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https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git
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a2ff884512
All the seat functions that request an interactive prompt of some kind to the user - both the main seat_get_userpass_input and the various confirmation dialogs for things like host keys - were using a simple int return value, with the general semantics of 0 = "fail", 1 = "proceed" (and in the case of seat_get_userpass_input, answers to the prompts were provided), and -1 = "request in progress, wait for a callback". In this commit I change all those functions' return types to a new struct called SeatPromptResult, whose primary field is an enum replacing those simple integer values. The main purpose is that the enum has not three but _four_ values: the "fail" result has been split into 'user abort' and 'software abort'. The distinction is that a user abort occurs as a result of an interactive UI action, such as the user clicking 'cancel' in a dialog box or hitting ^D or ^C at a terminal password prompt - and therefore, there's no need to display an error message telling the user that the interactive operation has failed, because the user already knows, because they _did_ it. 'Software abort' is from any other cause, where PuTTY is the first to know there was a problem, and has to tell the user. We already had this 'user abort' vs 'software abort' distinction in other parts of the code - the SSH backend has separate termination functions which protocol layers can call. But we assumed that any failure from an interactive prompt request fell into the 'user abort' category, which is not true. A couple of examples: if you configure a host key fingerprint in your saved session via the SSH > Host keys pane, and the server presents a host key that doesn't match it, then verify_ssh_host_key would report that the user had aborted the connection, and feel no need to tell the user what had gone wrong! Similarly, if a password provided on the command line was not accepted, then (after I fixed the semantics of that in the previous commit) the same wrong handling would occur. So now, those Seat prompt functions too can communicate whether the user or the software originated a connection abort. And in the latter case, we also provide an error message to present to the user. Result: in those two example cases (and others), error messages should no longer go missing. Implementation note: to avoid the hassle of having the error message in a SeatPromptResult being a dynamically allocated string (and hence, every recipient of one must always check whether it's non-NULL and free it on every exit path, plus being careful about copying the struct around), I've instead arranged that the structure contains a function pointer and a couple of parameters, so that the string form of the message can be constructed on demand. That way, the only users who need to free it are the ones who actually _asked_ for it in the first place, which is a much smaller set. (This is one of the rare occasions that I regret not having C++'s extra features available in this code base - a unique_ptr or shared_ptr to a string would have been just the thing here, and the compiler would have done all the hard work for me of remembering where to insert the frees!)
1898 lines
78 KiB
C
1898 lines
78 KiB
C
/*
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* Packet protocol layer for the client side of the SSH-2 userauth
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* protocol (RFC 4252).
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "putty.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "bpp.h"
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#include "ppl.h"
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#include "sshcr.h"
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#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
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#include "gssc.h"
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#include "gss.h"
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#endif
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#define BANNER_LIMIT 131072
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typedef struct agent_key {
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strbuf *blob, *comment;
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ptrlen algorithm;
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} agent_key;
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struct ssh2_userauth_state {
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int crState;
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PacketProtocolLayer *transport_layer, *successor_layer;
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Filename *keyfile;
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bool show_banner, tryagent, notrivialauth, change_username;
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char *hostname, *fullhostname;
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char *default_username;
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bool try_ki_auth, try_gssapi_auth, try_gssapi_kex_auth, gssapi_fwd;
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ptrlen session_id;
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enum {
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AUTH_TYPE_NONE,
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AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY,
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AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD,
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AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET,
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AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD,
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AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI, /* always QUIET */
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AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE,
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AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET
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} type;
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bool need_pw, can_pubkey, can_passwd, can_keyb_inter;
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SeatPromptResult spr;
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bool tried_pubkey_config, done_agent;
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struct ssh_connection_shared_gss_state *shgss;
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#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
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bool can_gssapi;
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bool can_gssapi_keyex_auth;
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bool tried_gssapi;
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bool tried_gssapi_keyex_auth;
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time_t gss_cred_expiry;
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Ssh_gss_buf gss_buf;
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Ssh_gss_buf gss_rcvtok, gss_sndtok;
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Ssh_gss_stat gss_stat;
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#endif
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bool suppress_wait_for_response_packet;
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strbuf *last_methods_string;
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bool kbd_inter_refused;
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prompts_t *cur_prompt;
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uint32_t num_prompts;
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const char *username;
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char *locally_allocated_username;
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char *password;
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bool got_username;
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strbuf *publickey_blob;
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bool privatekey_available, privatekey_encrypted;
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char *publickey_algorithm;
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char *publickey_comment;
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void *agent_response_to_free;
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ptrlen agent_response;
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BinarySource asrc[1]; /* for reading SSH agent response */
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size_t agent_keys_len;
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agent_key *agent_keys;
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size_t agent_key_index, agent_key_limit;
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ptrlen agent_keyalg;
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unsigned signflags;
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int len;
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PktOut *pktout;
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bool is_trivial_auth;
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agent_pending_query *auth_agent_query;
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bufchain banner;
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bufchain_sink banner_bs;
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StripCtrlChars *banner_scc;
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bool banner_scc_initialised;
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StripCtrlChars *ki_scc;
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bool ki_scc_initialised;
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bool ki_printed_header;
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PacketProtocolLayer ppl;
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};
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static void ssh2_userauth_free(PacketProtocolLayer *);
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static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *);
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static bool ssh2_userauth_get_specials(
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PacketProtocolLayer *ppl, add_special_fn_t add_special, void *ctx);
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static void ssh2_userauth_special_cmd(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl,
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SessionSpecialCode code, int arg);
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static void ssh2_userauth_reconfigure(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl, Conf *conf);
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static void ssh2_userauth_agent_query(struct ssh2_userauth_state *, strbuf *);
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static void ssh2_userauth_agent_callback(void *, void *, int);
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static void ssh2_userauth_add_sigblob(
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struct ssh2_userauth_state *s, PktOut *pkt, ptrlen pkblob, ptrlen sigblob);
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static void ssh2_userauth_add_session_id(
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struct ssh2_userauth_state *s, strbuf *sigdata);
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#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
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static PktOut *ssh2_userauth_gss_packet(
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struct ssh2_userauth_state *s, const char *authtype);
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#endif
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static const PacketProtocolLayerVtable ssh2_userauth_vtable = {
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.free = ssh2_userauth_free,
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.process_queue = ssh2_userauth_process_queue,
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.get_specials = ssh2_userauth_get_specials,
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.special_cmd = ssh2_userauth_special_cmd,
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.reconfigure = ssh2_userauth_reconfigure,
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.queued_data_size = ssh_ppl_default_queued_data_size,
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.name = "ssh-userauth",
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};
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PacketProtocolLayer *ssh2_userauth_new(
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PacketProtocolLayer *successor_layer,
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const char *hostname, const char *fullhostname,
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Filename *keyfile, bool show_banner, bool tryagent, bool notrivialauth,
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const char *default_username, bool change_username,
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bool try_ki_auth, bool try_gssapi_auth, bool try_gssapi_kex_auth,
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bool gssapi_fwd, struct ssh_connection_shared_gss_state *shgss)
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{
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struct ssh2_userauth_state *s = snew(struct ssh2_userauth_state);
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memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
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s->ppl.vt = &ssh2_userauth_vtable;
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s->successor_layer = successor_layer;
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s->hostname = dupstr(hostname);
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s->fullhostname = dupstr(fullhostname);
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s->keyfile = filename_copy(keyfile);
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s->show_banner = show_banner;
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s->tryagent = tryagent;
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s->notrivialauth = notrivialauth;
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s->default_username = dupstr(default_username);
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s->change_username = change_username;
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s->try_ki_auth = try_ki_auth;
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s->try_gssapi_auth = try_gssapi_auth;
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s->try_gssapi_kex_auth = try_gssapi_kex_auth;
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s->gssapi_fwd = gssapi_fwd;
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s->shgss = shgss;
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s->last_methods_string = strbuf_new();
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s->is_trivial_auth = true;
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bufchain_init(&s->banner);
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bufchain_sink_init(&s->banner_bs, &s->banner);
