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Minor semantic tweak to bug-compatibility modes: make

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BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD do exactly what it says on the tin, independent
of whether BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE is set.

This is invisible in the default configuration, as all servers marked as having
the second bug have the first one too, but it would allow one to manually
configure PuTTY to cope with a SSH-1 server that got upset by ignore messages
during authentication, but was fine with their use as keepalives.

[originally from svn r6876]
This commit is contained in:
Jacob Nevins
2006-10-22 19:51:28 +00:00
parent e9ce146b9f
commit 64f19d46d8
2 changed files with 28 additions and 21 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

33
ssh.c
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@ -2166,6 +2166,13 @@ static void ssh_detect_bugs(Ssh ssh, char *vstring)
ssh->remote_bugs = 0;
/*
* General notes on server version strings:
* - Not all servers reporting "Cisco-1.25" have all the bugs listed
* here -- in particular, we've heard of one that's perfectly happy
* with SSH1_MSG_IGNOREs -- but this string never seems to change,
* so we can't distinguish them.
*/
if (ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == FORCE_ON ||
(ssh->cfg.sshbug_ignore1 == AUTO &&
(!strcmp(imp, "1.2.18") || !strcmp(imp, "1.2.19") ||
@ -3703,19 +3710,19 @@ static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
* magnitude of the password length, but it will
* introduce a bit of extra uncertainty.
*
* A few servers (the old 1.2.18 through 1.2.22)
* can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE. For these
* servers, we need an alternative defence. We make
* use of the fact that the password is interpreted
* as a C string: so we can append a NUL, then some
* random data.
* A few servers can't deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, at
* least in this context. For these servers, we need
* an alternative defence. We make use of the fact
* that the password is interpreted as a C string:
* so we can append a NUL, then some random data.
*
* One server (a Cisco one) can deal with neither
* SSH1_MSG_IGNORE _nor_ a padded password string.
* For this server we are left with no defences
* A few servers can deal with neither SSH1_MSG_IGNORE
* here _nor_ a padded password string.
* For these servers we are left with no defences
* against password length sniffing.
*/
if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE)) {
if (!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE) &&
!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD)) {
/*
* The server can deal with SSH1_MSG_IGNORE, so
* we can use the primary defence.
@ -3784,10 +3791,8 @@ static int do_ssh1_login(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen,
PKTT_OTHER, PKT_END);
} else {
/*
* The server has _both_
* BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH1_IGNORE and
* BUG_NEEDS_SSH1_PLAIN_PASSWORD. There is
* therefore nothing we can do.
* The server is believed unable to cope with
* any of our password camouflage methods.
*/
int len;
len = strlen(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result);