
if (!fp)
|
|
|
|
return LF_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LoadFileStatus status = lf_load_fp(lf, fp);
|
|
|
|
fclose(fp);
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool lf_load_keyfile_helper(LoadFileStatus status,
|
|
|
|
const char **errptr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *error;
|
|
|
|
switch (status) {
|
|
|
|
case LF_OK:
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
case LF_TOO_BIG:
|
|
|
|
error = "file is too large to be a key file";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case LF_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
error = strerror(errno);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
unreachable("bad status value in lf_load_keyfile_helper");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (errptr)
|
|
|
|
*errptr = error;
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf_load_keyfile(const Filename *filename, const char **errptr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_new(MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (!lf_load_keyfile_helper(lf_load(lf, filename), errptr)) {
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return lf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf_load_keyfile_fp(FILE *fp, const char **errptr)
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_new(MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (!lf_load_keyfile_helper(lf_load_fp(lf, fp), errptr)) {
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return lf;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool expect_signature(BinarySource *src, ptrlen realsig)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ptrlen thissig = get_data(src, realsig.len);
|
|
|
|
return !get_err(src) && ptrlen_eq_ptrlen(realsig, thissig);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsa1_load_s_internal(BinarySource *src, RSAKey *key, bool pub_only,
|
|
|
|
char **commentptr, const char *passphrase,
|
|
|
|
const char **error)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
strbuf *buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int ciphertype;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
ptrlen comment;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*error = "not an SSH-1 RSA file";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!expect_signature(src, rsa1_signature))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
*error = "file format error";
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* One byte giving encryption type, and one reserved uint32. */
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ciphertype = get_byte(src);
|
2019-04-01 19:06:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ciphertype != 0 && ciphertype != SSH1_CIPHER_3DES)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (get_uint32(src) != 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end; /* reserved field nonzero, panic! */
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Now the serious stuff. An ordinary SSH-1 public key. */
|
2018-06-03 07:23:07 +00:00
|
|
|
get_rsa_ssh1_pub(src, key, RSA_SSH1_MODULUS_FIRST);
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Next, the comment field. */
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
comment = get_string(src);
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*commentptr = mkstr(comment);
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (key)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
key->comment = mkstr(comment);
|
2005-10-30 16:28:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pub_only) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2005-10-30 16:28:45 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!key) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = ciphertype != 0;
|
|
|
|
*error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Decrypt remainder of buffer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ciphertype) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t enclen = get_avail(src);
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (enclen & 7)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
buf = strbuf_new_nm();
|
|
|
|
put_datapl(buf, get_data(src, enclen));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned char keybuf[16];
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
hash_simple(&ssh_md5, ptrlen_from_asciz(passphrase), keybuf);
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
des3_decrypt_pubkey(keybuf, buf->u, enclen);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
smemclr(keybuf, sizeof(keybuf)); /* burn the evidence */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(src, ptrlen_from_strbuf(buf));
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are now in the secret part of the key. The first four
|
|
|
|
* bytes should be of the form a, b, a, b.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int b0a = get_byte(src);
|
|
|
|
int b1a = get_byte(src);
|
|
|
|
int b0b = get_byte(src);
|
|
|
|
int b1b = get_byte(src);
|
|
|
|
if (b0a != b0b || b1a != b1b) {
|
|
|
|
*error = "wrong passphrase";
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* After that, we have one further bignum which is our
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* decryption exponent, and then the three auxiliary values
|
|
|
|
* (iqmp, q, p).
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
get_rsa_ssh1_priv(src, key);
|
|
|
|
key->iqmp = get_mp_ssh1(src);
|
|
|
|
key->q = get_mp_ssh1(src);
|
|
|
|
key->p = get_mp_ssh1(src);
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-03-22 21:48:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!rsa_verify(key)) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*error = "rsa_verify failed";
|
|
|
|
freersakey(key);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
*error = NULL;
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-22 21:48:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
end:
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (buf)
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(buf);
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int rsa1_load_s(BinarySource *src, RSAKey *key,
|
|
|
|
const char *passphrase, const char **errstr)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return rsa1_load_s_internal(src, key, false, NULL, passphrase, errstr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int rsa1_load_f(const Filename *filename, RSAKey *key,
|
|
|
|
const char *passphrase, const char **errstr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_load_keyfile(filename, errstr);
|
|
|
|
if (!lf)
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int toret = rsa1_load_s(BinarySource_UPCAST(lf), key, passphrase, errstr);
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
2000-09-07 16:40:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See whether an RSA key is encrypted. Return its comment field as
|
|
|
|
* well.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool rsa1_encrypted_s(BinarySource *src, char **comment)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *dummy;
|
|
|
|
return rsa1_load_s_internal(src, NULL, false, comment, NULL, &dummy) == 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool rsa1_encrypted_f(const Filename *filename, char **comment)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_load_keyfile(filename, NULL);
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!lf)
|
|
|
|
return false; /* couldn't even open the file */
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool toret = rsa1_encrypted_s(BinarySource_UPCAST(lf), comment);
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
2000-09-25 10:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* Read the public part of an SSH-1 RSA key from a file (public or
|
|
|
|
* private), and generate its public blob in exponent-first order.
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int rsa1_loadpub_s(BinarySource *src, BinarySink *bs,
|
2020-01-05 10:28:45 +00:00
|
|
|
char **commentptr, const char **errorstr)
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-01-04 06:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
RSAKey key;
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *error = NULL;
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Default return if we fail. */
|
Convert a lot of 'int' variables to 'bool'.
My normal habit these days, in new code, is to treat int and bool as
_almost_ completely separate types. I'm still willing to use C's
implicit test for zero on an integer (e.g. 'if (!blob.len)' is fine,
no need to spell it out as blob.len != 0), but generally, if a
variable is going to be conceptually a boolean, I like to declare it
bool and assign to it using 'true' or 'false' rather than 0 or 1.
PuTTY is an exception, because it predates the C99 bool, and I've
stuck to its existing coding style even when adding new code to it.
But it's been annoying me more and more, so now that I've decided C99
bool is an acceptable thing to require from our toolchain in the first
place, here's a quite thorough trawl through the source doing
'boolification'. Many variables and function parameters are now typed
as bool rather than int; many assignments of 0 or 1 to those variables
are now spelled 'true' or 'false'.
I managed this thorough conversion with the help of a custom clang
plugin that I wrote to trawl the AST and apply heuristics to point out
where things might want changing. So I've even managed to do a decent
job on parts of the code I haven't looked at in years!
To make the plugin's work easier, I pushed platform front ends
generally in the direction of using standard 'bool' in preference to
platform-specific boolean types like Windows BOOL or GTK's gboolean;
I've left the platform booleans in places they _have_ to be for the
platform APIs to work right, but variables only used by my own code
have been converted wherever I found them.
In a few places there are int values that look very like booleans in
_most_ of the places they're used, but have a rarely-used third value,
or a distinction between different nonzero values that most users
don't care about. In these cases, I've _removed_ uses of 'true' and
'false' for the return values, to emphasise that there's something
more subtle going on than a simple boolean answer:
- the 'multisel' field in dialog.h's list box structure, for which
the GTK front end in particular recognises a difference between 1
and 2 but nearly everything else treats as boolean
- the 'urgent' parameter to plug_receive, where 1 vs 2 tells you
something about the specific location of the urgent pointer, but
most clients only care about 0 vs 'something nonzero'
- the return value of wc_match, where -1 indicates a syntax error in
the wildcard.
- the return values from SSH-1 RSA-key loading functions, which use
-1 for 'wrong passphrase' and 0 for all other failures (so any
caller which already knows it's not loading an _encrypted private_
key can treat them as boolean)
- term->esc_query, and the 'query' parameter in toggle_mode in
terminal.c, which _usually_ hold 0 for ESC[123h or 1 for ESC[?123h,
but can also hold -1 for some other intervening character that we
don't support.
In a few places there's an integer that I haven't turned into a bool
even though it really _can_ only take values 0 or 1 (and, as above,
tried to make the call sites consistent in not calling those values
true and false), on the grounds that I thought it would make it more
confusing to imply that the 0 value was in some sense 'negative' or
bad and the 1 positive or good:
- the return value of plug_accepting uses the POSIXish convention of
0=success and nonzero=error; I think if I made it bool then I'd
also want to reverse its sense, and that's a job for a separate
piece of work.
- the 'screen' parameter to lineptr() in terminal.c, where 0 and 1
represent the default and alternate screens. There's no obvious
reason why one of those should be considered 'true' or 'positive'
or 'success' - they're just indices - so I've left it as int.
ssh_scp_recv had particularly confusing semantics for its previous int
return value: its call sites used '<= 0' to check for error, but it
never actually returned a negative number, just 0 or 1. Now the
function and its call sites agree that it's a bool.
In a couple of places I've renamed variables called 'ret', because I
don't like that name any more - it's unclear whether it means the
return value (in preparation) for the _containing_ function or the
return value received from a subroutine call, and occasionally I've
accidentally used the same variable for both and introduced a bug. So
where one of those got in my way, I've renamed it to 'toret' or 'retd'
(the latter short for 'returned') in line with my usual modern
practice, but I haven't done a thorough job of finding all of them.
Finally, one amusing side effect of doing this is that I've had to
separate quite a few chained assignments. It used to be perfectly fine
to write 'a = b = c = TRUE' when a,b,c were int and TRUE was just a
the 'true' defined by stdbool.h, that idiom provokes a warning from
gcc: 'suggest parentheses around assignment used as truth value'!
2018-11-02 19:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool is_privkey_file = expect_signature(src, rsa1_signature);
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_REWIND(src);
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (is_privkey_file) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Load just the public half from an SSH-1 private key file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rsa1_load_s_internal(src, &key, true, commentptr, NULL, &error)) {
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
rsa_ssh1_public_blob(bs, &key, RSA_SSH1_EXPONENT_FIRST);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
freersakey(&key);
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Try interpreting the file as an SSH-1 public key.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char *line, *p, *bitsp, *expp, *modp, *commentp;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
line = mkstr(get_chomped_line(src));
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
p = line;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bitsp = p;
|
|
|
|
p += strspn(p, "0123456789");
|
|
|
|
if (*p != ' ')
|
|
|
|
goto not_public_either;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expp = p;
|
|
|
|
p += strspn(p, "0123456789");
|
|
|
|
if (*p != ' ')
|
|
|
|
goto not_public_either;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
modp = p;
|
|
|
|
p += strspn(p, "0123456789");
|
|
|
|
if (*p) {
|
|
|
|
if (*p != ' ')
|
|
|
|
goto not_public_either;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
commentp = p;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
commentp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
|
Complete rewrite of PuTTY's bignum library.