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return &s->ppl;
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}
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void ssh2_userauth_set_transport_layer(PacketProtocolLayer *userauth,
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PacketProtocolLayer *transport)
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{
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struct ssh2_userauth_state *s =
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container_of(userauth, struct ssh2_userauth_state, ppl);
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s->transport_layer = transport;
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}
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static void ssh2_userauth_free(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
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{
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struct ssh2_userauth_state *s =
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container_of(ppl, struct ssh2_userauth_state, ppl);
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bufchain_clear(&s->banner);
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if (s->successor_layer)
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ssh_ppl_free(s->successor_layer);
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if (s->agent_keys) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < s->agent_keys_len; i++) {
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strbuf_free(s->agent_keys[i].blob);
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strbuf_free(s->agent_keys[i].comment);
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}
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sfree(s->agent_keys);
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}
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sfree(s->agent_response_to_free);
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if (s->auth_agent_query)
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agent_cancel_query(s->auth_agent_query);
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filename_free(s->keyfile);
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sfree(s->default_username);
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sfree(s->locally_allocated_username);
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sfree(s->hostname);
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sfree(s->fullhostname);
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if (s->cur_prompt)
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free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
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sfree(s->publickey_comment);
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sfree(s->publickey_algorithm);
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if (s->publickey_blob)
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strbuf_free(s->publickey_blob);
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strbuf_free(s->last_methods_string);
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if (s->banner_scc)
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stripctrl_free(s->banner_scc);
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if (s->ki_scc)
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stripctrl_free(s->ki_scc);
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sfree(s);
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}
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static void ssh2_userauth_filter_queue(struct ssh2_userauth_state *s)
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{
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PktIn *pktin;
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ptrlen string;
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while ((pktin = pq_peek(s->ppl.in_pq)) != NULL) {
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switch (pktin->type) {
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case SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER:
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if (!s->show_banner) {
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pq_pop(s->ppl.in_pq);
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break;
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}
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string = get_string(pktin);
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if (string.len > BANNER_LIMIT - bufchain_size(&s->banner))
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string.len = BANNER_LIMIT - bufchain_size(&s->banner);
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if (!s->banner_scc_initialised) {
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s->banner_scc = seat_stripctrl_new(
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s->ppl.seat, BinarySink_UPCAST(&s->banner_bs), SIC_BANNER);
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if (s->banner_scc)
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stripctrl_enable_line_limiting(s->banner_scc);
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s->banner_scc_initialised = true;
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}
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if (s->banner_scc)
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put_datapl(s->banner_scc, string);
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else
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put_datapl(&s->banner_bs, string);
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pq_pop(s->ppl.in_pq);
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break;
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default:
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return;
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}
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}
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}
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static PktIn *ssh2_userauth_pop(struct ssh2_userauth_state *s)
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{
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ssh2_userauth_filter_queue(s);
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return pq_pop(s->ppl.in_pq);
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}
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static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
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{
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struct ssh2_userauth_state *s =
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container_of(ppl, struct ssh2_userauth_state, ppl);
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PktIn *pktin;
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ssh2_userauth_filter_queue(s); /* no matter why we were called */
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crBegin(s->crState);
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#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
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s->tried_gssapi = false;
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s->tried_gssapi_keyex_auth = false;
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#endif
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/*
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* Misc one-time setup for authentication.
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*/
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s->publickey_blob = NULL;
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s->session_id = ssh2_transport_get_session_id(s->transport_layer);
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/*
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* Load the public half of any configured public key file for
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* later use.
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*/
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if (!filename_is_null(s->keyfile)) {
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int keytype;
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ppl_logevent("Reading key file \"%s\"",
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filename_to_str(s->keyfile));
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keytype = key_type(s->keyfile);
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if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2 ||
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keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716 ||
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keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH) {
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const char *error;
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s->publickey_blob = strbuf_new();
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if (ppk_loadpub_f(s->keyfile, &s->publickey_algorithm,
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BinarySink_UPCAST(s->publickey_blob),
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&s->publickey_comment, &error)) {
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s->privatekey_available = (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2);
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if (!s->privatekey_available)
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ppl_logevent("Key file contains public key only");
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s->privatekey_encrypted = ppk_encrypted_f(s->keyfile, NULL);
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} else {
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ppl_logevent("Unable to load key (%s)", error);
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ppl_printf("Unable to load key file \"%s\" (%s)\r\n",
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filename_to_str(s->keyfile), error);
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strbuf_free(s->publickey_blob);
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s->publickey_blob = NULL;
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}
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} else {
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ppl_logevent("Unable to use this key file (%s)",
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key_type_to_str(keytype));
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ppl_printf("Unable to use key file \"%s\" (%s)\r\n",
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filename_to_str(s->keyfile),
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key_type_to_str(keytype));
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s->publickey_blob = NULL;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Find out about any keys Pageant has (but if there's a public
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* key configured, filter out all others).
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*/
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if (s->tryagent && agent_exists()) {
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ppl_logevent("Pageant is running. Requesting keys.");
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/* Request the keys held by the agent. */
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{
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strbuf *request = strbuf_new_for_agent_query();
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put_byte(request, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES);
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ssh2_userauth_agent_query(s, request);
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strbuf_free(request);
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crWaitUntilV(!s->auth_agent_query);
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}
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BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(s->asrc, s->agent_response);
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get_uint32(s->asrc); /* skip length field */
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if (get_byte(s->asrc) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
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size_t nkeys = get_uint32(s->asrc);
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size_t origpos = s->asrc->pos;
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/*
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* Check that the agent response is well formed.
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*/
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for (size_t i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
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get_string(s->asrc); /* blob */
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get_string(s->asrc); /* comment */
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if (get_err(s->asrc)) {
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ppl_logevent("Pageant's response was truncated");
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goto done_agent_query;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Copy the list of public-key blobs out of the Pageant
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* response.
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*/
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BinarySource_REWIND_TO(s->asrc, origpos);
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s->agent_keys_len = nkeys;
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s->agent_keys = snewn(s->agent_keys_len, agent_key);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
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s->agent_keys[i].blob = strbuf_new();
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put_datapl(s->agent_keys[i].blob, get_string(s->asrc));
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s->agent_keys[i].comment = strbuf_new();
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put_datapl(s->agent_keys[i].comment, get_string(s->asrc));
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/* Also, extract the algorithm string from the start
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* of the public-key blob. */
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BinarySource src[1];
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BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(src, ptrlen_from_strbuf(
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s->agent_keys[i].blob));
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s->agent_keys[i].algorithm = get_string(src);
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}
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ppl_logevent("Pageant has %"SIZEu" SSH-2 keys", nkeys);
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if (s->publickey_blob) {
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/*
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* If we've been given a specific public key blob,
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* filter the list of keys to try from the agent down
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* to only that one, or none if it's not there.
