The list of kex methods recently ran out of space due to the addition
of NTRU (at least, if you have GSSAPI enabled). It's time to stop
having an arbitrary limit on those arrays and switch to doing it
properly.
Until now, every kex method has represented the output as an mp_int.
So we were storing it in the mp_int field s->K, and adding it to the
exchange hash and key derivation hashes via put_mp_ssh2.
But there's now going to be the first kex method that represents the
output as a string (so that it might have the top bit set, or multiple
leading zero bytes, without its length varying). So we now need to be
more general.
The most general thing it's sensible to do is to replace s->K with a
strbuf containing _already-encoded_ data to become part of the hash,
including length fields if necessary. So every existing kex method
still derives an mp_int, but then immediately puts it into that strbuf
using put_mp_ssh2 and frees it.
All the seat functions that request an interactive prompt of some kind
to the user - both the main seat_get_userpass_input and the various
confirmation dialogs for things like host keys - were using a simple
int return value, with the general semantics of 0 = "fail", 1 =
"proceed" (and in the case of seat_get_userpass_input, answers to the
prompts were provided), and -1 = "request in progress, wait for a
callback".
In this commit I change all those functions' return types to a new
struct called SeatPromptResult, whose primary field is an enum
replacing those simple integer values.
The main purpose is that the enum has not three but _four_ values: the
"fail" result has been split into 'user abort' and 'software abort'.
The distinction is that a user abort occurs as a result of an
interactive UI action, such as the user clicking 'cancel' in a dialog
box or hitting ^D or ^C at a terminal password prompt - and therefore,
there's no need to display an error message telling the user that the
interactive operation has failed, because the user already knows,
because they _did_ it. 'Software abort' is from any other cause, where
PuTTY is the first to know there was a problem, and has to tell the
user.
We already had this 'user abort' vs 'software abort' distinction in
other parts of the code - the SSH backend has separate termination
functions which protocol layers can call. But we assumed that any
failure from an interactive prompt request fell into the 'user abort'
category, which is not true. A couple of examples: if you configure a
host key fingerprint in your saved session via the SSH > Host keys
pane, and the server presents a host key that doesn't match it, then
verify_ssh_host_key would report that the user had aborted the
connection, and feel no need to tell the user what had gone wrong!
Similarly, if a password provided on the command line was not
accepted, then (after I fixed the semantics of that in the previous
commit) the same wrong handling would occur.
So now, those Seat prompt functions too can communicate whether the
user or the software originated a connection abort. And in the latter
case, we also provide an error message to present to the user. Result:
in those two example cases (and others), error messages should no
longer go missing.
Implementation note: to avoid the hassle of having the error message
in a SeatPromptResult being a dynamically allocated string (and hence,
every recipient of one must always check whether it's non-NULL and
free it on every exit path, plus being careful about copying the
struct around), I've instead arranged that the structure contains a
function pointer and a couple of parameters, so that the string form
of the message can be constructed on demand. That way, the only users
who need to free it are the ones who actually _asked_ for it in the
first place, which is a much smaller set.
(This is one of the rare occasions that I regret not having C++'s
extra features available in this code base - a unique_ptr or
shared_ptr to a string would have been just the thing here, and the
compiler would have done all the hard work for me of remembering where
to insert the frees!)
This code base has always been a bit confused about which spelling it
likes to use to refer to that signature algorithm. The SSH protocol id
is "ssh-dss". But everyone I know refers to it as the Digital
Signature _Algorithm_, not the Digital Signature _Standard_.
When I moved everything down into the crypto subdir, I took the
opportunity to rename sshdss.c to dsa.c. Now I'm doing the rest of the
job: all internal identifiers and code comments refer to DSA, and the
spelling "dss" only survives in externally visible identifiers that
have to remain constant.
(Such identifiers include the SSH protocol id, and also the string id
used to identify the key type in PuTTY's own host key cache. We can't
change the latter without causing everyone a backwards-compatibility
headache, and if we _did_ ever decide to do that, we'd surely want to
do a much more thorough job of making the cache format more sensible!)
This clears up another large pile of clutter at the top level, and in
the process, allows me to rename source files to things that don't all
have that annoying 'ssh' prefix at the top.
