Rewrite the "Using PuTTY" section for 'clipboard-generality', and also
explain why we default to mouse-based selection, interaction with other
applications via PRIMARY when running PuTTY on Unix, and bracketed-paste
mode. Also add lots of index terms.
On all platforms, you can now configure which clipboard the mouse
pastes from, which clipboard Ctrl-Ins and Shift-Ins access, and which
Ctrl-Shift-C and Ctrl-Shift-V access. In each case, the options are:
- nothing at all
- a clipboard which is implicitly written by the act of mouse
selection (the PRIMARY selection on X, CLIP_LOCAL everywhere else)
- the standard clipboard written by explicit copy/paste UI actions
(CLIPBOARD on X, the unique system clipboard elsewhere).
Also, you can control whether selecting text with the mouse _also_
writes to the explicitly accessed clipboard.
The wording of the various messages changes between platforms, but the
basic UI shape is the same everywhere.
This makes space in the Selection panel (at least on Windows; it
wasn't overfull on Unix) to add a new set of config options
controlling the mapping of UI actions to clipboards.
(A possible future advantage of having spare space in this new Words
panel is that there's room to add controls for context-sensitive
special-casing, e.g. I'd quite like ':' to be treated differently when
it appears as part of "http://".)
I know some users don't like any colour _at all_, and we have a
separate option to turn off xterm-style 256-colour sequences, so it
seems remiss not to have an option to disable true colour as well.
This causes PuTTY processes spawned from its system-tray menu to run
with the -restrict-acl option (or rather, the synonymous &R prefix
used by my auto-constructed command lines for easier parsing).
The previous behaviour of Pageant was never to pass -restrict-acl to
PuTTY, even when started with -restrict-acl itself; this is not
actually a silly thing to want to do, because Pageant might well have
more need of -restrict-acl than PuTTY (it stores longer-term and more
powerful secrets) and conversely PuTTY might have more need to _not_
restrict its ACL than Pageant (in that among the things enabled by an
unrestricted ACL are various kinds of accessibility software, which is
more useful on the more user-facing PuTTY than on Pageant).
But for those who want to lock everything down with every security
option possible (even though -restrict-acl is only an ad-hoc
precaution and cannot deliver any hard guarantees), this new option
should fill in the UI gap.
After a conversation this week with a user who tried to use it, it's
clear that Borland C can't build the up-to-date PuTTY without having
to make too many compromises of functionality (unsupported API
details, no 'long long' type), even above the issues that could be
worked round with extra porting ifdefs.
While it's still true, the link to Winsock 2 is dead, our standard
release builds don't run on Win95 any more, and it's certainly not
frequently asked.
- I haven't heard of OpenSSH/OpenSSL mismatches being a common problem
for a long time. Specific advice about OpenSSH 3.1/3.4 seems unlikely
to be useful these days.
- "Incorrect MAC received on packet" doesn't seem to be a common
problem these days, and if anyone encounters it, the words in the
"Errors" bit of the docs seem adequate without a FAQ entry as well.
2ce0b680c inadvertently removed this ability in trying to ensure that
everyone got the new IUTF8 mode by default; you could remove a mode from
the list in the UI, but this would just revert PuTTY to its default.
The UI and storage have been revamped; the storage format now explicitly
says when a mode is not to be sent, and the configuration UI always
shows all modes known to PuTTY; if a mode is not to be sent it now shows
up as "(don't send)" in the list.
Old saved settings are migrated so as to preserve previous removals of
longstanding modes, while automatically adding IUTF8.
(In passing, this removes a bug where pressing the 'Remove' button of
the previous UI would populate the value edit box with garbage.)
Conflicts in the FAQ are fixed by incorporating Jacob's rewritten
post-0.68 version. (But owing to considerable git confusion I haven't
managed to get his name on to this commit anywhere.)
This commit also updates the dumps of Plink's and PSCP's help output,
adding the -proxycmd option to both and the -shareexists option to
Plink.
(Or rather, _re_-adding the latter, since it was introduced in error
by commit 07af4ed10 due to a branch management error and hastily
removed again in 29e8c24f9. This time it really does match reality.)
