New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
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/*
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* testsc: run PuTTY's crypto primitives under instrumentation that
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* checks for cache and timing side channels.
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*
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* The idea is: cryptographic code should avoid leaking secret data
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* through timing information, or through traces of its activity left
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* in the caches.
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*
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* (This property is sometimes called 'constant-time', although really
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* that's a misnomer. It would be impossible to avoid the execution
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* time varying for any number of reasons outside the code's control,
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* such as the prior contents of caches and branch predictors,
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* temperature-based CPU throttling, system load, etc. And in any case
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* you don't _need_ the execution time to be literally constant: you
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* just need it to be independent of your secrets. It can vary as much
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* as it likes based on anything else.)
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*
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* To avoid this, you need to ensure that various aspects of the
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* code's behaviour do not depend on the secret data. The control
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* flow, for a start - no conditional branches based on secrets - and
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* also the memory access pattern (no using secret data as an index
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* into a lookup table). A couple of other kinds of CPU instruction
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* also can't be trusted to run in constant time: we check for
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* register-controlled shifts and hardware divisions. (But, again,
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* it's perfectly fine to _use_ those instructions in the course of
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* crypto code. You just can't use a secret as any time-affecting
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* operand.)
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*
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* This test program works by running the same crypto primitive
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* multiple times, with different secret input data. The relevant
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* details of each run is logged to a file via the DynamoRIO-based
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* instrumentation system living in the subdirectory test/sclog. Then
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* we check over all the files and ensure they're identical.
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*
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* This program itself (testsc) is built by the ordinary PuTTY
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* makefiles. But run by itself, it will do nothing useful: it needs
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* to be run under DynamoRIO, with the sclog instrumentation library.
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*
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* Here's an example of how I built it:
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*
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* Download the DynamoRIO source. I did this by cloning
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* https://github.com/DynamoRIO/dynamorio.git, and at the time of
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* writing this, 259c182a75ce80112bcad329c97ada8d56ba854d was the head
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* commit.
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*
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* In the DynamoRIO checkout:
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*
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* mkdir build
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* cd build
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* cmake -G Ninja ..
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* ninja
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*
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* Now set the shell variable DRBUILD to be the location of the build
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* directory you did that in. (Or not, if you prefer, but the example
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* build commands below will assume that that's where the DynamoRIO
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* libraries, headers and runtime can be found.)
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*
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* Then, in test/sclog:
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*
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* cmake -G Ninja -DCMAKE_PREFIX_PATH=$DRBUILD/cmake .
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* ninja
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*
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* Finally, to run the actual test, set SCTMP to some temp directory
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* you don't mind filling with large temp files (several GB at a
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* time), and in the main PuTTY source directory (assuming that's
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* where testsc has been built):
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*
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* $DRBUILD/bin64/drrun -c test/sclog/libsclog.so -- ./testsc -O $SCTMP
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include "defs.h"
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#include "putty.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "mpint.h"
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#include "ecc.h"
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static NORETURN void fatal_error(const char *p, ...)
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{
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va_list ap;
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fprintf(stderr, "testsc: ");
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va_start(ap, p);
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vfprintf(stderr, p, ap);
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va_end(ap);
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fputc('\n', stderr);
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exit(1);
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}
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void out_of_memory(void) { fatal_error("out of memory"); }
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/*
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* A simple deterministic PRNG, without any of the Fortuna
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* complexities, for generating test inputs in a way that's repeatable
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* between runs of the program, even if only a subset of test cases is
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* run.
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*/
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static uint64_t random_counter = 0;
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static const char *random_seedstr = NULL;
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static uint8_t random_buf[MAX_HASH_LEN];
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static size_t random_buf_limit = 0;
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2019-12-15 09:57:30 +00:00
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static ssh_hash *random_hash;
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
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static void random_seed(const char *seedstr)
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{
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random_seedstr = seedstr;
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random_counter = 0;
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random_buf_limit = 0;
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}
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void random_read(void *vbuf, size_t size)
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{
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assert(random_seedstr);
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uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *)vbuf;
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while (size-- > 0) {
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if (random_buf_limit == 0) {
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2019-12-15 09:57:30 +00:00
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ssh_hash_reset(random_hash);
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put_asciz(random_hash, random_seedstr);
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put_uint64(random_hash, random_counter);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
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random_counter++;
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2019-12-15 09:57:30 +00:00
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random_buf_limit = ssh_hash_alg(random_hash)->hlen;
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ssh_hash_digest(random_hash, random_buf);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
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}
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*buf++ = random_buf[random_buf_limit--];
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}
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}
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/*
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* Macro that defines a function, and also a volatile function pointer
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* pointing to it. Callers indirect through the function pointer
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* instead of directly calling the function, to ensure that the
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* compiler doesn't try to get clever by eliminating the call
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* completely, or inlining it.