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*/
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ptrlen our_blob = ptrlen_from_strbuf(s->publickey_blob);
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
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if (ptrlen_eq_ptrlen(our_blob, ptrlen_from_strbuf(
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s->agent_keys[i].blob)))
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break;
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}
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if (i < nkeys) {
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ppl_logevent("Pageant key #%"SIZEu" matches "
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"configured key file", i);
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s->agent_key_index = i;
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s->agent_key_limit = i+1;
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} else {
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ppl_logevent("Configured key file not in Pageant");
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s->agent_key_index = 0;
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s->agent_key_limit = 0;
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}
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} else {
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/*
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* Otherwise, try them all.
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*/
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s->agent_key_index = 0;
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s->agent_key_limit = nkeys;
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}
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} else {
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ppl_logevent("Failed to get reply from Pageant");
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}
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done_agent_query:;
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}
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/*
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* We repeat this whole loop, including the username prompt,
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* until we manage a successful authentication. If the user
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* types the wrong _password_, they can be sent back to the
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* beginning to try another username, if this is configured on.
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* (If they specify a username in the config, they are never
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* asked, even if they do give a wrong password.)
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*
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* I think this best serves the needs of
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*
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* - the people who have no configuration, no keys, and just
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* want to try repeated (username,password) pairs until they
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* type both correctly
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*
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* - people who have keys and configuration but occasionally
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* need to fall back to passwords
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*
|
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* - people with a key held in Pageant, who might not have
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* logged in to a particular machine before; so they want to
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* type a username, and then _either_ their key will be
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* accepted, _or_ they will type a password. If they mistype
|
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* the username they will want to be able to get back and
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* retype it!
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*/
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s->got_username = false;
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while (1) {
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/*
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* Get a username.
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*/
|
|
if (s->got_username && !s->change_username) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We got a username last time round this loop, and
|
|
* with change_username turned off we don't try to get
|
|
* it again.
|
|
*/
|
|
} else if ((s->username = s->default_username) == NULL) {
|
|
s->cur_prompt = ssh_ppl_new_prompts(&s->ppl);
|
|
s->cur_prompt->to_server = true;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->from_server = false;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH login name");
|
|
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("login as: "), true);
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
while (s->spr.kind == SPRK_INCOMPLETE) {
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
}
|
|
if (spr_is_abort(s->spr)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* seat_get_userpass_input() failed to get a username.
|
|
* Terminate.
|
|
*/
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
ssh_spr_close(s->ppl.ssh, s->spr, "username prompt");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
sfree(s->locally_allocated_username); /* for change_username */
|
|
s->username = s->locally_allocated_username =
|
|
prompt_get_result(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]);
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (seat_verbose(s->ppl.seat) || seat_interactive(s->ppl.seat))
|
|
ppl_printf("Using username \"%s\".\r\n", s->username);
|
|
}
|
|
s->got_username = true;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send an authentication request using method "none": (a)
|
|
* just in case it succeeds, and (b) so that we know what
|
|
* authentication methods we can usefully try next.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
|
|
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "none"); /* method */
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
|
|
|
|
s->tried_pubkey_config = false;
|
|
s->kbd_inter_refused = false;
|
|
s->done_agent = false;
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Wait for the result of the last authentication request,
|
|
* unless the request terminated for some reason on our
|
|
* own side.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->suppress_wait_for_response_packet) {
|
|
pktin = NULL;
|
|
s->suppress_wait_for_response_packet = false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now is a convenient point to spew any banner material
|
|
* that we've accumulated. (This should ensure that when
|
|
* we exit the auth loop, we haven't any left to deal
|
|
* with.)
|
|
*
|
|
* Don't show the banner if we're operating in non-verbose
|
|
* non-interactive mode. (It's probably a script, which
|
|
* means nobody will read the banner _anyway_, and
|
|
* moreover the printing of the banner will screw up
|
|
* processing on the output of (say) plink.)
|
|
*
|
|
* The banner data has been sanitised already by this
|
|
* point, but we still need to precede and follow it with
|
|
* anti-spoofing header lines.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (bufchain_size(&s->banner) &&
|
|
(seat_verbose(s->ppl.seat) || seat_interactive(s->ppl.seat))) {
|
|
if (s->banner_scc) {
|
|
seat_antispoof_msg(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl),
|
|
"Pre-authentication banner message from server:");
|
|
seat_set_trust_status(s->ppl.seat, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool mid_line = false;
|
|
while (bufchain_size(&s->banner) > 0) {
|
|
ptrlen data = bufchain_prefix(&s->banner);
|
|
seat_banner_pl(ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), data);
|
|
mid_line =
|
|
(((const char *)data.ptr)[data.len-1] != '\n');
|
|
bufchain_consume(&s->banner, data.len);
|
|
}
|
|
bufchain_clear(&s->banner);
|
|
|
|
if (mid_line)
|
|
seat_banner_pl(ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl),
|
|
PTRLEN_LITERAL("\r\n"));
|
|
|
|
if (s->banner_scc) {
|
|
seat_set_trust_status(s->ppl.seat, true);
|
|
seat_antispoof_msg(ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl),
|
|
"End of banner message from server");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("Access granted");
|
|
goto userauth_success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pktin && pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE &&
|
|
s->type != AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
|
|
ssh_proto_error(s->ppl.ssh, "Received unexpected packet "
|
|
"in response to authentication request, "
|
|
"type %d (%s)", pktin->type,
|
|
ssh2_pkt_type(s->ppl.bpp->pls->kctx,
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx,
|
|
pktin->type));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* OK, we're now sitting on a USERAUTH_FAILURE message, so
|
|
* we can look at the string in it and know what we can
|
|
* helpfully try next.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pktin && pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
|
|
ptrlen methods = get_string(pktin);
|
|
bool partial_success = get_bool(pktin);
|
|
|
|
if (!partial_success) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have received an unequivocal Access
|
|
* Denied. This can translate to a variety of
|
|
* messages, or no message at all.
|
|
*
|
|
* For forms of authentication which are attempted
|
|
* implicitly, by which I mean without printing
|
|
* anything in the window indicating that we're
|
|
* trying them, we should never print 'Access
|
|
* denied'.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we do print a message saying that we're
|
|
* attempting some kind of authentication, it's OK
|
|
* to print a followup message saying it failed -
|
|
* but the message may sometimes be more specific
|
|
* than simply 'Access denied'.
|
|
*
|
|
* Additionally, if we'd just tried password
|
|
* authentication, we should break out of this
|
|
* whole loop so as to go back to the username
|
|
* prompt (iff we're configured to allow
|
|
* username change attempts).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
|
|
/* do nothing */
|
|
} else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD ||
|
|
s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET) {
|
|
if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD)
|
|
ppl_printf("Server refused our key\r\n");
|
|
ppl_logevent("Server refused our key");
|
|
} else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY) {
|
|
/* This _shouldn't_ happen except by a
|
|
* protocol bug causing client and server to
|
|
* disagree on what is a correct signature. */
|
|
ppl_printf("Server refused public-key signature"
|
|
" despite accepting key!\r\n");
|
|
ppl_logevent("Server refused public-key signature"
|
|
" despite accepting key!");
|
|
} else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET) {
|
|
/* quiet, so no ppl_printf */
|
|
ppl_logevent("Server refused keyboard-interactive "
|
|
"authentication");
|
|
} else if (s->type==AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI) {
|
|
/* always quiet, so no ppl_printf */
|
|
/* also, the code down in the GSSAPI block has
|
|
* already logged this in the Event Log */
|
|
} else if (s->type == AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("Keyboard-interactive authentication "
|
|
"failed");
|
|
ppl_printf("Access denied\r\n");
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert(s->type == AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD);
|
|
ppl_logevent("Password authentication failed");
|
|
ppl_printf("Access denied\r\n");
|
|
|
|
if (s->change_username) {
|
|
/* XXX perhaps we should allow
|
|
* keyboard-interactive to do this too? */
|
|
goto try_new_username;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ppl_printf("Further authentication required\r\n");
|
|
ppl_logevent("Further authentication required");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save the methods string for use in error messages.
