Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SOCKS 5 proxy negotiation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "putty.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "network.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "proxy.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "socks.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "sshcr.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline const char *socks5_auth_name(unsigned char m)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (m) {
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_AUTH_NONE: return "none";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_AUTH_GSSAPI: return "GSSAPI";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_AUTH_PASSWORD: return "password";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP: return "CHAP";
|
|
|
|
default: return "unknown";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline const char *socks5_response_text(unsigned char m)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (m) {
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_SUCCESS: return "success";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_FAILURE: return "unspecified failure";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_CONNECTION_NOT_ALLOWED_BY_RULESET:
|
|
|
|
return "connection not allowed by ruleset";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE: return "network unreachable";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_HOST_UNREACHABLE: return "host unreachable";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_CONNECTION_REFUSED: return "connection refused";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_TTL_EXPIRED: return "TTL expired";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED: return "command not supported";
|
|
|
|
case SOCKS5_RESP_ADDRTYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED:
|
|
|
|
return "address type not supported";
|
|
|
|
default: return "unknown";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct Socks5ProxyNegotiator {
|
|
|
|
int crLine;
|
|
|
|
strbuf *auth_methods_offered;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char auth_method;
|
|
|
|
unsigned n_chap_attrs;
|
|
|
|
unsigned chap_attr, chap_attr_len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char chap_buf[256];
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf *username, *password;
|
|
|
|
prompts_t *prompts;
|
|
|
|
int username_prompt_index, password_prompt_index;
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
int response_addr_length;
|
|
|
|
ProxyNegotiator pn;
|
|
|
|
} Socks5ProxyNegotiator;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ProxyNegotiator *proxy_socks5_new(const ProxyNegotiatorVT *vt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Socks5ProxyNegotiator *s = snew(Socks5ProxyNegotiator);
|
|
|
|
memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
|
|
|
|
s->pn.vt = vt;
|
|
|
|
s->auth_methods_offered = strbuf_new();
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
s->username = strbuf_new();
|
|
|
|
s->password = strbuf_new_nm();
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return &s->pn;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void proxy_socks5_free(ProxyNegotiator *pn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Socks5ProxyNegotiator *s = container_of(pn, Socks5ProxyNegotiator, pn);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(s->auth_methods_offered);
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
strbuf_free(s->username);
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(s->password);
|
|
|
|
if (s->prompts)
|
|
|
|
free_prompts(s->prompts);
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
smemclr(s, sizeof(s));
|
|
|
|
sfree(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void proxy_socks5_process_queue(ProxyNegotiator *pn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Socks5ProxyNegotiator *s = container_of(pn, Socks5ProxyNegotiator, pn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crBegin(s->crLine);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SOCKS 5 initial client packet:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte version
|
|
|
|
* byte number of available auth methods
|
|
|
|
* byte[] that many bytes indicating auth types
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_REQUEST_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strbuf_clear(s->auth_methods_offered);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have two basic kinds of authentication to offer: none at
|
|
|
|
* all, and password-based systems (whether the password is sent
|
|
|
|
* in cleartext or proved via CHAP).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We always offer 'none' as an option. We offer 'password' if we
|
|
|
|
* either have a username and password already from the Conf, or
|
|
|
|
* we have a Seat available to ask for them interactively. If
|
|
|
|
* neither, we don't offer those options in the first place.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
put_byte(s->auth_methods_offered, SOCKS5_AUTH_NONE);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
put_dataz(s->username, conf_get_str(pn->ps->conf, CONF_proxy_username));
|
|
|
|
put_dataz(s->password, conf_get_str(pn->ps->conf, CONF_proxy_password));
|
|
|
|
if (pn->itr || (s->username->len && s->password->len)) {
|
|
|
|
if (socks5_chap_available)
|
|
|
|
put_byte(s->auth_methods_offered, SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP);
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
put_byte(s->auth_methods_offered, SOCKS5_AUTH_PASSWORD);
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, s->auth_methods_offered->len);
|
|
|
|
put_datapl(pn->output, ptrlen_from_strbuf(s->auth_methods_offered));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SOCKS 5 initial server packet:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte version
|
|
|
|
* byte selected auth method, or SOCKS5_AUTH_REJECTED
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char data[2];
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(pn->input, data, 2));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[0] != SOCKS5_REPLY_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf("SOCKS proxy returned unexpected "
|
|
|
|
"reply version %d (expected %d)",
|
|
|
|
(int)data[0], SOCKS5_REPLY_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[1] == SOCKS5_AUTH_REJECTED) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupstr("SOCKS server rejected every authentication "
|
|
|
|
"method we offered");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool found = false;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < s->auth_methods_offered->len; i++)
|
|
|
|
if (s->auth_methods_offered->u[i] == data[1]) {
|
|
|
|
found = true;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!found) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf("SOCKS server asked for auth method %d "
|
|
|
|
"(%s), which we did not offer",
|
|
|
|
(int)data[1], socks5_auth_name(data[1]));
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->auth_method = data[1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* The 'none' auth option requires no further negotiation. If that
|
|
|
|
* was the one we selected, go straight to making the connection.
