It was horrible - even if harmless in practice - that it wrote the
NATed channel id over its input buffer, and I think it's worth the
extra memory management to avoid doing that.
After Pavel Kryukov pointed out that I have to put _something_ in the
'ssh_key' structure, I thought of an actually useful thing to put
there: why not make it store a pointer to the ssh_keyalg structure?
Then ssh_key becomes a classoid - or perhaps 'traitoid' is a closer
analogy - in the same style as Socket and Plug. And just like Socket
and Plug, I've also arranged a system of wrapper macros that avoid the
need to mention the 'object' whose method you're invoking twice at
each call site.
The new vtable pointer directly replaces an existing field of struct
ec_key (which was usable by several different ssh_keyalgs, so it
already had to store a pointer to the currently active one), and also
replaces the 'alg' field of the ssh2_userkey structure that wraps up a
cryptographic key with its comment field.
I've also taken the opportunity to clean things up a bit in general:
most of the methods now have new and clearer names (e.g. you'd never
know that 'newkey' made a public-only key while 'createkey' made a
public+private key pair unless you went and looked it up, but now
they're called 'new_pub' and 'new_priv' you might be in with a
chance), and I've completely removed the openssh_private_npieces field
after realising that it was duplicating information that is actually
_more_ conveniently obtained by calling the new_priv_openssh method
(formerly openssh_createkey) and throwing away the result.
This parameter returned a substring of the input, which was used for
two purposes. Firstly, it was used to hash the host and server keys
during the initial SSH-1 key setup phase; secondly, it was used to
check the keys in Pageant against the public key blob of a key
specified on the command line.
Unfortunately, those two purposes didn't agree! The first one needs
just the bare key modulus bytes (without even the SSH-1 mpint length
header); the second needs the entire key blob. So, actually, it seems
to have never worked in SSH-1 to say 'putty -i keyfile' and have PuTTY
find that key in Pageant and not have to ask for the passphrase to
decrypt the version on disk.
Fixed by removing that parameter completely, which simplifies all the
_other_ call sites, and replacing it by custom code in those two
places that each does the actually right thing.
It's an SSH-1 specific function, so it should have a name reflecting
that, and it didn't. Also it had one of those outdated APIs involving
passing it a client-allocated buffer and size. Now it has a sensible
name, and internally it constructs the output string using a strbuf
and returns it dynamically allocated.
Another piece of half-finished machinery that I can't have tested
properly when I set up connection sharing: I had the function
ssh_alloc_sharing_rportfwd which is how sshshare.c asks ssh.c to start
sending it channel-open requests for a given remote forwarded port,
but I had no companion function that removes one of those requests
again when a downstream remote port forwarding goes away (either by
mid-session cancel-tcpip-forward or by the whole downstream
disconnecting).
As a result, the _second_ attempt to set up the same remote port
forwarding, after a sharing downstream had done so once and then
stopped, would quietly fail.
There are several old functions that the previous commits have removed
all, or nearly all, of the references to. match_ssh_id is superseded
by ptrlen_eq_string; get_ssh_{string,uint32} is yet another replicated
set of decode functions (this time _partly_ centralised into misc.c);
the old APIs for the SSH-1 RSA decode functions are gone (together
with their last couple of holdout clients), as are
ssh{1,2}_{read,write}_bignum and ssh{1,2}_bignum_length.
Particularly odd was the use of ssh1_{read,write}_bignum in the SSH-2
Diffie-Hellman implementation. I'd completely forgotten I did that!
Now replaced with a raw bignum_from_bytes, which is simpler anyway.
Quite a few of the function pointers in the ssh_keyalg vtable now take
ptrlen arguments in place of separate pointer and length pairs.
Meanwhile, the various key types' implementations of those functions
now work by initialising a BinarySource with the input ptrlen and
using the new decode functions to walk along it.
One exception is the openssh_createkey method which reads a private
key in the wire format used by OpenSSH's SSH-2 agent protocol, which
has to consume a prefix of a larger data stream, and tell the caller
how much of that data was the private key. That function now takes an
actual BinarySource, and passes that directly to the decode functions,
so that on return the caller finds that the BinarySource's read
pointer has been advanced exactly past the private key.
This let me throw away _several_ reimplementations of mpint-reading
functions, one in each of sshrsa, sshdss.c and sshecc.c. Worse still,
they didn't all have exactly the SSH-2 semantics, because the thing in
sshrsa.c whose name suggested it was an mpint-reading function
actually tolerated the wrong number of leading zero bytes, which it
had to be able to do to cope with the "ssh-rsa" signature format which
contains a thing that isn't quite an SSH-2 mpint. Now that deviation
is clearly commented!
Another set of localised decoding routines get thrown away here. Also,
I've changed the APIs of a couple of helper functions in x11fwd.c to
take ptrlens in place of zero-terminated C strings, because that's the
format in which they come back from the decode, and it saves mallocing
a zero-terminated version of each one just to pass to those helpers.
The SSH-1 RSA key reading functions now have BinarySource-shaped get_*
forms, although for the moment I'm still supporting the old API as a
wrapper on the new one, because I haven't switched over the client
code yet. Also, rsa_public_blob_len uses the new system internally,
although its API is unchanged.
This is the companion to the BinarySink system I introduced a couple
of weeks ago, and provides the same type-genericity which will let me
use the same get_* routines on an SSH packet, an SFTP packet or
anything else that chooses to include an implementing substructure.
However, unlike BinarySink which contained a (one-function) vtable,
BinarySource contains only mutable data fields - so another thing you
might very well want to do is to simply instantiate a bare one without
any containing object at all. I couldn't quite coerce C into letting
me use the same setup macro in both cases, so I've arranged a
BinarySource_INIT you can use on larger implementing objects and a
BinarySource_BARE_INIT you can use on a BinarySource not contained in
anything.
The API follows the general principle that even if decoding fails, the
decode functions will always return _some_ kind of value, with the
same dynamically-allocated-ness they would have used for a completely
successful value. But they also set an error flag in the BinarySource
which can be tested later. So instead of having to decode a 10-field
packet by means of 10 separate 'if (!get_foo(src)) throw error'
clauses, you can just write 10 'variable = get_foo(src)' statements
followed by a single check of get_err(src), and if the error check
fails, you have to do exactly the same set of frees you would have
after a successful decode.