The old 'Bignum' data type is gone completely, and so is sshbn.c. In
its place is a new thing called 'mp_int', handled by an entirely new
library module mpint.c, with API differences both large and small.
The main aim of this change is that the new library should be free of
timing- and cache-related side channels. I've written the code so that
it _should_ - assuming I haven't made any mistakes - do all of its
work without either control flow or memory addressing depending on the
data words of the input numbers. (Though, being an _arbitrary_
precision library, it does have to at least depend on the sizes of the
numbers - but there's a 'formal' size that can vary separately from
the actual magnitude of the represented integer, so if you want to
keep it secret that your number is actually small, it should work fine
to have a very long mp_int and just happen to store 23 in it.) So I've
done all my conditionalisation by means of computing both answers and
doing bit-masking to swap the right one into place, and all loops over
the words of an mp_int go up to the formal size rather than the actual
size.
I haven't actually tested the constant-time property in any rigorous
way yet (I'm still considering the best way to do it). But this code
is surely at the very least a big improvement on the old version, even
if I later find a few more things to fix.
I've also completely rewritten the low-level elliptic curve arithmetic
from sshecc.c; the new ecc.c is closer to being an adjunct of mpint.c
than it is to the SSH end of the code. The new elliptic curve code
keeps all coordinates in Montgomery-multiplication transformed form to
speed up all the multiplications mod the same prime, and only converts
them back when you ask for the affine coordinates. Also, I adopted
extended coordinates for the Edwards curve implementation.
sshecc.c has also had a near-total rewrite in the course of switching
it over to the new system. While I was there, I've separated ECDSA and
EdDSA more completely - they now have separate vtables, instead of a
single vtable in which nearly every function had a big if statement in
it - and also made the externally exposed types for an ECDSA key and
an ECDH context different.
A minor new feature: since the new arithmetic code includes a modular
square root function, we can now support the compressed point
representation for the NIST curves. We seem to have been getting along
fine without that so far, but it seemed a shame not to put it in,
since it was suddenly easy.
In sshrsa.c, one major change is that I've removed the RSA blinding
step in rsa_privkey_op, in which we randomise the ciphertext before
doing the decryption. The purpose of that was to avoid timing leaks
giving away the plaintext - but the new arithmetic code should take
that in its stride in the course of also being careful enough to avoid
leaking the _private key_, which RSA blinding had no way to do
anything about in any case.
Apart from those specific points, most of the rest of the changes are
more or less mechanical, just changing type names and translating code
into the new API.
2018-12-31 13:53:41 +00:00
|
|
|
key.exponent = mp_from_decimal(expp);
|
|
|
|
key.modulus = mp_from_decimal(modp);
|
|
|
|
if (atoi(bitsp) != mp_get_nbits(key.modulus)) {
|
|
|
|
mp_free(key.exponent);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(key.modulus);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
|
|
|
error = "key bit count does not match in SSH-1 public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
|
|
|
*commentptr = commentp ? dupstr(commentp) : NULL;
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
rsa_ssh1_public_blob(bs, &key, RSA_SSH1_EXPONENT_FIRST);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
freersakey(&key);
|
2017-01-23 18:04:50 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
Convert a lot of 'int' variables to 'bool'.
My normal habit these days, in new code, is to treat int and bool as
_almost_ completely separate types. I'm still willing to use C's
implicit test for zero on an integer (e.g. 'if (!blob.len)' is fine,
no need to spell it out as blob.len != 0), but generally, if a
variable is going to be conceptually a boolean, I like to declare it
bool and assign to it using 'true' or 'false' rather than 0 or 1.
PuTTY is an exception, because it predates the C99 bool, and I've
stuck to its existing coding style even when adding new code to it.
But it's been annoying me more and more, so now that I've decided C99
bool is an acceptable thing to require from our toolchain in the first
place, here's a quite thorough trawl through the source doing
'boolification'. Many variables and function parameters are now typed
as bool rather than int; many assignments of 0 or 1 to those variables
are now spelled 'true' or 'false'.
I managed this thorough conversion with the help of a custom clang
plugin that I wrote to trawl the AST and apply heuristics to point out
where things might want changing. So I've even managed to do a decent
job on parts of the code I haven't looked at in years!
To make the plugin's work easier, I pushed platform front ends
generally in the direction of using standard 'bool' in preference to
platform-specific boolean types like Windows BOOL or GTK's gboolean;
I've left the platform booleans in places they _have_ to be for the
platform APIs to work right, but variables only used by my own code
have been converted wherever I found them.
In a few places there are int values that look very like booleans in
_most_ of the places they're used, but have a rarely-used third value,
or a distinction between different nonzero values that most users
don't care about. In these cases, I've _removed_ uses of 'true' and
'false' for the return values, to emphasise that there's something
more subtle going on than a simple boolean answer:
- the 'multisel' field in dialog.h's list box structure, for which
the GTK front end in particular recognises a difference between 1
and 2 but nearly everything else treats as boolean
- the 'urgent' parameter to plug_receive, where 1 vs 2 tells you
something about the specific location of the urgent pointer, but
most clients only care about 0 vs 'something nonzero'
- the return value of wc_match, where -1 indicates a syntax error in
the wildcard.
- the return values from SSH-1 RSA-key loading functions, which use
-1 for 'wrong passphrase' and 0 for all other failures (so any
caller which already knows it's not loading an _encrypted private_
key can treat them as boolean)
- term->esc_query, and the 'query' parameter in toggle_mode in
terminal.c, which _usually_ hold 0 for ESC[123h or 1 for ESC[?123h,
but can also hold -1 for some other intervening character that we
don't support.
In a few places there's an integer that I haven't turned into a bool
even though it really _can_ only take values 0 or 1 (and, as above,
tried to make the call sites consistent in not calling those values
true and false), on the grounds that I thought it would make it more
confusing to imply that the 0 value was in some sense 'negative' or
bad and the 1 positive or good:
- the return value of plug_accepting uses the POSIXish convention of
0=success and nonzero=error; I think if I made it bool then I'd
also want to reverse its sense, and that's a job for a separate
piece of work.
- the 'screen' parameter to lineptr() in terminal.c, where 0 and 1
represent the default and alternate screens. There's no obvious
reason why one of those should be considered 'true' or 'positive'
or 'success' - they're just indices - so I've left it as int.
ssh_scp_recv had particularly confusing semantics for its previous int
return value: its call sites used '<= 0' to check for error, but it
never actually returned a negative number, just 0 or 1. Now the
function and its call sites agree that it's a bool.
In a couple of places I've renamed variables called 'ret', because I
don't like that name any more - it's unclear whether it means the
return value (in preparation) for the _containing_ function or the
return value received from a subroutine call, and occasionally I've
accidentally used the same variable for both and introduced a bug. So
where one of those got in my way, I've renamed it to 'toret' or 'retd'
(the latter short for 'returned') in line with my usual modern
practice, but I haven't done a thorough job of finding all of them.
Finally, one amusing side effect of doing this is that I've had to
separate quite a few chained assignments. It used to be perfectly fine
to write 'a = b = c = TRUE' when a,b,c were int and TRUE was just a
the 'true' defined by stdbool.h, that idiom provokes a warning from
gcc: 'suggest parentheses around assignment used as truth value'!
2018-11-02 19:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
not_public_either:
|
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
error = "not an SSH-1 RSA file";
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
if ((ret != 1) && errorstr)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*errorstr = error;
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int rsa1_loadpub_f(const Filename *filename, BinarySink *bs,
|
|
|
|
char **commentptr, const char **errorstr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_load_keyfile(filename, errorstr);
|
|
|
|
if (!lf)
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int toret = rsa1_loadpub_s(BinarySource_UPCAST(lf), bs,
|
|
|
|
commentptr, errorstr);
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strbuf *rsa1_save_sb(RSAKey *key, const char *passphrase)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-03-01 19:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *buf = strbuf_new_nm();
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
int estart;
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
* The public part of the key.
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
put_datapl(buf, rsa1_signature);
|
2019-04-01 19:06:42 +00:00
|
|
|
put_byte(buf, passphrase ? SSH1_CIPHER_3DES : 0); /* encryption type */
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
put_uint32(buf, 0); /* reserved */
|
|
|
|
rsa_ssh1_public_blob(BinarySink_UPCAST(buf), key,
|
|
|
|
RSA_SSH1_MODULUS_FIRST);
|
|
|
|
put_stringz(buf, NULLTOEMPTY(key->comment));
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The encrypted portion starts here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
estart = buf->len;
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Two bytes, then the same two bytes repeated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
Replace random_byte() with random_read().
This is in preparation for a PRNG revamp which will want to have a
well defined boundary for any given request-for-randomness, so that it
can destroy the evidence afterwards. So no more looping round calling
random_byte() and then stopping when we feel like it: now you say up
front how many random bytes you want, and call random_read() which
gives you that many in one go.
Most of the call sites that had to be fixed are fairly mechanical, and
quite a few ended up more concise afterwards. A few became more
cumbersome, such as mp_random_bits, in which the new API doesn't let
me load the random bytes directly into the target integer without
triggering undefined behaviour, so instead I have to allocate a
separate temporary buffer.
The _most_ interesting call site was in the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding code
in sshrsa.c (used in SSH-1), in which you need a stream of _nonzero_
random bytes. The previous code just looped on random_byte, retrying
if it got a zero. Now I'm doing a much more interesting thing with an
mpint, essentially scaling a binary fraction repeatedly to extract a
number in the range [0,255) and then adding 1 to it.
2019-01-22 19:43:27 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t bytes[2];
|
|
|
|
random_read(bytes, 2);
|
|
|
|
put_data(buf, bytes, 2);
|
|
|
|
put_data(buf, bytes, 2);
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Four more bignums: the decryption exponent, then iqmp, then
|
|
|
|
* q, then p.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
put_mp_ssh1(buf, key->private_exponent);
|
|
|
|
put_mp_ssh1(buf, key->iqmp);
|
|
|
|
put_mp_ssh1(buf, key->q);
|
|
|
|
put_mp_ssh1(buf, key->p);
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now write zeros until the encrypted portion is a multiple of
|
|
|
|
* 8 bytes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-06-09 08:01:07 +00:00
|
|
|
put_padding(buf, (estart - buf->len) & 7, 0);
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now encrypt the encrypted portion.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (passphrase) {
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char keybuf[16];
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-15 09:57:30 +00:00
|
|
|
hash_simple(&ssh_md5, ptrlen_from_asciz(passphrase), keybuf);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
des3_encrypt_pubkey(keybuf, buf->u + estart, buf->len - estart);
|
|
|
|
smemclr(keybuf, sizeof(keybuf)); /* burn the evidence */
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Save an RSA key file. Return true on success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bool rsa1_save_f(const Filename *filename, RSAKey *key, const char *passphrase)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FILE *fp = f_open(filename, "wb", true);
|
|
|
|
if (!fp)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strbuf *buf = rsa1_save_sb(key, passphrase);
|
2020-01-10 19:25:38 +00:00
|
|
|
bool toret = fwrite(buf->s, 1, buf->len, fp) == buf->len;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fclose(fp))
|
|
|
|
toret = false;
|
2019-01-29 20:11:46 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf_free(buf);
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return toret;
|
2000-10-19 15:43:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
* SSH-2 private key load/store functions.
