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putty-source/sshdh.c
Simon Tatham d515e4f1a3 Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:

 * Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
   or the old service ticket is nearly expired.

 * Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
   by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.

 * Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
   libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
   the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.

My further comments:

The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.

Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 07:21:16 +01:00

324 lines
9.6 KiB
C

/*
* Diffie-Hellman implementation for PuTTY.
*/
#include "ssh.h"
/*
* The primes used in the group1 and group14 key exchange.
*/
static const unsigned char P1[] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
static const unsigned char P14[] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2,
0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6,
0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D,
0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9,
0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11,
0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36,
0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56,
0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08,
0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2,
0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C,
0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
/*
* The generator g = 2 (used for both group1 and group14).
*/
static const unsigned char G[] = { 2 };
struct dh_extra {
const unsigned char *pdata, *gdata; /* NULL means group exchange */
int plen, glen;
};
static const struct dh_extra extra_group1 = {
P1, G, lenof(P1), lenof(G),
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1 = {
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1", "group1",
KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group1,
};
static const struct ssh_kex *const group1_list[] = {
&ssh_diffiehellman_group1_sha1
};
const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group1 = {
sizeof(group1_list) / sizeof(*group1_list),
group1_list
};
static const struct dh_extra extra_group14 = {
P14, G, lenof(P14), lenof(G),
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha256 = {
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256", "group14",
KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha256, &extra_group14,
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1 = {
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1", "group14",
KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group14,
};
static const struct ssh_kex *const group14_list[] = {
&ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha256,
&ssh_diffiehellman_group14_sha1
};
const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_group14 = {
sizeof(group14_list) / sizeof(*group14_list),
group14_list
};
static const struct dh_extra extra_gex = {
NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256 = {
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256", NULL,
KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha256, &extra_gex,
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1 = {
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1", NULL,
KEXTYPE_DH, &ssh_sha1, &extra_gex,
};
static const struct ssh_kex *const gex_list[] = {
&ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha256,
&ssh_diffiehellman_gex_sha1
};
const struct ssh_kexes ssh_diffiehellman_gex = {
sizeof(gex_list) / sizeof(*gex_list),
gex_list
};
/*
* Suffix on GSSAPI SSH protocol identifiers that indicates Kerberos 5
* as the mechanism.
*
* This suffix is the base64-encoded MD5 hash of the byte sequence
* 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 12 01 02 02, which in turn is the ASN.1 DER
* encoding of the object ID 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 which designates
* Kerberos v5.
*
* (The same encoded OID, minus the two-byte DER header, is defined in
* pgssapi.c as GSS_MECH_KRB5.)
*/
#define GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g=="
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_gex_sha1 = {
"gss-gex-sha1-" GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH, NULL,
KEXTYPE_GSS, &ssh_sha1, &extra_gex,
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group14_sha1 = {
