mirror of
https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git
synced 2025-01-09 09:27:59 +00:00
29c729a8d5
If you specified --encrypted or one of its synonyms while not adding keys, Pageant would start going on about the unrelated -E option for some reason.
1539 lines
49 KiB
C
1539 lines
49 KiB
C
/*
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* Unix Pageant, more or less similar to ssh-agent.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <termios.h>
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#include "putty.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "pageant.h"
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void cmdline_error(const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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va_list ap;
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va_start(ap, fmt);
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console_print_error_msg_fmt_v("pageant", fmt, ap);
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va_end(ap);
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exit(1);
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}
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static void setup_sigchld_handler(void);
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typedef enum RuntimePromptType {
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RTPROMPT_UNAVAILABLE,
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RTPROMPT_DEBUG,
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RTPROMPT_GUI,
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} RuntimePromptType;
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static const char *progname;
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struct uxpgnt_client {
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FILE *logfp;
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strbuf *prompt_buf;
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RuntimePromptType prompt_type;
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bool prompt_active;
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PageantClientDialogId *dlgid;
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int passphrase_fd;
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int termination_pid;
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PageantListenerClient plc;
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};
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static void uxpgnt_log(PageantListenerClient *plc, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
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{
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struct uxpgnt_client *upc = container_of(plc, struct uxpgnt_client, plc);
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if (!upc->logfp)
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return;
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fprintf(upc->logfp, "pageant: ");
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vfprintf(upc->logfp, fmt, ap);
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fprintf(upc->logfp, "\n");
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}
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static int make_pipe_to_askpass(const char *msg)
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{
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int pipefds[2];
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setup_sigchld_handler();
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if (pipe(pipefds) < 0)
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return -1;
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pid_t pid = fork();
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if (pid < 0) {
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close(pipefds[0]);
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close(pipefds[1]);
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return -1;
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}
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if (pid == 0) {
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const char *args[5] = {
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progname, "--gui-prompt", "--askpass", msg, NULL
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};
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dup2(pipefds[1], 1);
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cloexec(pipefds[0]);
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cloexec(pipefds[1]);
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/*
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* See comment in fork_and_exec_self() in main-gtk-simple.c.
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*/
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execv("/proc/self/exe", (char **)args);
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execvp(progname, (char **)args);
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perror("exec");
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_exit(127);
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}
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close(pipefds[1]);
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return pipefds[0];
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}
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static bool uxpgnt_ask_passphrase(
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PageantListenerClient *plc, PageantClientDialogId *dlgid,
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const char *comment)
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{
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struct uxpgnt_client *upc = container_of(plc, struct uxpgnt_client, plc);
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assert(!upc->dlgid); /* Pageant core should be serialising requests */
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char *msg = dupprintf(
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"A client of Pageant wants to use the following encrypted key:\n"
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"%s\n"
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"If you intended this, enter the passphrase to decrypt the key.",
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comment);
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switch (upc->prompt_type) {
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case RTPROMPT_UNAVAILABLE:
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sfree(msg);
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return false;
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case RTPROMPT_GUI:
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upc->passphrase_fd = make_pipe_to_askpass(msg);
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sfree(msg);
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if (upc->passphrase_fd < 0)
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return false; /* something went wrong */
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break;
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case RTPROMPT_DEBUG:
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fprintf(upc->logfp, "pageant passphrase request: %s\n", msg);
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sfree(msg);
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break;
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}
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upc->prompt_active = true;
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upc->dlgid = dlgid;
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return true;
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}
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static void passphrase_done(struct uxpgnt_client *upc, bool success)
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{
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PageantClientDialogId *dlgid = upc->dlgid;
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upc->dlgid = NULL;
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upc->prompt_active = false;
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if (upc->logfp)
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fprintf(upc->logfp, "pageant passphrase response: %s\n",
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success ? "success" : "failure");
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if (success)
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pageant_passphrase_request_success(
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dlgid, ptrlen_from_strbuf(upc->prompt_buf));
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else
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pageant_passphrase_request_refused(dlgid);
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strbuf_free(upc->prompt_buf);
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upc->prompt_buf = strbuf_new_nm();
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}
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static const PageantListenerClientVtable uxpgnt_vtable = {
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.log = uxpgnt_log,
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.ask_passphrase = uxpgnt_ask_passphrase,
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};
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/*
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* More stubs.
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*/
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void random_save_seed(void) {}
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void random_destroy_seed(void) {}
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char *platform_default_s(const char *name) { return NULL; }
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bool platform_default_b(const char *name, bool def) { return def; }
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int platform_default_i(const char *name, int def) { return def; }
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FontSpec *platform_default_fontspec(const char *name) { return fontspec_new_default(); }
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Filename *platform_default_filename(const char *name) { return filename_from_str(""); }
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char *x_get_default(const char *key) { return NULL; }
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/*
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* Short description of parameters.