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->auth_method == SOCKS5_AUTH_NONE)
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
goto authenticated;
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, we're going to need a username and password, so this
|
|
|
|
* is the moment to stop and ask for one if we don't already have
|
|
|
|
* them.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pn->itr && (!s->username->len || !s->password->len)) {
|
|
|
|
s->prompts = proxy_new_prompts(pn->ps);
|
|
|
|
s->prompts->to_server = true;
|
|
|
|
s->prompts->from_server = false;
|
|
|
|
s->prompts->name = dupstr("SOCKS proxy authentication");
|
|
|
|
if (!s->username->len) {
|
|
|
|
s->username_prompt_index = s->prompts->n_prompts;
|
|
|
|
add_prompt(s->prompts, dupstr("Proxy username: "), true);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s->username_prompt_index = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->password->len) {
|
|
|
|
s->password_prompt_index = s->prompts->n_prompts;
|
|
|
|
add_prompt(s->prompts, dupstr("Proxy password: "), false);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s->password_prompt_index = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
|
|
int prompt_result = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
|
|
interactor_announce(pn->itr), s->prompts);
|
|
|
|
if (prompt_result > 0) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else if (prompt_result == 0) {
|
|
|
|
pn->aborted = true;
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->username_prompt_index != -1) {
|
|
|
|
strbuf_clear(s->username);
|
|
|
|
put_dataz(s->username,
|
|
|
|
prompt_get_result_ref(
|
|
|
|
s->prompts->prompts[s->username_prompt_index]));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->password_prompt_index != -1) {
|
|
|
|
strbuf_clear(s->password);
|
|
|
|
put_dataz(s->password,
|
|
|
|
prompt_get_result_ref(
|
|
|
|
s->prompts->prompts[s->password_prompt_index]));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free_prompts(s->prompts);
|
|
|
|
s->prompts = NULL;
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now process the different auth methods that will use that
|
|
|
|
* username and password. Note we can't do this using the natural
|
|
|
|
* idiom of a switch statement, because there are crReturns inside
|
|
|
|
* some cases.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s->auth_method == SOCKS5_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SOCKS 5 password auth packet:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte version
|
|
|
|
* pstring username
|
|
|
|
* pstring password
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_AUTH_PASSWORD_VERSION);
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!put_pstring(pn->output, s->username->s)) {
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
pn->error = dupstr("SOCKS 5 authentication cannot support "
|
|
|
|
"usernames longer than 255 chars");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!put_pstring(pn->output, s->password->s)) {
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
pn->error = dupstr("SOCKS 5 authentication cannot support "
|
|
|
|
"passwords longer than 255 chars");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SOCKS 5 password reply packet:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte version
|
|
|
|
* byte 0 for success, >0 for failure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char data[2];
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(pn->input, data, 2));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[0] != SOCKS5_AUTH_PASSWORD_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf(
|
|
|
|
"SOCKS 5 password reply had version number %d (expected "
|
|
|
|
"%d)", (int)data[0], SOCKS5_AUTH_PASSWORD_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[1] != 0) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupstr("SOCKS 5 server rejected our password");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (s->auth_method == SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP) {
|
|
|
|
assert(socks5_chap_available);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* All CHAP packets, in both directions, have the same
|
|
|
|
* overall format:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte version
|
|
|
|
* byte number of attributes
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* and then for each attribute:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte attribute type
|
|
|
|
* byte length
|
|
|
|
* byte[] that many bytes of payload
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In the initial outgoing packet we send two attributes:
|
|
|
|
* the list of supported algorithm names, and the
|
|
|
|
* username.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (It's possible that we ought to delay sending the
|
|
|
|
* username until the second packet, in case the proxy
|
|
|
|
* sent back an attribute indicating which character set
|
|
|
|