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*
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* This is used to mark functions that DynamoRIO will look for to
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* intercept, and also to inhibit inlining and unrolling where they'd
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* cause a failure of experimental control in the main test.
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*/
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#define VOLATILE_WRAPPED_DEFN(qualifier, rettype, fn, params) \
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qualifier rettype fn##_real params; \
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qualifier rettype (*volatile fn) params = fn##_real; \
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qualifier rettype fn##_real params
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VOLATILE_WRAPPED_DEFN(, void, log_to_file, (const char *filename))
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{
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/*
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* This function is intercepted by the DynamoRIO side of the
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* mechanism. We use it to send instructions to the DR wrapper,
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* namely, 'please start logging to this file' or 'please stop
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* logging' (if filename == NULL). But we don't have to actually
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* do anything in _this_ program - all the functionality is in the
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* DR wrapper.
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*/
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}
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static const char *outdir = NULL;
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char *log_filename(const char *basename, size_t index)
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{
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return dupprintf("%s/%s.%04zu", outdir, basename, index);
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}
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static char *last_filename;
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static const char *test_basename;
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static size_t test_index = 0;
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void log_start(void)
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{
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last_filename = log_filename(test_basename, test_index++);
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log_to_file(last_filename);
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}
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void log_end(void)
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{
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log_to_file(NULL);
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sfree(last_filename);
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}
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static bool test_skipped = false;
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VOLATILE_WRAPPED_DEFN(, intptr_t, dry_run, (void))
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{
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/*
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* This is another function intercepted by DynamoRIO. In this
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* case, DR overrides this function to return 0 rather than 1, so
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* we can use it as a check for whether we're running under
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* instrumentation, or whether this is just a dry run which goes
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* through the motions but doesn't expect to find any log files
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* created.
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*/
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return 1;
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}
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static void mp_random_bits_into(mp_int *r, size_t bits)
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{
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mp_int *x = mp_random_bits(bits);
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mp_copy_into(r, x);
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mp_free(x);
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}
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static void mp_random_fill(mp_int *r)
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{
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mp_random_bits_into(r, mp_max_bits(r));
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}
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VOLATILE_WRAPPED_DEFN(static, size_t, looplimit, (size_t x))
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{
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/*
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* looplimit() is the identity function on size_t, but the
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* compiler isn't allowed to rely on it being that. I use it to
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* make loops in the test functions look less attractive to
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* compilers' unrolling heuristics.
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*/
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return x;
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}
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/* Ciphers that we expect to pass this test. Blowfish and Arcfour are
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* intentionally omitted, because we already know they don't. */
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#define CIPHERS(X, Y) \
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X(Y, ssh_3des_ssh1) \
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X(Y, ssh_3des_ssh2_ctr) \
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X(Y, ssh_3des_ssh2) \
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X(Y, ssh_des) \
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X(Y, ssh_des_sshcom_ssh2) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes256_sdctr) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes256_sdctr_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes256_sdctr_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes256_cbc) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes256_cbc_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes256_cbc_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes192_sdctr) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes192_sdctr_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes192_sdctr_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes192_cbc) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes192_cbc_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes192_cbc_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes128_sdctr) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes128_sdctr_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes128_sdctr_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes128_cbc) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes128_cbc_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_aes128_cbc_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh2_chacha20_poly1305) \
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/* end of list */
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#define CIPHER_TESTLIST(X, name) X(cipher_ ## name)
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#define MACS(X, Y) \
