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86e44d3988
The event log messages generated during DH key exchange now include both the modulus size and hash algorithm used as well as whether the DH parameters are from one of the standardized groups or were supplied by the server during Group Exchange.
327 lines
9.5 KiB
C
327 lines
9.5 KiB
C
/*
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* Diffie-Hellman implementation for PuTTY.
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*/
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#include "ssh.h"
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/*
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* The primes used in the group1 and group14 key exchange.
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*/
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static const unsigned char P1[] = {
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
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0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
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0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
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0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
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0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
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0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
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0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
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0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
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0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
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0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
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};
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static const unsigned char P14[] = {
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
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0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
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0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
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0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
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0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
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0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
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0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
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0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
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0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
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0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
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0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36,
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0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
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0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56,
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0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
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0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08,
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0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
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0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2,
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0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
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0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C,
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0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
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0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
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};
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/*
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* The generator g = 2 (used for both group1 and group14).
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*/
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static const unsigned char G[] = { 2 };
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struct dh_extra {
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const unsigned char *pdata, *gdata; /* NULL means group exchange */
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int plen, glen;
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};
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static const struct dh_extra extra_group1 = {
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P1, G, lenof(P1), lenof(G),
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1 = {
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"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1", "group1",
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KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group1,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex *const group1_list[] = {
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&ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1
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};
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const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group1 = {
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sizeof(group1_list) / sizeof(*group1_list),
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group1_list
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};
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static const struct dh_extra extra_group14 = {
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P14, G, lenof(P14), lenof(G),
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha256 = {
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"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256", "group14",
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KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha256, &extra_group14,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1 = {
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"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1", "group14",
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KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group14,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex *const group14_list[] = {
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&ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha256,
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&ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1
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};
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const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group14 = {
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sizeof(group14_list) / sizeof(*group14_list),
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group14_list
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};
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static const struct dh_extra extra_gex = {
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NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256 = {
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"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256", NULL,
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KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha256, &extra_gex,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1 = {
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"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1", NULL,
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KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha1, &extra_gex,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex *const gex_list[] = {
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&ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256,
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&ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1
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};
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const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_gex = {
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sizeof(gex_list) / sizeof(*gex_list),
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gex_list
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};
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/*
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* Suffix on GSSAPI SSH protocol identifiers that indicates Kerberos 5
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* as the mechanism.
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*
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* This suffix is the base64-encoded MD5 hash of the byte sequence
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* 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02, which in turn is the ASN.1 DER
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* encoding of the object ID 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 which designates
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* Kerberos v5.
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*
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* (The same encoded OID, minus the two-byte DER header, is defined in
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* pgssapi.c as GSS_MECH_KRB5.)
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*/
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#define GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g=="
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_gex_sha1 = {
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"gss-gex-sha1-" GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH, NULL,
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KEXTYPE_GSS, &ssh_sha1, &extra_gex,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group14_sha1 = {
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"gss-group14-sha1-" GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH, "group14",
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KEXTYPE_GSS, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group14,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group1_sha1 = {
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"gss-group1-sha1-" GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH, "group1",
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KEXTYPE_GSS, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group1,
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};
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static const struct ssh_kex *const gssk5_sha1_kex_list[] = {
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&ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_gex_sha1,
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&ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group14_sha1,
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&ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group1_sha1
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};
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const struct ssh_kexes ssh_gssk5_sha1_kex = {
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sizeof(gssk5_sha1_kex_list) / sizeof(*gssk5_sha1_kex_list),
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gssk5_sha1_kex_list
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};
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/*
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* Variables.
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*/
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struct dh_ctx {
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Bignum x, e, p, q, qmask, g;
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};
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/*
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* Common DH initialisation.
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*/
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static void dh_init(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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{
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ctx->q = bignum_rshift(ctx->p, 1);
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ctx->qmask = bignum_bitmask(ctx->q);
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ctx->x = ctx->e = NULL;
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}
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bool dh_is_gex(const struct ssh_kex *kex)
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{
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const struct dh_extra *extra = (const struct dh_extra *)kex->extra;
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return extra->pdata == NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Initialise DH for a standard group.
