Because SSH-1 is a very niche interest these days. Mostly this affects
the public key documentation.
Also, a couple of unrelated concessions to modernity.
- Mention public key authentication
- Define and describe the "terminal window"
- Mention trust sigils
- Describe here the lack of feedback in password prompts, as well as in
the FAQ
Remove the 'winhelp-topic' IDs from the Halibut source, and from the
code. Now we have one fewer name to think of every time we add a
setting.
I've left the HELPCTX system in place, with the vague notion that it
might be a useful layer of indirection for some future help system on a
platform like Mac OS X.
(I've left the putty.hlp target in doc/Makefile, if nothing else because
this is a convenient test case for Halibut's WinHelp support. But the
resulting help file will no longer support context help.)
At the point when we change over the seat's trust status to untrusted
for the last time, to finish authentication, Plink will now present a
final interactive prompt saying 'Press Return to begin session'. This
is a hint that anything after that that resembles an auth prompt
should be treated with suspicion, because _PuTTY_ thinks it's finished
authenticating.
This is of course an annoying inconvenience for interactive users, so
I've tried to reduce its impact as much as I can. It doesn't happen in
GUI PuTTY at all (because the trust sigil system is used instead); it
doesn't happen if you use plink -batch (because then the user already
knows that they _never_ expect an interactive prompt); and it doesn't
happen if Plink's standard input is being redirected from anywhere
other than the terminal / console (because then it would be pointless
for the server to try to scam passphrases out of the user anyway,
since the user isn't in a position to enter one in response to a spoof
prompt). So it should only happen to people who are using Plink in a
terminal for interactive login purposes, and that's not _really_ what
I ever intended Plink to be used for (which is why it's never had any
out-of-band control UI like OpenSSH's ~ system).
If anyone _still_ doesn't like this new prompt, it can also be turned
off using the new -no-antispoof flag, if the user is willing to
knowingly assume the risk.
The executables were already ignoring it.
This is a minimal change; PUTTY.HLP can still be built, and there's
still all the context IDs lying around.
Buildscr changes are untested.
This commit adds sanitisation to PSCP and PSFTP in the same style as
I've just put it into Plink. This time, standard error is sanitised
without reference to whether it's redirected (at least unless you give
an override option), on the basis that where Plink is _sometimes_ an
SSH transport for some other protocol, PSCP and PSFTP _always_ are.
But also, the sanitiser is run over any remote filename sent by the
server, substituting ? for any control characters it finds. That
removes another avenue for the server to deliberately confuse the
display.
This commit fixes our bug 'pscp-unsanitised-server-output', aka the
two notional 'vulnerabilities' CVE-2019-6109 and CVE-2019-6110.
(Although we regard those in isolation as only bugs, not serious
vulnerabilities, because their main threat was in hiding the evidence
of a server having exploited other more serious vulns that we never
had.)
If Plink's standard output and/or standard error points at a Windows
console or a Unix tty device, and if Plink was not configured to
request a remote pty (and hence to send a terminal-type string), then
we apply the new control-character stripping facility.
The idea is to be a mild defence against malicious remote processes
sending confusing escape sequences through the standard error channel
when Plink is being used as a transport for something like git: it's
OK to have actual sensible error messages come back from the server,
but when you run a git command, you didn't really intend to give the
remote server the implicit licence to write _all over_ your local
terminal display. At the same time, in that scenario, the standard
_output_ of Plink is left completely alone, on the grounds that git
will be expecting it to be 8-bit clean. (And Plink can tell that
because it's redirected away from the console.)
For interactive login sessions using Plink, this behaviour is
disabled, on the grounds that once you've sent a terminal-type string
it's assumed that you were _expecting_ the server to use it to know
what escape sequences to send to you.
So it should be transparent for all the use cases I've so far thought
of. But in case it's not, there's a family of new command-line options
like -no-sanitise-stdout and -sanitise-stderr that you can use to
forcibly override the autodetection of whether to do it.
This all applies the same way to both Unix and Windows Plink.