This wraps up a (pointer, length) pair into a convenient struct that
lets me return it by value from a function, and also pass it through
to other functions in one go.
Ideally quite a lot of this code base could be switched over to using
ptrlen in place of separate pointer and length variables or function
parameters. (In fact, in my personal ideal conception of C, the usual
string type would be of this form, and all the string.h functions
would operate on ptrlens instead of zero-terminated 'char *'.)
For the moment, I'm just introducing it to make some upcoming
refactoring less inconvenient. Bulk migration of existing code to
ptrlen is a project for another time.
Along with the type itself, I've provided a convenient system of
including the contents of a ptrlen in a printf; a constructor function
that wraps up a pointer and length so you can make a ptrlen on the fly
in mid-expression; a function to compare a ptrlen against an ordinary
C string (which I mostly expect to use with string literals); and a
function 'mkstr' to make a dynamically allocated C string out of one.
That last function replaces a function of the same name in sftp.c,
which I'm promoting to a whole-codebase facility and adjusting its
API.
Now I've got FROMFIELD, I can rework it so that structures providing
an implementation of the Socket or Plug trait no longer have to have
the vtable pointer as the very first thing in the structure. In
particular, this means that the ProxySocket structure can now directly
implement _both_ the Socket and Plug traits, which is always
_logically_ how it's worked, but previously it had to be implemented
via two separate structs linked to each other.
During last week's work, I made a mistake in which I got the arguments
backwards in one of the key-blob-generating functions - mistakenly
swapped the 'void *' key instance with the 'BinarySink *' output
destination - and I didn't spot the mistake until run time, because in
C you can implicitly convert both to and from void * and so there was
no compile-time failure of type checking.
Now that I've introduced the FROMFIELD macro that downcasts a pointer
to one field of a structure to retrieve a pointer to the whole
structure, I think I might start using that more widely to indicate
this kind of polymorphic subtyping. So now all the public-key
functions in the struct ssh_signkey vtable handle their data instance
in the form of a pointer to a subfield of a new zero-sized structure
type 'ssh_key', which outside the key implementations indicates 'this
is some kind of key instance but it could be of any type'; they
downcast that pointer internally using FROMFIELD in place of the
previous ordinary C cast, and return one by returning &foo->sshk for
whatever foo they've just made up.
The sshk member is not at the beginning of the structure, which means
all those FROMFIELDs and &key->sshk are actually adding and
subtracting an offset. Of course I could have put the member at the
start anyway, but I had the idea that it's actually a feature _not_ to
have the two types start at the same address, because it means you
should notice earlier rather than later if you absentmindedly cast
from one to the other directly rather than by the approved method (in
particular, if you accidentally assign one through a void * and back
without even _noticing_ you perpetrated a cast). In particular, this
enforces that you can't sfree() the thing even once without realising
you should instead of called the right freekey function. (I found
several bugs by this method during initial testing, so I think it's
already proved its worth!)
While I'm here, I've also renamed the vtable structure ssh_signkey to
ssh_keyalg, because it was a confusing name anyway - it describes the
_algorithm_ for handling all keys of that type, not a specific key. So
ssh_keyalg is the collection of code, and ssh_key is one instance of
the data it handles.
This is a cleanup I started to notice a need for during the BinarySink
work. It removes a lot of faffing about casting things to char * or
unsigned char * so that some API will accept them, even though lots of
such APIs really take a plain 'block of raw binary data' argument and
don't care what C thinks the signedness of that data might be - they
may well reinterpret it back and forth internally.
So I've tried to arrange for all the function call APIs that ought to
have a void * (or const void *) to have one, and those that need to do
pointer arithmetic on the parameter internally can cast it back at the
top of the function. That saves endless ad-hoc casts at the call
sites.
There was a time, back when the USA was more vigorously against
cryptography, when we toyed with the idea of having a version of PuTTY
that outsourced its cryptographic primitives to the Microsoft optional
encryption API, which would effectively create a tool that acted like
PuTTY proper on a system with that API installed, but automatically
degraded to being PuTTYtel on a system without, and meanwhile (so went
the theory) it could be moved freely across national borders with
crypto restrictions, because it didn't _contain_ any of the actual
crypto.
I don't recall that we ever got it working at all. And certainly the
vestiges of it here and there in the current code are completely
unworkable - they refer to an 'mscrypto.c' that doesn't even exist,
and the ifdefs in the definitions of structures like RSAKey and
MD5Context are not matched by any corresponding ifdefs in the code. So
I ought to have got round to removing it long ago, in order to avoid
misleading anyone.
Just as I did a few commits ago with the low-level SHA_Bytes type
functions, the ssh_hash and ssh_mac abstract types now no longer have
a direct foo->bytes() update method at all. Instead, each one has a
foo->sink() function that returns a BinarySink with the same lifetime
as the hash context, and then the caller can feed data into that in
the usual way.
This lets me get rid of a couple more duplicate marshalling routines
in ssh.c: hash_string(), hash_uint32(), hash_mpint().
This affects all the functions that generate public and private key
and signature blobs of all kinds, plus ssh_ecdhkex_getpublic. Instead
of returning a bare block of memory and taking an extra 'int *length'
parameter, all these functions now write to a BinarySink, and it's the
caller's job to have prepared an appropriate one where they want the
output to go (usually a strbuf).
The main value of this change is that those blob-generation functions
were chock full of ad-hoc length-counting and data marshalling. You
have only to look at rsa2_{public,private}_blob, for example, to see
the kind of thing I was keen to get rid of!
In fact, those functions don't even exist any more. The only way to
get data into a primitive hash state is via the new put_* system. Of
course, that means put_data() is a viable replacement for every
previous call to one of the per-hash update functions - but just
mechanically doing that would have missed the opportunity to simplify
a lot of the call sites.
I've finally got tired of all the code throughout PuTTY that repeats
the same logic about how to format the SSH binary primitives like
uint32, string, mpint. We've got reasonably organised code in ssh.c
that appends things like that to 'struct Packet'; something similar in
sftp.c which repeats a lot of the work; utility functions in various
places to format an mpint to feed to one or another hash function; and
no end of totally ad-hoc stuff in functions like public key blob
formatters which actually have to _count up_ the size of data
painstakingly, then malloc exactly that much and mess about with
PUT_32BIT.