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*/
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static void usage(void)
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{
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printf("Pageant: SSH agent\n");
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printf("%s\n", ver);
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printf("Usage: pageant <lifetime> [[--encrypted] key files]\n");
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printf(" pageant [[--encrypted] key files] --exec <command> [args]\n");
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printf(" pageant -a [--encrypted] [key files]\n");
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printf(" pageant -d [key identifiers]\n");
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printf(" pageant -D\n");
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printf(" pageant -r [key identifiers]\n");
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printf(" pageant -R\n");
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printf(" pageant --public [key identifiers]\n");
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printf(" pageant ( --public-openssh | -L ) [key identifiers]\n");
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printf(" pageant -l [-E fptype]\n");
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printf("Lifetime options, for running Pageant as an agent:\n");
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printf(" -X run with the lifetime of the X server\n");
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printf(" -T run with the lifetime of the controlling tty\n");
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printf(" --permanent run permanently\n");
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printf(" --debug run in debugging mode, without forking\n");
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printf(" --foreground run permanently, without forking\n");
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printf(" --exec <command> run with the lifetime of that command\n");
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printf("Client options, for talking to an existing agent:\n");
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printf(" -a add key(s) to the existing agent\n");
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printf(" -l list currently loaded key fingerprints and comments\n");
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printf(" --public print public keys in RFC 4716 format\n");
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printf(" --public-openssh, -L print public keys in OpenSSH format\n");
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printf(" -d delete key(s) from the agent\n");
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printf(" -D delete all keys from the agent\n");
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printf(" -r re-encrypt keys in the agent (forget cleartext)\n");
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printf(" -R re-encrypt all possible keys in the agent\n");
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printf("Other options:\n");
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printf(" -v verbose mode (in agent mode)\n");
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printf(" -s -c force POSIX or C shell syntax (in agent mode)\n");
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printf(" --symlink path create symlink to socket (in agent mode)\n");
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printf(" --encrypted when adding keys, don't decrypt\n");
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printf(" -E alg, --fptype alg fingerprint type for -l (sha256, md5)\n");
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printf(" --tty-prompt force tty-based passphrase prompt\n");
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printf(" --gui-prompt force GUI-based passphrase prompt\n");
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printf(" --askpass <prompt> behave like a standalone askpass program\n");
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}
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static void version(void)
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{
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char *buildinfo_text = buildinfo("\n");
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printf("pageant: %s\n%s\n", ver, buildinfo_text);
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sfree(buildinfo_text);
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exit(0);
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}
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void keylist_update(void)
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{
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/* Nothing needs doing in Unix Pageant */
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}
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#define PAGEANT_DIR_PREFIX "/tmp/pageant"
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static bool time_to_die = false;
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static void x11_closing(Plug *plug, PlugCloseType type, const char *error_msg)
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{
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/*
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* When the X connection closes, signal back to the main loop that
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* it's time to terminate.
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*/
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time_to_die = true;
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}
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struct X11Connection {
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Plug plug;
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};
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static char *socketname;
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static enum { SHELL_AUTO, SHELL_SH, SHELL_CSH } shell_type = SHELL_AUTO;
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void pageant_print_env(int pid)
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{
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if (shell_type == SHELL_AUTO) {
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/* Same policy as OpenSSH: if $SHELL ends in "csh" then assume
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* it's csh-shaped. */
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const char *shell = getenv("SHELL");
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if (shell && strlen(shell) >= 3 &&
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!strcmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh"))
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shell_type = SHELL_CSH;
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else
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shell_type = SHELL_SH;
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}
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/*
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* These shell snippets could usefully pay some attention to
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* escaping of interesting characters. I don't think it causes a
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* problem at the moment, because the pathnames we use are so
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* utterly boring, but it's a lurking bug waiting to happen once
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* a bit more flexibility turns up.
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*/
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switch (shell_type) {
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case SHELL_SH:
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printf("SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%s; export SSH_AUTH_SOCK;\n"
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"SSH_AGENT_PID=%d; export SSH_AGENT_PID;\n",
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socketname, pid);
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break;
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case SHELL_CSH:
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printf("setenv SSH_AUTH_SOCK %s;\n"
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"setenv SSH_AGENT_PID %d;\n",
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socketname, pid);
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break;
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case SHELL_AUTO:
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unreachable("SHELL_AUTO should have been eliminated by now");
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break;
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}
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}
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void pageant_fork_and_print_env(bool retain_tty)
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{
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pid_t pid = fork();
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if (pid == -1) {
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perror("fork");
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exit(1);
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} else if (pid != 0) {
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pageant_print_env(pid);
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exit(0);
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}
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/*
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* Having forked off, we now daemonise ourselves as best we can.
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* It's good practice in general to setsid() ourself out of any
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* process group we didn't want to be part of, and to chdir("/")
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* to avoid holding any directories open that we don't need in
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* case someone wants to umount them; also, we should definitely
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* close standard output (because it will very likely be pointing
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* at a pipe from which some parent process is trying to read our
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* environment variable dump, so if we hold open another copy of
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* it then that process will never finish reading). We close
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* standard input too on general principles, but not standard
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* error, since we might need to shout a panicky error message
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* down that one.
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*/
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if (chdir("/") < 0) {
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/* should there be an error condition, nothing we can do about
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* it anyway */
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}
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close(0);
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close(1);
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if (retain_tty) {
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/* Get out of our previous process group, to avoid being
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* blasted by passing signals. But keep our controlling tty,
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* so we can keep checking to see if we still have one. */
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#if HAVE_NULLARY_SETPGRP
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setpgrp();
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#elif HAVE_BINARY_SETPGRP
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setpgrp(0, 0);
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#endif
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} else {
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/* Do that, but also leave our entire session and detach from
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* the controlling tty (if any). */
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setsid();
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}
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}
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static int signalpipe[2] = { -1, -1 };
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static void sigchld(int signum)
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{
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if (write(signalpipe[1], "x", 1) <= 0)
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/* not much we can do about it */;
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}
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static void setup_sigchld_handler(void)
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{
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if (signalpipe[0] >= 0)
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return;
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/*
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* Set up the pipe we'll use to tell us about SIGCHLD.