Of course this wouldn't have prevented me from making that mistake
myself - it's not as if I carefully re-read the design principles
appendix before writing each code change! - but it might help explain
to _someone_ at some point...
It claimed they were only found in ssh.c, which is no longer true:
after I broke up ssh.c into smaller pieces, they're now found all over
the place.
Also, one of the things I did during that refactoring was to arrange
that each protocol layer's cleanup function (hopefully) reliably frees
everything the coroutine might have allocated and been in the middle
of using, which was something I knew the old code was quite bad at. So
I've mentioned that in the coroutines section too, while I'm here.
I've recently started using several C99 features in PuTTY, after
finally reaching the point where it didn't break my builds to do so,
even on Windows. So it's now outright inaccurate for the documented
design principles to claim that we're sticking to C90.
While I'm here, I've filled in a bit more detail about the assumptions
we do permit.
It is useful to be able to exclude the header so that the log file
can be used for realtime input to other programs such as Kst for
plotting live data from sensors.
This commit adds the new ids and fingerprints in the keys appendix of
the manual, and moves the old ones down into the historic-keys
section. I've tweaked a few pieces of wording for ongoing use, so that
they don't imply a specific number of past key rollovers.
The -pgpfp option in all the tools now shows the new Master Key
fingerprint and the previous (2015) one. I've adjusted all the uses of
the #defines in putty.h so that future rollovers should only have to
modify the #defines themselves.
Most importantly, sign.sh bakes in the ids of the current release and
snapshot keys, so that snapshots will automatically be signed with the
new snapshot key and the -r option will invoke the new release key.
Thanks to Jiri Kaspar for sending this patch (apart from the new docs
section, which is in my own words), which implements a feature we've
had as a wishlist item ('utf8-plus-vt100') for a long time.
I was actually surprised it was possible to implement it in so few
lines of code! I'd forgotten, or possibly never noticed in the first
place, that even in UTF-8 mode PuTTY not only accepts but still
_processes_ all the ISO 2022 control sequences and shift characters,
and keeps running track of all the same state in term->cset and
term->cset_attrs that it tracks in IS0-2022-enabled modes. It's just
that in UTF-8 mode, at the very last minute when a character+attribute
pair is about to be written into the terminal's character buffer, it
deliberately ignores the contents of those variables.
So all that was needed was a new flag checked at that last moment
which causes it not quite to ignore them after all, and bingo,
utf8-plus-vt100 is supported. And it works no matter which ISO 2022
sequences you're using; whether you're using ESC ( 0 to select the
line drawing set directly into GL and ESC ( B to get back when you're
done, or whether you send a preliminary ESC ( B ESC ) 0 to get GL/GR
to be ASCII and line drawing respectively so you can use SI and SO as
one-byte mode switches thereafter, both work just as well.
This implementation strategy has a couple of consequences, which I
don't think matter very much one way or the other but I document them
just in case they turn out to be important later:
- if an application expecting this mode has already filled your
terminal window with lqqqqqqqqk, then enabling this mode in Change
Settings won't retroactively turn them into the line drawing
characters you wanted, because no memory is preserved in the screen
buffer of what the ISO 2022 state was when they were printed. So
the application still has to do a screen refresh.
- on the other hand, if you already sent the ESC ( 0 or whatever to
put the terminal _into_ line drawing mode, and then you turn on
this mode in Change Settings, you _will_ still be in line drawing
mode, because the system _does_ remember your current ISO 2022
state at all times, whether it's currently applying it to output
printing characters or not.
The former has advantages in terms of keeping Kerberos credentials up
to date, but it also does something sufficiently weird to the usual
SSH host key system that I think it's worth making sure users have a
means of turning it off separately from the less intrusive GSS
userauth.
This was originally sent in as part of the GSSAPI patch, but I've
extracted into a separate commit because that patch was more than
complicated enough by itself.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
Rewrite the "Using PuTTY" section for 'clipboard-generality', and also
explain why we default to mouse-based selection, interaction with other
applications via PRIMARY when running PuTTY on Unix, and bracketed-paste
mode. Also add lots of index terms.