It's time to bring all of that into one place, and stop repeating
myself in error-prone ways everywhere. The new marshal.h defines a
system in which I centralise all the actual marshalling functions, and
then layer a touch of C macro trickery on top to allow me to (look as
if I) pass a wide range of different types to those functions, as long
as the target type has been set up in the right way to have a write()
function.
This commit adds the new header and source file, and sets up some
general centralised types (strbuf and the various hash-function
contexts like SHA_State), but doesn't use the new calls for anything
yet.
(I've also renamed some internal functions in import.c which were
using the same names that I've just defined macros over. That won't
last long - those functions are going to go away soon, so the changed
names are strictly temporary.)
This centralises a few things that multiple header files were
previously defining, and were protecting against each other's
redefinition with ifdefs - small things like structs and typedefs. Now
all those things are in a defs.h which is by definition safe to
include _first_ (out of all the codebase-local headers) and only need
to be defined once.
Lots of functions had really generic names (like 'makekey'), or names
that missed out an important concept (like 'rsakey_pubblob', which
loads a public blob from a _file_ and doesn't generate it from an
in-memory representation at all). Also, the opaque 'int order' that
distinguishes the two formats of public key blob is now a mnemonic
enumeration, and while I'm at it, rsa_ssh1_public_blob takes one of
those as an extra argument.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
__clang_major__ and __clang_minor__ macros may be overriden
in Apple and other compilers. Instead of them, we use
__has_attribute(target) to check whether Clang supports per-function
targeted build and __has_include() to check if there are intrinsic
header files
These pointers will be required in next commits
where subroutines with new instructions are introduced.
Depending on CPUID dynamic check, pointers will refer to old
SW-only implementations or to new instructions subroutines
These must have been absent-mindedly copied from function declarations
of the form 'const type *fn(args)', where the 'const' is meaningful
and describes the data pointed to by the returned pointer, to
functions of the form 'const type fn(args)' where the 'const' is
completely pointless.
I can't believe this codebase is around 20 years old and has had
multiple giant const-fixing patches, and yet there are _still_ things
that should have been const for years and aren't.
Jacob pointed out that a free-text field for entering a key size in
bits is all very well for key types where we actually _can_ generate a
key to a size of your choice, but less useful for key types where
there are only three (or one) legal values for the field, especially
if we don't _say_ what they are.
So I've revamped the UI a bit: now, in ECDSA mode, you get a dropdown
list selector showing the available elliptic curves (and they're even
named, rather than just given by bit count), and in ED25519 mode even
that disappears. The curve selector for ECDSA and the bits selector
for RSA/DSA are independent controls, so each one remembers its last
known value even while temporarily hidden in favour of the other.
The actual generation function still expects a bit count rather than
an actual curve or algorithm ID, so the easiest way to actually
arrange to populate the drop-down list was to have an array of bit
counts exposed by sshecc.c. That's a bit ugly, but there we go.
One small functional change: if you enter an absurdly low value into
the RSA/DSA bit count box (under 256), PuTTYgen used to give a warning
and reset it to 256. Now it resets it to the default key length of
2048, basically because I was touching that code anyway to change a
variable name and just couldn't bring myself to leave it in a state
where it intentionally chose such an utterly useless key size. Of
course this doesn't prevent generation of 256-bit keys if someone
still really wants one - it just means they don't get one selected as
the result of a typo.
A Plink invocation of the form 'plink -shareexists <session>' tests
for a currently live connection-sharing upstream for the session in
question. <session> can be any syntax you'd use with Plink to make the
actual connection (a host/port number, a bare saved session name,
-load, whatever).
I envisage this being useful for things like adaptive proxying - e.g.
if you want to connect to host A which you can't route to directly,
and you might already have a connection to either of hosts B or C
which are viable proxies, then you could write a proxy shell script
which checks whether you already have an upstream for B or C and goes
via whichever one is currently active.
Testing for the upstream's existence has to be done by actually
connecting to its socket, because on Unix the mere existence of a
Unix-domain socket file doesn't guarantee that there's a process
listening to it. So we make a test connection, and then immediately
disconnect; hence, that shows up in the upstream's event log.
The revamp of key generation in commit e460f3083 made the assumption
that you could decide how many bytes of key material to generate by
converting cipher->keylen from bits to bytes. This is a good
assumption for all ciphers except DES/3DES: since the SSH DES key
setup ignores one bit in every byte of key material it's given, you
need more bytes than its keylen field would have you believe. So
currently the DES ciphers aren't being keyed correctly.
The original keylen field is used for deciding how big a DH group to
request, and on that basis I think it still makes sense to keep it
reflecting the true entropy of a cipher key. So it turns out we need
two _separate_ key length fields per cipher - one for the real
entropy, and one for the much more obvious purpose of knowing how much
data to ask for from ssh2_mkkey.
A compensatory advantage, though, is that we can now measure the
latter directly in bytes rather than bits, so we no longer have to
faff about with dividing by 8 and rounding up.
The key derivation code has been assuming (though non-critically, as
it happens) that the size of the MAC output is the same as the size of
the MAC key. That isn't even a good assumption for the HMAC family,
due to HMAC-SHA1-96 and also the bug-compatible versions of HMAC-SHA1
that only use 16 bytes of key material; so now we have an explicit
key-length field separate from the MAC-length field.
This permits a hash state to be cloned in the middle of being used, so
that multiple strings with the same prefix can be hashed without
having to repeat all the computation over the prefix.
Having done that, we'll also sometimes need to free a hash state that
we aren't generating actual hash output from, so we need a free method
as well.
It seems like quite an important thing to mention in the event log!
Suppose there's a bug affecting only one curve, for example? Fixed-
group Diffie-Hellman has always logged the group, but the ECDH log
message just told you the hash and not also the curve.
To implement this, I've added a 'textname' field to all elliptic
curves, whether they're used for kex or signing or both, suitable for
use in this log message and any others we might find a need for in
future.
When anyone connects to a PuTTY tool's listening socket - whether it's
a user of a local->remote port forwarding, a connection-sharing
downstream or a client of Pageant - we'd like to log as much
information as we can find out about where the connection came from.