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*/
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if (pipe(signalpipe) < 0) {
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perror("pipe");
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exit(1);
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}
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putty_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld);
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}
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#define TTY_LIFE_POLL_INTERVAL (TICKSPERSEC * 30)
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static void *dummy_timer_ctx;
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static void tty_life_timer(void *ctx, unsigned long now)
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{
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schedule_timer(TTY_LIFE_POLL_INTERVAL, tty_life_timer, &dummy_timer_ctx);
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}
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typedef enum {
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KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD,
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KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD_ENCRYPTED,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_BASE,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD = KEYACT_CLIENT_BASE,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD_ENCRYPTED,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_DEL,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_DEL_ALL,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_LIST,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_PUBLIC_OPENSSH,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_PUBLIC,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_SIGN,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_REENCRYPT,
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KEYACT_CLIENT_REENCRYPT_ALL,
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} keyact;
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struct cmdline_key_action {
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struct cmdline_key_action *next;
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keyact action;
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const char *filename;
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};
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bool is_agent_action(keyact action)
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{
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return action < KEYACT_CLIENT_BASE;
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}
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static struct cmdline_key_action *keyact_head = NULL, *keyact_tail = NULL;
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static uint32_t sign_flags = 0;
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void add_keyact(keyact action, const char *filename)
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{
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struct cmdline_key_action *a = snew(struct cmdline_key_action);
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a->action = action;
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a->filename = filename;
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a->next = NULL;
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if (keyact_tail)
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keyact_tail->next = a;
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else
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keyact_head = a;
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keyact_tail = a;
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}
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bool have_controlling_tty(void)
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{
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int fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDONLY);
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if (fd < 0) {
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if (errno != ENXIO) {
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perror("/dev/tty: open");
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exit(1);
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}
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return false;
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} else {
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close(fd);
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return true;
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}
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}
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static char **exec_args = NULL;
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static enum {
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LIFE_UNSPEC, LIFE_X11, LIFE_TTY, LIFE_DEBUG, LIFE_PERM, LIFE_EXEC, LIFE_FOREGROUND
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} life = LIFE_UNSPEC;
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static const char *display = NULL;
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static enum {
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PROMPT_UNSPEC, PROMPT_TTY, PROMPT_GUI
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} prompt_type = PROMPT_UNSPEC;
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static FingerprintType key_list_fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_DEFAULT;
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static char *askpass_tty(const char *prompt)
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{
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prompts_t *p = new_prompts();
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p->to_server = false;
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p->from_server = false;
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p->name = dupstr("Pageant passphrase prompt");
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add_prompt(p, dupcat(prompt, ": "), false);
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SeatPromptResult spr = console_get_userpass_input(p);
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assert(spr.kind != SPRK_INCOMPLETE);
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if (spr.kind == SPRK_USER_ABORT) {
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free_prompts(p);
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return NULL;
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} else if (spr.kind == SPRK_SW_ABORT) {
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free_prompts(p);
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char *err = spr_get_error_message(spr);
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fprintf(stderr, "pageant: unable to read passphrase: %s", err);
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sfree(err);
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return NULL;
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} else {
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char *passphrase = prompt_get_result(p->prompts[0]);
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free_prompts(p);
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return passphrase;
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}
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}
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static char *askpass_gui(const char *prompt)
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{
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char *passphrase;
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bool success;
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passphrase = gtk_askpass_main(
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display, "Pageant passphrase prompt", prompt, &success);
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if (!success) {
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/* return value is error message */
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fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", passphrase);
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sfree(passphrase);
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passphrase = NULL;
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}
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return passphrase;
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}
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static char *askpass(const char *prompt)
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{
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if (prompt_type == PROMPT_TTY) {
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if (!have_controlling_tty()) {
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fprintf(stderr, "no controlling terminal available "
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"for passphrase prompt\n");
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return NULL;
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}
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return askpass_tty(prompt);
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}
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|
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if (prompt_type == PROMPT_GUI) {
|
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if (!display) {
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fprintf(stderr, "no graphical display available "
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"for passphrase prompt\n");
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return NULL;
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}
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return askpass_gui(prompt);
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}
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|
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if (have_controlling_tty()) {
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return askpass_tty(prompt);
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} else if (display) {
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return askpass_gui(prompt);
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} else {
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fprintf(stderr, "no way to read a passphrase without tty or "
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"X display\n");
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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|
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static bool unix_add_keyfile(const char *filename_str, bool add_encrypted)
|
|
{
|
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Filename *filename = filename_from_str(filename_str);
|
|
int status;
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bool ret;
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char *err;
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ret = true;
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/*
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* Try without a passphrase.
