mirror of
https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git
synced 2025-01-10 09:58:01 +00:00
5d718ef64b
The number of people has been steadily increasing who read our source code with an editor that thinks tab stops are 4 spaces apart, as opposed to the traditional tty-derived 8 that the PuTTY code expects. So I've been wondering for ages about just fixing it, and switching to a spaces-only policy throughout the code. And I recently found out about 'git blame -w', which should make this change not too disruptive for the purposes of source-control archaeology; so perhaps now is the time. While I'm at it, I've also taken the opportunity to remove all the trailing spaces from source lines (on the basis that git dislikes them, and is the only thing that seems to have a strong opinion one way or the other). Apologies to anyone downstream of this code who has complicated patch sets to rebase past this change. I don't intend it to be needed again.
326 lines
9.2 KiB
C
326 lines
9.2 KiB
C
/*
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* winsecur.c: implementation of winsecur.h.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include "putty.h"
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#if !defined NO_SECURITY
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#define WINSECUR_GLOBAL
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#include "winsecur.h"
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/* Initialised once, then kept around to reuse forever */
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static PSID worldsid, networksid, usersid;
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bool got_advapi(void)
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{
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static bool attempted = false;
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static bool successful;
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static HMODULE advapi;
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if (!attempted) {
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attempted = true;
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advapi = load_system32_dll("advapi32.dll");
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successful = advapi &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, GetSecurityInfo) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetSecurityInfo) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, OpenProcessToken) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, GetTokenInformation) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, InitializeSecurityDescriptor) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetSecurityDescriptorOwner) &&
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GET_WINDOWS_FUNCTION(advapi, SetEntriesInAclA);
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}
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return successful;
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}
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PSID get_user_sid(void)
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{
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HANDLE proc = NULL, tok = NULL;
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TOKEN_USER *user = NULL;
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DWORD toklen, sidlen;
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PSID sid = NULL, ret = NULL;
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if (usersid)
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return usersid;
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if (!got_advapi())
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goto cleanup;
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if ((proc = OpenProcess(MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, false,
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GetCurrentProcessId())) == NULL)
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goto cleanup;
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if (!p_OpenProcessToken(proc, TOKEN_QUERY, &tok))
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goto cleanup;
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if (!p_GetTokenInformation(tok, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &toklen) &&
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GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
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goto cleanup;
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if ((user = (TOKEN_USER *)LocalAlloc(LPTR, toklen)) == NULL)
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goto cleanup;
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if (!p_GetTokenInformation(tok, TokenUser, user, toklen, &toklen))
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goto cleanup;
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sidlen = GetLengthSid(user->User.Sid);
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sid = (PSID)smalloc(sidlen);
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if (!CopySid(sidlen, sid, user->User.Sid))
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goto cleanup;
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/* Success. Move sid into the return value slot, and null it out
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* to stop the cleanup code freeing it. */
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ret = usersid = sid;
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sid = NULL;
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cleanup:
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if (proc != NULL)
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CloseHandle(proc);
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if (tok != NULL)
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CloseHandle(tok);
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if (user != NULL)
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LocalFree(user);
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if (sid != NULL)
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sfree(sid);
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return ret;
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}
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bool getsids(char **error)
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{
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#ifdef __clang__
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#pragma clang diagnostic push
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#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wmissing-braces"
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#endif
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY world_auth = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY;
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY nt_auth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
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#ifdef __clang__
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#pragma clang diagnostic pop
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#endif
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bool ret = false;
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*error = NULL;
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if (!usersid) {
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if ((usersid = get_user_sid()) == NULL) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for current user: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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}
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if (!worldsid) {
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if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&world_auth, 1, SECURITY_WORLD_RID,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &worldsid)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for world: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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}
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if (!networksid) {
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if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&nt_auth, 1, SECURITY_NETWORK_RID,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &networksid)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct SID for "
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"local same-user access only: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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}
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ret = true;
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cleanup:
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return ret;
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}
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bool make_private_security_descriptor(DWORD permissions,
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PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *psd,
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PACL *acl,
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char **error)
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{
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EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[3];
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int acl_err;
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bool ret = false;
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*psd = NULL;
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*acl = NULL;
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*error = NULL;
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if (!getsids(error))
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goto cleanup;
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memset(ea, 0, sizeof(ea));
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ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = permissions;
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ea[0].grfAccessMode = REVOKE_ACCESS;
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ea[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