To that end, I've implemented a function sk_peer_info() in the socket
abstraction, which returns a freeform text string as best it can (or
NULL, if it can't get anything at all) describing the thing at the
other end of the connection. For TCP connections, this is done using
getpeername() to get an IP address and port in the obvious way; for
Unix-domain sockets, we attempt SO_PEERCRED (conditionalised on some
moderately hairy autoconfery) to get the pid and owner of the peer. I
haven't implemented anything for Windows named pipes, but I will if I
hear of anything useful.
Having found a lot of unfixed constness issues in recent development,
I thought perhaps it was time to get proactive, so I compiled the
whole codebase with -Wwrite-strings. That turned up a huge load of
const problems, which I've fixed in this commit: the Unix build now
goes cleanly through with -Wwrite-strings, and the Windows build is as
close as I could get it (there are some lingering issues due to
occasional Windows API functions like AcquireCredentialsHandle not
having the right constness).
Notable fallout beyond the purely mechanical changing of types:
- the stuff saved by cmdline_save_param() is now explicitly
dupstr()ed, and freed in cmdline_run_saved.
- I couldn't make both string arguments to cmdline_process_param()
const, because it intentionally writes to one of them in the case
where it's the argument to -pw (in the vain hope of being at least
slightly friendly to 'ps'), so elsewhere I had to temporarily
dupstr() something for the sake of passing it to that function
- I had to invent a silly parallel version of const_cmp() so I could
pass const string literals in to lookup functions.
- stripslashes() in pscp.c and psftp.c has the annoying strchr nature
The ec_name_to_curve and ec_curve_to_name functions shouldn't really
have had to exist at all: whenever any part of the PuTTY codebase
starts using sshecc.c, it's starting from an ssh_signkey or ssh_kex
pointer already found by some other means. So if we make sure not to
lose that pointer, we should never need to do any string-based lookups
to find the curve we want, and conversely, when we need to know the
name of our curve or our algorithm, we should be able to look it up as
a straightforward const char * starting from the algorithm pointer.
This commit cleans things up so that that is indeed what happens. The
ssh_signkey and ssh_kex structures defined in sshecc.c now have
'extra' fields containing pointers to all the necessary stuff;
ec_name_to_curve and ec_curve_to_name have been completely removed;
struct ec_curve has a string field giving the curve's name (but only
for those curves which _have_ a name exposed in the wire protocol,
i.e. the three NIST ones); struct ec_key keeps a pointer to the
ssh_signkey it started from, and uses that to remember the algorithm
name rather than reconstructing it from the curve. And I think I've
got rid of all the ad-hockery scattered around the code that switches
on curve->fieldBits or manually constructs curve names using stuff
like sprintf("nistp%d"); the only remaining switch on fieldBits
(necessary because that's the UI for choosing a curve in PuTTYgen) is
at least centralised into one place in sshecc.c.
One user-visible result is that the format of ed25519 host keys in the
registry has changed: there's now no curve name prefix on them,
because I think it's not really right to make up a name to use. So any
early adopters who've been using snapshot PuTTY in the last week will
be inconvenienced; sorry about that.
This gives families of public key and kex functions (by which I mean
those sharing a set of methods) a place to store parameters that allow
the methods to vary depending on which exact algorithm is in use.
The ssh_kex structure already had a set of parameters specific to
Diffie-Hellman key exchange; I've moved those into sshdh.c and made
them part of the 'extra' structure for that family only, so that
unrelated kex methods don't have to faff about saying NULL,NULL,0,0.
(This required me to write an extra accessor function for ssh.c to ask
whether a DH method was group-exchange style or fixed-group style, but
that doesn't seem too silly.)
Not all of them, but the ones that don't get a 'void *key' parameter.
This means I can share methods between multiple ssh_signkey
structures, and still give those methods an easy way to find out which
public key method they're dealing with, by loading parameters from a
larger structure in which the ssh_signkey is the first element.
(In OO terms, I'm arranging that all static methods of my public key
classes get a pointer to the class vtable, to make up for not having a
pointer to the class instance.)
I haven't actually done anything with the new facility in this commit,
but it will shortly allow me to clean up the constant lookups by curve
name in the ECDSA code.
All the name strings in ssh_cipher, ssh_mac, ssh_hash, ssh_signkey
point to compile-time string literals, hence should obviously be const
char *.
Most of these const-correctness patches are just a mechanical job of
adding a 'const' in the one place you need it right now, and then
chasing the implications through the code adding further consts until
it compiles. But this one has actually shown up a bug: the 'algorithm'
output parameter in ssh2_userkey_loadpub was sometimes returning a
pointer to a string literal, and sometimes a pointer to dynamically
allocated memory, so callers were forced to either sometimes leak
memory or sometimes free a bad thing. Now it's consistently
dynamically allocated, and should be freed everywhere too.
There were ad-hoc functions for fingerprinting a bare key blob in both
cmdgen.c and pageant.c, not quite doing the same thing. Also, every
SSH-2 public key algorithm in the code base included a dedicated
fingerprint() method, which is completely pointless since SSH-2 key
fingerprints are computed in an algorithm-independent way (just hash
the standard-format public key blob), so each of those methods was
just duplicating the work of the public_blob() method with a less
general output mechanism.
Now sshpubk.c centrally provides an ssh2_fingerprint_blob() function
that does all the real work, plus an ssh2_fingerprint() function that
wraps it and deals with calling public_blob() to get something to
fingerprint. And the fingerprint() method has been completely removed
from ssh_signkey and all its implementations, and good riddance.
There was a fair amount of duplication between Windows and Unix
PuTTYgen, and some confusion over writing things to FILE * and
formatting them internally into strings. I think all the public-key
output code now lives in sshpubk.c, and there's only one copy of the
code to generate each format.
The rsakey_pubblob() and ssh2_userkey_loadpub() functions, which
expected to be given a private key file and load only the unencrypted
public half, now also cope with any of the public-only formats I know
about (SSH-1 only has one, whereas SSH-2 has the RFC 4716 format and
OpenSSH's one-line format) and return an appropriate public key blob
from each of those too.
cmdgen now supports this functionality, by permitting public key files
to be loaded and used by any operation that doesn't need the private
key: so you can convert back and forth between the SSH-2 public
formats, or list the file's fingerprint.