|
|
*/
|
|
status = pageant_add_keyfile(filename, NULL, &err, add_encrypted);
|
|
if (status == PAGEANT_ACTION_OK) {
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
} else if (status == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: %s: %s\n", filename_str, err);
|
|
ret = false;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* And now try prompting for a passphrase.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
char *prompt = dupprintf(
|
|
"Enter passphrase to load key '%s'", err);
|
|
char *passphrase = askpass(prompt);
|
|
sfree(err);
|
|
sfree(prompt);
|
|
err = NULL;
|
|
if (!passphrase)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
status = pageant_add_keyfile(filename, passphrase, &err,
|
|
add_encrypted);
|
|
|
|
smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
|
|
sfree(passphrase);
|
|
passphrase = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (status == PAGEANT_ACTION_OK) {
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
} else if (status == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: %s: %s\n", filename_str, err);
|
|
ret = false;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
sfree(err);
|
|
filename_free(filename);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void key_list_callback(void *ctx, char **fingerprints, const char *comment,
|
|
uint32_t ext_flags, struct pageant_pubkey *key)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *mode = "";
|
|
if (ext_flags & LIST_EXTENDED_FLAG_HAS_NO_CLEARTEXT_KEY)
|
|
mode = " (encrypted)";
|
|
else if (ext_flags & LIST_EXTENDED_FLAG_HAS_ENCRYPTED_KEY_FILE)
|
|
mode = " (re-encryptable)";
|
|
|
|
FingerprintType this_type =
|
|
ssh2_pick_fingerprint(fingerprints, key_list_fptype);
|
|
printf("%s %s%s\n", fingerprints[this_type], comment, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct key_find_ctx {
|
|
const char *string;
|
|
bool match_fp, match_comment;
|
|
bool match_fptypes[SSH_N_FPTYPES];
|
|
struct pageant_pubkey *found;
|
|
int nfound;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static bool match_fingerprint_string(
|
|
const char *string_orig, char **fingerprints,
|
|
const struct key_find_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *hash;
|
|
|
|
for (unsigned fptype = 0; fptype < SSH_N_FPTYPES; fptype++) {
|
|
if (!ctx->match_fptypes[fptype])
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
const char *fingerprint = fingerprints[fptype];
|
|
if (!fingerprint)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Find the hash in the fingerprint string. It'll be the word
|
|
* at the end. */
|
|
hash = strrchr(fingerprint, ' ');
|
|
assert(hash);
|
|
hash++;
|
|
|
|
const char *string = string_orig;
|
|
bool case_sensitive;
|
|
const char *ignore_chars = "";
|
|
|
|
switch (fptype) {
|
|
case SSH_FPTYPE_MD5:
|
|
case SSH_FPTYPE_MD5_CERT:
|
|
/* MD5 fingerprints are in hex, so disregard case differences. */
|
|
case_sensitive = false;
|
|
/* And we don't really need to force the user to type the
|
|
* colons in between the digits, which are always the
|
|
* same. */
|
|
ignore_chars = ":";
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSH_FPTYPE_SHA256:
|
|
case SSH_FPTYPE_SHA256_CERT:
|
|
/* Skip over the "SHA256:" prefix, which we don't really
|
|
* want to force the user to type. On the other hand,
|
|
* tolerate it on the input string. */
|
|
assert(strstartswith(hash, "SHA256:"));
|
|
hash += 7;
|
|
if (strstartswith(string, "SHA256:"))
|
|
string += 7;
|
|
/* SHA256 fingerprints are base64, which is intrinsically
|
|
* case sensitive. */
|
|
case_sensitive = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now see if the search string is a prefix of the full hash,
|
|
* neglecting colons and (where appropriate) case differences. */
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
string += strspn(string, ignore_chars);
|
|
hash += strspn(hash, ignore_chars);
|
|
if (!*string)
|
|
return true;
|
|
char sc = *string, hc = *hash;
|
|
if (!case_sensitive) {
|
|
sc = tolower((unsigned char)sc);
|
|
hc = tolower((unsigned char)hc);
|
|
}
|
|
if (sc != hc)
|
|
break;
|
|
string++;
|
|
hash++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void key_find_callback(void *vctx, char **fingerprints,
|
|
const char *comment, uint32_t ext_flags,
|
|
struct pageant_pubkey *key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key_find_ctx *ctx = (struct key_find_ctx *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
if ((ctx->match_comment && !strcmp(ctx->string, comment)) ||
|
|
(ctx->match_fp && match_fingerprint_string(ctx->string, fingerprints,
|
|
ctx))) {
|
|
if (!ctx->found)
|
|
ctx->found = pageant_pubkey_copy(key);
|
|
ctx->nfound++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct pageant_pubkey *find_key(const char *string, char **retstr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key_find_ctx ctx[1];
|
|
struct pageant_pubkey key_in, *key_ret;
|
|
bool try_file = true, try_fp = true, try_comment = true;
|
|
bool file_errors = false;
|
|
bool try_all_fptypes = true;
|
|
FingerprintType fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_DEFAULT;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Trim off disambiguating prefixes telling us how to interpret
|
|
* the provided string.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!strncmp(string, "file:", 5)) {
|
|
string += 5;
|
|
try_fp = false;
|
|
try_comment = false;
|
|
file_errors = true; /* also report failure to load the file */
|
|
} else if (!strncmp(string, "comment:", 8)) {
|
|
string += 8;
|
|
try_file = false;
|
|
try_fp = false;
|
|
} else if (!strncmp(string, "fp:", 3)) {
|
|
string += 3;
|
|
try_file = false;
|
|
try_comment = false;
|
|
} else if (!strncmp(string, "fingerprint:", 12)) {
|
|
string += 12;
|
|
try_file = false;
|
|
try_comment = false;
|
|
} else if (!strnicmp(string, "md5:", 4)) {
|
|
string += 4;
|
|
try_file = false;
|
|
try_comment = false;
|
|
try_all_fptypes = false;
|
|
fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_MD5;
|
|
} else if (!strncmp(string, "sha256:", 7)) {
|
|
string += 7;
|
|
try_file = false;
|
|
try_comment = false;
|
|
try_all_fptypes = false;
|
|
fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_SHA256;
|
|
} else if (!strnicmp(string, "md5-cert:", 9)) {
|
|
string += 9;
|
|
try_file = false;
|
|
try_comment = false;
|
|
try_all_fptypes = false;
|
|
fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_MD5_CERT;
|
|
} else if (!strncmp(string, "sha256-cert:", 12)) {
|
|
string += 12;
|
|
try_file = false;
|
|
try_comment = false;
|
|
try_all_fptypes = false;
|
|
fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_SHA256_CERT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try interpreting the string as a key file name.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (try_file) {
|
|
Filename *fn = filename_from_str(string);
|
|
int keytype = key_type(fn);
|
|
if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1 ||
|
|
keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH1_PUBLIC) {
|
|
const char *error;
|
|
|
|
key_in.blob = strbuf_new();
|
|
if (!rsa1_loadpub_f(fn, BinarySink_UPCAST(key_in.blob),
|
|
NULL, &error)) {
|
|
strbuf_free(key_in.blob);
|
|
key_in.blob = NULL;
|
|
if (file_errors) {
|
|
*retstr = dupprintf("unable to load file '%s': %s",
|
|
string, error);
|
|
filename_free(fn);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we've successfully loaded the file, stop here - we
|
|
* already have a key blob and need not go to the agent to
|
|
* list things.