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2021-02-15 18:45:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* PuTTY's own file format for SSH-2 keys is given in doc/ppk.but, aka
|
|
|
|
* the "PPK file format" appendix in the PuTTY manual.
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool read_header(BinarySource *src, char *header)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int len = 39;
|
|
|
|
int c;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-14 10:46:55 +00:00
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
c = get_byte(src);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == EOF)
|
|
|
|
return false; /* failure */
|
|
|
|
if (c == ':') {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
c = get_byte(src);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (c != ' ')
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
*header = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return true; /* success! */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
|
|
|
return false; /* failure */
|
|
|
|
*header++ = c;
|
|
|
|
len--;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Convert a lot of 'int' variables to 'bool'.
My normal habit these days, in new code, is to treat int and bool as
_almost_ completely separate types. I'm still willing to use C's
implicit test for zero on an integer (e.g. 'if (!blob.len)' is fine,
no need to spell it out as blob.len != 0), but generally, if a
variable is going to be conceptually a boolean, I like to declare it
bool and assign to it using 'true' or 'false' rather than 0 or 1.
PuTTY is an exception, because it predates the C99 bool, and I've
stuck to its existing coding style even when adding new code to it.
But it's been annoying me more and more, so now that I've decided C99
bool is an acceptable thing to require from our toolchain in the first
place, here's a quite thorough trawl through the source doing
'boolification'. Many variables and function parameters are now typed
as bool rather than int; many assignments of 0 or 1 to those variables
are now spelled 'true' or 'false'.
I managed this thorough conversion with the help of a custom clang
plugin that I wrote to trawl the AST and apply heuristics to point out
where things might want changing. So I've even managed to do a decent
job on parts of the code I haven't looked at in years!
To make the plugin's work easier, I pushed platform front ends
generally in the direction of using standard 'bool' in preference to
platform-specific boolean types like Windows BOOL or GTK's gboolean;
I've left the platform booleans in places they _have_ to be for the
platform APIs to work right, but variables only used by my own code
have been converted wherever I found them.
In a few places there are int values that look very like booleans in
_most_ of the places they're used, but have a rarely-used third value,
or a distinction between different nonzero values that most users
don't care about. In these cases, I've _removed_ uses of 'true' and
'false' for the return values, to emphasise that there's something
more subtle going on than a simple boolean answer:
- the 'multisel' field in dialog.h's list box structure, for which
the GTK front end in particular recognises a difference between 1
and 2 but nearly everything else treats as boolean
- the 'urgent' parameter to plug_receive, where 1 vs 2 tells you
something about the specific location of the urgent pointer, but
most clients only care about 0 vs 'something nonzero'
- the return value of wc_match, where -1 indicates a syntax error in
the wildcard.
- the return values from SSH-1 RSA-key loading functions, which use
-1 for 'wrong passphrase' and 0 for all other failures (so any
caller which already knows it's not loading an _encrypted private_
key can treat them as boolean)
- term->esc_query, and the 'query' parameter in toggle_mode in
terminal.c, which _usually_ hold 0 for ESC[123h or 1 for ESC[?123h,
but can also hold -1 for some other intervening character that we
don't support.
In a few places there's an integer that I haven't turned into a bool
even though it really _can_ only take values 0 or 1 (and, as above,
tried to make the call sites consistent in not calling those values
true and false), on the grounds that I thought it would make it more
confusing to imply that the 0 value was in some sense 'negative' or
bad and the 1 positive or good:
- the return value of plug_accepting uses the POSIXish convention of
0=success and nonzero=error; I think if I made it bool then I'd
also want to reverse its sense, and that's a job for a separate
piece of work.
- the 'screen' parameter to lineptr() in terminal.c, where 0 and 1
represent the default and alternate screens. There's no obvious
reason why one of those should be considered 'true' or 'positive'
or 'success' - they're just indices - so I've left it as int.
ssh_scp_recv had particularly confusing semantics for its previous int
return value: its call sites used '<= 0' to check for error, but it
never actually returned a negative number, just 0 or 1. Now the
function and its call sites agree that it's a bool.
In a couple of places I've renamed variables called 'ret', because I
don't like that name any more - it's unclear whether it means the
return value (in preparation) for the _containing_ function or the
return value received from a subroutine call, and occasionally I've
accidentally used the same variable for both and introduced a bug. So
where one of those got in my way, I've renamed it to 'toret' or 'retd'
(the latter short for 'returned') in line with my usual modern
practice, but I haven't done a thorough job of finding all of them.
Finally, one amusing side effect of doing this is that I've had to
separate quite a few chained assignments. It used to be perfectly fine
to write 'a = b = c = TRUE' when a,b,c were int and TRUE was just a
the 'true' defined by stdbool.h, that idiom provokes a warning from
gcc: 'suggest parentheses around assignment used as truth value'!
2018-11-02 19:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
return false; /* failure */
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static char *read_body(BinarySource *src)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-03-01 19:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *buf = strbuf_new_nm();
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int c = get_byte(src);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (c == '\r' || c == '\n' || c == EOF) {
|
|
|
|
if (c != EOF) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
c = get_byte(src);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (c != '\r' && c != '\n')
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
src->pos--;
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return strbuf_to_str(buf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
put_byte(buf, c);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool read_blob(BinarySource *src, int nlines, BinarySink *bs)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *blob;
|
|
|
|
char *line;
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
int linelen;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int i, j, k;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We expect at most 64 base64 characters, ie 48 real bytes, per line. */
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
assert(nlines < MAX_KEY_BLOB_LINES);
|
2003-03-29 16:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
blob = snewn(48 * nlines, unsigned char);
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < nlines; i++) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
line = read_body(src);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!line) {
|
|
|
|
sfree(blob);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
linelen = strlen(line);
|
|
|
|
if (linelen % 4 != 0 || linelen > 64) {
|
|
|
|
sfree(blob);
|
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < linelen; j += 4) {
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char decoded[3];
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
k = base64_decode_atom(line + j, decoded);
|
|
|
|
if (!k) {
|
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
|
|
|
sfree(blob);
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
put_data(bs, decoded, k);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-01-23 18:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(blob);
|
2018-10-29 19:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Magic error return value for when the passphrase is wrong.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-01-04 06:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh2_userkey ssh2_wrong_passphrase = { NULL, NULL };
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-11-22 08:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
const ssh_keyalg *const all_keyalgs[] = {
|
|
|
|
&ssh_rsa,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_rsa_sha256,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_rsa_sha512,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_dss,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_ecdsa_nistp256,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_ecdsa_nistp384,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_ecdsa_nistp521,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_ecdsa_ed25519,
|
|
|
|
&ssh_ecdsa_ed448,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const size_t n_keyalgs = lenof(all_keyalgs);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-27 15:56:51 +00:00
|
|
|
const ssh_keyalg *find_pubkey_alg_len(ptrlen name)
|
2004-01-22 19:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-11-22 08:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_keyalgs; i++)
|
|
|
|
if (ptrlen_eq_string(name, all_keyalgs[i]->ssh_id))
|
|
|
|
return all_keyalgs[i];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2004-01-22 19:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Invent a struct type for polymorphic SSH key data.
During last week's work, I made a mistake in which I got the arguments
backwards in one of the key-blob-generating functions - mistakenly
swapped the 'void *' key instance with the 'BinarySink *' output
destination - and I didn't spot the mistake until run time, because in
C you can implicitly convert both to and from void * and so there was
no compile-time failure of type checking.
Now that I've introduced the FROMFIELD macro that downcasts a pointer
to one field of a structure to retrieve a pointer to the whole
structure, I think I might start using that more widely to indicate
this kind of polymorphic subtyping. So now all the public-key
functions in the struct ssh_signkey vtable handle their data instance
in the form of a pointer to a subfield of a new zero-sized structure
type 'ssh_key', which outside the key implementations indicates 'this
is some kind of key instance but it could be of any type'; they
downcast that pointer internally using FROMFIELD in place of the
previous ordinary C cast, and return one by returning &foo->sshk for
whatever foo they've just made up.
The sshk member is not at the beginning of the structure, which means
all those FROMFIELDs and &key->sshk are actually adding and
subtracting an offset. Of course I could have put the member at the
start anyway, but I had the idea that it's actually a feature _not_ to
have the two types start at the same address, because it means you
should notice earlier rather than later if you absentmindedly cast
from one to the other directly rather than by the approved method (in
particular, if you accidentally assign one through a void * and back
without even _noticing_ you perpetrated a cast). In particular, this
enforces that you can't sfree() the thing even once without realising
you should instead of called the right freekey function. (I found
several bugs by this method during initial testing, so I think it's
already proved its worth!)
While I'm here, I've also renamed the vtable structure ssh_signkey to
ssh_keyalg, because it was a confusing name anyway - it describes the
_algorithm_ for handling all keys of that type, not a specific key. So
ssh_keyalg is the collection of code, and ssh_key is one instance of
the data it handles.
2018-05-27 07:32:21 +00:00
|
|
|
const ssh_keyalg *find_pubkey_alg(const char *name)
|
2015-05-07 18:57:46 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-10-13 15:30:59 +00:00
|
|
|
return find_pubkey_alg_len(ptrlen_from_asciz(name));
|
2015-05-07 18:57:46 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ssh2_ppk_derivekey(ptrlen passphrase, uint8_t *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash *h;
|
|
|
|
h = ssh_hash_new(&ssh_sha1);
|
|
|
|
put_uint32(h, 0);
|
|
|
|
put_datapl(h, passphrase);
|
2019-12-15 09:57:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_hash_digest(h, key + 0);
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash_reset(h);
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
put_uint32(h, 1);
|
|
|
|
put_datapl(h, passphrase);
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash_final(h, key + 20);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
static int userkey_parse_line_counter(const char *text)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *endptr;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ul = strtoul(text, &endptr, 10);
|
|
|
|
if (*text && !*endptr && ul < MAX_KEY_BLOB_LINES)
|
|
|
|
return ul;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh2_userkey *ppk_load_s(BinarySource *src, const char *passphrase,
|
2020-01-05 10:28:45 +00:00
|
|
|
const char **errorstr)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
char header[40], *b, *encryption, *comment, *mac;
|
Invent a struct type for polymorphic SSH key data.