|
|
*/
|
|
strbuf_clear(s->last_methods_string);
|
|
put_datapl(s->last_methods_string, methods);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Scan it for method identifiers we know about.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool srv_pubkey = false, srv_passwd = false;
|
|
bool srv_keyb_inter = false;
|
|
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
|
|
bool srv_gssapi = false, srv_gssapi_keyex_auth = false;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
for (ptrlen method; get_commasep_word(&methods, &method) ;) {
|
|
if (ptrlen_eq_string(method, "publickey"))
|
|
srv_pubkey = true;
|
|
else if (ptrlen_eq_string(method, "password"))
|
|
srv_passwd = true;
|
|
else if (ptrlen_eq_string(method, "keyboard-interactive"))
|
|
srv_keyb_inter = true;
|
|
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
|
|
else if (ptrlen_eq_string(method, "gssapi-with-mic"))
|
|
srv_gssapi = true;
|
|
else if (ptrlen_eq_string(method, "gssapi-keyex"))
|
|
srv_gssapi_keyex_auth = true;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* And combine those flags with our own configuration
|
|
* and context to set the main can_foo variables.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->can_pubkey = srv_pubkey;
|
|
s->can_passwd = srv_passwd;
|
|
s->can_keyb_inter = s->try_ki_auth && srv_keyb_inter;
|
|
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
|
|
s->can_gssapi = s->try_gssapi_auth && srv_gssapi &&
|
|
s->shgss->libs->nlibraries > 0;
|
|
s->can_gssapi_keyex_auth = s->try_gssapi_kex_auth &&
|
|
srv_gssapi_keyex_auth &&
|
|
s->shgss->libs->nlibraries > 0 && s->shgss->ctx;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_NOAUTH;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
|
|
if (s->can_gssapi_keyex_auth && !s->tried_gssapi_keyex_auth) {
|
|
|
|
/* gssapi-keyex authentication */
|
|
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
|
|
s->tried_gssapi_keyex_auth = true;
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
|
|
|
|
if (s->shgss->lib->gsslogmsg)
|
|
ppl_logevent("%s", s->shgss->lib->gsslogmsg);
|
|
|
|
ppl_logevent("Trying gssapi-keyex...");
|
|
s->pktout = ssh2_userauth_gss_packet(s, "gssapi-keyex");
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
s->shgss->lib->release_cred(s->shgss->lib, &s->shgss->ctx);
|
|
s->shgss->ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* NO_GSSAPI */
|
|
|
|
if (s->can_pubkey && !s->done_agent &&
|
|
s->agent_key_index < s->agent_key_limit) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Attempt public-key authentication using a key from Pageant.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->agent_keyalg = s->agent_keys[s->agent_key_index].algorithm;
|
|
s->signflags = 0;
|
|
if (ptrlen_eq_string(s->agent_keyalg, "ssh-rsa")) {
|
|
/* Try to upgrade ssh-rsa to one of the rsa-sha2-* family,
|
|
* if the server has announced support for them. */
|
|
if (s->ppl.bpp->ext_info_rsa_sha512_ok) {
|
|
s->agent_keyalg = PTRLEN_LITERAL("rsa-sha2-512");
|
|
s->signflags = SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
|
|
} else if (s->ppl.bpp->ext_info_rsa_sha256_ok) {
|
|
s->agent_keyalg = PTRLEN_LITERAL("rsa-sha2-256");
|
|
s->signflags = SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
|
|
|
|
ppl_logevent("Trying Pageant key #%"SIZEu, s->agent_key_index);
|
|
|
|
/* See if server will accept it */
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "publickey");
|
|
/* method */
|
|
put_bool(s->pktout, false); /* no signature included */
|
|
put_stringpl(s->pktout, s->agent_keyalg);
|
|
put_stringpl(s->pktout, ptrlen_from_strbuf(
|
|
s->agent_keys[s->agent_key_index].blob));
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_QUIET;
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
|
|
|
|
/* Offer of key refused, presumably via
|
|
* USERAUTH_FAILURE. Requeue for the next iteration. */
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
strbuf *agentreq, *sigdata;
|
|
ptrlen comment = ptrlen_from_strbuf(
|
|
s->agent_keys[s->agent_key_index].comment);
|
|
|
|
if (seat_verbose(s->ppl.seat))
|
|
ppl_printf("Authenticating with public key "
|
|
"\"%.*s\" from agent\r\n",
|
|
PTRLEN_PRINTF(comment));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Server is willing to accept the key.
|
|
* Construct a SIGN_REQUEST.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "publickey");
|
|
/* method */
|
|
put_bool(s->pktout, true); /* signature included */
|
|
put_stringpl(s->pktout, s->agent_keyalg);
|
|
put_stringpl(s->pktout, ptrlen_from_strbuf(
|
|
s->agent_keys[s->agent_key_index].blob));
|
|
|
|
/* Ask agent for signature. */
|
|
agentreq = strbuf_new_for_agent_query();
|
|
put_byte(agentreq, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringpl(agentreq, ptrlen_from_strbuf(
|
|
s->agent_keys[s->agent_key_index].blob));
|
|
/* Now the data to be signed... */
|
|
sigdata = strbuf_new();
|
|
ssh2_userauth_add_session_id(s, sigdata);
|
|
put_data(sigdata, s->pktout->data + 5,
|
|
s->pktout->length - 5);
|
|
put_stringsb(agentreq, sigdata);
|
|
/* And finally the flags word. */
|
|
put_uint32(agentreq, s->signflags);
|
|
ssh2_userauth_agent_query(s, agentreq);
|
|
strbuf_free(agentreq);
|
|
crWaitUntilV(!s->auth_agent_query);
|
|
|
|
if (s->agent_response.ptr) {
|
|
ptrlen sigblob;
|
|
BinarySource src[1];
|
|
BinarySource_BARE_INIT(src, s->agent_response.ptr,
|
|
s->agent_response.len);
|
|
get_uint32(src); /* skip length field */
|
|
if (get_byte(src) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE &&
|
|
(sigblob = get_string(src), !get_err(src))) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("Sending Pageant's response");
|
|
ssh2_userauth_add_sigblob(
|
|
s, s->pktout,
|
|
ptrlen_from_strbuf(
|
|
s->agent_keys[s->agent_key_index].blob),
|
|
sigblob);
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
|
|
s->is_trivial_auth = false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ppl_logevent("Pageant refused signing request");
|
|
ppl_printf("Pageant failed to "
|
|
"provide a signature\r\n");
|
|
s->suppress_wait_for_response_packet = true;
|
|
ssh_free_pktout(s->pktout);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ppl_logevent("Pageant failed to respond to "
|
|
"signing request");
|
|
ppl_printf("Pageant failed to "
|
|
"respond to signing request\r\n");
|
|
s->suppress_wait_for_response_packet = true;
|
|
ssh_free_pktout(s->pktout);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do we have any keys left to try? */
|
|
if (++s->agent_key_index >= s->agent_key_limit)
|
|
s->done_agent = true;
|
|
|
|
} else if (s->can_pubkey && s->publickey_blob &&
|
|
s->privatekey_available && !s->tried_pubkey_config) {
|
|
|
|
ssh2_userkey *key; /* not live over crReturn */
|
|
char *passphrase; /* not live over crReturn */
|
|
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PUBLICKEY;
|
|
|
|
s->tried_pubkey_config = true;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try the public key supplied in the configuration.