|
|
*/
|
|
key_in.ssh_version = 1;
|
|
key_in.comment = NULL;
|
|
key_ret = pageant_pubkey_copy(&key_in);
|
|
strbuf_free(key_in.blob);
|
|
key_in.blob = NULL;
|
|
filename_free(fn);
|
|
return key_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2 ||
|
|
keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716 ||
|
|
keytype == SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH) {
|
|
const char *error;
|
|
|
|
key_in.blob = strbuf_new();
|
|
if (!ppk_loadpub_f(fn, NULL, BinarySink_UPCAST(key_in.blob),
|
|
NULL, &error)) {
|
|
strbuf_free(key_in.blob);
|
|
key_in.blob = NULL;
|
|
if (file_errors) {
|
|
*retstr = dupprintf("unable to load file '%s': %s",
|
|
string, error);
|
|
filename_free(fn);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we've successfully loaded the file, stop here - we
|
|
* already have a key blob and need not go to the agent to
|
|
* list things.
|
|
*/
|
|
key_in.ssh_version = 2;
|
|
key_in.comment = NULL;
|
|
key_ret = pageant_pubkey_copy(&key_in);
|
|
strbuf_free(key_in.blob);
|
|
key_in.blob = NULL;
|
|
filename_free(fn);
|
|
return key_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (file_errors) {
|
|
*retstr = dupprintf("unable to load key file '%s': %s",
|
|
string, key_type_to_str(keytype));
|
|
filename_free(fn);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
filename_free(fn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Failing that, go through the keys in the agent, and match
|
|
* against fingerprints and comments as appropriate.
|
|
*/
|
|
ctx->string = string;
|
|
ctx->match_fp = try_fp;
|
|
ctx->match_comment = try_comment;
|
|
for (unsigned i = 0; i < SSH_N_FPTYPES; i++)
|
|
ctx->match_fptypes[i] = (try_all_fptypes || i == fptype);
|
|
ctx->found = NULL;
|
|
ctx->nfound = 0;
|
|
if (pageant_enum_keys(key_find_callback, ctx, retstr) ==
|
|
PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->nfound == 0) {
|
|
*retstr = dupstr("no key matched");
|
|
assert(!ctx->found);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
} else if (ctx->nfound > 1) {
|
|
*retstr = dupstr("multiple keys matched");
|
|
assert(ctx->found);
|
|
pageant_pubkey_free(ctx->found);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(ctx->found);
|
|
return ctx->found;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void run_client(void)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cmdline_key_action *act;
|
|
struct pageant_pubkey *key;
|
|
bool errors = false;
|
|
char *retstr;
|
|
LoadedFile *message = lf_new(AGENT_MAX_MSGLEN);
|
|
bool message_loaded = false, message_ok = false;
|
|
strbuf *signature = strbuf_new();
|
|
|
|
if (!agent_exists()) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: no agent running to talk to\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (act = keyact_head; act; act = act->next) {
|
|
switch (act->action) {
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD:
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD_ENCRYPTED:
|
|
if (!unix_add_keyfile(act->filename,
|
|
act->action == KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD_ENCRYPTED))
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_LIST:
|
|
if (pageant_enum_keys(key_list_callback, NULL, &retstr) ==
|
|
PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: listing keys: %s\n", retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_DEL:
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
if (!(key = find_key(act->filename, &retstr)) ||
|
|
pageant_delete_key(key, &retstr) == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: deleting key '%s': %s\n",
|
|
act->filename, retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (key)
|
|
pageant_pubkey_free(key);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_REENCRYPT:
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
if (!(key = find_key(act->filename, &retstr)) ||
|
|
pageant_reencrypt_key(key, &retstr) == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: re-encrypting key '%s': %s\n",
|
|
act->filename, retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (key)
|
|
pageant_pubkey_free(key);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_PUBLIC_OPENSSH:
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_PUBLIC:
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
if (!(key = find_key(act->filename, &retstr))) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: finding key '%s': %s\n",
|
|
act->filename, retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
FILE *fp = stdout; /* FIXME: add a -o option? */
|
|
|
|
if (key->ssh_version == 1) {
|
|
BinarySource src[1];
|
|
RSAKey rkey;
|
|
|
|
BinarySource_BARE_INIT(src, key->blob->u, key->blob->len);
|
|
memset(&rkey, 0, sizeof(rkey));
|
|
rkey.comment = dupstr(key->comment);
|
|
get_rsa_ssh1_pub(src, &rkey, RSA_SSH1_EXPONENT_FIRST);
|
|
ssh1_write_pubkey(fp, &rkey);
|
|
freersakey(&rkey);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssh2_write_pubkey(fp, key->comment,
|
|
key->blob->u,
|
|
key->blob->len,
|
|
(act->action == KEYACT_CLIENT_PUBLIC ?