During last week's work, I made a mistake in which I got the arguments
backwards in one of the key-blob-generating functions - mistakenly
swapped the 'void *' key instance with the 'BinarySink *' output
destination - and I didn't spot the mistake until run time, because in
C you can implicitly convert both to and from void * and so there was
no compile-time failure of type checking.
Now that I've introduced the FROMFIELD macro that downcasts a pointer
to one field of a structure to retrieve a pointer to the whole
structure, I think I might start using that more widely to indicate
this kind of polymorphic subtyping. So now all the public-key
functions in the struct ssh_signkey vtable handle their data instance
in the form of a pointer to a subfield of a new zero-sized structure
type 'ssh_key', which outside the key implementations indicates 'this
is some kind of key instance but it could be of any type'; they
downcast that pointer internally using FROMFIELD in place of the
previous ordinary C cast, and return one by returning &foo->sshk for
whatever foo they've just made up.
The sshk member is not at the beginning of the structure, which means
all those FROMFIELDs and &key->sshk are actually adding and
subtracting an offset. Of course I could have put the member at the
start anyway, but I had the idea that it's actually a feature _not_ to
have the two types start at the same address, because it means you
should notice earlier rather than later if you absentmindedly cast
from one to the other directly rather than by the approved method (in
particular, if you accidentally assign one through a void * and back
without even _noticing_ you perpetrated a cast). In particular, this
enforces that you can't sfree() the thing even once without realising
you should instead of called the right freekey function. (I found
several bugs by this method during initial testing, so I think it's
already proved its worth!)
While I'm here, I've also renamed the vtable structure ssh_signkey to
ssh_keyalg, because it was a confusing name anyway - it describes the
_algorithm_ for handling all keys of that type, not a specific key. So
ssh_keyalg is the collection of code, and ssh_key is one instance of
the data it handles.
2018-05-27 07:32:21 +00:00
|
|
|
const ssh_keyalg *alg;
|
2019-01-04 06:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh2_userkey *ret;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int cipher, cipherblk;
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *public_blob, *private_blob;
|
Convert a lot of 'int' variables to 'bool'.
My normal habit these days, in new code, is to treat int and bool as
_almost_ completely separate types. I'm still willing to use C's
implicit test for zero on an integer (e.g. 'if (!blob.len)' is fine,
no need to spell it out as blob.len != 0), but generally, if a
variable is going to be conceptually a boolean, I like to declare it
bool and assign to it using 'true' or 'false' rather than 0 or 1.
PuTTY is an exception, because it predates the C99 bool, and I've
stuck to its existing coding style even when adding new code to it.
But it's been annoying me more and more, so now that I've decided C99
bool is an acceptable thing to require from our toolchain in the first
place, here's a quite thorough trawl through the source doing
'boolification'. Many variables and function parameters are now typed
as bool rather than int; many assignments of 0 or 1 to those variables
are now spelled 'true' or 'false'.
I managed this thorough conversion with the help of a custom clang
plugin that I wrote to trawl the AST and apply heuristics to point out
where things might want changing. So I've even managed to do a decent
job on parts of the code I haven't looked at in years!
To make the plugin's work easier, I pushed platform front ends
generally in the direction of using standard 'bool' in preference to
platform-specific boolean types like Windows BOOL or GTK's gboolean;
I've left the platform booleans in places they _have_ to be for the
platform APIs to work right, but variables only used by my own code
have been converted wherever I found them.
In a few places there are int values that look very like booleans in
_most_ of the places they're used, but have a rarely-used third value,
or a distinction between different nonzero values that most users
don't care about. In these cases, I've _removed_ uses of 'true' and
'false' for the return values, to emphasise that there's something
more subtle going on than a simple boolean answer:
- the 'multisel' field in dialog.h's list box structure, for which
the GTK front end in particular recognises a difference between 1
and 2 but nearly everything else treats as boolean
- the 'urgent' parameter to plug_receive, where 1 vs 2 tells you
something about the specific location of the urgent pointer, but
most clients only care about 0 vs 'something nonzero'
- the return value of wc_match, where -1 indicates a syntax error in
the wildcard.
- the return values from SSH-1 RSA-key loading functions, which use
-1 for 'wrong passphrase' and 0 for all other failures (so any
caller which already knows it's not loading an _encrypted private_
key can treat them as boolean)
- term->esc_query, and the 'query' parameter in toggle_mode in
terminal.c, which _usually_ hold 0 for ESC[123h or 1 for ESC[?123h,
but can also hold -1 for some other intervening character that we
don't support.
In a few places there's an integer that I haven't turned into a bool
even though it really _can_ only take values 0 or 1 (and, as above,
tried to make the call sites consistent in not calling those values
true and false), on the grounds that I thought it would make it more
confusing to imply that the 0 value was in some sense 'negative' or
bad and the 1 positive or good:
- the return value of plug_accepting uses the POSIXish convention of
0=success and nonzero=error; I think if I made it bool then I'd
also want to reverse its sense, and that's a job for a separate
piece of work.
- the 'screen' parameter to lineptr() in terminal.c, where 0 and 1
represent the default and alternate screens. There's no obvious
reason why one of those should be considered 'true' or 'positive'
or 'success' - they're just indices - so I've left it as int.
ssh_scp_recv had particularly confusing semantics for its previous int
return value: its call sites used '<= 0' to check for error, but it
never actually returned a negative number, just 0 or 1. Now the
function and its call sites agree that it's a bool.
In a couple of places I've renamed variables called 'ret', because I
don't like that name any more - it's unclear whether it means the
return value (in preparation) for the _containing_ function or the
return value received from a subroutine call, and occasionally I've
accidentally used the same variable for both and introduced a bug. So
where one of those got in my way, I've renamed it to 'toret' or 'retd'
(the latter short for 'returned') in line with my usual modern
practice, but I haven't done a thorough job of finding all of them.
Finally, one amusing side effect of doing this is that I've had to
separate quite a few chained assignments. It used to be perfectly fine
to write 'a = b = c = TRUE' when a,b,c were int and TRUE was just a
the 'true' defined by stdbool.h, that idiom provokes a warning from
gcc: 'suggest parentheses around assignment used as truth value'!
2018-11-02 19:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
bool is_mac, old_fmt;
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int passlen = passphrase ? strlen(passphrase) : 0;
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *error = NULL;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = NULL; /* return NULL for most errors */
|
2003-02-01 17:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
encryption = comment = mac = NULL;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
public_blob = private_blob = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the first header line which contains the key type. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header)) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
error = "no header line found in key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2018-10-09 17:07:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (0 == strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2")) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
old_fmt = false;
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (0 == strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-1")) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* this is an old key file; warn and then continue */
|
|
|
|
old_keyfile_warning();
|
|
|
|
old_fmt = true;
|
2013-02-22 21:39:02 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (0 == strncmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-", 20)) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* this is a key file FROM THE FUTURE; refuse it, but with a
|
2013-02-22 21:39:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* more specific error message than the generic one below */
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
error = "PuTTY key format too new";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
error = "not a PuTTY SSH-2 private key";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = "file format error";
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Select key algorithm structure. */
|
2004-01-22 19:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
alg = find_pubkey_alg(b);
|
|
|
|
if (!alg) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Read the Encryption header line. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Encryption"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((encryption = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(encryption, "aes256-cbc")) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
cipher = 1;
|
|
|
|
cipherblk = 16;
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(encryption, "none")) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
cipher = 0;
|
|
|
|
cipherblk = 1;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the Comment header line. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Comment"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((comment = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the Public-Lines header line and the public blob. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Public-Lines"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
i = userkey_parse_line_counter(b);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
public_blob = strbuf_new();
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_blob(src, i, BinarySink_UPCAST(public_blob)))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the Private-Lines header line and the Private blob. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Private-Lines"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
i = userkey_parse_line_counter(b);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2019-03-01 19:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
private_blob = strbuf_new_nm();
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_blob(src, i, BinarySink_UPCAST(private_blob)))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Read the Private-MAC or Private-Hash header line. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (0 == strcmp(header, "Private-MAC")) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((mac = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
is_mac = true;
|
2005-02-26 15:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (0 == strcmp(header, "Private-Hash") && old_fmt) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((mac = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
is_mac = false;
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Decrypt the private blob.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (cipher) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char key[40];
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!passphrase)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (private_blob->len % cipherblk)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh2_ppk_derivekey(ptrlen_from_asciz(passphrase), key);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
aes256_decrypt_pubkey(key, private_blob->u, private_blob->len);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
* Verify the MAC.
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
char realmac[41];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char binary[20];
|
|
|
|
strbuf *macdata;
|
Convert a lot of 'int' variables to 'bool'.
My normal habit these days, in new code, is to treat int and bool as
_almost_ completely separate types. I'm still willing to use C's
implicit test for zero on an integer (e.g. 'if (!blob.len)' is fine,
no need to spell it out as blob.len != 0), but generally, if a
variable is going to be conceptually a boolean, I like to declare it
bool and assign to it using 'true' or 'false' rather than 0 or 1.
PuTTY is an exception, because it predates the C99 bool, and I've
stuck to its existing coding style even when adding new code to it.
But it's been annoying me more and more, so now that I've decided C99
bool is an acceptable thing to require from our toolchain in the first
place, here's a quite thorough trawl through the source doing
'boolification'. Many variables and function parameters are now typed
as bool rather than int; many assignments of 0 or 1 to those variables
are now spelled 'true' or 'false'.
I managed this thorough conversion with the help of a custom clang
plugin that I wrote to trawl the AST and apply heuristics to point out
where things might want changing. So I've even managed to do a decent
job on parts of the code I haven't looked at in years!
To make the plugin's work easier, I pushed platform front ends
generally in the direction of using standard 'bool' in preference to
platform-specific boolean types like Windows BOOL or GTK's gboolean;
I've left the platform booleans in places they _have_ to be for the
platform APIs to work right, but variables only used by my own code
have been converted wherever I found them.
In a few places there are int values that look very like booleans in
_most_ of the places they're used, but have a rarely-used third value,
or a distinction between different nonzero values that most users
don't care about. In these cases, I've _removed_ uses of 'true' and
'false' for the return values, to emphasise that there's something
more subtle going on than a simple boolean answer:
- the 'multisel' field in dialog.h's list box structure, for which
the GTK front end in particular recognises a difference between 1
and 2 but nearly everything else treats as boolean
- the 'urgent' parameter to plug_receive, where 1 vs 2 tells you
something about the specific location of the urgent pointer, but
most clients only care about 0 vs 'something nonzero'
- the return value of wc_match, where -1 indicates a syntax error in
the wildcard.