|
|
*
|
|
* First, try to upgrade its algorithm.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!strcmp(s->publickey_algorithm, "ssh-rsa")) {
|
|
/* Try to upgrade ssh-rsa to one of the rsa-sha2-* family,
|
|
* if the server has announced support for them. */
|
|
if (s->ppl.bpp->ext_info_rsa_sha512_ok) {
|
|
sfree(s->publickey_algorithm);
|
|
s->publickey_algorithm = dupstr("rsa-sha2-512");
|
|
s->signflags = SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
|
|
} else if (s->ppl.bpp->ext_info_rsa_sha256_ok) {
|
|
sfree(s->publickey_algorithm);
|
|
s->publickey_algorithm = dupstr("rsa-sha2-256");
|
|
s->signflags = SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Offer the public blob to see if the server is willing to
|
|
* accept it.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
|
|
put_bool(s->pktout, false);
|
|
/* no signature included */
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
|
|
put_string(s->pktout, s->publickey_blob->s,
|
|
s->publickey_blob->len);
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
ppl_logevent("Offered public key");
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) {
|
|
/* Key refused. Give up. */
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY_OFFER_LOUD;
|
|
continue; /* process this new message */
|
|
}
|
|
ppl_logevent("Offer of public key accepted");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Actually attempt a serious authentication using
|
|
* the key.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (seat_verbose(s->ppl.seat))
|
|
ppl_printf("Authenticating with public key \"%s\"\r\n",
|
|
s->publickey_comment);
|
|
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
while (!key) {
|
|
const char *error; /* not live over crReturn */
|
|
if (s->privatekey_encrypted) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get a passphrase from the user.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->cur_prompt = ssh_ppl_new_prompts(&s->ppl);
|
|
s->cur_prompt->to_server = false;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->from_server = false;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH key passphrase");
|
|
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
|
|
dupprintf("Passphrase for key \"%s\": ",
|
|
s->publickey_comment),
|
|
false);
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
while (s->spr.kind == SPRK_INCOMPLETE) {
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
}
|
|
if (spr_is_abort(s->spr)) {
|
|
/* Failed to get a passphrase. Terminate. */
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
ssh_bpp_queue_disconnect(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, "Unable to authenticate",
|
|
SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER);
|
|
ssh_spr_close(s->ppl.ssh, s->spr,
|
|
"passphrase prompt");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
passphrase =
|
|
prompt_get_result(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]);
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
passphrase = NULL; /* no passphrase needed */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try decrypting the key.
|
|
*/
|
|
key = ppk_load_f(s->keyfile, passphrase, &error);
|
|
if (passphrase) {
|
|
/* burn the evidence */
|
|
smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
|
|
sfree(passphrase);
|
|
}
|
|
if (key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE || key == NULL) {
|
|
if (passphrase &&
|
|
(key == SSH2_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
|
|
ppl_printf("Wrong passphrase\r\n");
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
/* and loop again */
|
|
} else {
|
|
ppl_printf("Unable to load private key (%s)\r\n",
|
|
error);
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
s->suppress_wait_for_response_packet = true;
|
|
break; /* try something else */
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* FIXME: if we ever support variable signature
|
|
* flags, this is somewhere they'll need to be
|
|
* put */
|
|
char *invalid = ssh_key_invalid(key->key, 0);
|
|
if (invalid) {
|
|
ppl_printf("Cannot use this private key (%s)\r\n",
|
|
invalid);
|
|
ssh_key_free(key->key);
|
|
sfree(key->comment);
|
|
sfree(key);
|
|
sfree(invalid);
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
s->suppress_wait_for_response_packet = true;
|
|
break; /* try something else */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key) {
|
|
strbuf *pkblob, *sigdata, *sigblob;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have loaded the private key and the server
|
|
* has announced that it's willing to accept it.
|
|
* Hallelujah. Generate a signature and send it.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "publickey"); /* method */
|
|
put_bool(s->pktout, true); /* signature follows */
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->publickey_algorithm);
|
|
pkblob = strbuf_new();
|
|
ssh_key_public_blob(key->key, BinarySink_UPCAST(pkblob));
|
|
put_string(s->pktout, pkblob->s, pkblob->len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The data to be signed is:
|
|
*
|
|
* string session-id
|
|
*
|
|
* followed by everything so far placed in the
|
|
* outgoing packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
sigdata = strbuf_new();
|
|
ssh2_userauth_add_session_id(s, sigdata);
|
|
put_data(sigdata, s->pktout->data + 5,
|
|
s->pktout->length - 5);
|
|
sigblob = strbuf_new();
|
|
ssh_key_sign(key->key, ptrlen_from_strbuf(sigdata),
|
|
s->signflags, BinarySink_UPCAST(sigblob));
|
|
strbuf_free(sigdata);
|
|
ssh2_userauth_add_sigblob(
|
|
s, s->pktout, ptrlen_from_strbuf(pkblob),
|
|
ptrlen_from_strbuf(sigblob));
|
|
strbuf_free(pkblob);
|
|
strbuf_free(sigblob);
|
|
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
ppl_logevent("Sent public key signature");
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
|
|
ssh_key_free(key->key);
|
|
sfree(key->comment);
|
|
sfree(key);
|
|
s->is_trivial_auth = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
|
|
} else if (s->can_gssapi && !s->tried_gssapi) {
|
|
|
|
/* gssapi-with-mic authentication */
|
|
|
|
ptrlen data;
|
|
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_GSSAPI;
|
|
s->tried_gssapi = true;
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_GSSAPI;
|
|
|
|
if (s->shgss->lib->gsslogmsg)
|
|
ppl_logevent("%s", s->shgss->lib->gsslogmsg);
|
|
|
|
/* Sending USERAUTH_REQUEST with "gssapi-with-mic" method */
|
|
ppl_logevent("Trying gssapi-with-mic...");
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "gssapi-with-mic");
|
|
ppl_logevent("Attempting GSSAPI authentication");
|
|
|
|
/* add mechanism info */
|
|
s->shgss->lib->indicate_mech(s->shgss->lib, &s->gss_buf);
|
|
|
|
/* number of GSSAPI mechanisms */
|
|
put_uint32(s->pktout, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* length of OID + 2 */
|
|
put_uint32(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length + 2);
|
|
put_byte(s->pktout, SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE);
|
|
|
|
/* length of OID */
|
|
put_byte(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.length);
|
|
|
|
put_data(s->pktout, s->gss_buf.value, s->gss_buf.length);
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication request refused");
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check returned packet ... */
|
|
|
|
data = get_string(pktin);
|
|
s->gss_rcvtok.value = (char *)data.ptr;
|
|
s->gss_rcvtok.length = data.len;
|
|
if (s->gss_rcvtok.length != s->gss_buf.length + 2 ||
|
|
((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[0] != SSH2_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
|
|
((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value)[1] != s->gss_buf.length ||
|
|
memcmp((char *)s->gss_rcvtok.value + 2,
|
|
s->gss_buf.value,s->gss_buf.length) ) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication - wrong response "
|
|
"from server");