|
|
SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_RFC4716 :
|
|
SSH_KEYTYPE_SSH2_PUBLIC_OPENSSH));
|
|
}
|
|
pageant_pubkey_free(key);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_DEL_ALL:
|
|
if (pageant_delete_all_keys(&retstr) == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: deleting all keys: %s\n", retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_REENCRYPT_ALL: {
|
|
int status = pageant_reencrypt_all_keys(&retstr);
|
|
if (status == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: re-encrypting all keys: "
|
|
"%s\n", retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
} else if (status == PAGEANT_ACTION_WARNING) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: re-encrypting all keys: "
|
|
"warning: %s\n", retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case KEYACT_CLIENT_SIGN:
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
if (!message_loaded) {
|
|
message_loaded = true;
|
|
switch(lf_load_fp(message, stdin)) {
|
|
case LF_TOO_BIG:
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: message to sign is too big\n");
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
case LF_ERROR:
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: reading message to sign: %s\n",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
case LF_OK:
|
|
message_ok = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!message_ok)
|
|
break;
|
|
strbuf_clear(signature);
|
|
if (!(key = find_key(act->filename, &retstr)) ||
|
|
pageant_sign(key, ptrlen_from_lf(message), signature,
|
|
sign_flags, &retstr) == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: signing with key '%s': %s\n",
|
|
act->filename, retstr);
|
|
sfree(retstr);
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fwrite(signature->s, 1, signature->len, stdout);
|
|
}
|
|
if (key)
|
|
pageant_pubkey_free(key);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
unreachable("Invalid client action found");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lf_free(message);
|
|
strbuf_free(signature);
|
|
|
|
if (errors)
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const PlugVtable X11Connection_plugvt = {
|
|
.log = nullplug_log,
|
|
.closing = x11_closing,
|
|
.receive = nullplug_receive,
|
|
.sent = nullplug_sent,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool agent_loop_pw_setup(void *vctx, pollwrapper *pw)
|
|
{
|
|
struct uxpgnt_client *upc = (struct uxpgnt_client *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
if (signalpipe[0] >= 0) {
|
|
pollwrap_add_fd_rwx(pw, signalpipe[0], SELECT_R);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (upc->prompt_active)
|
|
pollwrap_add_fd_rwx(pw, upc->passphrase_fd, SELECT_R);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void agent_loop_pw_check(void *vctx, pollwrapper *pw)
|
|
{
|
|
struct uxpgnt_client *upc = (struct uxpgnt_client *)vctx;
|
|
|
|
if (life == LIFE_TTY) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Every time we wake up (whether it was due to tty_timer
|
|
* elapsing or for any other reason), poll to see if we still
|
|
* have a controlling terminal. If we don't, then our
|
|
* containing tty session has ended, so it's time to clean up
|
|
* and leave.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!have_controlling_tty()) {
|
|
time_to_die = true;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (signalpipe[0] >= 0 &&
|
|
pollwrap_check_fd_rwx(pw, signalpipe[0], SELECT_R)) {
|
|
char c[1];
|
|
if (read(signalpipe[0], c, 1) <= 0)
|
|
/* ignore error */;
|
|
/* ignore its value; it'll be `x' */
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
int status;
|
|
pid_t pid;
|
|
pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG);
|
|
if (pid <= 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (pid == upc->termination_pid)
|
|
time_to_die = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (upc->prompt_active &&
|
|
pollwrap_check_fd_rwx(pw, upc->passphrase_fd, SELECT_R)) {
|
|
char c;
|
|
int retd = read(upc->passphrase_fd, &c, 1);
|
|
|
|
switch (upc->prompt_type) {
|
|
case RTPROMPT_GUI:
|
|
if (retd <= 0) {
|
|
close(upc->passphrase_fd);
|
|
upc->passphrase_fd = -1;
|
|
bool ok = (retd == 0);
|
|
if (!strbuf_chomp(upc->prompt_buf, '\n'))
|
|
ok = false;
|
|
passphrase_done(upc, ok);
|
|
} else {
|
|
put_byte(upc->prompt_buf, c);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case RTPROMPT_DEBUG:
|
|
if (retd <= 0) {
|
|
passphrase_done(upc, false);
|
|
/* Now never try to read from stdin again */
|
|
upc->prompt_type = RTPROMPT_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (c) {
|
|
case '\n':
|
|
case '\r':
|
|
passphrase_done(upc, true);
|
|
break;
|
|
case '\004':
|
|
passphrase_done(upc, false);
|
|
break;
|
|
case '\b':
|
|
case '\177':
|
|
strbuf_shrink_by(upc->prompt_buf, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
case '\025':
|
|
strbuf_clear(upc->prompt_buf);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
put_byte(upc->prompt_buf, c);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case RTPROMPT_UNAVAILABLE:
|
|
unreachable("Should never have started a prompt at all");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool agent_loop_continue(void *vctx, bool fd, bool cb)
|
|
{
|
|
return !time_to_die;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void run_agent(FILE *logfp, const char *symlink_path)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *err;
|
|
char *errw;
|
|
struct pageant_listen_state *pl;
|
|
Plug *pl_plug;
|
|
Socket *sock;
|
|
bool errors = false;
|
|
Conf *conf;
|
|
const struct cmdline_key_action *act;
|
|
|
|
pageant_init();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Start by loading any keys provided on the command line.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (act = keyact_head; act; act = act->next) {
|
|
assert(act->action == KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD ||
|
|
act->action == KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD_ENCRYPTED);
|
|
if (!unix_add_keyfile(act->filename,
|
|
act->action == KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD_ENCRYPTED))
|
|
errors = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (errors)
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set up a listening socket and run Pageant on it.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct uxpgnt_client upc[1];
|
|
memset(upc, 0, sizeof(upc));
|
|
upc->plc.vt = &uxpgnt_vtable;
|
|
upc->logfp = logfp;
|
|
upc->passphrase_fd = -1;
|
|
upc->termination_pid = -1;
|
|
upc->prompt_buf = strbuf_new_nm();
|
|
upc->prompt_type = display ? RTPROMPT_GUI : RTPROMPT_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
pl = pageant_listener_new(&pl_plug, &upc->plc);
|
|
sock = platform_make_agent_socket(pl_plug, PAGEANT_DIR_PREFIX,
|
|
&errw, &socketname);
|
|
if (!sock) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: %s\n", errw);
|
|
sfree(errw);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
pageant_listener_got_socket(pl, sock);
|
|
|
|
if (symlink_path) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try to make a symlink to the Unix socket, in a location of
|
|
* the user's choosing.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the link already exists, we want to replace it. There
|
|
* are two ways we could do this: either make it under another
|
|
* name and then rename it over the top, or remove the old
|
|
* link first. The former is what 'ln -sf' does, on the
|
|
* grounds that it's more atomic. But I think in this case,
|
|
* where the expected use case is that the previous agent has
|
|
* long since shut down, atomicity isn't a critical concern
|
|
* compared to not accidentally overwriting some non-symlink
|
|
* that might have important data in it!