- the return values from SSH-1 RSA-key loading functions, which use
-1 for 'wrong passphrase' and 0 for all other failures (so any
caller which already knows it's not loading an _encrypted private_
key can treat them as boolean)
- term->esc_query, and the 'query' parameter in toggle_mode in
terminal.c, which _usually_ hold 0 for ESC[123h or 1 for ESC[?123h,
but can also hold -1 for some other intervening character that we
don't support.
In a few places there's an integer that I haven't turned into a bool
even though it really _can_ only take values 0 or 1 (and, as above,
tried to make the call sites consistent in not calling those values
true and false), on the grounds that I thought it would make it more
confusing to imply that the 0 value was in some sense 'negative' or
bad and the 1 positive or good:
- the return value of plug_accepting uses the POSIXish convention of
0=success and nonzero=error; I think if I made it bool then I'd
also want to reverse its sense, and that's a job for a separate
piece of work.
- the 'screen' parameter to lineptr() in terminal.c, where 0 and 1
represent the default and alternate screens. There's no obvious
reason why one of those should be considered 'true' or 'positive'
or 'success' - they're just indices - so I've left it as int.
ssh_scp_recv had particularly confusing semantics for its previous int
return value: its call sites used '<= 0' to check for error, but it
never actually returned a negative number, just 0 or 1. Now the
function and its call sites agree that it's a bool.
In a couple of places I've renamed variables called 'ret', because I
don't like that name any more - it's unclear whether it means the
return value (in preparation) for the _containing_ function or the
return value received from a subroutine call, and occasionally I've
accidentally used the same variable for both and introduced a bug. So
where one of those got in my way, I've renamed it to 'toret' or 'retd'
(the latter short for 'returned') in line with my usual modern
practice, but I haven't done a thorough job of finding all of them.
Finally, one amusing side effect of doing this is that I've had to
separate quite a few chained assignments. It used to be perfectly fine
to write 'a = b = c = TRUE' when a,b,c were int and TRUE was just a
the 'true' defined by stdbool.h, that idiom provokes a warning from
gcc: 'suggest parentheses around assignment used as truth value'!
2018-11-02 19:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
bool free_macdata;
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (old_fmt) {
|
|
|
|
/* MAC (or hash) only covers the private blob. */
|
|
|
|
macdata = private_blob;
|
|
|
|
free_macdata = false;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2019-03-01 19:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
macdata = strbuf_new_nm();
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
put_stringz(macdata, alg->ssh_id);
|
|
|
|
put_stringz(macdata, encryption);
|
|
|
|
put_stringz(macdata, comment);
|
|
|
|
put_string(macdata, public_blob->s,
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
public_blob->len);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
put_string(macdata, private_blob->s,
|
2018-05-24 12:11:56 +00:00
|
|
|
private_blob->len);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
free_macdata = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (is_mac) {
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_hash *hash;
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac *mac;
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char mackey[20];
|
|
|
|
char header[] = "putty-private-key-file-mac-key";
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
hash = ssh_hash_new(&ssh_sha1);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
put_data(hash, header, sizeof(header)-1);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher && passphrase)
|
|
|
|
put_data(hash, passphrase, passlen);
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash_final(hash, mackey);
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
mac = ssh2_mac_new(&ssh_hmac_sha1, NULL);
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_setkey(mac, make_ptrlen(mackey, 20));
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_start(mac);
|
|
|
|
put_data(mac, macdata->s, macdata->len);
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_genresult(mac, binary);
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_free(mac);
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
smemclr(mackey, sizeof(mackey));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
hash_simple(&ssh_sha1, ptrlen_from_strbuf(macdata), binary);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (free_macdata)
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(macdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
|
|
|
|
sprintf(realmac + 2 * i, "%02x", binary[i]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(mac, realmac)) {
|
|
|
|
/* An incorrect MAC is an unconditional Error if the key is
|
|
|
|
* unencrypted. Otherwise, it means Wrong Passphrase. */
|
|
|
|
if (cipher) {
|
|
|
|
error = "wrong passphrase";
|
|
|
|
ret = SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error = "MAC failed";
|
|
|
|
ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create and return the key.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-01-04 06:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = snew(ssh2_userkey);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
ret->comment = comment;
|
2021-02-20 16:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
comment = NULL;
|
2018-06-03 11:58:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ret->key = ssh_key_new_priv(
|
2018-10-13 15:30:59 +00:00
|
|
|
alg, ptrlen_from_strbuf(public_blob),
|
|
|
|
ptrlen_from_strbuf(private_blob));
|
2018-06-03 11:58:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ret->key) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(ret);
|
|
|
|
ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
error = "createkey failed";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-22 21:48:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-20 16:39:12 +00:00
|
|
|
error = NULL;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Error processing.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
if (comment)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (encryption)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(encryption);
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mac)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(mac);
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (public_blob)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf_free(public_blob);
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (private_blob)
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(private_blob);
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (errorstr)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*errorstr = error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh2_userkey *ppk_load_f(const Filename *filename, const char *passphrase,
|
|
|
|
const char **errorstr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_load_keyfile(filename, errorstr);
|
|
|
|
if (!lf)
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
*errorstr = "can't open file";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssh2_userkey *toret = ppk_load_s(BinarySource_UPCAST(lf),
|
|
|
|
passphrase, errorstr);
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool rfc4716_loadpub(BinarySource *src, char **algorithm,
|
|
|
|
BinarySink *bs,
|
|
|
|
char **commentptr, const char **errorstr)
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *error;
|
|
|
|
char *line, *colon, *value;
|
|
|
|
char *comment = NULL;
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *pubblob = NULL;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
char base64in[4];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char base64out[3];
|
|
|
|
int base64bytes;
|
|
|
|
int alglen;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
line = mkstr(get_chomped_line(src));
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!line || 0 != strcmp(line, "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----")) {
|
|
|
|
error = "invalid begin line in SSH-2 public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sfree(line); line = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
line = mkstr(get_chomped_line(src));
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!line) {
|
|
|
|
error = "truncated SSH-2 public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
colon = strstr(line, ": ");
|
|
|
|
if (!colon)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
*colon = '\0';
|
|
|
|
value = colon + 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(line, "Comment")) {
|
|
|
|
char *p, *q;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Remove containing double quotes, if present */
|
|
|
|
p = value;
|
|
|
|
if (*p == '"' && p[strlen(p)-1] == '"') {
|
|
|
|
p[strlen(p)-1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Remove \-escaping, not in RFC4716 but seen in the wild
|
|
|
|
* in practice. */
|
|
|
|
for (q = line; *p; p++) {
|
|
|
|
if (*p == '\\' && p[1])
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
*q++ = *p;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*q = '\0';
|
2017-02-14 20:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(comment); /* *just* in case of multiple Comment headers */
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
comment = dupstr(line);
|
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(line, "Subject") ||
|
|
|
|
!strncmp(line, "x-", 2)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Headers we recognise and ignore. Do nothing. */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
error = "unrecognised header in SSH-2 public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sfree(line); line = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now line contains the initial line of base64 data. Loop round
|
|
|
|
* while it still does contain base64.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
pubblob = strbuf_new();
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
base64bytes = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (line && line[0] != '-') {
|
|
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
for (p = line; *p; p++) {
|
|
|
|
base64in[base64bytes++] = *p;
|
|
|
|
if (base64bytes == 4) {
|
|
|
|
int n = base64_decode_atom(base64in, base64out);
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
put_data(pubblob, base64out, n);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
base64bytes = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sfree(line); line = NULL;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
line = mkstr(get_chomped_line(src));
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Finally, check the END line makes sense.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!line || 0 != strcmp(line, "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----")) {
|
|
|
|
error = "invalid end line in SSH-2 public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sfree(line); line = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* OK, we now have a public blob and optionally a comment. We must
|
|
|
|
* return the key algorithm string too, so look for that at the
|
|
|
|
* start of the public blob.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pubblob->len < 4) {
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
error = "not enough data in SSH-2 public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
alglen = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(pubblob->u));
|
|
|
|
if (alglen < 0 || alglen > pubblob->len-4) {
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
error = "invalid algorithm prefix in SSH-2 public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (algorithm)
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
*algorithm = dupprintf("%.*s", alglen, pubblob->s+4);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
|
|
|
*commentptr = comment;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
put_datapl(bs, ptrlen_from_strbuf(pubblob));
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(pubblob);
|
2018-10-29 19:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
2019-02-11 06:58:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pubblob)
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(pubblob);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (errorstr)
|
|
|
|
*errorstr = error;
|
2018-10-29 19:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool openssh_loadpub(BinarySource *src, char **algorithm,
|
|
|
|
BinarySink *bs,
|
|
|
|
char **commentptr, const char **errorstr)
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *error;
|
|
|
|
char *line, *base64;
|
|
|
|
char *comment = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *pubblob = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int pubbloblen, pubblobsize;
|
|
|
|
int alglen;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
line = mkstr(get_chomped_line(src));
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
base64 = strchr(line, ' ');
|
|
|
|
if (!base64) {
|
|
|
|
error = "no key blob in OpenSSH public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*base64++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
comment = strchr(base64, ' ');
|
|
|
|
if (comment) {
|
|
|
|
*comment++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
comment = dupstr(comment);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pubblobsize = strlen(base64) / 4 * 3;
|
|
|
|
pubblob = snewn(pubblobsize, unsigned char);
|
|
|
|
pubbloblen = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (!memchr(base64, '\0', 4)) {
|
|
|
|
assert(pubbloblen + 3 <= pubblobsize);
|
|
|
|
pubbloblen += base64_decode_atom(base64, pubblob + pubbloblen);
|
|
|
|
base64 += 4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*base64) {
|
|
|
|
error = "invalid length for base64 data in OpenSSH public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Sanity check: the first word on the line should be the key
|
|
|
|
* algorithm, and should match the encoded string at the start of
|
|
|
|
* the public blob.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
alglen = strlen(line);
|
|
|
|
if (pubbloblen < alglen + 4 ||
|
2019-02-04 07:39:03 +00:00
|
|
|
GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(pubblob) != alglen ||
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
0 != memcmp(pubblob + 4, line, alglen)) {
|
|
|
|
error = "key algorithms do not match in OpenSSH public key file";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Done.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (algorithm)
|
|
|
|
*algorithm = dupstr(line);
|
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
|
|
|
*commentptr = comment;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
2017-01-23 18:10:40 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
put_data(bs, pubblob, pubbloblen);
|
|
|
|
sfree(pubblob);
|
2018-10-29 19:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
sfree(line);
|
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
|
|
|
sfree(pubblob);
|
|
|
|
if (errorstr)
|
|
|
|
*errorstr = error;
|
2018-10-29 19:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ppk_loadpub_s(BinarySource *src, char **algorithm, BinarySink *bs,
|
2020-01-05 10:28:45 +00:00
|
|
|
char **commentptr, const char **errorstr)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
char header[40], *b;
|
Invent a struct type for polymorphic SSH key data.
