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Minor semantic tweak to bug-compatibility modes: make

BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD do exactly what it says on the tin, independent
of whether BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE is set.

This is invisible in the default configuration, as all servers marked as having
the second bug have the first one too, but it would allow one to manually
configure PuTTY to cope with a SSH-1 server that got upset by ignore messages
during authentication, but was fine with their use as keepalives.

[originally from svn r6876]
This commit is contained in:
Jacob Nevins
2006-10-22 19:51:28 +00:00
parent e9ce146b9f
commit 64f19d46d8
2 changed files with 28 additions and 21 deletions

View File

@ -2789,10 +2789,11 @@ to try to guess whether or not the server has the bug.
An ignore message (SSH_MSG_IGNORE) is a message in the SSH protocol
which can be sent from the client to the server, or from the server
to the client, at any time. Either side is required to ignore the
message whenever it receives it. PuTTY uses ignore messages to hide
the password packet in SSH-1, so that a listener cannot tell the
length of the user's password; it also uses ignore messages for
connection keepalives (see \k{config-keepalive}).
message whenever it receives it. PuTTY uses ignore messages to
\I{password camouflage}hide the password packet in SSH-1, so that
a listener cannot tell the length of the user's password; it also
uses ignore messages for connection \i{keepalives} (see
\k{config-keepalive}).
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will stop using ignore messages. This
means that keepalives will stop working, and PuTTY will have to fall
@ -2819,9 +2820,10 @@ camouflage. In this sense, for a server to refuse to accept a padded
password packet is not really a bug, but it does make life
inconvenient if the server can also not handle ignore messages.
If this \q{bug} is detected, PuTTY will have no choice but to send
the user's password with no form of camouflage, so that an
eavesdropping user will be easily able to find out the exact length
If this \q{bug} is detected, PuTTY will assume that neither ignore
messages nor padding are acceptable, and that it thus has no choice
but to send the user's password with no form of camouflage, so that
an eavesdropping user will be easily able to find out the exact length
of the password. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct
server, the session will succeed, but will be more vulnerable to
eavesdroppers than it could be.