On all platforms, you can now configure which clipboard the mouse
pastes from, which clipboard Ctrl-Ins and Shift-Ins access, and which
Ctrl-Shift-C and Ctrl-Shift-V access. In each case, the options are:
- nothing at all
- a clipboard which is implicitly written by the act of mouse
selection (the PRIMARY selection on X, CLIP_LOCAL everywhere else)
- the standard clipboard written by explicit copy/paste UI actions
(CLIPBOARD on X, the unique system clipboard elsewhere).
Also, you can control whether selecting text with the mouse _also_
writes to the explicitly accessed clipboard.
The wording of the various messages changes between platforms, but the
basic UI shape is the same everywhere.
This makes space in the Selection panel (at least on Windows; it
wasn't overfull on Unix) to add a new set of config options
controlling the mapping of UI actions to clipboards.
(A possible future advantage of having spare space in this new Words
panel is that there's room to add controls for context-sensitive
special-casing, e.g. I'd quite like ':' to be treated differently when
it appears as part of "http://".)
I know some users don't like any colour _at all_, and we have a
separate option to turn off xterm-style 256-colour sequences, so it
seems remiss not to have an option to disable true colour as well.
This causes PuTTY processes spawned from its system-tray menu to run
with the -restrict-acl option (or rather, the synonymous &R prefix
used by my auto-constructed command lines for easier parsing).
The previous behaviour of Pageant was never to pass -restrict-acl to
PuTTY, even when started with -restrict-acl itself; this is not
actually a silly thing to want to do, because Pageant might well have
more need of -restrict-acl than PuTTY (it stores longer-term and more
powerful secrets) and conversely PuTTY might have more need to _not_
restrict its ACL than Pageant (in that among the things enabled by an
unrestricted ACL are various kinds of accessibility software, which is
more useful on the more user-facing PuTTY than on Pageant).
But for those who want to lock everything down with every security
option possible (even though -restrict-acl is only an ad-hoc
precaution and cannot deliver any hard guarantees), this new option
should fill in the UI gap.
After a conversation this week with a user who tried to use it, it's
clear that Borland C can't build the up-to-date PuTTY without having
to make too many compromises of functionality (unsupported API
details, no 'long long' type), even above the issues that could be
worked round with extra porting ifdefs.
While it's still true, the link to Winsock 2 is dead, our standard
release builds don't run on Win95 any more, and it's certainly not
frequently asked.
- I haven't heard of OpenSSH/OpenSSL mismatches being a common problem
for a long time. Specific advice about OpenSSH 3.1/3.4 seems unlikely
to be useful these days.
- "Incorrect MAC received on packet" doesn't seem to be a common
problem these days, and if anyone encounters it, the words in the
"Errors" bit of the docs seem adequate without a FAQ entry as well.
2ce0b680c inadvertently removed this ability in trying to ensure that
everyone got the new IUTF8 mode by default; you could remove a mode from
the list in the UI, but this would just revert PuTTY to its default.
The UI and storage have been revamped; the storage format now explicitly
says when a mode is not to be sent, and the configuration UI always
shows all modes known to PuTTY; if a mode is not to be sent it now shows
up as "(don't send)" in the list.
Old saved settings are migrated so as to preserve previous removals of
longstanding modes, while automatically adding IUTF8.
(In passing, this removes a bug where pressing the 'Remove' button of
the previous UI would populate the value edit box with garbage.)
Conflicts in the FAQ are fixed by incorporating Jacob's rewritten
post-0.68 version. (But owing to considerable git confusion I haven't
managed to get his name on to this commit anywhere.)
This commit also updates the dumps of Plink's and PSCP's help output,
adding the -proxycmd option to both and the -shareexists option to
Plink.
(Or rather, _re_-adding the latter, since it was introduced in error
by commit 07af4ed10 due to a branch management error and hastily
removed again in 29e8c24f9. This time it really does match reality.)
Several places in the docs were labelled for review because they need
to change when 0.68's feature set comes in - no SSH-2 to SSH-1
fallback any more, but on the other hand, Unix Pageant now exists.