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X(Y, ssh_hmac_md5) \
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X(Y, ssh_hmac_sha1) \
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X(Y, ssh_hmac_sha1_buggy) \
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X(Y, ssh_hmac_sha1_96) \
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X(Y, ssh_hmac_sha1_96_buggy) \
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X(Y, ssh_hmac_sha256) \
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|
/* end of list */
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#define MAC_TESTLIST(X, name) X(mac_ ## name)
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#define HASHES(X, Y) \
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|
X(Y, ssh_md5) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha1) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha1_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha1_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha256) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha256_hw) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha256_sw) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha384) \
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X(Y, ssh_sha512) \
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/* end of list */
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|
#define HASH_TESTLIST(X, name) X(hash_ ## name)
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|
#define TESTLIST(X) \
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|
X(mp_get_nbits) \
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|
X(mp_from_decimal) \
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|
X(mp_from_hex) \
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|
X(mp_get_decimal) \
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|
X(mp_get_hex) \
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|
X(mp_cmp_hs) \
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|
|
X(mp_cmp_eq) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_min) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_max) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_select_into) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_cond_swap) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_cond_clear) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_add) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_sub) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_mul) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_rshift_safe) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_divmod) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_modadd) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_modsub) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_modmul) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_modpow) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_invert_mod_2to) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_invert) \
|
|
|
|
X(mp_modsqrt) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_weierstrass_add) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_weierstrass_double) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_weierstrass_add_general) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_weierstrass_multiply) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_weierstrass_is_identity) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_weierstrass_get_affine) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_weierstrass_decompress) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_montgomery_diff_add) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_montgomery_double) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_montgomery_multiply) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_montgomery_get_affine) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_edwards_add) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_edwards_multiply) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_edwards_eq) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_edwards_get_affine) \
|
|
|
|
X(ecc_edwards_decompress) \
|
|
|
|
CIPHERS(CIPHER_TESTLIST, X) \
|
|
|
|
MACS(MAC_TESTLIST, X) \
|
|
|
|
HASHES(HASH_TESTLIST, X) \
|
|
|
|
/* end of list */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_get_nbits(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *z = mp_new(512);
|
|
|
|
static const size_t bitposns[] = {
|
|
|
|
0, 1, 5, 16, 23, 32, 67, 123, 234, 511
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
mp_int *prev = mp_from_integer(0);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(lenof(bitposns)); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_power_2(bitposns[i]);
|
|
|
|
mp_add_into(z, x, prev);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(prev);
|
|
|
|
prev = x;
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_get_nbits(z);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(prev);
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
mp_free(z);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_from_decimal(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char dec[64];
|
|
|
|
static const size_t starts[] = { 0, 1, 5, 16, 23, 32, 63, 64 };
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(lenof(starts)); i++) {
|
|
|
|
memset(dec, '0', lenof(dec));
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = starts[i]; j < lenof(dec); j++) {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t r[4];
|
|
|
|
random_read(r, 4);
|
|
|
|
dec[j] = '0' + GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(r) % 10;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_from_decimal_pl(make_ptrlen(dec, lenof(dec)));
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_from_hex(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char hex[64];
|
|
|
|
static const size_t starts[] = { 0, 1, 5, 16, 23, 32, 63, 64 };
|
|
|
|
static const char digits[] = "0123456789abcdefABCDEF";
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(lenof(starts)); i++) {
|
|
|
|
memset(hex, '0', lenof(hex));
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = starts[i]; j < lenof(hex); j++) {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t r[4];
|
|
|
|
random_read(r, 4);
|
|
|
|
hex[j] = digits[GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(r) % lenof(digits)];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_from_hex_pl(make_ptrlen(hex, lenof(hex)));
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_string_format(char *(*mp_format)(mp_int *x))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *z = mp_new(512);
|
|
|
|
static const size_t bitposns[] = {
|
|
|
|
0, 1, 5, 16, 23, 32, 67, 123, 234, 511
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(lenof(bitposns)); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_random_bits_into(z, bitposns[i]);
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
char *formatted = mp_format(z);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
sfree(formatted);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
mp_free(z);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_get_decimal(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_string_format(mp_get_decimal);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_get_hex(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_string_format(mp_get_hex);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_cmp(unsigned (*mp_cmp)(mp_int *a, mp_int *b))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = mp_new(512), *b = mp_new(512);
|
|
|
|
static const size_t bitposns[] = {
|
|
|
|
0, 1, 5, 16, 23, 32, 67, 123, 234, 511
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(lenof(bitposns)); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(b);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_random_bits(bitposns[i]);
|
|
|
|