Several places in the docs were labelled for review because they need
to change when 0.68's feature set comes in - no SSH-2 to SSH-1
fallback any more, but on the other hand, Unix Pageant now exists.
(In a XXX-REVIEW-BEFORE-RELEASE form.)
Also, note the effect of compilation with different Visual Studio
versions on Windows version compatibility in the source README, for the
sake of having it written down somewhere.
They were there mainly to distinguish from 16-bit Windows, which hasn't
been a thing since before a noticeable fraction of the userbase were
born, probably. These days the obvious comparison is with 64-bit
Windows.
Also tweak some wording to reflect that official PuTTY executables are
not necessarily 32-bit any more, and add some XXX-REVIEW-BEFORE-RELEASE
in the same vein.
As documented in bug 'win-process-acl-finesse', we've had enough
assorted complaints about it breaking various non-malicious pieces of
Windows process interaction (ranging from git->plink integration to
screen readers for the vision-impaired) that I think it's more
sensible to set the process back to its default level of protection.
This precaution was never a fully effective protection anyway, due to
the race condition at process startup; the only properly effective
defence would have been to prevent malware running under the same user
ID as PuTTY in the first place, so in that sense, nothing has changed.
But people who want the arguable defence-in-depth advantage of the ACL
restriction can now turn it on with the '-restrict-acl' command-line
option, and it's up to them whether they can live with the assorted
inconveniences that come with it.
In the course of this change, I've centralised a bit more of the
restriction code into winsecur.c, to avoid repeating the error
handling in multiple places.
This is equivalent to selecting 'Local' as the proxy type and entering
the argument string in the proxy command box, in the GUI.
I've pulled this out of all the other proxy options to promote to a
named command-line option, partly because it's the proxy option with
the most natural command-line expression in the first place (any shell
command you might want to use is already in the form of a single
string), and also because it has uses beyond end-user proxying
applications: in particular, replacing the network connection with a
local process is a convenient way to do testing in the style of
contrib/samplekex.py, avoiding the need to run a separate command to
make the test 'server' listen on a port.
Also try to upgrade the settings of people who haven't changed the
defaults; but anyone who has, or anyone who's used the pre-release
snapshots with elliptic-curve support, will have to review their
settings manually.
The UI now only has "1" and "2" options for SSH protocol version, which
behave like the old "1 only" and "2 only" options; old
SSH-N-with-fallback settings are interpreted as SSH-N-only.
This prevents any attempt at a protocol downgrade attack.
Most users should see no difference; those poor souls who still have to
work with SSH-1 equipment now have to explicitly opt in.
Both in a new section about reporting vulnerabilities, and in the
section about large attachments (since some large attachments will
surely contain confidential information from the sender).
I think the deterministic DSA system we've been using for ages can now
be considered proven in use, not to mention the fact that RFC 6979 and
the Ed25519 spec both give variants on the same idea. So I've removed
the 'don't use DSA if you can avoid it' warning.
Now we actually have enough of them to worry about, and especially
since some of the types we support are approved by organisations that
people might make their own decisions about whether to trust, it seems
worth having a config list for host keys the same way we have one for
kex types and ciphers.
To make room for this, I've created an SSH > Host Keys config panel,
and moved the existing host-key related configuration (manually
specified fingerprints) into there from the Kex panel.
It's too esoteric to be the first thing on the Auth panel; I've never
heard of any SSH server that supports it in the decade since I
implemented it. The only Google hits are lost souls mistakenly believing
they need it for passwordless public-key login and the like.
Patch due to Colin Watson.
Putting the passphrase in a file avoids exposing it to 'ps' which can
print out every process's command line, while at the same time not
being as platform-specific as the approach of providing an fd number
(since cmdgen.c is in principle a potential cross-platform PuTTYgen,
not just a Unix one, which is why it's not in the 'unix' directory).
Of course it introduces its own risks if someone can read the file
from your disk after you delete it; probably the best approach to
avoiding this, if possible, is to point the option at a file on an
in-memory tmpfs type file system. Or better still, use bash-style
/dev/fd options such as
puttygen --new-passphrase <(echo -n "my passphrase") [options]
Failing that, try a secure file-wipe utility, as the man page change
mentions.
