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mirror of https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git synced 2025-01-09 09:27:59 +00:00
putty-source/sshprng.c
Simon Tatham 404f558705 sshprng.c: remove pointless pending_output buffer.
In an early draft of the new PRNG, before I decided to get rid of
random_byte() and replace it with random_read(), it was important
after generating a hash-worth of PRNG output to buffer it so as to
return it a byte at a time. So the PRNG data structure itself had to
keep a hash-sized buffer of pending output, and be able to return the
next byte from it on every random_byte() call.

But when random_read() came in, there was no need to do that any more,
because at the end of a read, the generator is re-seeded and the
remains of any generated data is deliberately thrown away. So the
pending_output buffer has no need to live in the persistent prng
object; it can be relegated to a local variable inside random_read
(and a couple of other functions that used the same buffer since it
was conveniently there).

A side effect of this is that we're no longer yielding the bytes of
each hash in reverse order, because only the previous silly code
structure made it convenient. Fortunately, of course, nothing is
depending on that - except the cryptsuite tests, which I've updated.
2020-01-26 16:37:48 +00:00

286 lines
8.6 KiB
C

/*
* sshprng.c: PuTTY's cryptographic pseudorandom number generator.
*
* This module just defines the PRNG object type and its methods. The
* usual global instance of it is managed by sshrand.c.
*/
#include "putty.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "mpint.h"
#ifdef PRNG_DIAGNOSTICS
#define prngdebug debug
#else
#define prngdebug(...) ((void)0)
#endif
/*
* This random number generator is based on the 'Fortuna' design by
* Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier. The biggest difference is that I
* use SHA-256 in place of a block cipher: the generator side of the
* system works by computing HASH(key || counter) instead of
* ENCRYPT(counter, key).
*
* Rationale: the Fortuna description itself suggests that using
* SHA-256 would be nice but people wouldn't accept it because it's
* too slow - but PuTTY isn't a heavy enough user of random numbers to
* make that a serious worry. In fact even with SHA-256 this generator
* is faster than the one we previously used. Also the Fortuna
* description worries about periodic rekeying to avoid the barely
* detectable pattern of never repeating a cipher block - but with
* SHA-256, even that shouldn't be a worry, because the output
* 'blocks' are twice the size, and also SHA-256 has no guarantee of
* bijectivity, so it surely _could_ be possible to generate the same
* block from two counter values. Thirdly, Fortuna has to have a hash
* function anyway, for reseeding and entropy collection, so reusing
* the same one means it only depends on one underlying primitive and
* can be easily reinstantiated with a larger hash function if you
* decide you'd like to do that on a particular occasion.
*/
#define NCOLLECTORS 32
#define RESEED_DATA_SIZE 64
typedef struct prng_impl prng_impl;
struct prng_impl {
prng Prng;
const ssh_hashalg *hashalg;
/*
* Generation side:
*
* 'generator' is a hash object with the current key preloaded
* into it. The counter-mode generation is achieved by copying
* that hash object, appending the counter value to the copy, and
* calling ssh_hash_final.
*/
ssh_hash *generator;
mp_int *counter;
/*
* When re-seeding the generator, you call prng_seed_begin(),
* which sets up a hash object in 'keymaker'. You write your new
* seed data into it (which you can do by calling put_data on the
* PRNG object itself) and then call prng_seed_finish(), which
* finalises this hash and uses the output to set up the new
* generator.
*
* The keymaker hash preimage includes the previous key, so if you
* just want to change keys for the sake of not keeping the same
* one for too long, you don't have to put any extra seed data in
* at all.
*/
ssh_hash *keymaker;
/*
* Collection side:
*
* There are NCOLLECTORS hash objects collecting entropy. Each
* separately numbered entropy source puts its output into those
* hash objects in the order 0,1,0,2,0,1,0,3,0,1,0,2,0,1,0,4,...,
* that is to say, each entropy source has a separate counter
* which is incremented every time that source generates an event,
* and the event data is added to the collector corresponding to
* the index of the lowest set bit in the current counter value.
*
* Whenever collector #0 has at least RESEED_DATA_SIZE bytes (and
* it's not at least 100ms since the last reseed), the PRNG is