When I implemented reading and writing of the new format a couple of
weeks ago, I kept them strictly separate in the UI, so you have to ask
for the format you want when exporting. But in fact this is silly,
because not every key type can be saved in both formats, and OpenSSH
itself has the policy of using the old format for key types it can
handle, unless specifically asked to use the new one.
So I've now arranged that the key file format enum has three values
for OpenSSH: PEM, NEW and AUTO. Files being loaded are identified as
either PEM or NEW, which describe the two physical file formats. But
exporting UIs present either AUTO or NEW, where AUTO is the virtual
format meaning 'save in the old format if possible, otherwise the new
one'.
This is the kex protocol id "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org", so called
because it's over the prime field of order 2^255 - 19.
Arithmetic in this curve is done using the Montgomery representation,
rather than the Weierstrass representation. So 'struct ec_curve' has
grown a discriminant field and a union of subtypes.
The only reason those couldn't be replaced with a call to the
centralised find_pubkey_alg is because that function takes a zero-
terminated string and instead we had a (length,pointer) string. Easily
fixed; there's now a find_pubkey_alg_len(), and we call that.
This also fixes a string-matching bug in which the sense of memcmp was
reversed by mistake for ECDSA keys!
Several of the functions in ssh2_signkey, and one or two SSH-1 key
functions too, were still taking assorted non-const buffer parameters
that had never been properly constified. Sort them all out.
This is better than listing all the algorithm names in yet another
place that will then need updating when a new key format is added.
However, that also means I need to find a new place to put the
'npieces' value I was previously setting up differently per key type;
since that's a fundamental property of the key format, I've moved it
to a constant field in the ssh_signkey structure, and filled that
field in for all the existing key types with the values from the
replaced code in openssh_read_new().
It's all very well for these two different formats to share a type
code as long as we're only loading them and not saving, but as soon as
we need to save one or the other, we'll need different type codes
after all.
This commit introduces the openssh_new_write() function, but for the
moment, it always returns failure.
This isn't the same as the standard bcrypt; it's OpenSSH's
modification that they use for their new-style key format.
In order to implement this, I've broken up blowfish_setkey() into two
subfunctions, and provided one of them with an extra optional salt
parameter, which is NULL in ordinary Blowfish but used by bcrypt.
Also, I've exposed some of sshblowf.c's internal machinery for the new
sshbcrypt.c to use.
SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD and SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST were
correctly _defined_ as different numbers, but the comments to the
right containing the hex representations of their values were
accidentally the same.
This causes the initial length field of the SSH-2 binary packet to be
unencrypted (with the knock-on effect that now the packet length not
including MAC must be congruent to 4 rather than 0 mod the cipher
block size), and then the MAC is applied over the unencrypted length
field and encrypted ciphertext (prefixed by the sequence number as
usual). At the cost of exposing some information about the packet
lengths to an attacker (but rarely anything they couldn't have
inferred from the TCP headers anyway), this closes down any
possibility of a MITM using the client as a decryption oracle, unless
they can _first_ fake a correct MAC.
ETM mode is enabled by means of selecting a different MAC identifier,
all the current ones of which are constructed by appending
"-etm@openssh.com" to the name of a MAC that already existed.
We currently prefer the original SSH-2 binary packet protocol (i.e. we
list all the ETM-mode MACs last in our KEXINIT), on the grounds that
it's better tested and more analysed, so at the moment the new mode is
only activated if a server refuses to speak anything else.
PuTTY now uses the updated version of Diffie-Hellman group exchange,
except for a few old OpenSSH versions which Darren Tucker reports only
support the old version.
FIXME: this needs further work because the Bugs config panel has now
overflowed.
Florent Daigniere of Matta points out that RFC 4253 actually
_requires_ us to refuse to accept out-of-range values, though it isn't
completely clear to me why this should be a MUST on the receiving end.
Matta considers this to be a security vulnerability, on the grounds
that if a server should accidentally send an obviously useless value
such as 1 then we will fail to reject it and agree a key that an
eavesdropper could also figure out. Their id for this vulnerability is
MATTA-2015-002.
This provides support for ECDSA public keys, for both hosts and users,
and also ECDH key exchange. Supported curves are currently just the
three NIST curves required by RFC 5656.
SHA-384 was previously not implemented at all, but is a trivial
adjustment to SHA-512 (different starting constants, and truncate the
output hash). Both are now exposed as 'ssh_hash' structures so that
key exchange methods can ask for them.
It's now a separate function, which you call with an identifying
string to be hashed into the generation of x. The idea is that other
DSA-like signature algorithms can reuse the same function, with a
different id string.
As a minor refinement, we now also never return k=1.
The basic strategy is described at the top of the new source file
sshshare.c. In very brief: an 'upstream' PuTTY opens a Unix-domain
socket or Windows named pipe, and listens for connections from other
PuTTYs wanting to run sessions on the same server. The protocol spoken
down that socket/pipe is essentially the bare ssh-connection protocol,
using a trivial binary packet protocol with no encryption, and the
upstream has to do some fiddly transformations that I've been
referring to as 'channel-number NAT' to avoid resource clashes between
the sessions it's managing.
This is quite different from OpenSSH's approach of using the Unix-
domain socket as a means of passing file descriptors around; the main
reason for that is that fd-passing is Unix-specific but this system
has to work on Windows too. However, there are additional advantages,
such as making it easy for each downstream PuTTY to run its own
independent set of port and X11 forwardings (though the method for
making the latter work is quite painful).
Sharing is off by default, but configuration is intended to be very
easy in the normal case - just tick one box in the SSH config panel
and everything else happens automatically.
[originally from svn r10083]
Now that it doesn't actually make a network connection because that's
deferred until after the X authorisation exchange, there's no point in
having it return an error message and write the real output through a
pointer argument. Instead, we can just have it return xconn directly
and simplify the call sites.
[originally from svn r10081]
I've moved it out into a separate function, preparatory to calling it
from somewhere completely different in changes to come. Also, we now
retain the peer address sent from the SSH server in string form,
rather than translating it immediately into a numeric IP address, so
that its original form will be available later to pass on elsewhere.