mp_xor_into(a, b, x);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_cmp(a, b);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(b);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_cmp_hs(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_cmp(mp_cmp_hs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_cmp_eq(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_cmp(mp_cmp_eq);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_minmax(
|
|
|
|
void (*mp_minmax_into)(mp_int *r, mp_int *x, mp_int *y))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = mp_new(256), *b = mp_new(256);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(10); i++) {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t lens[2];
|
|
|
|
random_read(lens, 2);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_random_bits(lens[0]);
|
|
|
|
mp_copy_into(a, x);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *y = mp_random_bits(lens[1]);
|
|
|
|
mp_copy_into(a, y);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(y);
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_minmax_into(a, a, b);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(b);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_max(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_minmax(mp_max_into);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_min(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_minmax(mp_min_into);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_select_into(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = mp_random_bits(256);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *b = mp_random_bits(512);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *r = mp_new(384);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_select_into(r, a, b, i & 1);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(b);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_cond_swap(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = mp_random_bits(512);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *b = mp_random_bits(512);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_cond_swap(a, b, i & 1);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(b);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_cond_clear(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = mp_random_bits(512);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_copy(a);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_copy_into(x, a);
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_cond_clear(a, i & 1);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_arithmetic(mp_int *(*mp_arith)(mp_int *x, mp_int *y))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = mp_new(256), *b = mp_new(512);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(b);
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *r = mp_arith(a, b);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
mp_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(b);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_add(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_arithmetic(mp_add);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_sub(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_arithmetic(mp_sub);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_mul(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_arithmetic(mp_mul);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_invert(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_arithmetic(mp_invert);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_rshift_safe(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_random_bits(256);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(mp_max_bits(x)+1); i++) {
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *r = mp_rshift_safe(x, i);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
mp_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_divmod(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *n = mp_new(256), *d = mp_new(256);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *q = mp_new(256), *r = mp_new(256);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(32); i++) {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t sizes[2];
|
|
|
|
random_read(sizes, 2);
|
|
|
|
mp_random_bits_into(n, sizes[0]);
|
|
|
|
mp_random_bits_into(d, sizes[1]);
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_divmod_into(n, d, q, r);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(n);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(d);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(q);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_modarith(
|
|
|
|
mp_int *(*mp_modarith)(mp_int *x, mp_int *y, mp_int *modulus))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *base = mp_new(256);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *exponent = mp_new(256);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *modulus = mp_new(256);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(8); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(base);
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(exponent);
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(modulus);
|
|
|
|
mp_set_bit(modulus, 0, 1); /* we only support odd moduli */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *out = mp_modarith(base, exponent, modulus);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(base);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(exponent);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(modulus);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_modadd(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_modarith(mp_modadd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_modsub(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_modarith(mp_modsub);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_modmul(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_modarith(mp_modmul);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_modpow(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
test_mp_modarith(mp_modpow);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_invert_mod_2to(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_new(512);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(32); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(x);
|
|
|
|
mp_set_bit(x, 0, 1); /* input should be odd */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *out = mp_invert_mod_2to(x, 511);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mp_modsqrt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* The prime isn't secret in this function (and in any case
|
|
|
|
* finding a non-square on the fly would be prohibitively
|
|
|
|
* annoying), so I hardcode a fixed one, selected to have a lot of
|
|
|
|
* factors of two in p-1 so as to exercise lots of choices in the
|
|
|
|
* algorithm. */
|
|
|
|
mp_int *p =
|
|
|
|
MP_LITERAL(0xb56a517b206a88c73cfa9ec6f704c7030d18212cace82401);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *nonsquare = MP_LITERAL(0x5);
|
|
|
|
size_t bits = mp_max_bits(p);
|
|
|
|
ModsqrtContext *sc = modsqrt_new(p, nonsquare);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(p);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(nonsquare);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_new(bits);
|
|
|
|
unsigned success;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do one initial call to cause the lazily initialised sub-context
|
|
|
|
* to be set up. This will take a while, but it can't be helped. */
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
mp_int *unwanted = mp_modsqrt(sc, x, &success);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(unwanted);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(8); i++) {
|
|
|
|
mp_random_bits_into(x, bits - 1);
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *out = mp_modsqrt(sc, x, &success);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
mp_free(out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
2019-05-04 15:19:13 +00:00
|
|
|