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Import server name if not cached from KEX */
|
|
if (s->shgss->srv_name == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
|
|
s->gss_stat = s->shgss->lib->import_name(
|
|
s->shgss->lib, s->fullhostname, &s->shgss->srv_name);
|
|
if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
|
|
if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_BAD_HOST_NAME)
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI import name failed -"
|
|
" Bad service name");
|
|
else
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI import name failed");
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate our gss_ctx */
|
|
s->gss_stat = s->shgss->lib->acquire_cred(
|
|
s->shgss->lib, &s->shgss->ctx, NULL);
|
|
if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed to get "
|
|
"credentials");
|
|
/* The failure was on our side, so the server
|
|
* won't be sending a response packet indicating
|
|
* failure. Avoid waiting for it next time round
|
|
* the loop. */
|
|
s->suppress_wait_for_response_packet = true;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* initial tokens are empty */
|
|
SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_rcvtok);
|
|
SSH_GSS_CLEAR_BUF(&s->gss_sndtok);
|
|
|
|
/* now enter the loop */
|
|
do {
|
|
/*
|
|
* When acquire_cred yields no useful expiration, go with
|
|
* the service ticket expiration.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->gss_stat = s->shgss->lib->init_sec_context
|
|
(s->shgss->lib,
|
|
&s->shgss->ctx,
|
|
s->shgss->srv_name,
|
|
s->gssapi_fwd,
|
|
&s->gss_rcvtok,
|
|
&s->gss_sndtok,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_COMPLETE &&
|
|
s->gss_stat!=SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialisation "
|
|
"failed");
|
|
|
|
if (s->shgss->lib->display_status(s->shgss->lib,
|
|
s->shgss->ctx, &s->gss_buf) == SSH_GSS_OK) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("%s", (char *)s->gss_buf.value);
|
|
sfree(s->gss_buf.value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication initialised");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Client and server now exchange tokens until GSSAPI
|
|
* no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
|
|
s->is_trivial_auth = false;
|
|
s->pktout =
|
|
ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
|
|
put_string(s->pktout,
|
|
s->gss_sndtok.value, s->gss_sndtok.length);
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
s->shgss->lib->free_tok(s->shgss->lib, &s->gss_sndtok);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Per RFC 4462 section 3.9, this packet
|
|
* type MUST immediately precede an
|
|
* ordinary USERAUTH_FAILURE.
|
|
*
|
|
* We currently don't know how to do
|
|
* anything with the GSSAPI error token
|
|
* contained in this packet, so we ignore
|
|
* it and just wait for the following
|
|
* FAILURE.
|
|
*/
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV(
|
|
(pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
|
|
ssh_proto_error(
|
|
s->ppl.ssh, "Received unexpected packet "
|
|
"after SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK "
|
|
"(expected SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE): "
|
|
"type %d (%s)", pktin->type,
|
|
ssh2_pkt_type(s->ppl.bpp->pls->kctx,
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx,
|
|
pktin->type));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication failed");
|
|
s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
break;
|
|
} else if (pktin->type !=
|
|
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN) {
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication -"
|
|
" bad server response");
|
|
s->gss_stat = SSH_GSS_FAILURE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
data = get_string(pktin);
|
|
s->gss_rcvtok.value = (char *)data.ptr;
|
|
s->gss_rcvtok.length = data.len;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (s-> gss_stat == SSH_GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
|
|
|
|
if (s->gss_stat != SSH_GSS_OK) {
|
|
s->shgss->lib->release_cred(s->shgss->lib, &s->shgss->ctx);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
ppl_logevent("GSSAPI authentication loop finished OK");
|
|
|
|
/* Now send the MIC */
|
|
|
|
s->pktout = ssh2_userauth_gss_packet(s, "gssapi-with-mic");
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
|
|
s->shgss->lib->release_cred(s->shgss->lib, &s->shgss->ctx);
|
|
continue;
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else if (s->can_keyb_inter && !s->kbd_inter_refused) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Keyboard-interactive authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE;
|
|
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_KBDINTER;
|
|
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "keyboard-interactive");
|
|
/* method */
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, ""); /* lang */
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, ""); /* submethods */
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
|
|
ppl_logevent("Attempting keyboard-interactive authentication");
|
|
|
|
if (!s->ki_scc_initialised) {
|
|
s->ki_scc = seat_stripctrl_new(
|
|
s->ppl.seat, NULL, SIC_KI_PROMPTS);
|
|
if (s->ki_scc)
|
|
stripctrl_enable_line_limiting(s->ki_scc);
|
|
s->ki_scc_initialised = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
if (pktin->type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
/* Server is not willing to do keyboard-interactive
|
|
* at all (or, bizarrely but legally, accepts the
|
|
* user without actually issuing any prompts).
|
|
* Give up on it entirely. */
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_KEYBOARD_INTERACTIVE_QUIET;
|
|
s->kbd_inter_refused = true; /* don't try it again */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->ki_printed_header = false;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
|
|
ptrlen name, inst;
|
|
strbuf *sb;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We've got a fresh USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST.
|
|
* Get the preamble and start building a prompt.
|
|
*/
|
|
name = get_string(pktin);
|
|
inst = get_string(pktin);
|
|
get_string(pktin); /* skip language tag */
|
|
s->cur_prompt = ssh_ppl_new_prompts(&s->ppl);
|
|
s->cur_prompt->to_server = true;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->from_server = true;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get any prompt(s) from the packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->num_prompts = get_uint32(pktin);
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
|
|
s->is_trivial_auth = false;
|
|
ptrlen prompt = get_string(pktin);
|
|
bool echo = get_bool(pktin);
|
|
|
|
if (get_err(pktin)) {
|
|
ssh_proto_error(
|
|
s->ppl.ssh, "Server sent truncated "
|
|
"SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST packet");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sb = strbuf_new();
|
|
if (!prompt.len) {
|
|
put_datapl(sb, PTRLEN_LITERAL(
|
|
"<server failed to send prompt>: "));
|
|
} else if (s->ki_scc) {
|
|
stripctrl_retarget(
|
|
s->ki_scc, BinarySink_UPCAST(sb));
|
|
put_datapl(s->ki_scc, prompt);
|
|
stripctrl_retarget(s->ki_scc, NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
put_datapl(sb, prompt);
|
|
}
|
|
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, strbuf_to_str(sb), echo);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make the header strings. This includes the
|
|
* 'name' (optional dialog-box title) and
|
|
* 'instruction' from the server.
|
|
*
|
|
* First, display our disambiguating header line
|
|
* if this is the first time round the loop -
|
|
* _unless_ the server has sent a completely empty
|
|
* k-i packet with no prompts _or_ text, which
|
|
* apparently some do. In that situation there's
|
|
* no need to alert the user that the following
|
|
* text is server- supplied, because, well, _what_
|
|
* text?