(And a use case not to be overlooked, of course, is the one where you
actually want to generate an unprotected key - in which case, just
pass /dev/null as the filename.)
That option does exist, but only on master; it was not in the 0.66
release. It turned up by mistake when I updated the documentation copy
of the Plink online help while preparing the 0.66 release, because I
ran plink from the wrong branch.
The new release automation should stop that kind of mistake from
happening in future.
The reporter of vuln-pscp-sink-sscanf asked for a key to encrypt the
vulnerability report with, and having generated one, it seemed like a
good idea to make it part of the official PuTTY GPG key set and
publish it for the next person to use.
Now we have licence.pl, it seems to me to make very good sense to have
it generate the Halibut form(s) of the licence and copyright year as
well as the source-code forms.
As a result, I believe _no_ copies of the licence text or copyright
date exist any more except for the master one in LICENCE - so I can
completely remove the checklist section about all the places to update
it, because there's only one. Hooray!
(cherry picked from commit 774d37a0dc)
Conflicts:
doc/licence.but
(cherry-picker's note: the conflict was just because the deleted file
didn't have identical contents)
TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK (i.e. pterm) already has "-log" (as does Unix
PuTTY), so there's no sense suppressing the synonym "-sessionlog".
Undocumented lacunae that remain:
plink accepts -sessionlog, but does nothing with it. Arguably it should.
puttytel accepts -sshlog/-sshrawlog (and happily logs e.g. Telnet
negotiation, as does PuTTY proper).
(cherry picked from commit a454399ec8)
Conflicts:
unix/uxplink.c
windows/winplink.c
(cherry-picker's notes: the conflict was only contextual, in the Plink
help output)
Now we have licence.pl, it seems to me to make very good sense to have
it generate the Halibut form(s) of the licence and copyright year as
well as the source-code forms.
As a result, I believe _no_ copies of the licence text or copyright
date exist any more except for the master one in LICENCE - so I can
completely remove the checklist section about all the places to update
it, because there's only one. Hooray!
TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK (i.e. pterm) already has "-log" (as does Unix
PuTTY), so there's no sense suppressing the synonym "-sessionlog".
Undocumented lacunae that remain:
plink accepts -sessionlog, but does nothing with it. Arguably it should.
puttytel accepts -sshlog/-sshrawlog (and happily logs e.g. Telnet
negotiation, as does PuTTY proper).
This brings in the rest of the 0.66 branch, including some changes new
on master.
Conflicts:
doc/plink.but
sshrsa.c
(The conflicts were both trivial: in one, the addition of an extra
parameter to rsa2_newkey on master happened on the line next to 0.66's
addition of a check for NULL return value, and in the other, I'd got
the version number in the plink -h transcript messed up on master.)
The aim is to try to reduce the incidence of the two least helpful
classes of those reports: the ones which have just got mismatched
checksum files, and the ones which don't tell us the information that
would help.
(cherry picked from commit 8ff3b22243)
What should have been links to the old DSA keys were actually a second
copy of the links to the old RSA ones. Ahem.
(cherry picked from commit b62af0f40a)
This gives pride of place to the new set of keys we've recently
generated, and relegates the old ones to an afterthought.
(cherry picked from commit bb68baf53b)
Users have requested this from time to time, for distinguishing log
file names when there's more than one SSH server running on different
ports of the same host. Since we do take account of that possibility
in other areas (e.g. we cache host keys indexed by (host,port) rather
than just host), it doesn't seem unreasonable to do so here too.
(cherry picked from commit 0550943b51)
The validation end of XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 needs to check that two
time_t values differ by at most XDM_MAXSKEW, which it was doing by
subtracting them and passing the result to abs(). This provoked a
warning from OS X's clang, on the reasonable enough basis that the
value passed to abs was unsigned.
Fixed by using the (well defined) unsigned arithmetic wraparound: to
check that the mathematical difference of two unsigned numbers is in
the interval [-k,+k], compute their difference _plus k_ as an
unsigned, and check the result is in the interval [0,2k] by doing an
unsigned comparison against 2k.