(In a XXX-REVIEW-BEFORE-RELEASE form.)
Also, note the effect of compilation with different Visual Studio
versions on Windows version compatibility in the source README, for the
sake of having it written down somewhere.
They were there mainly to distinguish from 16-bit Windows, which hasn't
been a thing since before a noticeable fraction of the userbase were
born, probably. These days the obvious comparison is with 64-bit
Windows.
Also tweak some wording to reflect that official PuTTY executables are
not necessarily 32-bit any more, and add some XXX-REVIEW-BEFORE-RELEASE
in the same vein.
As documented in bug 'win-process-acl-finesse', we've had enough
assorted complaints about it breaking various non-malicious pieces of
Windows process interaction (ranging from git->plink integration to
screen readers for the vision-impaired) that I think it's more
sensible to set the process back to its default level of protection.
This precaution was never a fully effective protection anyway, due to
the race condition at process startup; the only properly effective
defence would have been to prevent malware running under the same user
ID as PuTTY in the first place, so in that sense, nothing has changed.
But people who want the arguable defence-in-depth advantage of the ACL
restriction can now turn it on with the '-restrict-acl' command-line
option, and it's up to them whether they can live with the assorted
inconveniences that come with it.
In the course of this change, I've centralised a bit more of the
restriction code into winsecur.c, to avoid repeating the error
handling in multiple places.
This is equivalent to selecting 'Local' as the proxy type and entering
the argument string in the proxy command box, in the GUI.
I've pulled this out of all the other proxy options to promote to a
named command-line option, partly because it's the proxy option with
the most natural command-line expression in the first place (any shell
command you might want to use is already in the form of a single
string), and also because it has uses beyond end-user proxying
applications: in particular, replacing the network connection with a
local process is a convenient way to do testing in the style of
contrib/samplekex.py, avoiding the need to run a separate command to
make the test 'server' listen on a port.
Also try to upgrade the settings of people who haven't changed the
defaults; but anyone who has, or anyone who's used the pre-release
snapshots with elliptic-curve support, will have to review their
settings manually.
The UI now only has "1" and "2" options for SSH protocol version, which
behave like the old "1 only" and "2 only" options; old
SSH-N-with-fallback settings are interpreted as SSH-N-only.
This prevents any attempt at a protocol downgrade attack.
Most users should see no difference; those poor souls who still have to
work with SSH-1 equipment now have to explicitly opt in.
Both in a new section about reporting vulnerabilities, and in the
section about large attachments (since some large attachments will
surely contain confidential information from the sender).
I think the deterministic DSA system we've been using for ages can now
be considered proven in use, not to mention the fact that RFC 6979 and
the Ed25519 spec both give variants on the same idea. So I've removed
the 'don't use DSA if you can avoid it' warning.
Now we actually have enough of them to worry about, and especially
since some of the types we support are approved by organisations that
people might make their own decisions about whether to trust, it seems
worth having a config list for host keys the same way we have one for
kex types and ciphers.
To make room for this, I've created an SSH > Host Keys config panel,
and moved the existing host-key related configuration (manually
specified fingerprints) into there from the Kex panel.
It's too esoteric to be the first thing on the Auth panel; I've never
heard of any SSH server that supports it in the decade since I
implemented it. The only Google hits are lost souls mistakenly believing
they need it for passwordless public-key login and the like.
Patch due to Colin Watson.
Putting the passphrase in a file avoids exposing it to 'ps' which can
print out every process's command line, while at the same time not
being as platform-specific as the approach of providing an fd number
(since cmdgen.c is in principle a potential cross-platform PuTTYgen,
not just a Unix one, which is why it's not in the 'unix' directory).
Of course it introduces its own risks if someone can read the file
from your disk after you delete it; probably the best approach to
avoiding this, if possible, is to point the option at a file on an
in-memory tmpfs type file system. Or better still, use bash-style
/dev/fd options such as
puttygen --new-passphrase <(echo -n "my passphrase") [options]
Failing that, try a secure file-wipe utility, as the man page change
mentions.