|
|
*
|
|
* We also only do this if we got a stripctrl,
|
|
* because if we didn't, that suggests this is all
|
|
* being done via dialog boxes anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->ki_printed_header && s->ki_scc &&
|
|
(s->num_prompts || name.len || inst.len)) {
|
|
seat_antispoof_msg(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), "Keyboard-interactive "
|
|
"authentication prompts from server:");
|
|
s->ki_printed_header = true;
|
|
seat_set_trust_status(s->ppl.seat, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sb = strbuf_new();
|
|
if (name.len) {
|
|
if (s->ki_scc) {
|
|
stripctrl_retarget(s->ki_scc,
|
|
BinarySink_UPCAST(sb));
|
|
put_datapl(s->ki_scc, name);
|
|
stripctrl_retarget(s->ki_scc, NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
put_datapl(sb, name);
|
|
}
|
|
s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
put_datapl(sb, PTRLEN_LITERAL(
|
|
"SSH server authentication"));
|
|
s->cur_prompt->name_reqd = false;
|
|
}
|
|
s->cur_prompt->name = strbuf_to_str(sb);
|
|
|
|
sb = strbuf_new();
|
|
if (inst.len) {
|
|
if (s->ki_scc) {
|
|
stripctrl_retarget(s->ki_scc,
|
|
BinarySink_UPCAST(sb));
|
|
put_datapl(s->ki_scc, inst);
|
|
stripctrl_retarget(s->ki_scc, NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
put_datapl(sb, inst);
|
|
}
|
|
s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sb->len)
|
|
s->cur_prompt->instruction = strbuf_to_str(sb);
|
|
else
|
|
strbuf_free(sb);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Our prompts_t is fully constructed now. Get the
|
|
* user's response(s).
|
|
*/
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
while (s->spr.kind == SPRK_INCOMPLETE) {
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
}
|
|
if (spr_is_abort(s->spr)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Failed to get responses. Terminate.
|
|
*/
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
ssh_bpp_queue_disconnect(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, "Unable to authenticate",
|
|
SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER);
|
|
ssh_spr_close(s->ppl.ssh, s->spr, "keyboard-"
|
|
"interactive authentication prompt");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send the response(s) to the server.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
|
|
put_uint32(s->pktout, s->num_prompts);
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, prompt_get_result_ref(
|
|
s->cur_prompt->prompts[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
s->pktout->minlen = 256;
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Free the prompts structure from this iteration.
|
|
* If there's another, a new one will be allocated
|
|
* when we return to the top of this while loop.
|
|
*/
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the next packet in case it's another
|
|
* INFO_REQUEST.
|
|
*/
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Print our trailer line, if we printed a header.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->ki_printed_header) {
|
|
seat_set_trust_status(s->ppl.seat, true);
|
|
seat_antispoof_msg(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl),
|
|
"End of keyboard-interactive prompts from server");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We should have SUCCESS or FAILURE now.
|
|
*/
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
|
|
} else if (s->can_passwd) {
|
|
s->is_trivial_auth = false;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Plain old password authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool changereq_first_time; /* not live over crReturn */
|
|
|
|
s->ppl.bpp->pls->actx = SSH2_PKTCTX_PASSWORD;
|
|
|
|
s->cur_prompt = ssh_ppl_new_prompts(&s->ppl);
|
|
s->cur_prompt->to_server = true;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->from_server = false;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("SSH password");
|
|
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupprintf("%s@%s's password: ",
|
|
s->username, s->hostname),
|
|
false);
|
|
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
while (s->spr.kind == SPRK_INCOMPLETE) {
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
}
|
|
if (spr_is_abort(s->spr)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Failed to get responses. Terminate.
|
|
*/
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
ssh_bpp_queue_disconnect(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, "Unable to authenticate",
|
|
SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER);
|
|
ssh_spr_close(s->ppl.ssh, s->spr, "password prompt");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Squirrel away the password. (We may need it later if
|
|
* asked to change it.)
|
|
*/
|
|
s->password = prompt_get_result(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]);
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send the password packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* We pad out the password packet to 256 bytes to make
|
|
* it harder for an attacker to find the length of the
|
|
* user's password.
|
|
*
|
|
* Anyone using a password longer than 256 bytes
|
|
* probably doesn't have much to worry about from
|
|
* people who find out how long their password is!
|
|
*/
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "password");
|
|
put_bool(s->pktout, false);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->password);
|
|
s->pktout->minlen = 256;
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
ppl_logevent("Sent password");
|
|
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Wait for next packet, in case it's a password change
|
|
* request.
|
|
*/
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
changereq_first_time = true;
|
|
|
|
while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're being asked for a new password
|
|
* (perhaps not for the first time).
|
|
* Loop until the server accepts it.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bool got_new = false; /* not live over crReturn */
|
|
ptrlen prompt; /* not live over crReturn */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
const char *msg;
|
|
if (changereq_first_time)
|
|
msg = "Server requested password change";
|
|
else
|
|
msg = "Server rejected new password";
|
|
ppl_logevent("%s", msg);
|
|
ppl_printf("%s\r\n", msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prompt = get_string(pktin);
|
|
|
|
s->cur_prompt = ssh_ppl_new_prompts(&s->ppl);
|
|
s->cur_prompt->to_server = true;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->from_server = false;
|
|
s->cur_prompt->name = dupstr("New SSH password");
|
|
s->cur_prompt->instruction = mkstr(prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt->instr_reqd = true;
|
|
/*
|
|
* There's no explicit requirement in the protocol
|
|
* for the "old" passwords in the original and
|
|
* password-change messages to be the same, and
|
|
* apparently some Cisco kit supports password change
|
|
* by the user entering a blank password originally
|
|
* and the real password subsequently, so,
|
|
* reluctantly, we prompt for the old password again.
|
|
*
|
|
* (On the other hand, some servers don't even bother
|
|
* to check this field.)
|
|
*/
|
|
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt,
|
|
dupstr("Current password (blank for previously entered password): "),
|
|
false);
|
|
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Enter new password: "),
|
|
false);
|
|
add_prompt(s->cur_prompt, dupstr("Confirm new password: "),
|
|
false);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Loop until the user manages to enter the same
|
|
* password twice.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (!got_new) {
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
while (s->spr.kind == SPRK_INCOMPLETE) {
|
|
crReturnV;
|
|
s->spr = seat_get_userpass_input(
|
|
ppl_get_iseat(&s->ppl), s->cur_prompt);
|
|
}
|
|
if (spr_is_abort(s->spr)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Failed to get responses. Terminate.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* burn the evidence */
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
|
|
sfree(s->password);
|
|
ssh_bpp_queue_disconnect(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, "Unable to authenticate",
|
|
SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER);
|
|
ssh_spr_close(s->ppl.ssh, s->spr,
|
|
"password-change prompt");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the user specified a new original password
|
|
* (IYSWIM), overwrite any previously specified
|
|
* one.
|
|
* (A side effect is that the user doesn't have to
|
|
* re-enter it if they louse up the new password.)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]->result->s[0]) {
|
|
smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
|
|
/* burn the evidence */
|
|
sfree(s->password);
|
|
s->password = prompt_get_result(
|
|
s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check the two new passwords match.
|
|
*/
|
|
got_new = !strcmp(
|
|
prompt_get_result_ref(s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]),
|
|
prompt_get_result_ref(s->cur_prompt->prompts[2]));
|
|
if (!got_new)
|
|
/* They don't. Silly user. */
|
|
ppl_printf("Passwords do not match\r\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send the new password (along with the old one).
|
|
* (see above for padding rationale)
|
|
*/
|
|
s->pktout = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, "password");
|
|
put_bool(s->pktout, true);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, s->password);
|
|
put_stringz(s->pktout, prompt_get_result_ref(
|
|
s->cur_prompt->prompts[1]));
|
|
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
|
|
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
|
|
s->pktout->minlen = 256;
|
|
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
|
|
ppl_logevent("Sent new password");
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now see what the server has to say about it.
|
|
* (If it's CHANGEREQ again, it's not happy with the
|
|
* new password.)