[originally from svn r10080]
Rather than the top-level component of X forwarding being an
X11Display structure which owns some auth data, it's now a collection
of X11FakeAuth structures, each of which owns a display. The idea is
that when we receive an X connection, we wait to see which of our
available auth cookies it matches, and then connect to whatever X
display that auth cookie identifies. At present the tree will only
have one thing in it; this is all groundwork for later changes.
[originally from svn r10079]
Now we wait to open the socket to the X server until we've seen the
authorisation data. This prepares us to do something else with the
channel if we see different auth data, which will come up in
connection sharing.
[originally from svn r10078]
The most important change is that, where previously ssh.c held the
Socket pointer for each X11 and port forwarding, and the support
modules would find their internal state structure by calling
sk_get_private_ptr on that Socket, it's now the other way round. ssh.c
now directly holds the internal state structure pointer for each
forwarding, and when the support module needs the Socket it looks it
up in a field of that. This will come in handy when I decouple socket
creation from logical forwarding setup, so that X forwardings can
delay actually opening a connection to an X server until they look at
the authentication data and see which server it has to be.
However, while I'm here, I've also taken the opportunity to clean up a
few other points, notably error message handling, and also the fact
that the same kind of state structure was used for both
connection-type and listening-type port forwardings. Now there are
separate PortForwarding and PortListener structure types, which seems
far more sensible.
[originally from svn r10074]
as specified in RFC 6668. This is not so much because I think it's
necessary, but because scrypt uses HMAC-SHA-256 and once we've got it we
may as well use it.
Code very closely derived from the HMAC-SHA-1 code.
Tested against OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1.
[originally from svn r9759]
subsidiary network modules like portfwd.c. To be called when the
subsidiary module experiences a socket error: it sends an emergency
CHANNEL_CLOSE (not just outgoing CHANNEL_EOF), and immediately deletes
the local side of the channel. (I've invented a new channel type in
ssh.c called CHAN_ZOMBIE, for channels whose original local side has
already been thrown away and they're just hanging around waiting to
receive the acknowledging CHANNEL_CLOSE.)
As a result of this and the last few commits, I can now run a port
forwarding session in which a local socket error occurs on a forwarded
port, and PuTTY now handles it apparently correctly, closing both the
SSH channel and the local socket and then actually recognising that
it's OK to terminate when all _other_ channels have been closed.
Previously the channel corresponding to the duff connection would
linger around (because of net_pending_errors never being called), and
keep being selected on (hence chewing CPU), and inhibit program
termination at the end of the session (because not all channels were
closed).
[originally from svn r9364]
data channels. Should comprehensively fix 'half-closed', in principle,
though it's a big and complicated change and so there's a good chance
I've made at least one mistake somewhere.
All connections should now be rigorous about propagating end-of-file
(or end-of-data-stream, or socket shutdown, or whatever) independently
in both directions, except in frontends with no mechanism for sending
explicit EOF (e.g. interactive terminal windows) or backends which are
basically always used for interactive sessions so it's unlikely that
an application would be depending on independent EOF (telnet, rlogin).
EOF should now never accidentally be sent while there's still buffered
data to go out before it. (May help fix 'portfwd-corrupt', and also I
noticed recently that the ssh main session channel can accidentally
have MSG_EOF sent before the output bufchain is clear, leading to
embarrassment when it subsequently does send the output).
[originally from svn r9279]
'Config' in putty.h, which stores all PuTTY's settings and includes an
arbitrary length limit on every single one of those settings which is
stored in string form. In place of it is 'Conf', an opaque data type
everywhere outside the new file conf.c, which stores a list of (key,
value) pairs in which every key contains an integer identifying a
configuration setting, and for some of those integers the key also
contains extra parts (so that, for instance, CONF_environmt is a
string-to-string mapping). Everywhere that a Config was previously
used, a Conf is now; everywhere there was a Config structure copy,
conf_copy() is called; every lookup, adjustment, load and save
operation on a Config has been rewritten; and there's a mechanism for
serialising a Conf into a binary blob and back for use with Duplicate
Session.
User-visible effects of this change _should_ be minimal, though I
don't doubt I've introduced one or two bugs here and there which will
eventually be found. The _intended_ visible effects of this change are
that all arbitrary limits on configuration strings and lists (e.g.
limit on number of port forwardings) should now disappear; that list
boxes in the configuration will now be displayed in a sorted order
rather than the arbitrary order in which they were added to the list
(since the underlying data structure is now a sorted tree234 rather
than an ad-hoc comma-separated string); and one more specific change,
which is that local and dynamic port forwardings on the same port
number are now mutually exclusive in the configuration (putting 'D' in
the key rather than the value was a mistake in the first place).
One other reorganisation as a result of this is that I've moved all
the dialog.c standard handlers (dlg_stdeditbox_handler and friends)
out into config.c, because I can't really justify calling them generic
any more. When they took a pointer to an arbitrary structure type and
the offset of a field within that structure, they were independent of
whether that structure was a Config or something completely different,
but now they really do expect to talk to a Conf, which can _only_ be
used for PuTTY configuration, so I've renamed them all things like
conf_editbox_handler and moved them out of the nominally independent
dialog-box management module into the PuTTY-specific config.c.
[originally from svn r9214]
reorganises the GSSAPI support so that it handles alternative
implementations of the GSS-API. In particular, this means PuTTY can
now talk to MIT Kerberos for Windows instead of being limited to
SSPI. I don't know for sure whether further tweaking will be needed
(to the UI, most likely, or to automatic selection of credentials),
but testing reports suggest it's now at least worth committing to
trunk to get it more widely tested.
[originally from svn r8952]
under SSH-2, don't risk looking at the length field of an incoming packet
until we've successfully MAC'ed the packet.
This requires a change to the MAC mechanics so that we can calculate MACs
incrementally, and output a MAC for the packet so far while still being
able to add more data to the packet later.
[originally from svn r8334]
strings more rigorously, and then we look up the local X authority
data in .Xauthority _ourself_ rather than delegating to an external
xauth program. This is (negligibly) more efficient on Unix, assuming
I haven't got it wrong in some subtle way, but its major benefit is
that we can now support X authority lookups on Windows as well
provided the user points us at an appropriate X authority file in
the standard format. A new Windows-specific config option has been
added for this purpose.
[originally from svn r8305]
addressing X displays. Update PuTTY's display-name-to-Unix-socket-
path translation code to cope with it, thus causing X forwarding to
start working again on Leopard.