* it would like us to use.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, 2); /* number of attributes */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_ATTR_ALGLIST);
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, 1); /* string length */
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_ALG_HMACMD5);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Second attribute: username */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_ATTR_USERNAME);
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!put_pstring(pn->output, s->username->s)) {
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
pn->error = dupstr(
|
|
|
|
"SOCKS 5 CHAP authentication cannot support "
|
|
|
|
"usernames longer than 255 chars");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Process a CHAP response packet, which has the same
|
|
|
|
* overall format as the outgoing packet shown above.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned char data[2];
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(
|
|
|
|
pn->input, data, 2));
|
|
|
|
if (data[0] != SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf(
|
|
|
|
"SOCKS 5 CHAP reply had version number %d (expected "
|
|
|
|
"%d)", (int)data[0], SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->n_chap_attrs = data[1];
|
|
|
|
if (s->n_chap_attrs == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we receive a CHAP packet containing no
|
|
|
|
* attributes, then we have nothing we didn't have
|
|
|
|
* before, and can't make further progress.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf(
|
|
|
|
"SOCKS 5 CHAP reply sent no attributes");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (s->n_chap_attrs-- > 0) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char data[2];
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(
|
|
|
|
pn->input, data, 2));
|
|
|
|
s->chap_attr = data[0];
|
|
|
|
s->chap_attr_len = data[1];
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(
|
|
|
|
pn->input, s->chap_buf, s->chap_attr_len));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->chap_attr == SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_ATTR_STATUS) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->chap_attr_len == 1 && s->chap_buf[0] == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Status 0 means success: we are authenticated! */
|
|
|
|
goto authenticated;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupstr(
|
|
|
|
"SOCKS 5 CHAP authentication failed");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (s->chap_attr==SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_ATTR_CHALLENGE) {
|
|
|
|
/* The CHAP challenge string. Send the response */
|
|
|
|
strbuf *response = chap_response(
|
|
|
|
make_ptrlen(s->chap_buf, s->chap_attr_len),
|
2021-11-19 14:33:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ptrlen_from_strbuf(s->password));
|
Reorganise proxy system into coroutines.
Previously, the proxy negotiation functions were written as explicit
state machines, with ps->state being manually set to a sequence of
positive integer values which would be tested by if statements in the
next call to the same negotiation function.
That's not how this code base likes to do things! We have a coroutine
system to allow those state machines to be implicit rather than
explicit, so that we can use ordinary control flow statements like
while loops. Reorganised each proxy negotiation function into a
coroutine-based system like that.
While I'm at it, I've also moved each proxy negotiator out into its
own source file, to make proxy.c less overcrowded and monolithic. And
_that_ gave me the opportunity to define each negotiator as an
implementation of a trait rather than as a single function - which
means now each one can define its own local variables and have its own
cleanup function, instead of all of them having to share the variables
inside the main ProxySocket struct.
In the new coroutine system, negotiators don't have to worry about the
mechanics of actually sending data down the underlying Socket any
more. The negotiator coroutine just appends to a bufchain (via a
provided bufchain_sink), and after every call to the coroutine,
central code in proxy.c transfers the data to the Socket itself. This
avoids a lot of intermediate allocations within the negotiators, which
previously kept having to make temporary strbufs or arrays in order to
have something to point an sk_write() at; now they can just put
formatted data directly into the output bufchain via the marshal.h
interface.
In this version of the code, I've also moved most of the SOCKS5 CHAP
implementation from cproxy.c into socks5.c, so that it can sit in the
same coroutine as the rest of the proxy negotiation control flow.
That's because calling a sub-coroutine (co-subroutine?) is awkward to
set up (though it is _possible_ - we do SSH-2 kex that way), and
there's no real need to bother in this case, since the only thing that
really needs to go in cproxy.c is the actual cryptography plus a flag
to tell socks5.c whether to offer CHAP authentication in the first
place.
