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putty-source/unix/uxmisc.c
Simon Tatham 64ec5e03d5 Sanitise bad characters in log file names.
On Windows, colons are illegal in filenames, because they're part of
the path syntax. But colons can appear in automatically constructed
log file names, if an IPv6 address is expanded from the &H placeholder.

Now we coerce any such illegal characters to '.', which is a bit of a
bodge but should at least cause a log file to be generated.
2015-09-25 09:35:07 +01:00

325 lines
8.2 KiB
C

/*
* PuTTY miscellaneous Unix stuff
*/
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include "putty.h"
unsigned long getticks(void)
{
/*
* We want to use milliseconds rather than the microseconds or
* nanoseconds given by the underlying clock functions, because we
* need a decent number of them to fit into a 32-bit word so it
* can be used for keepalives.
*/
#if defined HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && defined HAVE_DECL_CLOCK_MONOTONIC
{
/* Use CLOCK_MONOTONIC if available, so as to be unconfused if
* the system clock changes. */
struct timespec ts;
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
return ts.tv_sec * TICKSPERSEC +
ts.tv_nsec / (1000000000 / TICKSPERSEC);
}
#endif
{
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
return tv.tv_sec * TICKSPERSEC + tv.tv_usec / (1000000 / TICKSPERSEC);
}
}
Filename *filename_from_str(const char *str)
{
Filename *ret = snew(Filename);
ret->path = dupstr(str);
return ret;
}
Filename *filename_copy(const Filename *fn)
{
return filename_from_str(fn->path);
}
const char *filename_to_str(const Filename *fn)
{
return fn->path;
}
int filename_equal(const Filename *f1, const Filename *f2)
{
return !strcmp(f1->path, f2->path);
}
int filename_is_null(const Filename *fn)
{
return !fn->path[0];
}
void filename_free(Filename *fn)
{
sfree(fn->path);
sfree(fn);
}
int filename_serialise(const Filename *f, void *vdata)
{
char *data = (char *)vdata;
int len = strlen(f->path) + 1; /* include trailing NUL */
if (data) {
strcpy(data, f->path);
}
return len;
}
Filename *filename_deserialise(void *vdata, int maxsize, int *used)
{
char *data = (char *)vdata;
char *end;
end = memchr(data, '\0', maxsize);
if (!end)
return NULL;
end++;
*used = end - data;
return filename_from_str(data);
}
char filename_char_sanitise(char c)
{
if (c == '/')
return '.';
return c;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
static FILE *debug_fp = NULL;
void dputs(const char *buf)
{
if (!debug_fp) {
debug_fp = fopen("debug.log", "w");
}
if (write(1, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) {} /* 'error check' to placate gcc */
fputs(buf, debug_fp);
fflush(debug_fp);
}
#endif
char *get_username(void)
{
struct passwd *p;
uid_t uid = getuid();
char *user, *ret = NULL;
/*
* First, find who we think we are using getlogin. If this
* agrees with our uid, we'll go along with it. This should
* allow sharing of uids between several login names whilst
* coping correctly with people who have su'ed.
*/
user = getlogin();
setpwent();
if (user)
p = getpwnam(user);
else
p = NULL;
if (p && p->pw_uid == uid) {
/*
* The result of getlogin() really does correspond to
* our uid. Fine.
*/
ret = user;
} else {
/*
* If that didn't work, for whatever reason, we'll do
* the simpler version: look up our uid in the password
* file and map it straight to a name.
*/
p = getpwuid(uid);
if (!p)
return NULL;
ret = p->pw_name;
}
endpwent();
return dupstr(ret);
}
/*
* Display the fingerprints of the PGP Master Keys to the user.
* (This is here rather than in uxcons because it's appropriate even for
* Unix GUI apps.)
*/
void pgp_fingerprints(void)
{
fputs("These are the fingerprints of the PuTTY PGP Master Keys. They can\n"
"be used to establish a trust path from this executable to another\n"
"one. See the manual for more information.\n"
"(Note: these fingerprints have nothing to do with SSH!)\n"
"\n"
"PuTTY Master Key as of 2015 (RSA, 4096-bit):\n"
" " PGP_MASTER_KEY_FP "\n\n"
"Original PuTTY Master Key (RSA, 1024-bit):\n"
" " PGP_RSA_MASTER_KEY_FP "\n"
"Original PuTTY Master Key (DSA, 1024-bit):\n"
" " PGP_DSA_MASTER_KEY_FP "\n", stdout);
}
/*
* Set and clear fcntl options on a file descriptor. We don't
* realistically expect any of these operations to fail (the most
* plausible error condition is EBADF, but we always believe ourselves
* to be passing a valid fd so even that's an assertion-fail sort of
* response), so we don't make any effort to return sensible error
* codes to the caller - we just log to standard error and die
* unceremoniously. However, nonblock and no_nonblock do return the
* previous state of O_NONBLOCK.
*/
void cloexec(int fd) {
int fdflags;
fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
if (fdflags < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fdflags | FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
void noncloexec(int fd) {
int fdflags;
fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
if (fdflags < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fdflags & ~FD_CLOEXEC) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFD): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
int nonblock(int fd) {
int fdflags;
fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (fdflags < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fdflags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
return fdflags & O_NONBLOCK;
}
int no_nonblock(int fd) {
int fdflags;
fdflags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (fdflags < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_GETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fdflags & ~O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: fcntl(F_SETFL): %s\n", fd, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
return fdflags & O_NONBLOCK;
}
FILE *f_open(const Filename *filename, char const *mode, int is_private)
{
if (!is_private) {
return fopen(filename->path, mode);
} else {
int fd;
assert(mode[0] == 'w'); /* is_private is meaningless for read,
and tricky for append */
fd = open(filename->path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
return NULL;
return fdopen(fd, mode);
}
}
FontSpec *fontspec_new(const char *name)
{
FontSpec *f = snew(FontSpec);
f->name = dupstr(name);
return f;
}
FontSpec *fontspec_copy(const FontSpec *f)
{
return fontspec_new(f->name);
}
void fontspec_free(FontSpec *f)
{
sfree(f->name);
sfree(f);
}
int fontspec_serialise(FontSpec *f, void *data)
{
int len = strlen(f->name);
if (data)
strcpy(data, f->name);
return len + 1; /* include trailing NUL */
}
FontSpec *fontspec_deserialise(void *vdata, int maxsize, int *used)
{
char *data = (char *)vdata;
char *end = memchr(data, '\0', maxsize);
if (!end)
return NULL;
*used = end - data + 1;
return fontspec_new(data);
}
char *make_dir_and_check_ours(const char *dirname)
{
struct stat st;
/*
* Create the directory. We might have created it before, so
* EEXIST is an OK error; but anything else is doom.
*/
if (mkdir(dirname, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
return dupprintf("%s: mkdir: %s", dirname, strerror(errno));
/*
* Now check that that directory is _owned by us_ and not writable
* by anybody else. This protects us against somebody else
* previously having created the directory in a way that's
* writable to us, and thus manipulating us into creating the
* actual socket in a directory they can see so that they can
* connect to it and use our authenticated SSH sessions.
*/
if (stat(dirname, &st) < 0)
return dupprintf("%s: stat: %s", dirname, strerror(errno));
if (st.st_uid != getuid())
return dupprintf("%s: directory owned by uid %d, not by us",
dirname, st.st_uid);
if ((st.st_mode & 077) != 0)
return dupprintf("%s: directory has overgenerous permissions %03o"
" (expected 700)", dirname, st.st_mode & 0777);
return NULL;
}