(And a use case not to be overlooked, of course, is the one where you
actually want to generate an unprotected key - in which case, just
pass /dev/null as the filename.)
That option does exist, but only on master; it was not in the 0.66
release. It turned up by mistake when I updated the documentation copy
of the Plink online help while preparing the 0.66 release, because I
ran plink from the wrong branch.
The new release automation should stop that kind of mistake from
happening in future.
The reporter of vuln-pscp-sink-sscanf asked for a key to encrypt the
vulnerability report with, and having generated one, it seemed like a
good idea to make it part of the official PuTTY GPG key set and
publish it for the next person to use.
Now we have licence.pl, it seems to me to make very good sense to have
it generate the Halibut form(s) of the licence and copyright year as
well as the source-code forms.
As a result, I believe _no_ copies of the licence text or copyright
date exist any more except for the master one in LICENCE - so I can
completely remove the checklist section about all the places to update
it, because there's only one. Hooray!
(cherry picked from commit 774d37a0dc)
Conflicts:
doc/licence.but
(cherry-picker's note: the conflict was just because the deleted file
didn't have identical contents)
TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK (i.e. pterm) already has "-log" (as does Unix
PuTTY), so there's no sense suppressing the synonym "-sessionlog".
Undocumented lacunae that remain:
plink accepts -sessionlog, but does nothing with it. Arguably it should.
puttytel accepts -sshlog/-sshrawlog (and happily logs e.g. Telnet
negotiation, as does PuTTY proper).
(cherry picked from commit a454399ec8)
Conflicts:
unix/uxplink.c
windows/winplink.c
(cherry-picker's notes: the conflict was only contextual, in the Plink
help output)
Now we have licence.pl, it seems to me to make very good sense to have
it generate the Halibut form(s) of the licence and copyright year as
well as the source-code forms.
As a result, I believe _no_ copies of the licence text or copyright
date exist any more except for the master one in LICENCE - so I can
completely remove the checklist section about all the places to update
it, because there's only one. Hooray!
TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK (i.e. pterm) already has "-log" (as does Unix
PuTTY), so there's no sense suppressing the synonym "-sessionlog".
Undocumented lacunae that remain:
plink accepts -sessionlog, but does nothing with it. Arguably it should.
puttytel accepts -sshlog/-sshrawlog (and happily logs e.g. Telnet
negotiation, as does PuTTY proper).
This brings in the rest of the 0.66 branch, including some changes new
on master.
Conflicts:
doc/plink.but
sshrsa.c
(The conflicts were both trivial: in one, the addition of an extra
parameter to rsa2_newkey on master happened on the line next to 0.66's
addition of a check for NULL return value, and in the other, I'd got
the version number in the plink -h transcript messed up on master.)
The aim is to try to reduce the incidence of the two least helpful
classes of those reports: the ones which have just got mismatched
checksum files, and the ones which don't tell us the information that
would help.
(cherry picked from commit 8ff3b22243)
What should have been links to the old DSA keys were actually a second
copy of the links to the old RSA ones. Ahem.
(cherry picked from commit b62af0f40a)
This gives pride of place to the new set of keys we've recently
generated, and relegates the old ones to an afterthought.
(cherry picked from commit bb68baf53b)
Users have requested this from time to time, for distinguishing log
file names when there's more than one SSH server running on different
ports of the same host. Since we do take account of that possibility
in other areas (e.g. we cache host keys indexed by (host,port) rather
than just host), it doesn't seem unreasonable to do so here too.
(cherry picked from commit 0550943b51)
The validation end of XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 needs to check that two
time_t values differ by at most XDM_MAXSKEW, which it was doing by
subtracting them and passing the result to abs(). This provoked a
warning from OS X's clang, on the reasonable enough basis that the
value passed to abs was unsigned.
Fixed by using the (well defined) unsigned arithmetic wraparound: to
check that the mathematical difference of two unsigned numbers is in
the interval [-k,+k], compute their difference _plus k_ as an
unsigned, and check the result is in the interval [0,2k] by doing an
unsigned comparison against 2k.