2021-11-19 10:26:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, 1); /* number of attributes */
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_AUTH_CHAP_ATTR_RESPONSE);
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, response->len);
|
|
|
|
put_datapl(pn->output, ptrlen_from_strbuf(response));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(response);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* ignore all other attributes */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
unreachable("bad auth method in SOCKS 5 negotiation");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authenticated:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SOCKS 5 connection command:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte version
|
|
|
|
* byte command
|
|
|
|
* byte reserved (send as zero)
|
|
|
|
* byte address type
|
|
|
|
* byte[] address, with variable size (see below)
|
|
|
|
* uint16 port
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_REPLY_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS_CMD_CONNECT);
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, 0); /* reserved byte */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (sk_addrtype(pn->ps->remote_addr)) {
|
|
|
|
case ADDRTYPE_IPV4: {
|
|
|
|
/* IPv4: address is 4 raw bytes */
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_ADDR_IPV4);
|
|
|
|
char buf[4];
|
|
|
|
sk_addrcopy(pn->ps->remote_addr, buf);
|
|
|
|
put_data(pn->output, buf, sizeof(buf));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case ADDRTYPE_IPV6: {
|
|
|
|
/* IPv6: address is 16 raw bytes */
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_ADDR_IPV6);
|
|
|
|
char buf[16];
|
|
|
|
sk_addrcopy(pn->ps->remote_addr, buf);
|
|
|
|
put_data(pn->output, buf, sizeof(buf));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case ADDRTYPE_NAME: {
|
|
|
|
/* Hostname: address is a pstring (Pascal-style string,
|
|
|
|
* unterminated but with a one-byte prefix length) */
|
|
|
|
put_byte(pn->output, SOCKS5_ADDR_HOSTNAME);
|
|
|
|
char hostname[512];
|
|
|
|
sk_getaddr(pn->ps->remote_addr, hostname, lenof(hostname));
|
|
|
|
if (!put_pstring(pn->output, hostname)) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupstr(
|
|
|
|
"SOCKS 5 cannot support host names longer than 255 chars");
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
unreachable("Unexpected addrtype in SOCKS 5 proxy");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_uint16(pn->output, pn->ps->remote_port);
|
|
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SOCKS 5 connection response:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* byte version
|
|
|
|
* byte status
|
|
|
|
* byte reserved
|
|
|
|
* byte address type
|
|
|
|
* byte[] address bound to (same formats as in connection request)
|
|
|
|
* uint16 port
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We read the first four bytes and then decide what to do next.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char data[4];
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(pn->input, data, 4));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[0] != SOCKS5_REPLY_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf("SOCKS proxy returned unexpected "
|
|
|
|
"reply version %d (expected %d)",
|
|
|
|
(int)data[0], SOCKS5_REPLY_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[1] != SOCKS5_RESP_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf("SOCKS proxy failed to connect, error %d "
|
|
|
|
"(%s)", (int)data[1],
|
|
|
|
socks5_response_text(data[1]));
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Process each address type to find out the size of the rest
|
|
|
|
* of the packet. Note we can't do this using the natural
|
|
|
|
* idiom of a switch statement, because there are crReturns
|
|
|
|
* inside some cases.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (data[3] == SOCKS5_ADDR_IPV4) {
|
|
|
|
s->response_addr_length = 4;
|
|
|
|
} else if (data[3] == SOCKS5_ADDR_IPV6) {
|
|
|
|
s->response_addr_length = 16;
|
|
|
|
} else if (data[3] == SOCKS5_ADDR_HOSTNAME) {
|
|
|
|
/* Read the hostname length byte to find out how much to read */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char len;
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(pn->input, &len, 1));
|
|
|
|
s->response_addr_length = len;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pn->error = dupprintf("SOCKS proxy response included unknown "
|
|
|
|
"address type %d", (int)data[3]);
|
|
|
|
crStopV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read and ignore the address and port fields */
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_consume(
|
|
|
|
pn->input, s->response_addr_length + 2));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* And we're done! */
|
|
|
|
pn->done = true;
|
|
|
|
crFinishV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const struct ProxyNegotiatorVT socks5_proxy_negotiator_vt = {
|
|
|
|
.new = proxy_socks5_new,
|
|
|
|
.free = proxy_socks5_free,
|
|
|
|
.process_queue = proxy_socks5_process_queue,
|
|
|
|
.type = "SOCKS 5",
|
|
|
|
};
|