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cc3e4992d5
This is a module that I'd noticed in the past was too monolithic. There's a big pile of stub functions in uxpgnt.c that only have to be there because the implementation of true X11 _forwarding_ (i.e. actually managing a channel within an SSH connection), which Pageant doesn't need, was in the same module as more general X11-related utility functions which Pageant does need. So I've broken up this awkward monolith. Now x11fwd.c contains only the code that really does all go together for dealing with SSH X forwarding: the management of an X forwarding channel (including the vtables to make it behave as Channel at the SSH end and a Plug at the end that connects to the local X server), and the management of authorisation for those channels, including maintaining a tree234 of possible auth values and verifying the one we received. Most of the functions removed from this file have moved into the utils subdir, and also into the utils library (i.e. further down the link order), because they were basically just string and data processing. One exception is x11_setup_display, which parses a display string and returns a struct telling you everything about how to connect to it. That talks to the networking code (it does name lookups and makes a SockAddr), so it has to live in the network library rather than utils, and therefore it's not in the utils subdirectory either. The other exception is x11_get_screen_number, which it turned out nothing called at all! Apparently the job it used to do is now done as part of x11_setup_display. So I've just removed it completely.
245 lines
8.9 KiB
C
245 lines
8.9 KiB
C
/*
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* Functions to handle .Xauthority files.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "putty.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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ptrlen BinarySource_get_string_xauth(BinarySource *src)
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{
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size_t len = get_uint16(src);
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return get_data(src, len);
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}
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#define get_string_xauth(src) \
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BinarySource_get_string_xauth(BinarySource_UPCAST(src))
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void BinarySink_put_stringpl_xauth(BinarySink *bs, ptrlen pl)
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{
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assert((pl.len >> 16) == 0);
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put_uint16(bs, pl.len);
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put_datapl(bs, pl);
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}
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#define put_stringpl_xauth(bs, ptrlen) \
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BinarySink_put_stringpl_xauth(BinarySink_UPCAST(bs),ptrlen)
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void x11_get_auth_from_authfile(struct X11Display *disp,
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const char *authfilename)
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{
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FILE *authfp;
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char *buf;
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int size;
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BinarySource src[1];
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int family, protocol;
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ptrlen addr, protoname, data;
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char *displaynum_string;
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int displaynum;
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bool ideal_match = false;
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char *ourhostname;
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/* A maximally sized (wildly implausible) .Xauthority record
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* consists of a 16-bit integer to start with, then four strings,
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* each of which has a 16-bit length field followed by that many
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* bytes of data (i.e. up to 0xFFFF bytes). */
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const size_t MAX_RECORD_SIZE = 2 + 4 * (2+0xFFFF);
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/* We'll want a buffer of twice that size (see below). */
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const size_t BUF_SIZE = 2 * MAX_RECORD_SIZE;
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/*
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* Normally we should look for precisely the details specified in
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* `disp'. However, there's an oddity when the display is local:
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* displays like "localhost:0" usually have their details stored
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* in a Unix-domain-socket record (even if there isn't actually a
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* real Unix-domain socket available, as with OpenSSH's proxy X11
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* server).
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*
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* This is apparently a fudge to get round the meaninglessness of
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* "localhost" in a shared-home-directory context -- xauth entries
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* for Unix-domain sockets already disambiguate this by storing
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* the *local* hostname in the conveniently-blank hostname field,
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* but IP "localhost" records couldn't do this. So, typically, an
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* IP "localhost" entry in the auth database isn't present and if
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* it were it would be ignored.
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*
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* However, we don't entirely trust that (say) Windows X servers
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* won't rely on a straight "localhost" entry, bad idea though
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* that is; so if we can't find a Unix-domain-socket entry we'll
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* fall back to an IP-based entry if we can find one.
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*/
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bool localhost = !disp->unixdomain && sk_address_is_local(disp->addr);
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authfp = fopen(authfilename, "rb");
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if (!authfp)
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return;
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ourhostname = get_hostname();
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/*
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* Allocate enough space to hold two maximally sized records, so
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* that a full record can start anywhere in the first half. That
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* way we avoid the accidentally-quadratic algorithm that would
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* arise if we moved everything to the front of the buffer after
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* consuming each record; instead, we only move everything to the
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* front after our current position gets past the half-way mark.
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* Before then, there's no need to move anyway; so this guarantees
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* linear time, in that every byte written into this buffer moves
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* at most once (because every move is from the second half of the
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* buffer to the first half).
