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mirror of https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git synced 2025-01-10 01:48:00 +00:00
putty-source/windows/plink.c
Simon Tatham 5f5c710cf3 New option to reject 'trivial' success of userauth.
Suggested by Manfred Kaiser, who also wrote most of this patch
(although outlying parts, like documentation and SSH-1 support, are by
me).

This is a second line of defence against the kind of spoofing attacks
in which a malicious or compromised SSH server rushes the client
through the userauth phase of SSH without actually requiring any auth
inputs (passwords or signatures or whatever), and then at the start of
the connection phase it presents something like a spoof prompt,
intended to be taken for part of userauth by the user but in fact with
some more sinister purpose.

Our existing line of defence against this is the trust sigil system,
and as far as I know, that's still working. This option allows a bit of
extra defence in depth: if you don't expect your SSH server to
trivially accept authentication in the first place, then enabling this
option will cause PuTTY to disconnect if it unexpectedly does so,
without the user having to spot the presence or absence of a fiddly
little sigil anywhere.

Several types of authentication count as 'trivial'. The obvious one is
the SSH-2 "none" method, which clients always try first so that the
failure message will tell them what else they can try, and which a
server can instead accept in order to authenticate you unconditionally.
But there are two other ways to do it that we know of: one is to run
keyboard-interactive authentication and send an empty INFO_REQUEST
packet containing no actual prompts for the user, and another even
weirder one is to send USERAUTH_SUCCESS in response to the user's
preliminary *offer* of a public key (instead of sending the usual PK_OK
to request an actual signature from the key).

This new option detects all of those, by clearing the 'is_trivial_auth'
flag only when we send some kind of substantive authentication response
(be it a password, a k-i prompt response, a signature, or a GSSAPI
token). So even if there's a further path through the userauth maze we
haven't spotted, that somehow avoids sending anything substantive, this
strategy should still pick it up.
2021-06-19 21:34:56 +01:00

537 lines
18 KiB
C

/*
* PLink - a Windows command-line (stdin/stdout) variant of PuTTY.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "putty.h"
#include "storage.h"
#include "tree234.h"
#include "security-api.h"
void cmdline_error(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
console_print_error_msg_fmt_v("plink", fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
exit(1);
}
static HANDLE inhandle, outhandle, errhandle;
static struct handle *stdin_handle, *stdout_handle, *stderr_handle;
static handle_sink stdout_hs, stderr_hs;
static StripCtrlChars *stdout_scc, *stderr_scc;
static BinarySink *stdout_bs, *stderr_bs;
static DWORD orig_console_mode;
static Backend *backend;
static LogContext *logctx;
static Conf *conf;
static void plink_echoedit_update(Seat *seat, bool echo, bool edit)
{
/* Update stdin read mode to reflect changes in line discipline. */
DWORD mode;
mode = ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT;
if (echo)
mode = mode | ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
else
mode = mode & ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
if (edit)
mode = mode | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT;
else
mode = mode & ~ENABLE_LINE_INPUT;
SetConsoleMode(inhandle, mode);
}
static size_t plink_output(
Seat *seat, bool is_stderr, const void *data, size_t len)
{
BinarySink *bs = is_stderr ? stderr_bs : stdout_bs;
put_data(bs, data, len);
return handle_backlog(stdout_handle) + handle_backlog(stderr_handle);
}
static bool plink_eof(Seat *seat)
{
handle_write_eof(stdout_handle);
return false; /* do not respond to incoming EOF with outgoing */
}
static int plink_get_userpass_input(Seat *seat, prompts_t *p, bufchain *input)
{
int ret;
ret = cmdline_get_passwd_input(p);
if (ret == -1)
ret = console_get_userpass_input(p);
return ret;
}
static bool plink_seat_interactive(Seat *seat)
{
return (!*conf_get_str(conf, CONF_remote_cmd) &&
!*conf_get_str(conf, CONF_remote_cmd2) &&
!*conf_get_str(conf, CONF_ssh_nc_host));
}
static const SeatVtable plink_seat_vt = {
.output = plink_output,
.eof = plink_eof,
.get_userpass_input = plink_get_userpass_input,
.notify_remote_exit = nullseat_notify_remote_exit,
.notify_remote_disconnect = nullseat_notify_remote_disconnect,
.connection_fatal = console_connection_fatal,
.update_specials_menu = nullseat_update_specials_menu,
.get_ttymode = nullseat_get_ttymode,
.set_busy_status = nullseat_set_busy_status,
.verify_ssh_host_key = console_verify_ssh_host_key,
.confirm_weak_crypto_primitive = console_confirm_weak_crypto_primitive,
.confirm_weak_cached_hostkey = console_confirm_weak_cached_hostkey,
.is_utf8 = nullseat_is_never_utf8,
.echoedit_update = plink_echoedit_update,
.get_x_display = nullseat_get_x_display,
.get_windowid = nullseat_get_windowid,
.get_window_pixel_size = nullseat_get_window_pixel_size,
.stripctrl_new = console_stripctrl_new,
.set_trust_status = console_set_trust_status,
.verbose = cmdline_seat_verbose,
.interactive = plink_seat_interactive,
.get_cursor_position = nullseat_get_cursor_position,
};
static Seat plink_seat[1] = {{ &plink_seat_vt }};
static DWORD main_thread_id;
/*
* Short description of parameters.