modsqrt_free(sc);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static WeierstrassCurve *wcurve(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *p = MP_LITERAL(0xc19337603dc856acf31e01375a696fdf5451);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = MP_LITERAL(0x864946f50eecca4cde7abad4865e34be8f67);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *b = MP_LITERAL(0x6a5bf56db3a03ba91cfbf3241916c90feeca);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *nonsquare = mp_from_integer(3);
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = ecc_weierstrass_curve(p, a, b, nonsquare);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(p);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(b);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(nonsquare);
|
|
|
|
return wc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static WeierstrassPoint *wpoint(WeierstrassCurve *wc, size_t index)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *wp;
|
|
|
|
switch (index) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x12345);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0x3c2c799a365b53d003ef37dab65860bf80ae);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x4e1c77e3c00f7c3b15869e6a4e5f86b3ee53);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0x5bde01693130591400b5c9d257d8325a44a5);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0xb5f0e722b2f0f7e729f55ba9f15511e3b399);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0x033d636b855c931cfe679f0b18db164a0d64);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0xb5f0e722b2f0f7e729f55ba9f15511e3b399);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0xbe55d3f4b86bc38ff4b6622c418e599546ed);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
unreachable("only 5 example Weierstrass points defined");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (x && y) {
|
|
|
|
wp = ecc_weierstrass_point_new(wc, x, y);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
wp = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (x)
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
if (y)
|
|
|
|
mp_free(y);
|
|
|
|
return wp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_weierstrass_add(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = wcurve();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *a = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *b = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < looplimit(5); j++) {
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0 || j == 0 || i == j ||
|
|
|
|
(i==3 && j==4) || (i==4 && j==3))
|
|
|
|
continue; /* difficult cases */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *A = wpoint(wc, i), *B = wpoint(wc, j);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(b, B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *r = ecc_weierstrass_add(a, b);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(b);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_weierstrass_double(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = wcurve();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *a = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *A = wpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *r = ecc_weierstrass_double(a);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_weierstrass_add_general(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = wcurve();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *a = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *b = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < looplimit(5); j++) {
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *A = wpoint(wc, i), *B = wpoint(wc, j);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(b, B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *r = ecc_weierstrass_add_general(a, b);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(b);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_weierstrass_multiply(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = wcurve();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *a = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *exponent = mp_new(56);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 1; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *A = wpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(exponent);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *r = ecc_weierstrass_multiply(a, exponent);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_curve_free(wc);
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
mp_free(exponent);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_weierstrass_is_identity(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = wcurve();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *a = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 1; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *A = wpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_is_identity(a);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_weierstrass_get_affine(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = wcurve();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *r = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(4); i++) {
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *A = wpoint(wc, i), *B = wpoint(wc, i+1);
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *R = ecc_weierstrass_add_general(A, B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_copy_into(r, R);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(R);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x, *y;
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_get_affine(r, &x, &y);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(y);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_weierstrass_decompress(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassCurve *wc = wcurve();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* As in the mp_modsqrt test, prime the lazy initialisation of the
|
|
|
|
* ModsqrtContext */
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = mp_new(144);
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *a = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_from_x(wc, x, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (a) /* don't care whether this one succeeded */
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t p = 0; p < looplimit(2); p++) {
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 1; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *A = wpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *X;
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_get_affine(A, &X, NULL);
|
|
|
|
mp_copy_into(x, X);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(X);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
WeierstrassPoint *a = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_from_x(wc, x, p);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
ecc_weierstrass_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static MontgomeryCurve *mcurve(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *p = MP_LITERAL(0xde978eb1db35236a5792e9f0c04d86000659);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = MP_LITERAL(0x799b62a612b1b30e1c23cea6d67b2e33c51a);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *b = MP_LITERAL(0x944bf9042b56821a8c9e0b49b636c2502b2b);
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryCurve *mc = ecc_montgomery_curve(p, a, b);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(p);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(b);
|
|
|
|
return mc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static MontgomeryPoint *mpoint(MontgomeryCurve *wc, size_t index)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x = NULL;
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *mp;
|
|
|
|
