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https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git
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d36a4c3685
malloc functions, which automatically cast to the same type they're allocating the size of. Should prevent any future errors involving mallocing the size of the wrong structure type, and will also make life easier if we ever need to turn the PuTTY core code from real C into C++-friendly C. I haven't touched the Mac frontend in this checkin because I couldn't compile or test it. [originally from svn r3014]
161 lines
3.9 KiB
C
161 lines
3.9 KiB
C
#include "ssh.h"
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const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman = {
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"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
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};
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const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex = {
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"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
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};
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/*
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* The prime p used in the key exchange.
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*/
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static const unsigned char P[] = {
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
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0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
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0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
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0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
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0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
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0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
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0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
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0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
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0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
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0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
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0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
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};
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/*
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* The generator g = 2.
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*/
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static const unsigned char G[] = { 2 };
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/*
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* Variables.
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*/
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struct dh_ctx {
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Bignum x, e, p, q, qmask, g;
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};
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/*
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* Common DH initialisation.
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*/
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static void dh_init(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
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{
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ctx->q = bignum_rshift(ctx->p, 1);
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ctx->qmask = bignum_bitmask(ctx->q);
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ctx->x = ctx->e = NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Initialise DH for the standard group1.
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*/
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void *dh_setup_group1(void)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
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ctx->p = bignum_from_bytes(P, sizeof(P));
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ctx->g = bignum_from_bytes(G, sizeof(G));
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dh_init(ctx);
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return ctx;
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}
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/*
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* Initialise DH for an alternative group.
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*/
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void *dh_setup_group(Bignum pval, Bignum gval)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
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ctx->p = copybn(pval);
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ctx->g = copybn(gval);
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dh_init(ctx);
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return ctx;
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}
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/*
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* Clean up and free a context.
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*/
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void dh_cleanup(void *handle)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
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freebn(ctx->x);
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freebn(ctx->e);
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freebn(ctx->p);
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freebn(ctx->g);
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freebn(ctx->q);
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freebn(ctx->qmask);
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sfree(ctx);
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}
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/*
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* DH stage 1: invent a number x between 1 and q, and compute e =
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* g^x mod p. Return e.
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*
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* If `nbits' is greater than zero, it is used as an upper limit
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* for the number of bits in x. This is safe provided that (a) you
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* use twice as many bits in x as the number of bits you expect to
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* use in your session key, and (b) the DH group is a safe prime
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* (which SSH demands that it must be).
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*
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* P. C. van Oorschot, M. J. Wiener
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* "On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents".
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* Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '96
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* Springer-Verlag, May 1996.
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*/
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Bignum dh_create_e(void *handle, int nbits)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
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int i;
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int nbytes;
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unsigned char *buf;
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nbytes = ssh1_bignum_length(ctx->qmask);
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buf = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);
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do {
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/*
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* Create a potential x, by ANDing a string of random bytes
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* with qmask.
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*/
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if (ctx->x)
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freebn(ctx->x);
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if (nbits == 0 || nbits > bignum_bitcount(ctx->qmask)) {
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ssh1_write_bignum(buf, ctx->qmask);
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for (i = 2; i < nbytes; i++)
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buf[i] &= random_byte();
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ssh1_read_bignum(buf, &ctx->x);
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} else {
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int b, nb;
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ctx->x = bn_power_2(nbits);
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b = nb = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
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if (nb == 0) {
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nb = 8;
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b = random_byte();
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}
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bignum_set_bit(ctx->x, i, b & 1);
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b >>= 1;
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nb--;
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}
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}
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} while (bignum_cmp(ctx->x, One) <= 0 || bignum_cmp(ctx->x, ctx->q) >= 0);
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/*
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* Done. Now compute e = g^x mod p.
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*/
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ctx->e = modpow(ctx->g, ctx->x, ctx->p);
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return ctx->e;
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}
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/*
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* DH stage 2: given a number f, compute K = f^x mod p.
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*/
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Bignum dh_find_K(void *handle, Bignum f)
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{
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struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
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Bignum ret;
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ret = modpow(f, ctx->x, ctx->p);
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return ret;
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}
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