*/
static void usage(void)
{
printf("Plink: command-line connection utility\n");
printf("%s\n", ver);
printf("Usage: plink [options] [user@]host [command]\n");
printf(" (\"host\" can also be a PuTTY saved session name)\n");
printf("Options:\n");
printf(" -V print version information and exit\n");
printf(" -pgpfp print PGP key fingerprints and exit\n");
printf(" -v show verbose messages\n");
printf(" -load sessname Load settings from saved session\n");
printf(" -ssh -telnet -rlogin -raw -serial\n");
printf(" force use of a particular protocol\n");
printf(" -ssh-connection\n");
printf(" force use of the bare ssh-connection protocol\n");
printf(" -P port connect to specified port\n");
printf(" -l user connect with specified username\n");
printf(" -batch disable all interactive prompts\n");
printf(" -proxycmd command\n");
printf(" use 'command' as local proxy\n");
printf(" -sercfg configuration-string (e.g. 19200,8,n,1,X)\n");
printf(" Specify the serial configuration (serial only)\n");
printf("The following options only apply to SSH connections:\n");
printf(" -pw passw login with specified password\n");
printf(" -D [listen-IP:]listen-port\n");
printf(" Dynamic SOCKS-based port forwarding\n");
printf(" -L [listen-IP:]listen-port:host:port\n");
printf(" Forward local port to remote address\n");
printf(" -R [listen-IP:]listen-port:host:port\n");
printf(" Forward remote port to local address\n");
printf(" -X -x enable / disable X11 forwarding\n");
printf(" -A -a enable / disable agent forwarding\n");
printf(" -t -T enable / disable pty allocation\n");
printf(" -1 -2 force use of particular SSH protocol version\n");
printf(" -4 -6 force use of IPv4 or IPv6\n");
printf(" -C enable compression\n");
printf(" -i key private key file for user authentication\n");
printf(" -noagent disable use of Pageant\n");
printf(" -agent enable use of Pageant\n");
printf(" -no-trivial-auth\n");
printf(" disconnect if SSH authentication succeeds trivially\n");
printf(" -noshare disable use of connection sharing\n");
printf(" -share enable use of connection sharing\n");
printf(" -hostkey keyid\n");
printf(" manually specify a host key (may be repeated)\n");
printf(" -sanitise-stderr, -sanitise-stdout, "
"-no-sanitise-stderr, -no-sanitise-stdout\n");
printf(" do/don't strip control chars from standard "
"output/error\n");
printf(" -no-antispoof omit anti-spoofing prompt after "
"authentication\n");
printf(" -m file read remote command(s) from file\n");
printf(" -s remote command is an SSH subsystem (SSH-2 only)\n");
printf(" -N don't start a shell/command (SSH-2 only)\n");
printf(" -nc host:port\n");
printf(" open tunnel in place of session (SSH-2 only)\n");
printf(" -sshlog file\n");
printf(" -sshrawlog file\n");
printf(" log protocol details to a file\n");
printf(" -logoverwrite\n");
printf(" -logappend\n");
printf(" control what happens when a log file already exists\n");
printf(" -shareexists\n");
printf(" test whether a connection-sharing upstream exists\n");
exit(1);
}
static void version(void)
{
char *buildinfo_text = buildinfo("\n");
printf("plink: %s\n%s\n", ver, buildinfo_text);
sfree(buildinfo_text);
exit(0);
}
size_t stdin_gotdata(struct handle *h, const void *data, size_t len, int err)
{
if (err) {
char buf[4096];
FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, err, 0,
buf, lenof(buf), NULL);
buf[lenof(buf)-1] = '\0';
if (buf[strlen(buf)-1] == '\n')
buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read from standard input: %s\n", buf);
cleanup_exit(0);
}
noise_ultralight(NOISE_SOURCE_IOLEN, len);
if (backend_connected(backend)) {
if (len > 0) {
return backend_send(backend, data, len);
} else {
backend_special(backend, SS_EOF, 0);
return 0;
}
} else
return 0;
}
void stdouterr_sent(struct handle *h, size_t new_backlog, int err)
{
if (err) {
char buf[4096];
FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, err, 0,
buf, lenof(buf), NULL);
buf[lenof(buf)-1] = '\0';
if (buf[strlen(buf)-1] == '\n')
buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to write to standard %s: %s\n",
(h == stdout_handle ? "output" : "error"), buf);
cleanup_exit(0);
}
if (backend_connected(backend)) {
