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docs: Correct proven-primes side channel risk.
After reading Simon's wishlist write-up 'rsa-gen-side-channels'.
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@ -177,12 +177,14 @@ are prime, because it generates the output number together with a
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proof of its primality. This takes more effort, but it eliminates that
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proof of its primality. This takes more effort, but it eliminates that
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theoretical risk in the probabilistic method.
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theoretical risk in the probabilistic method.
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There in one way in which PuTTYgen's proven-primes method is not
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There in one way in which PuTTYgen's \q{proven primes} method is not
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strictly better than its probable-primes method. If you use PuTTYgen
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strictly better than its \q{probable primes} method. If you use
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to generate RSA or DSA keys on a computer that is potentially
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PuTTYgen to generate an RSA key on a computer that is potentially
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susceptible to timing- or cache-based \i{side-channel attacks}, such
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susceptible to timing- or cache-based \i{side-channel attacks}, such
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as a shared computer, the \q{probable primes} method is designed to
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as a shared computer, the \q{probable primes} method is designed to
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resist such attacks, whereas the \q{proven primes} methods are not.
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resist such attacks, whereas the \q{proven primes} methods are not.
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(This is only a concern for RSA keys; for other key types, primes
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are either not secret or not involved.)
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You might choose to switch from probable to proven primes if you have
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You might choose to switch from probable to proven primes if you have
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a local security standard that demands it, or if you don't trust the
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a local security standard that demands it, or if you don't trust the
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