The aim is to try to reduce the incidence of the two least helpful
classes of those reports: the ones which have just got mismatched
checksum files, and the ones which don't tell us the information that
would help.
Users have requested this from time to time, for distinguishing log
file names when there's more than one SSH server running on different
ports of the same host. Since we do take account of that possibility
in other areas (e.g. we cache host keys indexed by (host,port) rather
than just host), it doesn't seem unreasonable to do so here too.
PuTTY now uses the updated version of Diffie-Hellman group exchange,
except for a few old OpenSSH versions which Darren Tucker reports only
support the old version.
FIXME: this needs further work because the Bugs config panel has now
overflowed.
(cherry picked from commit 62a1bce7cb)
PuTTY now uses the updated version of Diffie-Hellman group exchange,
except for a few old OpenSSH versions which Darren Tucker reports only
support the old version.
FIXME: this needs further work because the Bugs config panel has now
overflowed.
It would be rare to have a host keypair in .ppk format or on a client
machine to load into PuTTYgen, and it might confuse people into thinking
they are required to do so.
I don't think anyone has ever actually called it that, colloquially
_or_ formally, and if anyone ever did (in a bug report, say) I'd
probably have to stop and think to work out what they meant. It's
universally called Plink, and should be officially so as well :-)
I've shifted away from using the SVN revision number as a monotonic
version identifier (replacing it in the Windows version resource with
a count of days since an arbitrary epoch), and I've removed all uses
of SVN keyword expansion (replacing them with version information
written out by Buildscr).
While I'm at it, I've done a major rewrite of the affected code which
centralises all the computation of the assorted version numbers and
strings into Buildscr, so that they're all more or less alongside each
other rather than scattered across multiple source files.
I've also retired the MD5-based manifest file system. A long time ago,
it seemed like a good idea to arrange that binaries of PuTTY would
automatically cease to identify themselves as a particular upstream
version number if any changes were made to the source code, so that if
someone made a local tweak and distributed the result then I wouldn't
get blamed for the results. Since then I've decided the whole idea is
more trouble than it's worth, so now distribution tarballs will have
version information baked in and people can just cope with that.
[originally from svn r10262]
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
We now expect that after the server has sent us CHANNEL_CLOSE, we
should not expect to see any replies to our outstanding channel
requests, and conversely after we have sent CHANNEL_CLOSE we avoid
sending any reply to channel requests from the server. This was the
consensus among implementors discussing the problem on ietf-ssh in
April 2014.
To cope with current OpenSSH's (and perhaps other servers we don't
know about yet) willingness to send request replies after
CHANNEL_CLOSE, I introduce a bug-compatibility flag which is detected
for every OpenSSH version up to and including the current 6.6 - but
not beyond, since https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1818
promises that 6.7 will also implement the new consensus behaviour.
[originally from svn r10200]
questionnaires in unfriendly formats like Excel, apparently in the
mistaken belief that we have some kind of incentive to answer them. I
hope I've managed to identify the key reason why they make this
mistake.
[originally from svn r10156]
The basic strategy is described at the top of the new source file
sshshare.c. In very brief: an 'upstream' PuTTY opens a Unix-domain
socket or Windows named pipe, and listens for connections from other
PuTTYs wanting to run sessions on the same server. The protocol spoken
down that socket/pipe is essentially the bare ssh-connection protocol,
using a trivial binary packet protocol with no encryption, and the
upstream has to do some fiddly transformations that I've been
referring to as 'channel-number NAT' to avoid resource clashes between
the sessions it's managing.
This is quite different from OpenSSH's approach of using the Unix-
domain socket as a means of passing file descriptors around; the main
reason for that is that fd-passing is Unix-specific but this system
has to work on Windows too. However, there are additional advantages,
such as making it easy for each downstream PuTTY to run its own
independent set of port and X11 forwardings (though the method for
making the latter work is quite painful).
Sharing is off by default, but configuration is intended to be very
easy in the normal case - just tick one box in the SSH config panel
and everything else happens automatically.
