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Whitespace rationalisation of entire code base.

Browse Source 
The number of people has been steadily increasing who read our source
code with an editor that thinks tab stops are 4 spaces apart, as
opposed to the traditional tty-derived 8 that the PuTTY code expects.

So I've been wondering for ages about just fixing it, and switching to
a spaces-only policy throughout the code. And I recently found out
about 'git blame -w', which should make this change not too disruptive
for the purposes of source-control archaeology; so perhaps now is the
time.

While I'm at it, I've also taken the opportunity to remove all the
trailing spaces from source lines (on the basis that git dislikes
them, and is the only thing that seems to have a strong opinion one
way or the other).
    
Apologies to anyone downstream of this code who has complicated patch
sets to rebase past this change. I don't intend it to be needed again.
This commit is contained in:
Simon Tatham
2019-09-08 20:29:00 +01:00
parent b60230dbb8
commit 5d718ef64b
210 changed files with 30897 additions and 30897 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

138
windows/winmisc.c
View File

@ -73,62 +73,62 @@ char *get_username(void)
char *user;
bool got_username = false;
DECL_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(static, BOOLEAN, GetUserNameExA,
(EXTENDED_NAME_FORMAT, LPSTR, PULONG));
(EXTENDED_NAME_FORMAT, LPSTR, PULONG));
{
static bool tried_usernameex = false;
if (!tried_usernameex) {
/* Not available on Win9x, so load dynamically */
HMODULE secur32 = load_system32_dll("secur32.dll");
/* If MIT Kerberos is installed, the following call to
GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION makes Windows implicitly load
sspicli.dll WITHOUT proper path sanitizing, so better
load it properly before */
HMODULE sspicli = load_system32_dll("sspicli.dll");
static bool tried_usernameex = false;
if (!tried_usernameex) {
/* Not available on Win9x, so load dynamically */
HMODULE secur32 = load_system32_dll("secur32.dll");
/* If MIT Kerberos is installed, the following call to
GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION makes Windows implicitly load
sspicli.dll WITHOUT proper path sanitizing, so better
load it properly before */
HMODULE sspicli = load_system32_dll("sspicli.dll");
(void)sspicli; /* squash compiler warning about unused variable */
GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(secur32, GetUserNameExA);
tried_usernameex = true;
}
GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(secur32, GetUserNameExA);
tried_usernameex = true;
}
}
if (p_GetUserNameExA) {
/*
* If available, use the principal -- this avoids the problem
* that the local username is case-insensitive but Kerberos
* usernames are case-sensitive.
*/
/*
* If available, use the principal -- this avoids the problem
* that the local username is case-insensitive but Kerberos
* usernames are case-sensitive.
*/
/* Get the length */
namelen = 0;
(void) p_GetUserNameExA(NameUserPrincipal, NULL, &namelen);
/* Get the length */
namelen = 0;
(void) p_GetUserNameExA(NameUserPrincipal, NULL, &namelen);
user = snewn(namelen, char);
got_username = p_GetUserNameExA(NameUserPrincipal, user, &namelen);
if (got_username) {
char *p = strchr(user, '@');
if (p) *p = 0;
} else {
sfree(user);
}
user = snewn(namelen, char);
got_username = p_GetUserNameExA(NameUserPrincipal, user, &namelen);
if (got_username) {
char *p = strchr(user, '@');
if (p) *p = 0;
} else {
sfree(user);
}
}
if (!got_username) {
/* Fall back to local user name */
namelen = 0;
if (!GetUserName(NULL, &namelen)) {
/*
* Apparently this doesn't work at least on Windows XP SP2.
* Thus assume a maximum of 256. It will fail again if it
* doesn't fit.
*/
namelen = 256;
}
/* Fall back to local user name */
namelen = 0;
if (!GetUserName(NULL, &namelen)) {
/*
* Apparently this doesn't work at least on Windows XP SP2.
* Thus assume a maximum of 256. It will fail again if it
* doesn't fit.
*/
namelen = 256;
}
user = snewn(namelen, char);
got_username = GetUserName(user, &namelen);
if (!got_username) {
sfree(user);
}
user = snewn(namelen, char);
got_username = GetUserName(user, &namelen);
if (!got_username) {
sfree(user);
}
}
return got_username ? user : NULL;
@ -372,35 +372,35 @@ void escape_registry_key(const char *in, strbuf *out)
static const char hex[16] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
while (*in) {
if (*in == ' ' || *in == '\\' || *in == '*' || *in == '?' ||
*in == '%' || *in < ' ' || *in > '~' || (*in == '.'
&& !candot)) {
if (*in == ' ' || *in == '\\' || *in == '*' || *in == '?' ||
*in == '%' || *in < ' ' || *in > '~' || (*in == '.'
&& !candot)) {
put_byte(out, '%');
put_byte(out, hex[((unsigned char) *in) >> 4]);
put_byte(out, hex[((unsigned char) *in) & 15]);
} else
put_byte(out, *in);
in++;
candot = true;
put_byte(out, hex[((unsigned char) *in) >> 4]);
put_byte(out, hex[((unsigned char) *in) & 15]);
} else
put_byte(out, *in);
in++;
candot = true;
}
}
void unescape_registry_key(const char *in, strbuf *out)
{
while (*in) {
if (*in == '%' && in[1] && in[2]) {
int i, j;
if (*in == '%' && in[1] && in[2]) {
int i, j;
i = in[1] - '0';
i -= (i > 9 ? 7 : 0);
j = in[2] - '0';
j -= (j > 9 ? 7 : 0);
i = in[1] - '0';
i -= (i > 9 ? 7 : 0);
j = in[2] - '0';
j -= (j > 9 ? 7 : 0);
put_byte(out, (i << 4) + j);
in += 3;
} else {
put_byte(out, (i << 4) + j);
in += 3;
} else {
put_byte(out, *in++);
}
}
}
}
@ -414,17 +414,17 @@ void dputs(const char *buf)
DWORD dw;
if (!debug_got_console) {
if (AllocConsole()) {
debug_got_console = 1;
debug_hdl = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
}
if (AllocConsole()) {
debug_got_console = 1;
debug_hdl = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
}
}
if (!debug_fp) {
debug_fp = fopen("debug.log", "w");
debug_fp = fopen("debug.log", "w");
}
if (debug_hdl != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
WriteFile(debug_hdl, buf, strlen(buf), &dw, NULL);
WriteFile(debug_hdl, buf, strlen(buf), &dw, NULL);
}
fputs(buf, debug_fp);
fflush(debug_fp);