During last week's work, I made a mistake in which I got the arguments
backwards in one of the key-blob-generating functions - mistakenly
swapped the 'void *' key instance with the 'BinarySink *' output
destination - and I didn't spot the mistake until run time, because in
C you can implicitly convert both to and from void * and so there was
no compile-time failure of type checking.
Now that I've introduced the FROMFIELD macro that downcasts a pointer
to one field of a structure to retrieve a pointer to the whole
structure, I think I might start using that more widely to indicate
this kind of polymorphic subtyping. So now all the public-key
functions in the struct ssh_signkey vtable handle their data instance
in the form of a pointer to a subfield of a new zero-sized structure
type 'ssh_key', which outside the key implementations indicates 'this
is some kind of key instance but it could be of any type'; they
downcast that pointer internally using FROMFIELD in place of the
previous ordinary C cast, and return one by returning &foo->sshk for
whatever foo they've just made up.
The sshk member is not at the beginning of the structure, which means
all those FROMFIELDs and &key->sshk are actually adding and
subtracting an offset. Of course I could have put the member at the
start anyway, but I had the idea that it's actually a feature _not_ to
have the two types start at the same address, because it means you
should notice earlier rather than later if you absentmindedly cast
from one to the other directly rather than by the approved method (in
particular, if you accidentally assign one through a void * and back
without even _noticing_ you perpetrated a cast). In particular, this
enforces that you can't sfree() the thing even once without realising
you should instead of called the right freekey function. (I found
several bugs by this method during initial testing, so I think it's
already proved its worth!)
While I'm here, I've also renamed the vtable structure ssh_signkey to
ssh_keyalg, because it was a confusing name anyway - it describes the
_algorithm_ for handling all keys of that type, not a specific key. So
ssh_keyalg is the collection of code, and ssh_key is one instance of
the data it handles.
2018-05-27 07:32:21 +00:00
|
|
|
const ssh_keyalg *alg;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
int type, i;
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *error = NULL;
|
2015-04-26 09:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
char *comment = NULL;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Initially, check if this is a public-only key file. Sometimes
|
|
|
|
* we'll be asked to read a public blob from one of those. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
type = key_type_s(src);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (type == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ret = rfc4716_loadpub(src, algorithm, bs, commentptr, errorstr);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} else if (type == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH) {
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ret = openssh_loadpub(src, algorithm, bs, commentptr, errorstr);
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} else if (type != SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2) {
|
|
|
|
error = "not a PuTTY SSH-2 private key";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Read the first header line which contains the key type. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|| (0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2") &&
|
|
|
|
0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-1"))) {
|
2013-02-22 21:39:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (0 == strncmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-", 20))
|
|
|
|
error = "PuTTY key format too new";
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
error = "not a PuTTY SSH-2 private key";
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = "file format error";
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-03-02 00:31:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Select key algorithm structure. */
|
2004-01-22 19:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
alg = find_pubkey_alg(b);
|
2015-04-26 09:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
2004-01-22 19:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!alg) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Read the Encryption header line. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Encryption"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
sfree(b); /* we don't care */
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the Comment header line. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Comment"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((comment = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-10-30 13:42:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*commentptr = comment;
|
2005-10-30 13:42:36 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the Public-Lines header line and the public blob. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Public-Lines"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
i = userkey_parse_line_counter(b);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
2019-01-19 07:40:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_blob(src, i, bs))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-12-30 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (algorithm)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*algorithm = dupstr(alg->ssh_id);
|
2018-10-29 19:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Error processing.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2003-08-29 22:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (errorstr)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*errorstr = error;
|
2015-04-26 09:49:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (comment && commentptr) {
|
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
|
|
|
*commentptr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-29 19:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ppk_loadpub_f(const Filename *filename, char **algorithm, BinarySink *bs,
|
|
|
|
char **commentptr, const char **errorstr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_load_keyfile(filename, errorstr);
|
|
|
|
if (!lf)
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool toret = ppk_loadpub_s(BinarySource_UPCAST(lf), algorithm, bs,
|
|
|
|
commentptr, errorstr);
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool ppk_encrypted_s(BinarySource *src, char **commentptr)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
char header[40], *b, *comment;
|
Convert a lot of 'int' variables to 'bool'.
My normal habit these days, in new code, is to treat int and bool as
_almost_ completely separate types. I'm still willing to use C's
implicit test for zero on an integer (e.g. 'if (!blob.len)' is fine,
no need to spell it out as blob.len != 0), but generally, if a
variable is going to be conceptually a boolean, I like to declare it
bool and assign to it using 'true' or 'false' rather than 0 or 1.
PuTTY is an exception, because it predates the C99 bool, and I've
stuck to its existing coding style even when adding new code to it.
But it's been annoying me more and more, so now that I've decided C99
bool is an acceptable thing to require from our toolchain in the first
place, here's a quite thorough trawl through the source doing
'boolification'. Many variables and function parameters are now typed
as bool rather than int; many assignments of 0 or 1 to those variables
are now spelled 'true' or 'false'.
I managed this thorough conversion with the help of a custom clang
plugin that I wrote to trawl the AST and apply heuristics to point out
where things might want changing. So I've even managed to do a decent
job on parts of the code I haven't looked at in years!
To make the plugin's work easier, I pushed platform front ends
generally in the direction of using standard 'bool' in preference to
platform-specific boolean types like Windows BOOL or GTK's gboolean;
I've left the platform booleans in places they _have_ to be for the
platform APIs to work right, but variables only used by my own code
have been converted wherever I found them.
In a few places there are int values that look very like booleans in
_most_ of the places they're used, but have a rarely-used third value,
or a distinction between different nonzero values that most users
don't care about. In these cases, I've _removed_ uses of 'true' and
'false' for the return values, to emphasise that there's something
more subtle going on than a simple boolean answer:
- the 'multisel' field in dialog.h's list box structure, for which
the GTK front end in particular recognises a difference between 1
and 2 but nearly everything else treats as boolean
- the 'urgent' parameter to plug_receive, where 1 vs 2 tells you
something about the specific location of the urgent pointer, but
most clients only care about 0 vs 'something nonzero'
- the return value of wc_match, where -1 indicates a syntax error in
the wildcard.
- the return values from SSH-1 RSA-key loading functions, which use
-1 for 'wrong passphrase' and 0 for all other failures (so any
caller which already knows it's not loading an _encrypted private_
key can treat them as boolean)
- term->esc_query, and the 'query' parameter in toggle_mode in
terminal.c, which _usually_ hold 0 for ESC[123h or 1 for ESC[?123h,
but can also hold -1 for some other intervening character that we
don't support.
In a few places there's an integer that I haven't turned into a bool
even though it really _can_ only take values 0 or 1 (and, as above,
tried to make the call sites consistent in not calling those values
true and false), on the grounds that I thought it would make it more
confusing to imply that the 0 value was in some sense 'negative' or
bad and the 1 positive or good:
- the return value of plug_accepting uses the POSIXish convention of
0=success and nonzero=error; I think if I made it bool then I'd
also want to reverse its sense, and that's a job for a separate
piece of work.
- the 'screen' parameter to lineptr() in terminal.c, where 0 and 1
represent the default and alternate screens. There's no obvious
reason why one of those should be considered 'true' or 'positive'
or 'success' - they're just indices - so I've left it as int.
ssh_scp_recv had particularly confusing semantics for its previous int
return value: its call sites used '<= 0' to check for error, but it
never actually returned a negative number, just 0 or 1. Now the
function and its call sites agree that it's a bool.
In a couple of places I've renamed variables called 'ret', because I
don't like that name any more - it's unclear whether it means the
return value (in preparation) for the _containing_ function or the
return value received from a subroutine call, and occasionally I've
accidentally used the same variable for both and introduced a bug. So
where one of those got in my way, I've renamed it to 'toret' or 'retd'
(the latter short for 'returned') in line with my usual modern
practice, but I haven't done a thorough job of finding all of them.
Finally, one amusing side effect of doing this is that I've had to
separate quite a few chained assignments. It used to be perfectly fine
to write 'a = b = c = TRUE' when a,b,c were int and TRUE was just a
the 'true' defined by stdbool.h, that idiom provokes a warning from
gcc: 'suggest parentheses around assignment used as truth value'!