The aim is to try to reduce the incidence of the two least helpful
classes of those reports: the ones which have just got mismatched
checksum files, and the ones which don't tell us the information that
would help.
Users have requested this from time to time, for distinguishing log
file names when there's more than one SSH server running on different
ports of the same host. Since we do take account of that possibility
in other areas (e.g. we cache host keys indexed by (host,port) rather
than just host), it doesn't seem unreasonable to do so here too.
PuTTY now uses the updated version of Diffie-Hellman group exchange,
except for a few old OpenSSH versions which Darren Tucker reports only
support the old version.
FIXME: this needs further work because the Bugs config panel has now
overflowed.
(cherry picked from commit 62a1bce7cb)
PuTTY now uses the updated version of Diffie-Hellman group exchange,
except for a few old OpenSSH versions which Darren Tucker reports only
support the old version.
FIXME: this needs further work because the Bugs config panel has now
overflowed.
It would be rare to have a host keypair in .ppk format or on a client
machine to load into PuTTYgen, and it might confuse people into thinking
they are required to do so.
I don't think anyone has ever actually called it that, colloquially
_or_ formally, and if anyone ever did (in a bug report, say) I'd
probably have to stop and think to work out what they meant. It's
universally called Plink, and should be officially so as well :-)
I've shifted away from using the SVN revision number as a monotonic
version identifier (replacing it in the Windows version resource with
a count of days since an arbitrary epoch), and I've removed all uses
of SVN keyword expansion (replacing them with version information
written out by Buildscr).
While I'm at it, I've done a major rewrite of the affected code which
centralises all the computation of the assorted version numbers and
strings into Buildscr, so that they're all more or less alongside each
other rather than scattered across multiple source files.
I've also retired the MD5-based manifest file system. A long time ago,
it seemed like a good idea to arrange that binaries of PuTTY would
automatically cease to identify themselves as a particular upstream
version number if any changes were made to the source code, so that if
someone made a local tweak and distributed the result then I wouldn't
get blamed for the results. Since then I've decided the whole idea is
more trouble than it's worth, so now distribution tarballs will have
version information baked in and people can just cope with that.
[originally from svn r10262]
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
We now expect that after the server has sent us CHANNEL_CLOSE, we
should not expect to see any replies to our outstanding channel
requests, and conversely after we have sent CHANNEL_CLOSE we avoid
sending any reply to channel requests from the server. This was the
consensus among implementors discussing the problem on ietf-ssh in
April 2014.
To cope with current OpenSSH's (and perhaps other servers we don't
know about yet) willingness to send request replies after
CHANNEL_CLOSE, I introduce a bug-compatibility flag which is detected
for every OpenSSH version up to and including the current 6.6 - but
not beyond, since https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1818
promises that 6.7 will also implement the new consensus behaviour.
[originally from svn r10200]
questionnaires in unfriendly formats like Excel, apparently in the
mistaken belief that we have some kind of incentive to answer them. I
hope I've managed to identify the key reason why they make this
mistake.
[originally from svn r10156]
The basic strategy is described at the top of the new source file
sshshare.c. In very brief: an 'upstream' PuTTY opens a Unix-domain
socket or Windows named pipe, and listens for connections from other
PuTTYs wanting to run sessions on the same server. The protocol spoken
down that socket/pipe is essentially the bare ssh-connection protocol,
using a trivial binary packet protocol with no encryption, and the
upstream has to do some fiddly transformations that I've been
referring to as 'channel-number NAT' to avoid resource clashes between
the sessions it's managing.
This is quite different from OpenSSH's approach of using the Unix-
domain socket as a means of passing file descriptors around; the main
reason for that is that fd-passing is Unix-specific but this system
has to work on Windows too. However, there are additional advantages,
such as making it easy for each downstream PuTTY to run its own
independent set of port and X11 forwardings (though the method for
making the latter work is quite painful).
Sharing is off by default, but configuration is intended to be very
easy in the normal case - just tick one box in the SSH config panel
and everything else happens automatically.
[originally from svn r10083]