backend_unthrottle(backend, (handle_backlog(stdout_handle) +
handle_backlog(stderr_handle)));
}
}
const bool share_can_be_downstream = true;
const bool share_can_be_upstream = true;
const unsigned cmdline_tooltype =
TOOLTYPE_HOST_ARG |
TOOLTYPE_HOST_ARG_CAN_BE_SESSION |
TOOLTYPE_HOST_ARG_PROTOCOL_PREFIX |
TOOLTYPE_HOST_ARG_FROM_LAUNCHABLE_LOAD;
static bool sending;
static bool plink_mainloop_pre(void *vctx, const HANDLE **extra_handles,
size_t *n_extra_handles)
{
if (!sending && backend_sendok(backend)) {
stdin_handle = handle_input_new(inhandle, stdin_gotdata, NULL,
0);
sending = true;
}
return true;
}
static bool plink_mainloop_post(void *vctx, size_t extra_handle_index)
{
if (sending)
handle_unthrottle(stdin_handle, backend_sendbuffer(backend));
if (!backend_connected(backend) &&
handle_backlog(stdout_handle) + handle_backlog(stderr_handle) == 0)
return false; /* we closed the connection */
return true;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int exitcode;
bool errors;
bool use_subsystem = false;
bool just_test_share_exists = false;
enum TriState sanitise_stdout = AUTO, sanitise_stderr = AUTO;
const struct BackendVtable *vt;
dll_hijacking_protection();
/*
* Initialise port and protocol to sensible defaults. (These
* will be overridden by more or less anything.)
*/
settings_set_default_protocol(PROT_SSH);
settings_set_default_port(22);
/*
* Process the command line.
*/
conf = conf_new();
do_defaults(NULL, conf);
settings_set_default_protocol(conf_get_int(conf, CONF_protocol));
settings_set_default_port(conf_get_int(conf, CONF_port));
errors = false;
{
/*
* Override the default protocol if PLINK_PROTOCOL is set.
*/
char *p = getenv("PLINK_PROTOCOL");
if (p) {
const struct BackendVtable *vt = backend_vt_from_name(p);
if (vt) {
settings_set_default_protocol(vt->protocol);
settings_set_default_port(vt->default_port);
conf_set_int(conf, CONF_protocol, vt->protocol);
conf_set_int(conf, CONF_port, vt->default_port);
}
}
}
while (--argc) {
char *p = *++argv;
int ret = cmdline_process_param(p, (argc > 1 ? argv[1] : NULL),
1, conf);
if (ret == -2) {
fprintf(stderr,
"plink: option \"%s\" requires an argument\n", p);
errors = true;
} else if (ret == 2) {
--argc, ++argv;
} else if (ret == 1) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-batch")) {
console_batch_mode = true;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-s")) {
/* Save status to write to conf later. */
use_subsystem = true;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-V") || !strcmp(p, "--version")) {
version();
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--help")) {
usage();
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-pgpfp")) {
pgp_fingerprints();
exit(1);
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-shareexists")) {
just_test_share_exists = true;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-sanitise-stdout") ||
!strcmp(p, "-sanitize-stdout")) {
sanitise_stdout = FORCE_ON;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-no-sanitise-stdout") ||
!strcmp(p, "-no-sanitize-stdout")) {
sanitise_stdout = FORCE_OFF;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-sanitise-stderr") ||
!strcmp(p, "-sanitize-stderr")) {
sanitise_stderr = FORCE_ON;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-no-sanitise-stderr") ||
!strcmp(p, "-no-sanitize-stderr")) {
sanitise_stderr = FORCE_OFF;
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-no-antispoof")) {
console_antispoof_prompt = false;
} else if (*p != '-') {
strbuf *cmdbuf = strbuf_new();
while (argc > 0) {
if (cmdbuf->len > 0)
put_byte(cmdbuf, ' '); /* add space separator */
put_datapl(cmdbuf, ptrlen_from_asciz(p));
if (--argc > 0)
p = *++argv;
}
conf_set_str(conf, CONF_remote_cmd, cmdbuf->s);
conf_set_str(conf, CONF_remote_cmd2, "");
conf_set_bool(conf, CONF_nopty, true); /* command => no tty */
strbuf_free(cmdbuf);
break; /* done with cmdline */
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "plink: unknown option \"%s\"\n", p);
errors = true;
}
}
if (errors)
return 1;
if (!cmdline_host_ok(conf)) {
usage();
}
prepare_session(conf);
/*
* Perform command-line overrides on session configuration.