|
|
*/
|
|
crMaybeWaitUntilV((pktin = ssh2_userauth_pop(s)) != NULL);
|
|
changereq_first_time = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to reexamine the current pktin at the top
|
|
* of the loop. Either:
|
|
* - we weren't asked to change password at all, in
|
|
* which case it's a SUCCESS or FAILURE with the
|
|
* usual meaning
|
|
* - we sent a new password, and the server was
|
|
* either OK with it (SUCCESS or FAILURE w/partial
|
|
* success) or unhappy with the _old_ password
|
|
* (FAILURE w/o partial success)
|
|
* In any of these cases, we go back to the top of
|
|
* the loop and start again.
|
|
*/
|
|
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't need the old password any more, in any
|
|
* case. Burn the evidence.
|
|
*/
|
|
smemclr(s->password, strlen(s->password));
|
|
sfree(s->password);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssh_bpp_queue_disconnect(
|
|
s->ppl.bpp,
|
|
"No supported authentication methods available",
|
|
SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE);
|
|
ssh_sw_abort(s->ppl.ssh, "No supported authentication methods "
|
|
"available (server sent: %s)",
|
|
s->last_methods_string->s);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
try_new_username:;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
userauth_success:
|
|
if (s->notrivialauth && s->is_trivial_auth) {
|
|
ssh_proto_error(s->ppl.ssh, "Authentication was trivial! "
|
|
"Abandoning session as specified in configuration.");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent
|
|
* any packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider
|
|
* doing an immediate rekey, if it has any reason to want to.
|
|
*/
|
|
ssh2_transport_notify_auth_done(s->transport_layer);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Finally, hand over to our successor layer, and return
|
|
* immediately without reaching the crFinishV: ssh_ppl_replace
|
|
* will have freed us, so crFinishV's zeroing-out of crState would
|
|
* be a use-after-free bug.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
PacketProtocolLayer *successor = s->successor_layer;
|
|
s->successor_layer = NULL; /* avoid freeing it ourself */
|
|
ssh_ppl_replace(&s->ppl, successor);
|
|
return; /* we've just freed s, so avoid even touching s->crState */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crFinishV;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ssh2_userauth_add_session_id(
|
|
struct ssh2_userauth_state *s, strbuf *sigdata)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->ppl.remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_PK_SESSIONID) {
|
|
put_datapl(sigdata, s->session_id);
|
|
} else {
|
|
put_stringpl(sigdata, s->session_id);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ssh2_userauth_agent_query(
|
|
struct ssh2_userauth_state *s, strbuf *req)
|
|
{
|
|
void *response;
|
|
int response_len;
|
|
|
|
sfree(s->agent_response_to_free);
|
|
s->agent_response_to_free = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->auth_agent_query = agent_query(req, &response, &response_len,
|
|
ssh2_userauth_agent_callback, s);
|
|
if (!s->auth_agent_query)
|
|
ssh2_userauth_agent_callback(s, response, response_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ssh2_userauth_agent_callback(void *uav, void *reply, int replylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssh2_userauth_state *s = (struct ssh2_userauth_state *)uav;
|
|
|
|
s->auth_agent_query = NULL;
|
|
s->agent_response_to_free = reply;
|
|
s->agent_response = make_ptrlen(reply, replylen);
|
|
|
|
queue_idempotent_callback(&s->ppl.ic_process_queue);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Helper function to add an SSH-2 signature blob to a packet. Expects
|
|
* to be shown the public key blob as well as the signature blob.
|
|
* Normally just appends the sig blob unmodified as a string, except
|
|
* that it optionally breaks it open and fiddle with it to work around
|
|
* BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ssh2_userauth_add_sigblob(
|
|
struct ssh2_userauth_state *s, PktOut *pkt, ptrlen pkblob, ptrlen sigblob)
|
|
{
|
|
BinarySource pk[1], sig[1];
|
|
BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(pk, pkblob);
|
|
BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(sig, sigblob);
|
|
|
|
/* dmemdump(pkblob, pkblob_len); */
|
|
/* dmemdump(sigblob, sigblob_len); */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* See if this is in fact an ssh-rsa signature and a buggy
|
|
* server; otherwise we can just do this the easy way.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->ppl.remote_bugs & BUG_SSH2_RSA_PADDING) &&
|
|
ptrlen_eq_string(get_string(pk), "ssh-rsa") &&
|
|
ptrlen_eq_string(get_string(sig), "ssh-rsa")) {
|
|
ptrlen mod_mp, sig_mp;
|
|
size_t sig_prefix_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find the modulus and signature integers.
|
|
*/
|
|
get_string(pk); /* skip over exponent */
|
|
mod_mp = get_string(pk); /* remember modulus */
|
|
sig_prefix_len = sig->pos;
|
|
sig_mp = get_string(sig);
|
|
if (get_err(pk) || get_err(sig))
|
|
goto give_up;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find the byte length of the modulus, not counting leading
|
|
* zeroes.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (mod_mp.len > 0 && *(const char *)mod_mp.ptr == 0) {
|
|
mod_mp.len--;
|
|
mod_mp.ptr = (const char *)mod_mp.ptr + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* debug("modulus length is %d\n", len); */
|
|
/* debug("signature length is %d\n", siglen); */
|
|
|
|
if (mod_mp.len > sig_mp.len) {
|
|
strbuf *substr = strbuf_new();
|
|
put_data(substr, sigblob.ptr, sig_prefix_len);
|
|
put_uint32(substr, mod_mp.len);
|
|
put_padding(substr, mod_mp.len - sig_mp.len, 0);
|
|
put_datapl(substr, sig_mp);
|
|
put_stringsb(pkt, substr);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise fall through and do it the easy way. We also come
|
|
* here as a fallback if we discover above that the key blob
|
|
* is misformatted in some way. */
|
|
give_up:;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
put_stringpl(pkt, sigblob);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
|
|
static PktOut *ssh2_userauth_gss_packet(
|
|
struct ssh2_userauth_state *s, const char *authtype)
|
|
{
|
|
strbuf *sb;
|
|
PktOut *p;
|
|
Ssh_gss_buf buf;
|
|
Ssh_gss_buf mic;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The mic is computed over the session id + intended
|
|
* USERAUTH_REQUEST packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
sb = strbuf_new();
|
|
put_stringpl(sb, s->session_id);
|
|
put_byte(sb, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(sb, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(sb, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(sb, authtype);
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the mic */
|
|
buf.value = sb->s;
|
|
buf.length = sb->len;
|
|
s->shgss->lib->get_mic(s->shgss->lib, s->shgss->ctx, &buf, &mic);
|
|
strbuf_free(sb);
|
|
|
|
/* Now we can build the real packet */
|
|
if (strcmp(authtype, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) {
|
|
p = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC);
|
|
} else {
|
|
p = ssh_bpp_new_pktout(s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
put_stringz(p, s->username);
|
|
put_stringz(p, s->successor_layer->vt->name);
|
|
put_stringz(p, authtype);
|
|
}
|
|
put_string(p, mic.value, mic.length);
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static bool ssh2_userauth_get_specials(
|
|
PacketProtocolLayer *ppl, add_special_fn_t add_special, void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
/* No specials provided by this layer. */
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ssh2_userauth_special_cmd(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl,
|
|
SessionSpecialCode code, int arg)
|
|
{
|
|
/* No specials provided by this layer. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ssh2_userauth_reconfigure(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl, Conf *conf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssh2_userauth_state *s =
|
|
container_of(ppl, struct ssh2_userauth_state, ppl);
|
|
ssh_ppl_reconfigure(s->successor_layer, conf);
|
|
}
|