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Check by assertion that we cross-certified the right key type.

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The flag 'cross_certifying' in the SSH-2 transport layer state is now
a pointer to the host key algorithm we expect to be certifying,
instead of a plain bool. That lets me check by assertion that it's
what we expected it to be after all the complicated key exchange has
happened.

(I have no reason to think this _will_ go wrong. When we cross-
certify, the desired algorithm should be the only one we put into our
KEXINIT host key algorithm list, so it should also be the only one we
can come out of the far end of KEXINIT having selected. But if
anything ever does go wrong with my KEXINIT handling then I'd prefer
an assertion failure to silently certifying the wrong key, and also,
this makes it clearer to static analysers - and perhaps also humans
reading the code - what we expect the situation to be.)
This commit is contained in:
Simon Tatham
2018-12-01 14:39:23 +00:00
parent e9b49fdced
commit 1e1f06b2ec
3 changed files with 10 additions and 6 deletions
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5
ssh2kex-client.c
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@ -836,6 +836,9 @@ void ssh2kex_coroutine(struct ssh2_transport_state *s)
s->hostkey_str = s->keystr;
s->keystr = NULL;
} else if (s->cross_certifying) {
assert(s->hkey);
assert(ssh_key_alg(s->hkey) == s->cross_certifying);
s->fingerprint = ssh2_fingerprint(s->hkey);
ppl_logevent(("Storing additional host key for this host:"));
ppl_logevent(("%s", s->fingerprint));
@ -843,7 +846,6 @@ void ssh2kex_coroutine(struct ssh2_transport_state *s)
s->fingerprint = NULL;
store_host_key(s->savedhost, s->savedport,
ssh_key_cache_id(s->hkey), s->keystr);
s->cross_certifying = false;
/*
* Don't forget to store the new key as the one we'll be
* re-checking in future normal rekeys.
@ -857,6 +859,7 @@ void ssh2kex_coroutine(struct ssh2_transport_state *s)
* enforce that the key we're seeing this time is identical to
* the one we saw before.
*/
assert(s->keystr); /* filled in by prior key exchange */
if (strcmp(s->hostkey_str, s->keystr)) {
#ifndef FUZZING
ssh_sw_abort(s->ppl.ssh,