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ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)worldsid;
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ea[1].grfAccessPermissions = permissions;
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ea[1].grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS;
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ea[1].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
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ea[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)usersid;
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ea[2].grfAccessPermissions = permissions;
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ea[2].grfAccessMode = REVOKE_ACCESS;
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ea[2].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
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ea[2].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[2].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)networksid;
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acl_err = p_SetEntriesInAclA(3, ea, NULL, acl);
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if (acl_err != ERROR_SUCCESS || *acl == NULL) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct ACL: %s",
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win_strerror(acl_err));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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*psd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)
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LocalAlloc(LPTR, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
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if (!*psd) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to allocate security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(*psd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to initialise security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (!SetSecurityDescriptorOwner(*psd, usersid, false)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to set owner in security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(*psd, true, *acl, false)) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to set DACL in security descriptor: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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ret = true;
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cleanup:
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if (!ret) {
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if (*psd) {
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LocalFree(*psd);
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*psd = NULL;
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}
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if (*acl) {
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LocalFree(*acl);
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*acl = NULL;
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}
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} else {
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sfree(*error);
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*error = NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static bool really_restrict_process_acl(char **error)
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{
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EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[2];
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int acl_err;
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bool ret = false;
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PACL acl = NULL;
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static const DWORD nastyace=WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER |
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PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS | PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD |
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PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE |
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PROCESS_SET_QUOTA | PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION |
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PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE |
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PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME;
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if (!getsids(error))
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goto cleanup;
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memset(ea, 0, sizeof(ea));
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/* Everyone: deny */
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ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = nastyace;
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ea[0].grfAccessMode = DENY_ACCESS;
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ea[0].grfInheritance = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT;
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ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)worldsid;
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/* User: user ace */
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ea[1].grfAccessPermissions = ~nastyace & 0x1fff;
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ea[1].grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS;
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ea[1].grfInheritance = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT;
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ea[1].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
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ea[1].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)usersid;
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acl_err = p_SetEntriesInAclA(2, ea, NULL, &acl);
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if (acl_err != ERROR_SUCCESS || acl == NULL) {
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*error = dupprintf("unable to construct ACL: %s",
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win_strerror(acl_err));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if (ERROR_SUCCESS != p_SetSecurityInfo
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(GetCurrentProcess(), SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,
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OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
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usersid, NULL, acl, NULL)) {
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*error = dupprintf("Unable to set process ACL: %s",
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win_strerror(GetLastError()));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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ret=true;
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cleanup:
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if (!ret) {
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if (acl) {
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LocalFree(acl);
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acl = NULL;
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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#endif /* !defined NO_SECURITY */
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/*
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* Lock down our process's ACL, to present an obstacle to malware
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* trying to write into its memory. This can't be a full defence,
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* because well timed malware could attack us before this code runs -
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* even if it was unconditionally run at the very start of main(),
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* which we wouldn't want to do anyway because it turns out in practie
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* that interfering with other processes in this way has significant
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* non-infringing uses on Windows (e.g. screen reader software).
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*
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* If we've been requested to do this and are unsuccessful, bomb out
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* via modalfatalbox rather than continue in a less protected mode.
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*
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* This function is intentionally outside the #ifndef NO_SECURITY that
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* covers the rest of this file, because when PuTTY is compiled
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* without the ability to restrict its ACL, we don't want it to
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* silently pretend to honour the instruction to do so.
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*/
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void restrict_process_acl(void)
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{
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char *error = NULL;
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bool ret;
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#if !defined NO_SECURITY
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ret = really_restrict_process_acl(&error);
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#else
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ret = false;
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error = dupstr("ACL restrictions not compiled into this binary");
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#endif
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if (!ret)
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modalfatalbox("Could not restrict process ACL: %s", error);
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}
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