2018-11-02 19:23:19 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ret;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*commentptr = NULL;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|| (0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2") &&
|
|
|
|
0 != strcmp(header, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-1"))) {
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b); /* we don't care about key type here */
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Read the Encryption header line. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Encryption")) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((b = read_body(src)) == NULL) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the Comment header line. */
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!read_header(src, header) || 0 != strcmp(header, "Comment")) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((comment = read_body(src)) == NULL) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*commentptr = comment;
|
2013-07-14 10:46:07 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sfree(comment);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(b, "aes256-cbc"))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = true;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = false;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(b);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ppk_encrypted_f(const Filename *filename, char **commentptr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_load_keyfile(filename, NULL);
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!lf) {
|
|
|
|
if (commentptr)
|
|
|
|
*commentptr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool toret = ppk_encrypted_s(BinarySource_UPCAST(lf), commentptr);
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
int base64_lines(int datalen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* When encoding, we use 64 chars/line, which equals 48 real chars. */
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
return (datalen + 47) / 48;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static void base64_encode_s(BinarySink *bs, const unsigned char *data,
|
|
|
|
int datalen, int cpl)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int linelen = 0;
|
|
|
|
char out[4];
|
2002-05-15 19:16:45 +00:00
|
|
|
int n, i;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (datalen > 0) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
n = (datalen < 3 ? datalen : 3);
|
|
|
|
base64_encode_atom(data, n, out);
|
|
|
|
data += n;
|
|
|
|
datalen -= n;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (linelen >= cpl) {
|
|
|
|
linelen = 0;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
put_byte(bs, '\n');
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
put_byte(bs, out[i]);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
linelen++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
put_byte(bs, '\n');
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void base64_encode(FILE *fp, const unsigned char *data, int datalen, int cpl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
stdio_sink ss;
|
|
|
|
stdio_sink_init(&ss, fp);
|
|
|
|
base64_encode_s(BinarySink_UPCAST(&ss), data, datalen, cpl);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *ppk_save_sb(ssh2_userkey *key, const char *passphrase)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *pub_blob, *priv_blob;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *priv_blob_encrypted;
|
|
|
|
int priv_encrypted_len;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int cipherblk;
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2015-05-15 10:15:42 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *cipherstr;
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char priv_mac[20];
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch the key component blobs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
pub_blob = strbuf_new();
|
2018-06-03 11:58:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_key_public_blob(key->key, BinarySink_UPCAST(pub_blob));
|
2019-03-01 19:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
priv_blob = strbuf_new_nm();
|
2018-06-03 11:58:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_key_private_blob(key->key, BinarySink_UPCAST(priv_blob));
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine encryption details, and encrypt the private blob.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (passphrase) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
cipherstr = "aes256-cbc";
|
|
|
|
cipherblk = 16;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
cipherstr = "none";
|
|
|
|
cipherblk = 1;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
priv_encrypted_len = priv_blob->len + cipherblk - 1;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
priv_encrypted_len -= priv_encrypted_len % cipherblk;
|
2003-03-29 16:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
priv_blob_encrypted = snewn(priv_encrypted_len, unsigned char);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(priv_blob_encrypted, 0, priv_encrypted_len);
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(priv_blob_encrypted, priv_blob->u, priv_blob->len);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Create padding based on the SHA hash of the unpadded blob. This prevents
|
|
|
|
* too easy a known-plaintext attack on the last block. */
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
hash_simple(&ssh_sha1, ptrlen_from_strbuf(priv_blob), priv_mac);
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
assert(priv_encrypted_len - priv_blob->len < 20);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(priv_blob_encrypted + priv_blob->len, priv_mac,
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
priv_encrypted_len - priv_blob->len);
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Now create the MAC. */
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *macdata;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char mackey[20];
|
|
|
|
char header[] = "putty-private-key-file-mac-key";
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
macdata = strbuf_new_nm();
|
|
|
|
put_stringz(macdata, ssh_key_ssh_id(key->key));
|
|
|
|
put_stringz(macdata, cipherstr);
|
|
|
|
put_stringz(macdata, key->comment);
|
|
|
|
put_string(macdata, pub_blob->s, pub_blob->len);
|
|
|
|
put_string(macdata, priv_blob_encrypted, priv_encrypted_len);
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_hash *h = ssh_hash_new(&ssh_sha1);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
put_data(h, header, sizeof(header)-1);
|
|
|
|
if (passphrase)
|
|
|
|
put_data(h, passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash_final(h, mackey);
|
|
|
|
mac_simple(&ssh_hmac_sha1, make_ptrlen(mackey, 20),
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptrlen_from_strbuf(macdata), priv_mac);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf_free(macdata);
|
|
|
|
smemclr(mackey, sizeof(mackey));
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (passphrase) {
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned char key[40];
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-20 16:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh2_ppk_derivekey(ptrlen_from_asciz(passphrase), key);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
aes256_encrypt_pubkey(key, priv_blob_encrypted, priv_encrypted_len);
|
2001-09-22 20:52:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
smemclr(key, sizeof(key));
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *out = strbuf_new_nm();
|
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "PuTTY-User-Key-File-2: %s\n", ssh_key_ssh_id(key->key));
|
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "Encryption: %s\n", cipherstr);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "Comment: %s\n", key->comment);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "Public-Lines: %d\n", base64_lines(pub_blob->len));
|
|
|
|
base64_encode_s(BinarySink_UPCAST(out), pub_blob->u, pub_blob->len, 64);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "Private-Lines: %d\n", base64_lines(priv_encrypted_len));
|
|
|
|
base64_encode_s(BinarySink_UPCAST(out),
|
|
|
|
priv_blob_encrypted, priv_encrypted_len, 64);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "Private-MAC: ");
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "%02x", priv_mac[i]);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_catf(out, "\n");
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf_free(pub_blob);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(priv_blob);
|
|
|
|
smemclr(priv_blob_encrypted, priv_encrypted_len);
|
2001-11-25 14:31:46 +00:00
|
|
|
sfree(priv_blob_encrypted);
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool ppk_save_f(const Filename *filename, ssh2_userkey *key,
|
|
|
|
const char *passphrase)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FILE *fp = f_open(filename, "wb", true);
|
|
|
|
if (!fp)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strbuf *buf = ppk_save_sb(key, passphrase);
|
|
|
|
bool toret = fwrite(buf->s, 1, buf->len, fp) == buf->len;
|
|
|
|
if (fclose(fp))
|
|
|
|
toret = false;
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(buf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
* Output public keys.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-01-04 06:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
char *ssh1_pubkey_str(RSAKey *key)
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *buffer;
|
|
|
|
char *dec1, *dec2;
|
|
|
|
|
Complete rewrite of PuTTY's bignum library.
The old 'Bignum' data type is gone completely, and so is sshbn.c. In
its place is a new thing called 'mp_int', handled by an entirely new
library module mpint.c, with API differences both large and small.
The main aim of this change is that the new library should be free of
timing- and cache-related side channels. I've written the code so that
it _should_ - assuming I haven't made any mistakes - do all of its
work without either control flow or memory addressing depending on the
data words of the input numbers. (Though, being an _arbitrary_
precision library, it does have to at least depend on the sizes of the
numbers - but there's a 'formal' size that can vary separately from
the actual magnitude of the represented integer, so if you want to
keep it secret that your number is actually small, it should work fine
to have a very long mp_int and just happen to store 23 in it.) So I've
done all my conditionalisation by means of computing both answers and
doing bit-masking to swap the right one into place, and all loops over
the words of an mp_int go up to the formal size rather than the actual
size.
I haven't actually tested the constant-time property in any rigorous
way yet (I'm still considering the best way to do it). But this code
is surely at the very least a big improvement on the old version, even
if I later find a few more things to fix.
I've also completely rewritten the low-level elliptic curve arithmetic
from sshecc.c; the new ecc.c is closer to being an adjunct of mpint.c
than it is to the SSH end of the code. The new elliptic curve code
keeps all coordinates in Montgomery-multiplication transformed form to
speed up all the multiplications mod the same prime, and only converts
them back when you ask for the affine coordinates. Also, I adopted
extended coordinates for the Edwards curve implementation.
sshecc.c has also had a near-total rewrite in the course of switching
it over to the new system. While I was there, I've separated ECDSA and
EdDSA more completely - they now have separate vtables, instead of a
single vtable in which nearly every function had a big if statement in
it - and also made the externally exposed types for an ECDSA key and
an ECDH context different.
A minor new feature: since the new arithmetic code includes a modular
square root function, we can now support the compressed point
representation for the NIST curves. We seem to have been getting along
fine without that so far, but it seemed a shame not to put it in,
since it was suddenly easy.
In sshrsa.c, one major change is that I've removed the RSA blinding
step in rsa_privkey_op, in which we randomise the ciphertext before
doing the decryption. The purpose of that was to avoid timing leaks
giving away the plaintext - but the new arithmetic code should take
that in its stride in the course of also being careful enough to avoid
leaking the _private key_, which RSA blinding had no way to do
anything about in any case.
Apart from those specific points, most of the rest of the changes are
more or less mechanical, just changing type names and translating code
into the new API.
2018-12-31 13:53:41 +00:00
|
|
|
dec1 = mp_get_decimal(key->exponent);
|
|
|
|
dec2 = mp_get_decimal(key->modulus);
|
2020-01-26 10:59:07 +00:00
|
|
|
buffer = dupprintf("%"SIZEu" %s %s%s%s", mp_get_nbits(key->modulus),
|
|
|
|
dec1, dec2, key->comment ? " " : "",
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
key->comment ? key->comment : "");
|
|
|
|
sfree(dec1);
|
|
|
|
sfree(dec2);
|
|
|
|
return buffer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-04 06:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssh1_write_pubkey(FILE *fp, RSAKey *key)
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *buffer = ssh1_pubkey_str(key);
|
|
|
|
fprintf(fp, "%s\n", buffer);
|
|
|
|
sfree(buffer);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char *ssh2_pubkey_openssh_str_internal(const char *comment,
|
|
|
|
const void *v_pub_blob,
|
|
|
|
int pub_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *ssh2blob = (const unsigned char *)v_pub_blob;
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ptrlen alg;
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
char *buffer, *p;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BinarySource src[1];
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_BARE_INIT(src, ssh2blob, pub_len);
|
|
|
|
alg = get_string(src);
|
|
|
|
if (get_err(src)) {
|
|
|
|
const char *replacement_str = "INVALID-ALGORITHM";
|
|
|
|
alg.ptr = replacement_str;
|
|
|
|
alg.len = strlen(replacement_str);
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
buffer = snewn(alg.len +
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
4 * ((pub_len+2) / 3) +
|
|
|
|
(comment ? strlen(comment) : 0) + 3, char);
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
p = buffer + sprintf(buffer, "%.*s ", PTRLEN_PRINTF(alg));
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (i < pub_len) {
|
|
|
|
int n = (pub_len - i < 3 ? pub_len - i : 3);
|
|
|
|
base64_encode_atom(ssh2blob + i, n, p);
|
|
|
|
i += n;
|
|
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-25 13:06:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (comment) {
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
*p++ = ' ';
|
|
|
|
strcpy(p, comment);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return buffer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-04 06:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
char *ssh2_pubkey_openssh_str(ssh2_userkey *key)
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *blob;
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
char *ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
blob = strbuf_new();
|
2018-06-03 11:58:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_key_public_blob(key->key, BinarySink_UPCAST(blob));
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = ssh2_pubkey_openssh_str_internal(
|
|
|
|
key->comment, blob->s, blob->len);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(blob);
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ssh2_write_pubkey(FILE *fp, const char *comment,
|
|
|
|
const void *v_pub_blob, int pub_len,
|
|
|
|
int keytype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *pub_blob = (unsigned char *)v_pub_blob;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716) {
|
|
|
|
const char *p;
|
|
|
|
int i, column;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(fp, "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (comment) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(fp, "Comment: \"");
|
|
|
|
for (p = comment; *p; p++) {
|
|
|
|
if (*p == '\\' || *p == '\"')
|
|
|
|
fputc('\\', fp);
|
|
|
|
fputc(*p, fp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fprintf(fp, "\"\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
|
|
column = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (i < pub_len) {
|
|
|
|
char buf[5];
|
|
|
|
int n = (pub_len - i < 3 ? pub_len - i : 3);
|
|
|
|
base64_encode_atom(pub_blob + i, n, buf);
|
|
|
|
i += n;
|
|
|
|
buf[4] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
fputs(buf, fp);
|
|
|
|
if (++column >= 16) {
|
|
|
|
fputc('\n', fp);
|
|
|
|
column = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (column > 0)
|
|
|
|
fputc('\n', fp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(fp, "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n");
|
|
|
|
} else if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH) {
|
|
|
|
char *buffer = ssh2_pubkey_openssh_str_internal(comment,
|
|
|
|
v_pub_blob, pub_len);
|
|
|
|
fprintf(fp, "%s\n", buffer);
|
|
|
|
sfree(buffer);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2019-01-03 08:12:19 +00:00
|
|
|
unreachable("Bad key type in ssh2_write_pubkey");
|
2015-05-12 12:42:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
* Utility functions to compute SSH-2 fingerprints in a uniform way.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-06 20:48:03 +00:00
|
|
|
char *ssh2_fingerprint_blob(ptrlen blob)
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char digest[16];
|
|
|
|
char fingerprint_str[16*3];
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ptrlen algname;
|
Invent a struct type for polymorphic SSH key data.