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*/
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struct dh_ctx *dh_setup_group(const struct ssh_kex *kex)
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{
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const struct dh_extra *extra = (const struct dh_extra *)kex->extra;
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
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ctx->p = bignum_from_bytes(extra->pdata, extra->plen);
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ctx->g = bignum_from_bytes(extra->gdata, extra->glen);
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dh_init(ctx);
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return ctx;
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}
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/*
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* Initialise DH for a server-supplied group.
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*/
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struct dh_ctx *dh_setup_gex(Bignum pval, Bignum gval)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
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ctx->p = copybn(pval);
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ctx->g = copybn(gval);
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dh_init(ctx);
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return ctx;
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}
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/*
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* Return size of DH modulus p.
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*/
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int dh_modulus_bit_size(const struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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{
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return bignum_bitcount(ctx->p);
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}
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/*
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* Clean up and free a context.
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*/
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void dh_cleanup(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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{
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freebn(ctx->x);
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freebn(ctx->e);
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freebn(ctx->p);
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freebn(ctx->g);
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freebn(ctx->q);
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freebn(ctx->qmask);
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sfree(ctx);
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}
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/*
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* DH stage 1: invent a number x between 1 and q, and compute e =
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* g^x mod p. Return e.
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*
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* If `nbits' is greater than zero, it is used as an upper limit
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* for the number of bits in x. This is safe provided that (a) you
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* use twice as many bits in x as the number of bits you expect to
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* use in your session key, and (b) the DH group is a safe prime
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* (which SSH demands that it must be).
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*
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* P. C. van Oorschot, M. J. Wiener
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* "On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents".
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* Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '96
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* Springer-Verlag, May 1996.
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*/
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Bignum dh_create_e(struct dh_ctx *ctx, int nbits)
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{
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int i;
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int nbytes;
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unsigned char *buf;
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nbytes = (bignum_bitcount(ctx->qmask) + 7) / 8;
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buf = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);
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do {
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/*
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* Create a potential x, by ANDing a string of random bytes
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* with qmask.
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*/
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if (ctx->x)
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freebn(ctx->x);
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if (nbits == 0 || nbits > bignum_bitcount(ctx->qmask)) {
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for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++)
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buf[i] = bignum_byte(ctx->qmask, i) & random_byte();
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ctx->x = bignum_from_bytes(buf, nbytes);
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} else {
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int b, nb;
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ctx->x = bn_power_2(nbits);
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b = nb = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
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if (nb == 0) {
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nb = 8;
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b = random_byte();
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}
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bignum_set_bit(ctx->x, i, b & 1);
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b >>= 1;
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nb--;
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}
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}
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} while (bignum_cmp(ctx->x, One) <= 0 || bignum_cmp(ctx->x, ctx->q) >= 0);
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sfree(buf);
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/*
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* Done. Now compute e = g^x mod p.
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*/
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ctx->e = modpow(ctx->g, ctx->x, ctx->p);
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return ctx->e;
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}
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/*
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* DH stage 2-epsilon: given a number f, validate it to ensure it's in
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* range. (RFC 4253 section 8: "Values of 'e' or 'f' that are not in
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* the range [1, p-1] MUST NOT be sent or accepted by either side."
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* Also, we rule out 1 and p-1 too, since that's easy to do and since
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* they lead to obviously weak keys that even a passive eavesdropper
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* can figure out.)
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*/
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const char *dh_validate_f(struct dh_ctx *ctx, Bignum f)
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{
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if (bignum_cmp(f, One) <= 0) {
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return "f value received is too small";
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} else {
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Bignum pm1 = bigsub(ctx->p, One);
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int cmp = bignum_cmp(f, pm1);
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freebn(pm1);
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if (cmp >= 0)
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return "f value received is too large";
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* DH stage 2: given a number f, compute K = f^x mod p.
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*/
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Bignum dh_find_K(struct dh_ctx *ctx, Bignum f)
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{
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Bignum ret;
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ret = modpow(f, ctx->x, ctx->p);
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return ret;
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}
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