switch (index) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(31415);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x4d352c654c06eecfe19104118857b38398e8);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x03fca2a73983bc3434caae3134599cd69cce);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0xa0fd735ce9b3406498b5f035ee655bda4e15);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x7c7f46a00cc286dbe47db39b6d8f5efd920e);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 5:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x07a6dc30d3b320448e6f8999be417e6b7c6b);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 6:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x7832da5fc16dfbd358170b2b96896cd3cd06);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
unreachable("only 7 example Weierstrass points defined");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp = ecc_montgomery_point_new(wc, x);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
return mp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_montgomery_diff_add(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryCurve *wc = mcurve();
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *c = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *A = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *B = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *C = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
if (!a) {
|
|
|
|
a = A;
|
|
|
|
b = B;
|
|
|
|
c = C;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_copy_into(b, B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_copy_into(c, C);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(C);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *r = ecc_montgomery_diff_add(b, c, a);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(b);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(c);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_montgomery_double(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryCurve *wc = mcurve();
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *a = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(7); i++) {
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *A = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
if (!a) {
|
|
|
|
a = A;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *r = ecc_montgomery_double(a);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_montgomery_multiply(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryCurve *wc = mcurve();
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *a = NULL;
|
|
|
|
mp_int *exponent = mp_new(56);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(7); i++) {
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *A = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
if (!a) {
|
|
|
|
a = A;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(exponent);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *r = ecc_montgomery_multiply(a, exponent);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_curve_free(wc);
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
mp_free(exponent);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_montgomery_get_affine(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryCurve *wc = mcurve();
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *r = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *A = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *B = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *C = mpoint(wc, i);
|
|
|
|
MontgomeryPoint *R = ecc_montgomery_diff_add(B, C, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(C);
|
|
|
|
if (!r) {
|
|
|
|
r = R;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_copy_into(r, R);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(R);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x;
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_get_affine(r, &x);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
ecc_montgomery_curve_free(wc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static EdwardsCurve *ecurve(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *p = MP_LITERAL(0xfce2dac1704095de0b5c48876c45063cd475);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *d = MP_LITERAL(0xbd4f77401c3b14ae1742a7d1d367adac8f3e);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *a = MP_LITERAL(0x51d0845da3fa871aaac4341adea53b861919);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *nonsquare = mp_from_integer(2);
|
|
|
|
EdwardsCurve *ec = ecc_edwards_curve(p, d, a, nonsquare);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(p);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(d);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(a);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(nonsquare);
|
|
|
|
return ec;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static EdwardsPoint *epoint(EdwardsCurve *wc, size_t index)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x, *y;
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *ep;
|
|
|
|
switch (index) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x0);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0x1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x3d8aef0294a67c1c7e8e185d987716250d7c);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0x27184);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0xf44ed5b8a6debfd3ab24b7874cd2589fd672);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0xd635d8d15d367881c8a3af472c8fe487bf40);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0xde114ecc8b944684415ef81126a07269cd30);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0xbe0fd45ff67ebba047ed0ec5a85d22e688a1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
|
|
|
x = MP_LITERAL(0x76bd2f90898d271b492c9c20dd7bbfe39fe5);
|
|
|
|
y = MP_LITERAL(0xbf1c82698b4a5a12c1057631c1ebdc216ae2);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
unreachable("only 5 example Edwards points defined");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ep = ecc_edwards_point_new(wc, x, y);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(y);
|
|
|
|
return ep;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_edwards_add(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EdwardsCurve *ec = ecurve();
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < looplimit(5); j++) {
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *A = epoint(ec, i), *B = epoint(ec, j);
|
|
|
|
if (!a) {
|
|
|
|
a = A;
|
|
|
|
b = B;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_copy_into(b, B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *r = ecc_edwards_add(a, b);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(b);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_curve_free(ec);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_edwards_multiply(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EdwardsCurve *ec = ecurve();
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *a = NULL;
|
|
|
|
mp_int *exponent = mp_new(56);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 1; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *A = epoint(ec, i);
|
|
|
|
if (!a) {
|
|
|
|
a = A;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_random_fill(exponent);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *r = ecc_edwards_multiply(a, exponent);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_curve_free(ec);
|
2019-05-05 09:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
mp_free(exponent);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_edwards_eq(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EdwardsCurve *ec = ecurve();
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < looplimit(5); j++) {
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *A = epoint(ec, i), *B = epoint(ec, j);
|
|
|
|
if (!a) {
|
|
|
|
a = A;
|
|
|
|
b = B;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_copy_into(a, A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_copy_into(b, B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_eq(a, b);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(b);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_curve_free(ec);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_edwards_get_affine(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EdwardsCurve *ec = ecurve();
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *r = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(4); i++) {