*/
cmdline_run_saved(conf);
/*
* Apply subsystem status.
*/
if (use_subsystem)
conf_set_bool(conf, CONF_ssh_subsys, true);
/*
* Select protocol. This is farmed out into a table in a
* separate file to enable an ssh-free variant.
*/
vt = backend_vt_from_proto(conf_get_int(conf, CONF_protocol));
if (vt == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Internal fault: Unsupported protocol found\n");
return 1;
}
if (vt->flags & BACKEND_NEEDS_TERMINAL) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Plink doesn't support %s, which needs terminal emulation\n",
vt->displayname);
return 1;
}
sk_init();
if (p_WSAEventSelect == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Plink requires WinSock 2\n");
return 1;
}
/*
* Plink doesn't provide any way to add forwardings after the
* connection is set up, so if there are none now, we can safely set
* the "simple" flag.
*/
if (conf_get_int(conf, CONF_protocol) == PROT_SSH &&
!conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_x11_forward) &&
!conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_agentfwd) &&
!conf_get_str_nthstrkey(conf, CONF_portfwd, 0))
conf_set_bool(conf, CONF_ssh_simple, true);
logctx = log_init(console_cli_logpolicy, conf);
if (just_test_share_exists) {
if (!vt->test_for_upstream) {
fprintf(stderr, "Connection sharing not supported for this "
"connection type (%s)'\n", vt->displayname);
return 1;
}
if (vt->test_for_upstream(conf_get_str(conf, CONF_host),
conf_get_int(conf, CONF_port), conf))
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
if (restricted_acl()) {
lp_eventlog(console_cli_logpolicy,
"Running with restricted process ACL");
}
inhandle = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
outhandle = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
errhandle = GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE);
/*
* Turn off ECHO and LINE input modes. We don't care if this
* call fails, because we know we aren't necessarily running in
* a console.
*/
GetConsoleMode(inhandle, &orig_console_mode);
SetConsoleMode(inhandle, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
/*
* Pass the output handles to the handle-handling subsystem.
* (The input one we leave until we're through the
* authentication process.)
*/
stdout_handle = handle_output_new(outhandle, stdouterr_sent, NULL, 0);
stderr_handle = handle_output_new(errhandle, stdouterr_sent, NULL, 0);
handle_sink_init(&stdout_hs, stdout_handle);
handle_sink_init(&stderr_hs, stderr_handle);
stdout_bs = BinarySink_UPCAST(&stdout_hs);
stderr_bs = BinarySink_UPCAST(&stderr_hs);
/*
* Decide whether to sanitise control sequences out of standard
* output and standard error.
*
* If we weren't given a command-line override, we do this if (a)
* the fd in question is pointing at a console, and (b) we aren't
* trying to allocate a terminal as part of the session.
*
* (Rationale: the risk of control sequences is that they cause
* confusion when sent to a local console, so if there isn't one,
* no problem. Also, if we allocate a remote terminal, then we
* sent a terminal type, i.e. we told it what kind of escape
* sequences we _like_, i.e. we were expecting to receive some.)
*/
if (sanitise_stdout == FORCE_ON ||
(sanitise_stdout == AUTO && is_console_handle(outhandle) &&
conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_nopty))) {
stdout_scc = stripctrl_new(stdout_bs, true, L'\0');
stdout_bs = BinarySink_UPCAST(stdout_scc);
}
if (sanitise_stderr == FORCE_ON ||
(sanitise_stderr == AUTO && is_console_handle(errhandle) &&
conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_nopty))) {
stderr_scc = stripctrl_new(stderr_bs, true, L'\0');
stderr_bs = BinarySink_UPCAST(stderr_scc);
}
/*
* Start up the connection.
*/
winselcli_setup(); /* ensure event object exists */
{
char *error, *realhost;
/* nodelay is only useful if stdin is a character device (console) */
bool nodelay = conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_tcp_nodelay) &&
(GetFileType(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE)) == FILE_TYPE_CHAR);
error = backend_init(vt, plink_seat, &backend, logctx, conf,
conf_get_str(conf, CONF_host),
conf_get_int(conf, CONF_port),
&realhost, nodelay,
conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_tcp_keepalives));
if (error) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open connection:\n%s", error);
sfree(error);
return 1;
}
ldisc_create(conf, NULL, backend, plink_seat);
sfree(realhost);
}
main_thread_id = GetCurrentThreadId();
sending = false;
cli_main_loop(plink_mainloop_pre, plink_mainloop_post, NULL);
exitcode = backend_exitcode(backend);
if (exitcode < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Remote process exit code unavailable\n");
exitcode = 1; /* this is an error condition */
}
cleanup_exit(exitcode);
return 0; /* placate compiler warning */
}