[originally from svn r10083]
winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org request. Not currently enabled
automatically, but should be usable as a manual workaround.
[originally from svn r9592]
Done in much the same way as it is in the GTK front end: the character
cell width is determined using the font's digits (which seems to give
generally not-too-offensive spacing in most cases, at the expense of
Ms and Ws typically overhanging a bit into adjacent cells) and each
character is centred in its cell. Overhangs never leave permanent
droppings on the window, because the existing work done in r5003
handles them just fine even in this stressful scenario.
There's a hacky new checkbox in the Appearance panel to make
variable-pitch fonts appear in the font selector (they still don't by
default, because I still think it's _usually_ not What You Want); the
checkbox state is not actually stored as part of a saved session, but
it should be automatically ticked when reloading a session that's got
a variable pitch font selected.
(I'm half-expecting a potential flurry of requests for this feature in
the wake of http://xkcd.com/840/ , so I thought I'd pre-empt them :-)
[originally from svn r9063]
[r5003 == ba470dec5e]
are now loaded from standard locations (system32 for SSPI, the
registry-stored MIT KfW install location for KfW) rather than using
the risky default DLL search path; I've therefore also added an
option to manually specify a GSS DLL we haven't heard of (which
should in principle Just Work provided it supports proper GSS-API as
specified in the RFC). The same option exists on Unix too, because
it seemed like too useful an idea to reserve to Windows. In
addition, GSSAPI is now documented, and also (unfortunately) its GUI
configuration has been moved out into a sub-subpanel on the grounds
that it was too big to fit in Auth.
[originally from svn r9003]
today reported an SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED from a Cisco router which
looks as if it was triggered by SSH2_MSG_IGNORE, so I'm
experimentally putting this flag in. Currently must be manually
enabled, though if it turns out to solve the user's problem then
I'll probably add at least one version string...
[Edited commit message: actually, I also committed in error a piece
of experimental code as part of this checkin. Serve me right for not
running 'svn diff' first.]
[originally from svn r8926]
page. Define in more detail what we mean by "Windows" in the Ports section of
the FAQ.
[originally from svn r8733]
[this svn revision also touched putty-website]
if we have no better ideas, with UI shamelessly stolen from Quest PuTTY.
Off by default, which effectively reverts the change to using the local
username by default that came in with GSSAPI support in r8138. Anyone wanting
seamless single sign-on will need to set the new option. (The previous
default behaviour was getting in the way in ad-hoc scenarios.)
Note that the PSCP and Unix-Plink behaviour of using the local username by
default have remained unchanged throughout; they are not affected by the new
option. Not sure if that's the Right Thing.
[originally from svn r8324]
[r8138 == de5dd9d65c]
strings more rigorously, and then we look up the local X authority
data in .Xauthority _ourself_ rather than delegating to an external
xauth program. This is (negligibly) more efficient on Unix, assuming
I haven't got it wrong in some subtle way, but its major benefit is
that we can now support X authority lookups on Windows as well
provided the user points us at an appropriate X authority file in
the standard format. A new Windows-specific config option has been
added for this purpose.
[originally from svn r8305]
on received data. Experiment and suggestion suggest that the character set
configuration applies equally to keystrokes sent to the server, or at least
that that's close enough to being true that we should document it as a first
approximation.
[originally from svn r8209]
Attempts at damage limitation from the name similarity with pterm.
Also try to refresh the ports section of the FAQ a bit.
[originally from svn r8139]
[this svn revision also touched putty-website]
to manually tweak the host name and port number under which the SSH
host key is read and written.
I've put it in the cross-platform Connection panel. Partly under the
flimsy pretext that other backends _can_ use it if they so wish (and
in fact it overrides the host name for title-bar purposes in all
network backends, though it has no other effect in anything but
SSH); but mostly because the SSH panel was too full already :-)
[originally from svn r8033]
advertise so that the server can't exceed our maximum packet size.
Enable it for "1.36_sshlib GlobalSCAPE" which apparently sends oversize
packets otherwise.
[originally from svn r7804]