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *A = epoint(ec, i), *B = epoint(ec, i+1);
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *R = ecc_edwards_add(A, B);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(B);
|
|
|
|
if (!r) {
|
|
|
|
r = R;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_copy_into(r, R);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(R);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
mp_int *x, *y;
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_get_affine(r, &x, &y);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mp_free(x);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(y);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(r);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_curve_free(ec);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_ecc_edwards_decompress(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EdwardsCurve *ec = ecurve();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* As in the mp_modsqrt test, prime the lazy initialisation of the
|
|
|
|
* ModsqrtContext */
|
|
|
|
mp_int *y = mp_new(144);
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *a = ecc_edwards_point_new_from_y(ec, y, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (a) /* don't care whether this one succeeded */
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t p = 0; p < looplimit(2); p++) {
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(5); i++) {
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *A = epoint(ec, i);
|
|
|
|
mp_int *Y;
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_get_affine(A, NULL, &Y);
|
|
|
|
mp_copy_into(y, Y);
|
|
|
|
mp_free(Y);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(A);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
EdwardsPoint *a = ecc_edwards_point_new_from_y(ec, y, p);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_point_free(a);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mp_free(y);
|
|
|
|
ecc_edwards_curve_free(ec);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_cipher(const ssh_cipheralg *calg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher *c = ssh_cipher_new(calg);
|
|
|
|
if (!c) {
|
|
|
|
test_skipped = true;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const ssh2_macalg *malg = calg->required_mac;
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac *m = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (malg) {
|
|
|
|
m = ssh2_mac_new(malg, c);
|
|
|
|
if (!m) {
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_free(c);
|
|
|
|
test_skipped = true;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *ckey = snewn(calg->padded_keybytes, uint8_t);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *civ = snewn(calg->blksize, uint8_t);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *mkey = malg ? snewn(malg->keylen, uint8_t) : NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t datalen = calg->blksize * 8;
|
|
|
|
size_t maclen = malg ? malg->len : 0;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *data = snewn(datalen + maclen, uint8_t);
|
|
|
|
size_t lenlen = 4;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *lendata = snewn(lenlen, uint8_t);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
|
|
|
random_read(ckey, calg->padded_keybytes);
|
|
|
|
if (malg)
|
|
|
|
random_read(mkey, malg->keylen);
|
|
|
|
random_read(data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
random_read(lendata, lenlen);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure one of our test IVs will cause SDCTR wraparound */
|
|
|
|
memset(civ, 0xFF, calg->blksize);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
random_read(civ, calg->blksize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t seqbuf[4];
|
|
|
|
random_read(seqbuf, 4);
|
|
|
|
uint32_t seq = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(seqbuf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_setkey(c, ckey);
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, civ);
|
|
|
|
if (m)
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_setkey(m, make_ptrlen(mkey, malg->keylen));
|
|
|
|
if (calg->flags & SSH_CIPHER_SEPARATE_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_encrypt_length(c, data, datalen, seq);
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_encrypt(c, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
if (m) {
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_generate(m, data, datalen, seq);
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_verify(m, data, datalen, seq);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (calg->flags & SSH_CIPHER_SEPARATE_LENGTH)
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_decrypt_length(c, data, datalen, seq);
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_decrypt(c, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sfree(ckey);
|
|
|
|
sfree(civ);
|
|
|
|
sfree(mkey);
|
|
|
|
sfree(data);
|
|
|
|
sfree(lendata);
|
|
|
|
if (m)
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_free(m);
|
|
|
|
ssh_cipher_free(c);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CIPHER_TESTFN(Y_unused, cipher) \
|
|
|
|
static void test_cipher_##cipher(void) { test_cipher(&cipher); }
|
|
|
|
CIPHERS(CIPHER_TESTFN, Y_unused)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_mac(const ssh2_macalg *malg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac *m = ssh2_mac_new(malg, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!m) {
|
|
|
|
test_skipped = true;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-05 07:20:24 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *mkey = snewn(malg->keylen, uint8_t);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t datalen = 256;
|
2019-05-05 07:20:24 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t maclen = malg->len;
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *data = snewn(datalen + maclen, uint8_t);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
|
|
|
random_read(mkey, malg->keylen);
|
|
|
|
random_read(data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t seqbuf[4];
|
|
|
|
random_read(seqbuf, 4);
|
|
|
|
uint32_t seq = GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(seqbuf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_setkey(m, make_ptrlen(mkey, malg->keylen));
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_generate(m, data, datalen, seq);
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_verify(m, data, datalen, seq);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sfree(mkey);
|
|
|
|
sfree(data);
|
|
|
|
ssh2_mac_free(m);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MAC_TESTFN(Y_unused, mac) \
|
|
|
|
static void test_mac_##mac(void) { test_mac(&mac); }
|
|
|
|
MACS(MAC_TESTFN, Y_unused)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_hash(const ssh_hashalg *halg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash *h = ssh_hash_new(halg);
|
|
|
|
if (!h) {
|
|
|
|
test_skipped = true;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t datalen = 256;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *data = snewn(datalen, uint8_t);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *hash = snewn(halg->hlen, uint8_t);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
|
|
|
random_read(data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_start();
|
|
|
|
put_data(h, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash_final(h, hash);
|
|
|
|
log_end();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
h = ssh_hash_new(halg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sfree(data);
|
|
|
|
sfree(hash);
|
|
|
|
ssh_hash_free(h);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define HASH_TESTFN(Y_unused, hash) \
|
|
|
|
static void test_hash_##hash(void) { test_hash(&hash); }
|
|
|
|
HASHES(HASH_TESTFN, Y_unused)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct test {
|
|
|
|
const char *testname;
|
|
|
|
void (*testfn)(void);
