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Macroise the cumbersome read idioms in the BPPs.

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Now the three 'proper' BPPs each have a BPP_READ() macro that wraps up
the fiddly combination of crMaybeWaitUntilV and bufchainery they use
to read a fixed-length amount of input data. The sshverstring 'BPP'
doesn't read fixed-length data in quite the same way, but it has a
similar BPP_WAITFOR macro.

No functional change. Mostly this is just a cleanup to make the code
more legible, but also, the new macros will be a good place to
centralise anything else that needs doing on every read, such as EOF
checking.
This commit is contained in:
Simon Tatham
2018-09-24 14:23:52 +01:00
parent 96622d17a3
commit d77b95cb42
4 changed files with 39 additions and 27 deletions
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12
ssh1bpp.c
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@ -91,6 +91,12 @@ void ssh1_bpp_requested_compression(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
s->pending_compression_request = TRUE;
}
#define BPP_READ(ptr, len) do \
{ \
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume( \
s->bpp.in_raw, ptr, len)); \
} while (0)
static void ssh1_bpp_handle_input(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
{
struct ssh1_bpp_state *s = FROMFIELD(bpp, struct ssh1_bpp_state, bpp);
@ -103,8 +109,7 @@ static void ssh1_bpp_handle_input(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
{
unsigned char lenbuf[4];
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(
bpp->in_raw, lenbuf, 4));
BPP_READ(lenbuf, 4);
s->len = toint(GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST(lenbuf));
}
@ -130,8 +135,7 @@ static void ssh1_bpp_handle_input(BinaryPacketProtocol *bpp)
s->maxlen = s->biglen;
s->data = snew_plus_get_aux(s->pktin);
crMaybeWaitUntilV(bufchain_try_fetch_consume(
bpp->in_raw, s->data, s->biglen));
BPP_READ(s->data, s->biglen);
if (s->cipher && detect_attack(s->crcda_ctx,
s->data, s->biglen, NULL)) {