During last week's work, I made a mistake in which I got the arguments
backwards in one of the key-blob-generating functions - mistakenly
swapped the 'void *' key instance with the 'BinarySink *' output
destination - and I didn't spot the mistake until run time, because in
C you can implicitly convert both to and from void * and so there was
no compile-time failure of type checking.
Now that I've introduced the FROMFIELD macro that downcasts a pointer
to one field of a structure to retrieve a pointer to the whole
structure, I think I might start using that more widely to indicate
this kind of polymorphic subtyping. So now all the public-key
functions in the struct ssh_signkey vtable handle their data instance
in the form of a pointer to a subfield of a new zero-sized structure
type 'ssh_key', which outside the key implementations indicates 'this
is some kind of key instance but it could be of any type'; they
downcast that pointer internally using FROMFIELD in place of the
previous ordinary C cast, and return one by returning &foo->sshk for
whatever foo they've just made up.
The sshk member is not at the beginning of the structure, which means
all those FROMFIELDs and &key->sshk are actually adding and
subtracting an offset. Of course I could have put the member at the
start anyway, but I had the idea that it's actually a feature _not_ to
have the two types start at the same address, because it means you
should notice earlier rather than later if you absentmindedly cast
from one to the other directly rather than by the approved method (in
particular, if you accidentally assign one through a void * and back
without even _noticing_ you perpetrated a cast). In particular, this
enforces that you can't sfree() the thing even once without realising
you should instead of called the right freekey function. (I found
several bugs by this method during initial testing, so I think it's
already proved its worth!)
While I'm here, I've also renamed the vtable structure ssh_signkey to
ssh_keyalg, because it was a confusing name anyway - it describes the
_algorithm_ for handling all keys of that type, not a specific key. So
ssh_keyalg is the collection of code, and ssh_key is one instance of
the data it handles.
2018-05-27 07:32:21 +00:00
|
|
|
const ssh_keyalg *alg;
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
BinarySource src[1];
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The fingerprint hash itself is always just the MD5 of the blob.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-06 20:48:03 +00:00
|
|
|
hash_simple(&ssh_md5, blob, digest);
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
|
|
|
|
sprintf(fingerprint_str + i*3, "%02x%s", digest[i], i==15 ? "" : ":");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Identify the key algorithm, if possible.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-06 20:48:03 +00:00
|
|
|
BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(src, blob);
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
algname = get_string(src);
|
|
|
|
if (!get_err(src)) {
|
|
|
|
alg = find_pubkey_alg_len(algname);
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (alg) {
|
2019-02-06 20:48:03 +00:00
|
|
|
int bits = ssh_key_public_bits(alg, blob);
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
return dupprintf("%.*s %d %s", PTRLEN_PRINTF(algname),
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
bits, fingerprint_str);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-05-29 18:29:54 +00:00
|
|
|
return dupprintf("%.*s %s", PTRLEN_PRINTF(algname),
|
|
|
|
fingerprint_str);
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No algorithm available (which means a seriously confused
|
|
|
|
* key blob, but there we go). Return only the hash.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return dupstr(fingerprint_str);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-06-03 11:58:05 +00:00
|
|
|
char *ssh2_fingerprint(ssh_key *data)
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *blob = strbuf_new();
|
2018-06-03 11:58:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_key_public_blob(data, BinarySink_UPCAST(blob));
|
2019-02-06 20:48:03 +00:00
|
|
|
char *ret = ssh2_fingerprint_blob(ptrlen_from_strbuf(blob));
|
2018-05-24 09:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf_free(blob);
|
2015-05-12 13:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
* Determine the type of a private key file.
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static int key_type_s_internal(BinarySource *src)
|
2001-05-06 14:35:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static const ptrlen public_std_sig =
|
|
|
|
PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY");
|
|
|
|
static const ptrlen putty2_sig =
|
|
|
|
PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("PuTTY-User-Key-File-");
|
|
|
|
static const ptrlen sshcom_sig =
|
|
|
|
PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVAT");
|
|
|
|
static const ptrlen openssh_new_sig =
|
|
|
|
PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY");
|
|
|
|
static const ptrlen openssh_sig =
|
|
|
|
PTRLEN_DECL_LITERAL("-----BEGIN ");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BinarySource_REWIND(src), expect_signature(src, rsa1_signature))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (BinarySource_REWIND(src), expect_signature(src, public_std_sig))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (BinarySource_REWIND(src), expect_signature(src, putty2_sig))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (BinarySource_REWIND(src), expect_signature(src, openssh_new_sig))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH_NEW;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (BinarySource_REWIND(src), expect_signature(src, openssh_sig))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH_PEM;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (BinarySource_REWIND(src), expect_signature(src, sshcom_sig))
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSHCOM;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_REWIND(src);
|
|
|
|
if (get_chars(src, "0123456789").len > 0 && get_chars(src, " ").len == 1 &&
|
|
|
|
get_chars(src, "0123456789").len > 0 && get_chars(src, " ").len == 1 &&
|
|
|
|
get_chars(src, "0123456789").len > 0 &&
|
|
|
|
get_nonchars(src, " \n").len == 0)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1_PUBLIC;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_REWIND(src);
|
|
|
|
if (find_pubkey_alg_len(get_nonchars(src, " \n")) > 0 &&
|
|
|
|
get_chars(src, " ").len == 1 &&
|
|
|
|
get_chars(src, "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV"
|
|
|
|
"WXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz+/=").len > 0 &&
|
|
|
|
get_nonchars(src, " \n").len == 0)
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH;
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_UNKNOWN; /* unrecognised or EOF */
|
2002-05-11 12:13:42 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-02 11:41:06 +00:00
|
|
|
int key_type_s(BinarySource *src)
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int toret = key_type_s_internal(src);
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_REWIND(src);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int key_type(const Filename *filename)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LoadedFile *lf = lf_new(1024);
|
|
|
|
if (lf_load(lf, filename) == LF_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return SSH_KEYTYPE_UNOPENABLE;
|
2020-02-02 11:27:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-01-06 19:57:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int toret = key_type_s(BinarySource_UPCAST(lf));
|
|
|
|
lf_free(lf);
|
|
|
|
return toret;
|
2015-05-12 11:19:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-11 12:13:42 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert the type word to a string, for `wrong type' error
|
|
|
|
* messages.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-05-15 10:15:42 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *key_type_to_str(int type)
|
2002-05-11 12:13:42 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
2020-01-29 06:35:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_UNOPENABLE:
|
|
|
|
return "unable to open file";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_UNKNOWN:
|
|
|
|
return "not a recognised key file format";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1_PUBLIC:
|
|
|
|
return "SSH-1 public key";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716:
|
|
|
|
return "SSH-2 public key (RFC 4716 format)";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH:
|
|
|
|
return "SSH-2 public key (OpenSSH format)";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1:
|
|
|
|
return "SSH-1 private key";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2:
|
|
|
|
return "PuTTY SSH-2 private key";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH_PEM:
|
|
|
|
return "OpenSSH SSH-2 private key (old PEM format)";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH_NEW:
|
|
|
|
return "OpenSSH SSH-2 private key (new format)";
|
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_SSHCOM:
|
|
|
|
return "ssh.com SSH-2 private key";
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-10 06:42:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This function is called with a key type derived from
|
|
|
|
* looking at an actual key file, so the output-only type
|
|
|
|
* OPENSSH_AUTO should never get here, and is much an INTERNAL
|
|
|
|
* ERROR as a code we don't even understand.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-01-29 06:35:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSH_KEYTYPE_OPENSSH_AUTO:
|
|
|
|
unreachable("OPENSSH_AUTO should never reach key_type_to_str");
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
unreachable("bad key type in key_type_to_str");
|
2002-05-11 12:13:42 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-03-03 11:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
cmdgen: add a --dump option.
Also spelled '-O text', this takes a public or private key as input,
and produces on standard output a dump of all the actual numbers
involved in the key: the exponent and modulus for RSA, the p,q,g,y
parameters for DSA, the affine x and y coordinates of the public
elliptic curve point for ECC keys, and all the extra bits and pieces
in the private keys too.
Partly I expect this to be useful to me for debugging: I've had to
paste key files a few too many times through base64 decoders and hex
dump tools, then manually decode SSH marshalling and paste the result
into the Python REPL to get an integer object. Now I should be able to
get _straight_ to text I can paste into Python.
But also, it's a way that other applications can use the key
generator: if you need to generate, say, an RSA key in some format I
don't support (I've recently heard of an XML-based one, for example),
then you can run 'puttygen -t rsa --dump' and have it print the
elements of a freshly generated keypair on standard output, and then
all you have to do is understand the output format.
2020-02-17 19:53:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_components *key_components_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
key_components *kc = snew(key_components);
|
|
|
|
kc->ncomponents = 0;
|
|
|
|
kc->componentsize = 0;
|
|
|
|
kc->components = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return kc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void key_components_add_text(key_components *kc,
|
|
|
|
const char *name, const char *value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sgrowarray(kc->components, kc->componentsize, kc->ncomponents);
|
|
|
|
size_t n = kc->ncomponents++;
|
|
|
|
kc->components[n].name = dupstr(name);
|
|
|
|
kc->components[n].is_mp_int = false;
|
|
|
|
kc->components[n].text = dupstr(value);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void key_components_add_mp(key_components *kc,
|
|
|
|
const char *name, mp_int *value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sgrowarray(kc->components, kc->componentsize, kc->ncomponents);
|
|
|
|
size_t n = kc->ncomponents++;
|
|
|
|
kc->components[n].name = dupstr(name);
|
|
|
|
kc->components[n].is_mp_int = true;
|
|
|
|
kc->components[n].mp = mp_copy(value);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void key_components_free(key_components *kc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kc->ncomponents; i++) {
|
|
|
|
sfree(kc->components[i].name);
|
|
|
|
if (kc->components[i].is_mp_int) {
|
|
|
|
mp_free(kc->components[i].mp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
smemclr(kc->components[i].text, strlen(kc->components[i].text));
|
|
|
|
sfree(kc->components[i].text);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sfree(kc->components);
|
|
|
|
sfree(kc);
|
|
|
|
}
|