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct test tests[] = {
|
|
|
|
#define STRUCT_TEST(X) { #X, test_##X },
|
|
|
|
TESTLIST(STRUCT_TEST)
|
|
|
|
#undef STRUCT_TEST
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool doing_opts = true;
|
|
|
|
const char *pname = argv[0];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t tests_to_run[lenof(tests)];
|
|
|
|
bool keep_outfiles = false;
|
|
|
|
bool test_names_given = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(tests_to_run, 1, sizeof(tests_to_run));
|
2019-12-15 09:57:30 +00:00
|
|
|
random_hash = ssh_hash_new(&ssh_sha256);
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (--argc > 0) {
|
|
|
|
char *p = *++argv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (p[0] == '-' && doing_opts) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(p, "-O")) {
|
|
|
|
if (--argc <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "'-O' expects a directory name\n");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
outdir = *++argv;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-k") || !strcmp(p, "--keep")) {
|
|
|
|
keep_outfiles = true;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--")) {
|
|
|
|
doing_opts = false;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--help")) {
|
|
|
|
printf(" usage: drrun -c test/sclog/libsclog.so -- "
|
|
|
|
"%s -O <outdir>\n", pname);
|
|
|
|
printf("options: -O <outdir> "
|
|
|
|
"put log files in the specified directory\n");
|
|
|
|
printf(" -k, --keep "
|
|
|
|
"do not delete log files for tests that passed\n");
|
|
|
|
printf(" also: --help "
|
|
|
|
"display this text\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "unknown command line option '%s'\n", p);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!test_names_given) {
|
|
|
|
test_names_given = true;
|
|
|
|
memset(tests_to_run, 0, sizeof(tests_to_run));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool found_one = false;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < lenof(tests); i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (wc_match(p, tests[i].testname)) {
|
|
|
|
tests_to_run[i] = 1;
|
|
|
|
found_one = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!found_one) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "no test name matched '%s'\n", p);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool is_dry_run = dry_run();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_dry_run) {
|
|
|
|
printf("Dry run (DynamoRIO instrumentation not detected)\n");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!outdir) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "expected -O <outdir> option\n");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
printf("Will write log files to %s\n", outdir);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t nrun = 0, npass = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < lenof(tests); i++) {
|
|
|
|
bool keep_these_outfiles = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tests_to_run[i])
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
const struct test *test = &tests[i];
|
|
|
|
printf("Running test %s ... ", test->testname);
|
|
|
|
fflush(stdout);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_skipped = false;
|
|
|
|
random_seed(test->testname);
|
|
|
|
test_basename = test->testname;
|
|
|
|
test_index = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test->testfn();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_skipped) {
|
|
|
|
/* Used for e.g. tests of hardware-accelerated crypto when
|
|
|
|
* the hardware acceleration isn't available */
|
|
|
|
printf("skipped\n");
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
nrun++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_dry_run) {
|
|
|
|
printf("dry run done\n");
|
|
|
|
continue; /* test files won't exist anyway */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_index < 2) {
|
|
|
|
printf("FAIL: test did not generate multiple output files\n");
|
|
|
|
goto test_done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char *firstfile = log_filename(test_basename, 0);
|
|
|
|
FILE *firstfp = fopen(firstfile, "rb");
|
|
|
|
if (!firstfp) {
|
|
|
|
printf("ERR: %s: open: %s\n", firstfile, strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
goto test_done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 1; i < test_index; i++) {
|
|
|
|
char *nextfile = log_filename(test_basename, i);
|
|
|
|
FILE *nextfp = fopen(nextfile, "rb");
|
|
|
|
if (!nextfp) {
|
|
|
|
printf("ERR: %s: open: %s\n", nextfile, strerror(errno));
|
|
|
|
goto test_done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rewind(firstfp);
|
|
|
|
char buf1[4096], bufn[4096];
|
|
|
|
bool compare_ok = false;
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
|
|
size_t r1 = fread(buf1, 1, sizeof(buf1), firstfp);
|
|
|
|
size_t rn = fread(bufn, 1, sizeof(bufn), nextfp);
|
|
|
|
if (r1 != rn) {
|
|
|
|
printf("FAIL: %s %s: different lengths\n",
|
|
|
|
firstfile, nextfile);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (r1 == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (feof(firstfp) && feof(nextfp)) {
|
|
|
|
compare_ok = true;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
printf("FAIL: %s %s: error at end of file\n",
|
|
|
|
firstfile, nextfile);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(buf1, bufn, r1) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
printf("FAIL: %s %s: different content\n",
|
|
|
|
firstfile, nextfile);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fclose(nextfp);
|
|
|
|
sfree(nextfile);
|
|
|
|
if (!compare_ok) {
|
|
|
|
goto test_done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fclose(firstfp);
|
|
|
|
sfree(firstfile);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
printf("pass\n");
|
|
|
|
npass++;
|
|
|
|
keep_these_outfiles = keep_outfiles;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
test_done:
|
|
|
|
if (!keep_these_outfiles) {
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < test_index; i++) {
|
|
|
|
char *file = log_filename(test_basename, i);
|
|
|
|
remove(file);
|
|
|
|
sfree(file);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-15 09:57:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ssh_hash_free(random_hash);
|
|
|
|
|
New test system to detect side channels in crypto code.
All the work I've put in in the last few months to eliminate timing
and cache side channels from PuTTY's mp_int and cipher implementations
has been on a seat-of-the-pants basis: just thinking very hard about
what kinds of language construction I think would be safe to use, and
trying not to absentmindedly leave a conditional branch or a cast to
bool somewhere vital.
Now I've got a test suite! The basic idea is that you run the same
crypto primitive multiple times, with inputs differing only in ways
that are supposed to avoid being leaked by timing or leaving evidence
in the cache; then you instrument the code so that it logs all the
control flow, memory access and a couple of other relevant things in
each of those runs, and finally, compare the logs and expect them to
be identical.
The instrumentation is done using DynamoRIO, which I found to be well
suited to this kind of work: it lets you define custom modifications
of the code in a reasonably low-effort way, and it lets you work at
both the low level of examining single instructions _and_ the higher
level of the function call ABI (so you can give things like malloc
special treatment, not to mention intercepting communications from the
program being instrumented). Build instructions are all in the comment
at the top of testsc.c.
At present, I've found this test to give a 100% pass rate using gcc
-O0 and -O3 (Ubuntu 18.10). With clang, there are a couple of
failures, which I'll fix in the next commit.
2019-02-10 13:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (npass == nrun) {
|
|
|
|
printf("All tests passed\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
printf("%zu tests failed\n", nrun - npass);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|