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Get rid of ssh_set_frozen.

Browse Source 
We used it to suppress reading from the network at every point during
protocol setup where PuTTY was waiting for a user response to a dialog
box (e.g. a host key warning). The purpose of this was to avoid
dropping an important packet while the coroutine was listening to one
of its other input parameters (as it were). But now everything is
queue-based, packets will stay queued until we're ready to look at
them anyway; so it's better _not_ to freeze the connection, so that
messages we _can_ handle in between (e.g. SSH_MSG_DEBUG or
SSH_MSG_IGNORE) can still be processed.

That dispenses with all uses of ssh_set_frozen except for its use by
ssh_throttle_conn to exert back-pressure on the server in SSH1 which
doesn't have per-channel windows. So I've moved that last use _into_
ssh_throttle_conn, and now the function is completely gone.
This commit is contained in:
Simon Tatham 2018-09-19 20:52:12 +01:00
parent 242c074646
commit 04226693e3
1 changed files with 12 additions and 24 deletions
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36
ssh.c
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@ -1284,13 +1284,6 @@ static void ssh_got_ssh_version(struct ssh_version_receiver *rcv,
}
}
static void ssh_set_frozen(Ssh ssh, int frozen)
{
if (ssh->s)
sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
ssh->frozen = frozen;
}
static void ssh_process_incoming_data(void *ctx)
{
Ssh ssh = (Ssh)ctx;
@ -1720,13 +1713,23 @@ static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, const char *host, int port,
static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
{
int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
int frozen;
ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
frozen = TRUE;
} else if (!ssh->conn_throttle_count && old_count) {
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
frozen = FALSE;
} else {
return; /* don't change current frozen state */
}
ssh->frozen = frozen;
if (ssh->s)
sk_set_frozen(ssh->s, frozen);
}
static void ssh_channel_check_throttle(struct ssh_channel *c)
@ -2025,7 +2028,6 @@ static void do_ssh1_login(void *vctx)
sfree(keystr);
crStopV;
} else if (s->dlgret < 0) { /* none configured; use standard handling */
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
"rsa", keystr, fingerprint,
@ -2039,7 +2041,6 @@ static void do_ssh1_login(void *vctx)
crWaitUntilV(ssh->user_response >= 0);
s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
}
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
if (s->dlgret == 0) {
ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key verification",
@ -2111,7 +2112,6 @@ static void do_ssh1_login(void *vctx)
/* Warn about chosen cipher if necessary. */
if (warn) {
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "cipher", cipher_string,
ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
if (s->dlgret < 0) {
@ -2119,7 +2119,6 @@ static void do_ssh1_login(void *vctx)
crWaitUntilV(ssh->user_response >= 0);
s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
}
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
if (s->dlgret == 0) {
ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
0, TRUE);
@ -4625,7 +4624,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
BinarySource_UPCAST(pktin)->len + 1);
if (s->warn_kex) {
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend, "key-exchange algorithm",
ssh->kex->name,
ssh_dialog_callback, ssh);
@ -4634,7 +4632,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
crWaitUntilV(ssh->user_response >= 0);
s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
}
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
if (s->dlgret == 0) {
ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at kex warning", NULL,
0, TRUE);
@ -4646,8 +4643,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
int j, k;
char *betteralgs;
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
/*
* Change warning box wording depending on why we chose a
* warning-level host key algorithm. If it's because
@ -4695,7 +4690,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
crWaitUntilV(ssh->user_response >= 0);
s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
}
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
if (s->dlgret == 0) {
ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at host key warning", NULL,
0, TRUE);
@ -4704,7 +4698,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
}
if (s->warn_cscipher) {
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
"client-to-server cipher",
s->out.cipher->name,
@ -4714,7 +4707,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
crWaitUntilV(ssh->user_response >= 0);
s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
}
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
if (s->dlgret == 0) {
ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
0, TRUE);
@ -4723,7 +4715,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
}
if (s->warn_sccipher) {
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
s->dlgret = askalg(ssh->frontend,
"server-to-client cipher",
s->in.cipher->name,
@ -4733,7 +4724,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
crWaitUntilV(ssh->user_response >= 0);
s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
}
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
if (s->dlgret == 0) {
ssh_disconnect(ssh, "User aborted at cipher warning", NULL,
0, TRUE);
@ -5498,7 +5488,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
bombout(("Host key did not appear in manually configured list"));
crStopV;
} else if (s->dlgret < 0) { /* none configured; use standard handling */
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 1);
s->dlgret = verify_ssh_host_key(ssh->frontend,
ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
ssh_key_cache_id(s->hkey),
@ -5512,7 +5501,6 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(void *vctx)
crWaitUntilV(ssh->user_response >= 0);
s->dlgret = ssh->user_response;
}
ssh_set_frozen(ssh, 0);
if (s->dlgret == 0) {
ssh_disconnect(ssh, "Aborted at host key verification", NULL,
0, TRUE);