[originally from svn r8020]
(Since we choose to compile with -Werror, this is particularly important.)
I haven't yet checked that the resulting source actually compiles cleanly with
GCC 4, hence not marking `gcc4-warnings' as fixed just yet.
[originally from svn r7041]
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, which the last DHGEX draft defined.
Code lifted from Simon's "crypto" directory, with changes to make it look
more like sshsh512.c.
[originally from svn r6252]
default preferred cipher), add code to inject SSH_MSG_IGNOREs to randomise
the IV when using CBC-mode ciphers. Each cipher has a flag to indicate
whether it needs this workaround, and the SSH packet output maze has gained
some extra complexity to implement it.
[originally from svn r5659]
discussed. Use Barrett and Silverman's convention of "SSH-1" for SSH protocol
version 1 and "SSH-2" for protocol 2 ("SSH1"/"SSH2" refer to ssh.com
implementations in this scheme). <http://www.snailbook.com/terms.html>
[originally from svn r5480]
- will now display a reason when it fails to load a key
- uses existing error return from native keys
- import.c had a lot of error descriptions which weren't going anywhere;
since the strings are probably taking up space in the binary, we
may as well use them
[originally from svn r5408]
of polishing to bring them to what I think should in principle be
release quality. Unlike the unfix.org patches themselves, this
checkin enables IPv6 by default; if you want to leave it out, you
have to build with COMPAT=-DNO_IPV6.
I have tested that this compiles on Visual C 7 (so the nightlies
_should_ acquire IPv6 support without missing a beat), but since I
don't have IPv6 set up myself I haven't actually tested that it
_works_. It still seems to make correct IPv4 connections, but that's
all I've been able to verify for myself. Further testing is needed.
[originally from svn r5047]
[this svn revision also touched putty-wishlist]
Change Settings, the port forwarding setup function is run again,
and tags all existing port forwardings as `do not keep'. Then it
iterates through the config in the normal way; when it encounters a
port forwarding which is already in the tree, it tags it `keep'
rather than setting it up from scratch. Finally, it goes through the
tree and removes any that haven't been labelled `keep'. Hence,
editing the list of forwardings in Change Settings has the effect of
cancelling any forwardings you remove, and adding any new ones.
The SSH panel now appears in the reconfig box, and is empty apart
from a message explaining that it has to be there for subpanels of
it to exist. Better wording for this message would be welcome.
[originally from svn r5030]
- new function platform_get_x_display() to find a sensible local display.
On Unix, the Gtk apps weren't taking account of --display when
determining where to send forwarded X traffic.
- explicitly document that leaving X display location blank in config tries
to do something sensible (and that it's now blank by default)
- don't override X11Display setting in plink, since that's more properly
done later
[originally from svn r4604]
when talking to SOCKS 5 proxies. Configures itself transparently (if
the proxy offers CHAP it will use it, otherwise it falls back to
ordinary cleartext passwords).
[originally from svn r4517]
on Linux, but the (very few) platform-specific bits are already
abstracted out of the main code, so it should port to other
platforms with a minimum of fuss.
[originally from svn r3762]
functions have sprouted `**errorstr' arguments, which if non-NULL can
return a textual error message. The interface additions are patchy and
ad-hoc since this seemed to suit the style of the existing interfaces.
I've since realised that most of this is masked by sanity-checking that
gets done before these functions are called, but it will at least report
MAC failures and the like (tested on Unix), which was the original point
of the exercise.
Note that not everyone who could be using this information is at the
moment.
[originally from svn r3430]
with the crc32() function in the zlib interface. (Not that PuTTY
itself _uses_ zlib, but on Unix it's linked against libgtk which
uses libpng which uses zlib. And zlib has poor namespace management
so it defines this ridiculously intrusive function name. Arrrrgh.)
[originally from svn r3191]
underlying integer type forming the Bignum. Using this, arranged
that gcc/x86 uses 32-bit chunks rather than the guaranteed ANSI-
portable 16-bit chunks. This has gained another 30% on key exchanges
by my measurements, but I'm not yet convinced that it's all
perfectly robust - it seems to work fine for SSH1 and SSH2/RSA but
I haven't ensured that every bignum routine is actually being
tested, so it may yet show up problems in DSA or key generation.
[originally from svn r3135]
supports SOCKS 4, SOCKS 4A and SOCKS 5 (well, actually IPv6 in SOCKS
5 isn't supported, but it'll be no difficulty once I actually get
round to it). Thanks to Chas Honton for his `stone soup' patch: I
didn't end up actually using any of his code, but it galvanised me
into doing it properly myself :-)
[originally from svn r3055]
opaque to all platform-independent modules and only handled within
per-platform code. `Filename' is there because the Mac has a magic
way to store filenames (though currently this checkin doesn't
support it!); `FontSpec' is there so that all the auxiliary stuff
such as font height and charset and so on which is needed under
Windows but not Unix can be kept where it belongs, and so that I can
have a hope in hell of dealing with a font chooser in the forthcoming
cross-platform config box code, and best of all it gets the horrid
font height wart out of settings.c and into the Windows code where
it should be.
The Mac part of this checkin is a bunch of random guesses which will
probably not quite compile, but which look roughly right to me.
Sorry if I screwed it up, Ben :-)
[originally from svn r2765]
areas of the code. Not all back-ends have been tested, but Telnet and SSH
behave reasonably.
Incidentally, almost all of this patch was written through Mac PuTTY,
admittedly over a Telnet connection.
[originally from svn r2615]
proxy-indirection network functions (name_lookup, new_connection,
new_listener) takes a `const Config *' as an argument, and extracts
enough information from it before returning to handle that
particular network operation in accordance with the proxy settings
it specifies. This involved {win,ux}net.c due to a `const'
repercussion.
[originally from svn r2567]
the remote IP/port data provided by the server for forwarded
connections. Disabled by default, since it's incompatible with SSH2,
probably incompatible with some X clients, and tickles a bug in
at least one version of OpenSSH.
[originally from svn r2554]
we're going to be a security program, we can at least make a token
effort to use the most secure local X auth available! And I'm still
half-tempted to see if I can support it for remote X servers too...