"gss-group14-sha1-" GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH, "group14",
KEXTYPE_GSS, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group14,
};
static const struct ssh_kex ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group1_sha1 = {
"gss-group1-sha1-" GSS_KRB5_OID_HASH, "group1",
KEXTYPE_GSS, &ssh_sha1, &extra_group1,
};
static const struct ssh_kex *const gssk5_sha1_kex_list[] = {
&ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_gex_sha1,
&ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group14_sha1,
&ssh_gssk5_diffiehellman_group1_sha1
};
const struct ssh_kexes ssh_gssk5_sha1_kex = {
sizeof(gssk5_sha1_kex_list) / sizeof(*gssk5_sha1_kex_list),
gssk5_sha1_kex_list
};
/*
* Variables.
*/
struct dh_ctx {
Bignum x, e, p, q, qmask, g;
};
/*
* Common DH initialisation.
*/
static void dh_init(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
{
ctx->q = bignum_rshift(ctx->p, 1);
ctx->qmask = bignum_bitmask(ctx->q);
ctx->x = ctx->e = NULL;
}
int dh_is_gex(const struct ssh_kex *kex)
{
const struct dh_extra *extra = (const struct dh_extra *)kex->extra;
return extra->pdata == NULL;
}
/*
* Initialise DH for a standard group.
*/
void *dh_setup_group(const struct ssh_kex *kex)
{
const struct dh_extra *extra = (const struct dh_extra *)kex->extra;
struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
ctx->p = bignum_from_bytes(extra->pdata, extra->plen);
ctx->g = bignum_from_bytes(extra->gdata, extra->glen);
dh_init(ctx);
return ctx;
}
/*
* Initialise DH for a server-supplied group.
*/
void *dh_setup_gex(Bignum pval, Bignum gval)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = snew(struct dh_ctx);
ctx->p = copybn(pval);
ctx->g = copybn(gval);
dh_init(ctx);
return ctx;
}
/*
* Clean up and free a context.
*/
void dh_cleanup(void *handle)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
freebn(ctx->x);
freebn(ctx->e);
freebn(ctx->p);
freebn(ctx->g);
freebn(ctx->q);
freebn(ctx->qmask);
sfree(ctx);
}
/*
* DH stage 1: invent a number x between 1 and q, and compute e =
* g^x mod p. Return e.
*
* If `nbits' is greater than zero, it is used as an upper limit
* for the number of bits in x. This is safe provided that (a) you
* use twice as many bits in x as the number of bits you expect to
* use in your session key, and (b) the DH group is a safe prime
* (which SSH demands that it must be).
*
* P. C. van Oorschot, M. J. Wiener
* "On Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement with Short Exponents".
* Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '96
* Springer-Verlag, May 1996.
*/
Bignum dh_create_e(void *handle, int nbits)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
int i;
int nbytes;
unsigned char *buf;
nbytes = ssh1_bignum_length(ctx->qmask);
buf = snewn(nbytes, unsigned char);
do {
/*
* Create a potential x, by ANDing a string of random bytes
* with qmask.
*/
if (ctx->x)
freebn(ctx->x);
if (nbits == 0 || nbits > bignum_bitcount(ctx->qmask)) {
ssh1_write_bignum(buf, ctx->qmask);
for (i = 2; i < nbytes; i++)
buf[i] &= random_byte();
ssh1_read_bignum(buf, nbytes, &ctx->x); /* can't fail */
} else {
int b, nb;
ctx->x = bn_power_2(nbits);
b = nb = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) {
if (nb == 0) {
nb = 8;
b = random_byte();
}
bignum_set_bit(ctx->x, i, b & 1);
b >>= 1;
nb--;
}
}
} while (bignum_cmp(ctx->x, One) <= 0 || bignum_cmp(ctx->x, ctx->q) >= 0);
sfree(buf);
/*
* Done. Now compute e = g^x mod p.
*/
ctx->e = modpow(ctx->g, ctx->x, ctx->p);
return ctx->e;
}
/*
* DH stage 2-epsilon: given a number f, validate it to ensure it's in
* range. (RFC 4253 section 8: "Values of 'e' or 'f' that are not in
* the range [1, p-1] MUST NOT be sent or accepted by either side."
* Also, we rule out 1 and p-1 too, since that's easy to do and since
* they lead to obviously weak keys that even a passive eavesdropper
* can figure out.)
*/
const char *dh_validate_f(void *handle, Bignum f)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
if (bignum_cmp(f, One) <= 0) {
return "f value received is too small";
} else {
Bignum pm1 = bigsub(ctx->p, One);
int cmp = bignum_cmp(f, pm1);
freebn(pm1);
if (cmp >= 0)
return "f value received is too large";
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* DH stage 2: given a number f, compute K = f^x mod p.
*/
Bignum dh_find_K(void *handle, Bignum f)
{
struct dh_ctx *ctx = (struct dh_ctx *)handle;
Bignum ret;
ret = modpow(f, ctx->x, ctx->p);
return ret;
}