|
|
*/
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
if (lstat(symlink_path, &st) == 0 && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
|
|
unlink(symlink_path);
|
|
if (symlink(socketname, symlink_path) < 0)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: making symlink %s: %s\n",
|
|
symlink_path, strerror(errno));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conf = conf_new();
|
|
conf_set_int(conf, CONF_proxy_type, PROXY_NONE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Lifetime preparations.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (life == LIFE_X11) {
|
|
struct X11Display *disp;
|
|
void *greeting;
|
|
int greetinglen;
|
|
Socket *s;
|
|
struct X11Connection *conn;
|
|
char *x11_setup_err;
|
|
|
|
if (!display) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: no DISPLAY for -X mode\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
disp = x11_setup_display(display, conf, &x11_setup_err);
|
|
if (!disp) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: unable to connect to X server: %s\n",
|
|
x11_setup_err);
|
|
sfree(x11_setup_err);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn = snew(struct X11Connection);
|
|
conn->plug.vt = &X11Connection_plugvt;
|
|
s = new_connection(sk_addr_dup(disp->addr),
|
|
disp->realhost, disp->port,
|
|
false, true, false, false, &conn->plug, conf,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if ((err = sk_socket_error(s)) != NULL) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: unable to connect to X server: %s", err);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
greeting = x11_make_greeting('B', 11, 0, disp->localauthproto,
|
|
disp->localauthdata,
|
|
disp->localauthdatalen,
|
|
NULL, 0, &greetinglen);
|
|
sk_write(s, greeting, greetinglen);
|
|
smemclr(greeting, greetinglen);
|
|
sfree(greeting);
|
|
|
|
pageant_fork_and_print_env(false);
|
|
} else if (life == LIFE_TTY) {
|
|
schedule_timer(TTY_LIFE_POLL_INTERVAL,
|
|
tty_life_timer, &dummy_timer_ctx);
|
|
pageant_fork_and_print_env(true);
|
|
} else if (life == LIFE_PERM) {
|
|
pageant_fork_and_print_env(false);
|
|
} else if (life == LIFE_FOREGROUND) {
|
|
pageant_print_env(getpid());
|
|
/* Close stdout, so that a parent process at the other end of a pipe
|
|
* can do the simple thing of reading up to EOF */
|
|
fclose(stdout);
|
|
} else if (life == LIFE_DEBUG) {
|
|
/* Force stdout to be line-buffered in preference to unbuffered, so
|
|
* that if diagnostic output is being piped somewhere, it will arrive
|
|
* promptly at the other end of the pipe */
|
|
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
|
|
|
|
pageant_print_env(getpid());
|
|
upc->logfp = stdout;
|
|
|
|
struct termios orig_termios;
|
|
upc->passphrase_fd = fileno(stdin);
|
|
if (tcgetattr(upc->passphrase_fd, &orig_termios) == 0) {
|
|
struct termios new_termios = orig_termios;
|
|
new_termios.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL | ICANON);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try to set up a watchdog process that will restore
|
|
* termios if we crash or are killed. If successful, turn
|
|
* off echo, for runtime passphrase prompts.
|
|
*/
|
|
int pipefd[2];
|
|
if (pipe(pipefd) == 0) {
|
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
|
if (pid == 0) {
|
|
tcsetattr(upc->passphrase_fd, TCSADRAIN, &new_termios);
|
|
close(pipefd[1]);
|
|
char buf[4096];
|
|
while (read(pipefd[0], buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0);
|
|
tcsetattr(upc->passphrase_fd, TCSADRAIN, &new_termios);
|
|
_exit(0);
|
|
} else if (pid > 0) {
|
|
upc->prompt_type = RTPROMPT_DEBUG;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
close(pipefd[0]);
|
|
if (pid < 0)
|
|
close(pipefd[1]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (life == LIFE_EXEC) {
|
|
pid_t agentpid, pid;
|
|
|
|
agentpid = getpid();
|
|
setup_sigchld_handler();
|
|
|
|
pid = fork();
|
|
if (pid < 0) {
|
|
perror("fork");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
} else if (pid == 0) {
|
|
setenv("SSH_AUTH_SOCK", socketname, true);
|
|
setenv("SSH_AGENT_PID", dupprintf("%d", (int)agentpid), true);
|
|
execvp(exec_args[0], exec_args);
|
|
perror("exec");
|
|
_exit(127);
|
|
} else {
|
|
upc->termination_pid = pid;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!upc->logfp)
|
|
upc->plc.suppress_logging = true;
|
|
|
|
cli_main_loop(agent_loop_pw_setup, agent_loop_pw_check,
|
|
agent_loop_continue, upc);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Before terminating, clean up our Unix socket file if possible.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlink(socketname) < 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: %s: %s\n", socketname, strerror(errno));
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strbuf_free(upc->prompt_buf);
|
|
conf_free(conf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
bool doing_opts = true;
|
|
keyact curr_keyact = KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD;
|
|
const char *standalone_askpass_prompt = NULL;
|
|
const char *symlink_path = NULL;
|
|
FILE *logfp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
progname = argv[0];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process the command line.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (--argc > 0) {
|
|
char *p = *++argv;
|
|
if (*p == '-' && doing_opts) {
|
|
if (!strcmp(p, "-V") || !strcmp(p, "--version")) {
|
|
version();
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--help")) {
|
|
usage();
|
|
exit(0);
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-v")) {
|
|
logfp = stderr;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-a")) {
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-d")) {
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_DEL;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-r")) {
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_REENCRYPT;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-s")) {
|
|
shell_type = SHELL_SH;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-c")) {
|
|
shell_type = SHELL_CSH;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-D")) {
|
|
add_keyact(KEYACT_CLIENT_DEL_ALL, NULL);
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-R")) {
|
|
add_keyact(KEYACT_CLIENT_REENCRYPT_ALL, NULL);
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-l")) {
|
|
add_keyact(KEYACT_CLIENT_LIST, NULL);
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--public")) {
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_PUBLIC;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--public-openssh") || !strcmp(p, "-L")) {