* reseeded, with seed data on reseed #n taken from the first j
* collectors, where j is one more than the number of factors of 2
* in n. That is, collector #0 is used in every reseed; #1 in
* every other one, #2 in every fourth, etc.
*
* 'until_reseed' counts the amount of data that still needs to be
* added to collector #0 before a reseed will be triggered.
*/
uint32_t source_counters[NOISE_MAX_SOURCES];
ssh_hash *collectors[NCOLLECTORS];
size_t until_reseed;
uint32_t reseeds;
uint64_t last_reseed_time;
};
static void prng_seed_BinarySink_write(
BinarySink *bs, const void *data, size_t len);
prng *prng_new(const ssh_hashalg *hashalg)
{
prng_impl *pi = snew(prng_impl);
memset(pi, 0, sizeof(prng_impl));
pi->hashalg = hashalg;
pi->keymaker = NULL;
pi->generator = NULL;
pi->counter = mp_new(128);
for (size_t i = 0; i < NCOLLECTORS; i++)
pi->collectors[i] = ssh_hash_new(pi->hashalg);
pi->until_reseed = 0;
BinarySink_INIT(&pi->Prng, prng_seed_BinarySink_write);
pi->Prng.savesize = pi->hashalg->hlen * 4;
return &pi->Prng;
}
void prng_free(prng *pr)
{
prng_impl *pi = container_of(pr, prng_impl, Prng);
mp_free(pi->counter);
for (size_t i = 0; i < NCOLLECTORS; i++)
ssh_hash_free(pi->collectors[i]);
if (pi->generator)
ssh_hash_free(pi->generator);
if (pi->keymaker)
ssh_hash_free(pi->keymaker);
smemclr(pi, sizeof(*pi));
sfree(pi);
}
void prng_seed_begin(prng *pr)
{
prng_impl *pi = container_of(pr, prng_impl, Prng);
assert(!pi->keymaker);
prngdebug("prng: reseed begin\n");
/*
* Make a hash instance that will generate the key for the new one.
*/
if (pi->generator) {
pi->keymaker = pi->generator;
pi->generator = NULL;
} else {
pi->keymaker = ssh_hash_new(pi->hashalg);
}
put_byte(pi->keymaker, 'R');
}
static void prng_seed_BinarySink_write(
BinarySink *bs, const void *data, size_t len)
{
prng *pr = BinarySink_DOWNCAST(bs, prng);
prng_impl *pi = container_of(pr, prng_impl, Prng);
assert(pi->keymaker);
prngdebug("prng: got %"SIZEu" bytes of seed\n", len);
put_data(pi->keymaker, data, len);
}
void prng_seed_finish(prng *pr)
{
prng_impl *pi = container_of(pr, prng_impl, Prng);
unsigned char buf[MAX_HASH_LEN];
assert(pi->keymaker);
prngdebug("prng: reseed finish\n");
/*
* Actually generate the key.
*/
ssh_hash_final(pi->keymaker, buf);
pi->keymaker = NULL;
/*
* Load that key into a fresh hash instance, which will become the
* new generator.
*/
assert(!pi->generator);
pi->generator = ssh_hash_new(pi->hashalg);
put_data(pi->generator, buf, pi->hashalg->hlen);
pi->until_reseed = RESEED_DATA_SIZE;
pi->last_reseed_time = prng_reseed_time_ms();
smemclr(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
static inline void prng_generate(prng_impl *pi, void *outbuf)
{
ssh_hash *h = ssh_hash_copy(pi->generator);
prngdebug("prng_generate\n");
put_byte(h, 'G');
put_mp_ssh2(h, pi->counter);
mp_add_integer_into(pi->counter, pi->counter, 1);
ssh_hash_final(h, outbuf);
}
void prng_read(prng *pr, void *vout, size_t size)
{
prng_impl *pi = container_of(pr, prng_impl, Prng);
unsigned char buf[MAX_HASH_LEN];
assert(!pi->keymaker);
prngdebug("prng_read %"SIZEu"\n", size);
uint8_t *out = (uint8_t *)vout;
while (size > 0) {
prng_generate(pi, buf);
size_t to_use = size > pi->hashalg->hlen ? pi->hashalg->hlen : size;
memcpy(out, buf, to_use);
out += to_use;
size -= to_use;
}
smemclr(buf, sizeof(buf));
prng_seed_begin(&pi->Prng);
prng_seed_finish(&pi->Prng);
}
void prng_add_entropy(prng *pr, unsigned source_id, ptrlen data)
{
prng_impl *pi = container_of(pr, prng_impl, Prng);
assert(source_id < NOISE_MAX_SOURCES);
uint32_t counter = ++pi->source_counters[source_id];
size_t index = 0;
while (index+1 < NCOLLECTORS && !(counter & 1)) {
counter >>= 1;
index++;
}
prngdebug("prng_add_entropy source=%u size=%"SIZEu" -> collector %zi\n",
source_id, data.len, index);
put_datapl(pi->collectors[index], data);
if (index == 0)
pi->until_reseed = (pi->until_reseed < data.len ? 0 :
pi->until_reseed - data.len);
if (pi->until_reseed == 0 &&
prng_reseed_time_ms() - pi->last_reseed_time >= 100) {
prng_seed_begin(&pi->Prng);
unsigned char buf[MAX_HASH_LEN];
uint32_t reseed_index = ++pi->reseeds;
prngdebug("prng entropy reseed #%"PRIu32"\n", reseed_index);
for (size_t i = 0; i < NCOLLECTORS; i++) {
prngdebug("emptying collector %"SIZEu"\n", i);
ssh_hash_digest(pi->collectors[i], buf);
put_data(&pi->Prng, buf, pi->hashalg->hlen);
ssh_hash_reset(pi->collectors[i]);
if (reseed_index & 1)
break;
reseed_index >>= 1;
}
smemclr(buf, sizeof(buf));
prng_seed_finish(&pi->Prng);
}
}
size_t prng_seed_bits(prng *pr)
{
prng_impl *pi = container_of(pr, prng_impl, Prng);
return pi->hashalg->hlen * 8;
}