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*/
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buf = snewn(BUF_SIZE, char);
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size = fread(buf, 1, BUF_SIZE, authfp);
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BinarySource_BARE_INIT(src, buf, size);
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while (!ideal_match) {
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bool match = false;
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if (src->pos >= MAX_RECORD_SIZE) {
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size -= src->pos;
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memcpy(buf, buf + src->pos, size);
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size += fread(buf + size, 1, BUF_SIZE - size, authfp);
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BinarySource_BARE_INIT(src, buf, size);
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}
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family = get_uint16(src);
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addr = get_string_xauth(src);
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displaynum_string = mkstr(get_string_xauth(src));
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displaynum = displaynum_string[0] ? atoi(displaynum_string) : -1;
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sfree(displaynum_string);
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protoname = get_string_xauth(src);
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data = get_string_xauth(src);
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if (get_err(src))
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break;
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/*
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* Now we have a full X authority record in memory. See
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* whether it matches the display we're trying to
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* authenticate to.
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*
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* The details we've just read should be interpreted as
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* follows:
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*
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* - 'family' is the network address family used to
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* connect to the display. 0 means IPv4; 6 means IPv6;
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* 256 means Unix-domain sockets.
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*
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* - 'addr' is the network address itself. For IPv4 and
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* IPv6, this is a string of binary data of the
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* appropriate length (respectively 4 and 16 bytes)
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* representing the address in big-endian format, e.g.
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* 7F 00 00 01 means IPv4 localhost. For Unix-domain
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* sockets, this is the host name of the machine on
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* which the Unix-domain display resides (so that an
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* .Xauthority file on a shared file system can contain
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* authority entries for Unix-domain displays on
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* several machines without them clashing).
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*
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* - 'displaynum' is the display number. An empty display
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* number is a wildcard for any display number.
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*
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* - 'protoname' is the authorisation protocol, encoded as
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* its canonical string name (i.e. "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1",
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* "XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1" or something we don't recognise).
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*
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* - 'data' is the actual authorisation data, stored in
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* binary form.
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*/
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if (disp->displaynum < 0 ||
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(displaynum >= 0 && disp->displaynum != displaynum))
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continue; /* not the one */
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for (protocol = 1; protocol < lenof(x11_authnames); protocol++)
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if (ptrlen_eq_string(protoname, x11_authnames[protocol]))
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break;
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if (protocol == lenof(x11_authnames))
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continue; /* don't recognise this protocol, look for another */
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switch (family) {
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case 0: /* IPv4 */
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if (!disp->unixdomain &&
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sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV4) {
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char buf[4];
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sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf);
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if (addr.len == 4 && !memcmp(addr.ptr, buf, 4)) {
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match = true;
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/* If this is a "localhost" entry, note it down
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* but carry on looking for a Unix-domain entry. */
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ideal_match = !localhost;
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}
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}
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break;
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case 6: /* IPv6 */
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if (!disp->unixdomain &&
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sk_addrtype(disp->addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV6) {
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char buf[16];
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sk_addrcopy(disp->addr, buf);
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if (addr.len == 16 && !memcmp(addr.ptr, buf, 16)) {
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match = true;
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ideal_match = !localhost;
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}
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}
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break;
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case 256: /* Unix-domain / localhost */
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if ((disp->unixdomain || localhost)
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&& ourhostname && ptrlen_eq_string(addr, ourhostname)) {
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/* A matching Unix-domain socket is always the best
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* match. */
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match = true;
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ideal_match = true;
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}
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break;
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}
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if (match) {
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/* Current best guess -- may be overridden if !ideal_match */
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disp->localauthproto = protocol;
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sfree(disp->localauthdata); /* free previous guess, if any */
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disp->localauthdata = snewn(data.len, unsigned char);
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memcpy(disp->localauthdata, data.ptr, data.len);
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disp->localauthdatalen = data.len;
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}
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}
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fclose(authfp);
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smemclr(buf, 2 * MAX_RECORD_SIZE);
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sfree(buf);
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sfree(ourhostname);
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}
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void x11_format_auth_for_authfile(
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BinarySink *bs, SockAddr *addr, int display_no,
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ptrlen authproto, ptrlen authdata)
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{
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if (sk_address_is_special_local(addr)) {
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char *ourhostname = get_hostname();
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put_uint16(bs, 256); /* indicates Unix-domain socket */
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put_stringpl_xauth(bs, ptrlen_from_asciz(ourhostname));
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sfree(ourhostname);
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} else if (sk_addrtype(addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV4) {
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char ipv4buf[4];
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sk_addrcopy(addr, ipv4buf);
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put_uint16(bs, 0); /* indicates IPv4 */
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put_stringpl_xauth(bs, make_ptrlen(ipv4buf, 4));
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} else if (sk_addrtype(addr) == ADDRTYPE_IPV6) {
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char ipv6buf[16];
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sk_addrcopy(addr, ipv6buf);
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put_uint16(bs, 6); /* indicates IPv6 */
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put_stringpl_xauth(bs, make_ptrlen(ipv6buf, 16));
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} else {
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unreachable("Bad address type in x11_format_auth_for_authfile");
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}
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{
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char *numberbuf = dupprintf("%d", display_no);
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put_stringpl_xauth(bs, ptrlen_from_asciz(numberbuf));
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sfree(numberbuf);
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}
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put_stringpl_xauth(bs, authproto);
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put_stringpl_xauth(bs, authdata);
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}
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