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_PUBLIC_OPENSSH;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-X")) {
|
|
life = LIFE_X11;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-T")) {
|
|
life = LIFE_TTY;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--no-decrypt") ||
|
|
!strcmp(p, "-no-decrypt") ||
|
|
!strcmp(p, "--no_decrypt") ||
|
|
!strcmp(p, "-no_decrypt") ||
|
|
!strcmp(p, "--nodecrypt") ||
|
|
!strcmp(p, "-nodecrypt") ||
|
|
!strcmp(p, "--encrypted") ||
|
|
!strcmp(p, "-encrypted")) {
|
|
if (curr_keyact == KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD)
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_AGENT_LOAD_ENCRYPTED;
|
|
else if (curr_keyact == KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD)
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_ADD_ENCRYPTED;
|
|
else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: unexpected %s while not adding "
|
|
"keys\n", p);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--debug")) {
|
|
life = LIFE_DEBUG;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--foreground")) {
|
|
life = LIFE_FOREGROUND;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--test-sign")) {
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_SIGN;
|
|
sign_flags = 0;
|
|
} else if (strstartswith(p, "--test-sign-with-flags=")) {
|
|
curr_keyact = KEYACT_CLIENT_SIGN;
|
|
sign_flags = atoi(p + strlen("--test-sign-with-flags="));
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--permanent")) {
|
|
life = LIFE_PERM;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--exec")) {
|
|
life = LIFE_EXEC;
|
|
/* Now all subsequent arguments go to the exec command. */
|
|
if (--argc > 0) {
|
|
exec_args = ++argv;
|
|
argc = 0; /* force end of option processing */
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: expected a command "
|
|
"after --exec\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--tty-prompt")) {
|
|
prompt_type = PROMPT_TTY;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--gui-prompt")) {
|
|
prompt_type = PROMPT_GUI;
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--askpass")) {
|
|
if (--argc > 0) {
|
|
standalone_askpass_prompt = *++argv;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: expected a prompt message "
|
|
"after --askpass\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--symlink")) {
|
|
if (--argc > 0) {
|
|
symlink_path = *++argv;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: expected a pathname "
|
|
"after --symlink\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "-E") || !strcmp(p, "--fptype")) {
|
|
const char *keyword;
|
|
if (--argc > 0) {
|
|
keyword = *++argv;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: expected a type string "
|
|
"after %s\n", p);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!strcmp(keyword, "md5"))
|
|
key_list_fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_MD5;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(keyword, "sha256"))
|
|
key_list_fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_SHA256;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(keyword, "md5-cert"))
|
|
key_list_fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_MD5_CERT;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(keyword, "sha256-cert"))
|
|
key_list_fptype = SSH_FPTYPE_SHA256_CERT;
|
|
else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: unknown fingerprint type `%s'\n",
|
|
keyword);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!strcmp(p, "--")) {
|
|
doing_opts = false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: unrecognised option '%s'\n", p);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Non-option arguments (apart from those after --exec,
|
|
* which are treated specially above) are interpreted as
|
|
* the names of private key files to either add or delete
|
|
* from an agent.
|
|
*/
|
|
add_keyact(curr_keyact, p);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (life == LIFE_EXEC && !exec_args) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: expected a command with --exec\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!display) {
|
|
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
|
|
if (display && !*display)
|
|
display = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Deal with standalone-askpass mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (standalone_askpass_prompt) {
|
|
char *passphrase = askpass(standalone_askpass_prompt);
|
|
|
|
if (!passphrase)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
puts(passphrase);
|
|
fflush(stdout);
|
|
|
|
smemclr(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
|
|
sfree(passphrase);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Block SIGPIPE, so that we'll get EPIPE individually on
|
|
* particular network connections that go wrong.
|
|
*/
|
|
putty_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
|
|
|
|
sk_init();
|
|
uxsel_init();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now distinguish our two main running modes. Either we're
|
|
* actually starting up an agent, in which case we should have a
|
|
* lifetime mode, and no key actions of KEYACT_CLIENT_* type; or
|
|
* else we're contacting an existing agent to add or remove keys,
|
|
* in which case we should have no lifetime mode, and no key
|
|
* actions of KEYACT_AGENT_* type.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
bool has_agent_actions = false;
|
|
bool has_client_actions = false;
|
|
bool has_lifetime = false;
|
|
const struct cmdline_key_action *act;
|
|
|
|
for (act = keyact_head; act; act = act->next) {
|
|
if (is_agent_action(act->action))
|
|
has_agent_actions = true;
|
|
else
|
|
has_client_actions = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (life != LIFE_UNSPEC)
|
|
has_lifetime = true;
|
|
|
|
if (has_lifetime && has_client_actions) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: client key actions (-a, -d, -D, -r, -R, "
|
|
"-l, -L) do not go with an agent lifetime option\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!has_lifetime && has_agent_actions) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: expected an agent lifetime option with"
|
|
" bare key file arguments\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!has_lifetime && !has_client_actions) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pageant: expected an agent lifetime option"
|
|
" or a client key action\n");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (has_lifetime) {
|
|
run_agent(logfp, symlink_path);
|
|
} else if (has_client_actions) {
|
|
run_client();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|