[originally from svn r2537]
Windows and Mac backends have acquired auth-finding functions which
do nothing; Unix backend has acquired one which actually works, so
Plink can now do X forwarding believably.
(This checkin stretches into some unlikely parts of the code because
there have been one or two knock-on effects involving `const'. Bah.)
[originally from svn r2536]
from import.c to ssh.h, so that the implementation can see them. This
necessitates ssh.h's including <stdio.h>.
Also remove a spare prototype for base64_encode_atom() from import.c.
[originally from svn r2481]
absent, and also (I think) all the frontend request functions (such
as request_resize) take a context pointer, so that multiple windows
can be handled sensibly. I wouldn't swear to this, but I _think_
that only leaves the Unicode stuff as the last stubborn holdout.
[originally from svn r2147]
As a result I've now been able to turn the global variables `back'
and `backhandle' into module-level statics in the individual front
ends. Now _that's_ progress!
[originally from svn r2142]
each backend now stores all its internal variables in a big struct,
and each backend function gets a pointer to this struct passed to
it. This still isn't the end of the work - lots of subsidiary things
still use globals, notably all the cipher and compressor modules and
the X11 forwarding authentication stuff. But ssh.c itself has now
been transformed, and that was the really painful bit, so from here
on it all ought to be a sequence of much smaller and simpler pieces
of work.
[originally from svn r2127]
now be told that the key is the wrong type, _and_ what type it is,
rather than being given a blanket `unable to read key file' message.
[originally from svn r1662]
load a key that is already loaded. This makes command lines such as
`pageant mykey -c mycommand' almost infinitely more useful.
[originally from svn r1522]
now a passphrase-keyed MAC covering _all_ important data in the
file, including the public blob and the key comment. Should
conclusively scupper any attacks based on nobbling the key file in
an attempt to sucker the machine that decrypts it. MACing the
comment field also protects against a key-substitution attack (if
someone's worked out a way past our DSA protections and can extract
the private key from a signature, swapping key files and
substituting comments might just enable them to get the signature
they need to do this. Paranoid, but might as well).
[originally from svn r1413]
the Cygwin CFLAGS, and declare `struct ssh_channel' in ssh.h to
prevent gcc warning about scope-confined-to-parameter-list.
[originally from svn r1268]
scp1 if it can't. Currently not very tested - I checked it in as
soon as it completed a successful recursive copy in both directions.
Also, one known bug: you can't specify a remote wildcard, because by
the nature of SFTP we'll need to implement the wildcard engine on
the client side. I do intend to do this (and use the same wildcard
engine in PSFTP as well) but I haven't got round to it yet.
[originally from svn r1208]
by ceasing to listen on input channels if the corresponding output
channel isn't accepting data. Has had basic check-I-didn't-actually-
break-anything-too-badly testing, but hasn't been genuinely tested
in stress conditions (because concocting stress conditions is non-
trivial).
[originally from svn r1198]
Only currently works on SSH1; SSH2 should be doable but it's late
and I have other things to do tonight. The Cool Guy award for this
one goes to Nicolas Barry, for doing most of the work and actually
understanding the code he was adding to.
[originally from svn r1176]
spawn another command after starting Pageant. Also, if Pageant is
already running, `pageant keyfile' and `pageant -c command' will do
the Right Thing, that is, add the key to the _first_ Pageant and/or
run a command and then exit. The only time you now get the `Pageant
is already running' error is if you try to start the second copy
with no arguments.
NB the affected files in this checkin are rather wide-ranging
because I renamed the not really SSH1-specific
`ssh1_bignum_bitcount' function to just `bignum_bitcount'.
[originally from svn r1044]
sensibly, as a release or a snapshot or a local build. With any luck
this should make bug reporting easier to handle, because anyone who
sends their Event Log should automatically include the version :-)
[originally from svn r1003]
contains a reference to a paper on the subject). Reduces time taken
for DH group exchange to the point where it's viable to enable it
all the time, so I have. :-)
[originally from svn r991]
compression. This involves introducing an option to disable Zlib
compression (that is, continue to work within the Zlib format but
output an uncompressed block) for the duration of a single packet.
[originally from svn r982]
error messages are currently wrong, and Pageant doesn't yet support
the new key type, and I haven't thoroughly tested that falling back
to password authentication and trying invalid keys etc all work. But
what I have here has successfully performed a public key
authentication, so it's working to at least some extent.
[originally from svn r973]
introduce another layer of abstraction in SSH2 ciphers, such that a
single `logical cipher' (as desired by a user) can equate to more
than one `physical cipher'. This is because AES comes in several key
lengths (PuTTY will pick the highest supported by the remote end)
and several different SSH2-protocol-level names (aes*-cbc,
rijndael*-cbc, and an unofficial one rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se).
[originally from svn r967]
(change the sense of #ifdef DO_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GEX in ssh.c) because
it's _far_ too slow. Will be re-enabled once the bignum routines
work a bit faster (or rather a _lot_ faster).
[originally from svn r962]
smalloc() macros and thence to the safemalloc() functions in misc.c.
This should allow me to plug in a debugging allocator and track
memory leaks and segfaults and things.
[originally from svn r818]
abstraction, so as to be able to re-use the same abstraction for
user authentication keys and probably in the SSH2 agent (when that
happens) as well.
[originally from svn r815]
features (prompt for passphrase twice, prompt before overwriting a
file, check the key file was actually saved OK), testing of the
generated keys to make sure I got the file format right, and support
for a variable key size. I think what's already here is basically
sound though.
[originally from svn r715]
functions as calls to the MS Crypto API. Not integrated into the
Makefile yet, but should eventually allow building of an SSH-enabled
PuTTY which contains no native crypto code, so it can be used
everywhere (and anyone who can get the MS encryption pack can still
use the SSH parts).
[originally from svn r425]
- NetHack keypad mode (Shift only works with NumLock off)
- Alt-Space handling (best I could manage; not too bad considering)
- Event Log rather than Telnet Negotiation Log
[originally from svn r284]
- Stop using the identifier `environ' as some platforms make it a macro
- Fix silly error box at end of connection in FWHACK mode
- Fix GPF on maximise-then-restore
- Use SetCapture to allow drag-selecting outside the window
- Correctly update window title when iconic and in win_name_always mode
[originally from svn r12]
