2001-01-17 10:11:16 +00:00
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\C{config} Configuring PuTTY
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2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
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This chapter describes all the \i{configuration options} in PuTTY.
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2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
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PuTTY is configured using the control panel that comes up before you
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start a session. Some options can also be changed in the middle of a
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2001-11-25 17:32:39 +00:00
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session, by selecting \q{Change Settings} from the window menu.
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2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
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\H{config-session} The Session panel
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The Session configuration panel contains the basic options you need
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to specify in order to open a session at all, and also allows you to
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save your settings to be reloaded later.
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2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
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\S{config-hostname} The \i{host name} section
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2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
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2021-04-20 15:25:49 +00:00
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The top box on the Session panel, labelled \q{Specify the destination
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you want to connect to}, contains the details that need to be filled
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in before PuTTY can open a session at all.
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2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
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2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
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\b The \q{Host Name} box is where you type the name, or the \i{IP
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address}, of the server you want to connect to.
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2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
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2021-04-17 12:20:58 +00:00
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\b The \q{Connection type} controls let you choose what type of
|
New protocol: PROT_SSHCONN, bare ssh-connection.
This is the same protocol that PuTTY's connection sharing has been
using for years, to communicate between the downstream and upstream
PuTTYs. I'm now promoting it to be a first-class member of the
protocols list: if you have a server for it, you can select it in the
GUI or on the command line, and write out a saved session that
specifies it.
This would be completely insecure if you used it as an ordinary
network protocol, of course. Not only is it non-cryptographic and wide
open to eavesdropping and hijacking, but it's not even _authenticated_
- it begins after the userauth phase of SSH. So there isn't even the
mild security theatre of entering an easy-to-eavesdrop password, as
there is with, say, Telnet.
However, that's not what I want to use it for. My aim is to use it for
various specialist and niche purposes, all of which involve speaking
it over an 8-bit-clean data channel that is already set up, secured
and authenticated by other methods. There are lots of examples of such
channels:
- a userv(1) invocation
- the console of a UML kernel
- the stdio channels into other kinds of container, such as Docker
- the 'adb shell' channel (although it seems quite hard to run a
custom binary at the far end of that)
- a pair of pipes between PuTTY and a Cygwin helper process
- and so on.
So this protocol is intended as a convenient way to get a client at
one end of any those to run a shell session at the other end. Unlike
other approaches, it will give you all the SSH-flavoured amenities
you're already used to, like forwarding your SSH agent into the
container, or forwarding selected network ports in or out of it, or
letting it open a window on your X server, or doing SCP/SFTP style
file transfer.
Of course another way to get all those amenities would be to run an
ordinary SSH server over the same channel - but this approach avoids
having to manage a phony password or authentication key, or taking up
your CPU time with pointless crypto.
2020-02-16 12:07:43 +00:00
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connection you want to make: an \i{SSH} network connection, a
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connection to a local \i{serial line}, or various other kinds of
|
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network connection.
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\lcont{
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\b See \k{which-one} for a summary of the
|
2019-04-04 13:48:56 +00:00
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|
differences between the network remote login protocols SSH, Telnet,
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|
Rlogin, and SUPDUP.
|
New protocol: PROT_SSHCONN, bare ssh-connection.
This is the same protocol that PuTTY's connection sharing has been
using for years, to communicate between the downstream and upstream
PuTTYs. I'm now promoting it to be a first-class member of the
protocols list: if you have a server for it, you can select it in the
GUI or on the command line, and write out a saved session that
specifies it.
This would be completely insecure if you used it as an ordinary
network protocol, of course. Not only is it non-cryptographic and wide
open to eavesdropping and hijacking, but it's not even _authenticated_
- it begins after the userauth phase of SSH. So there isn't even the
mild security theatre of entering an easy-to-eavesdrop password, as
there is with, say, Telnet.
However, that's not what I want to use it for. My aim is to use it for
various specialist and niche purposes, all of which involve speaking
it over an 8-bit-clean data channel that is already set up, secured
and authenticated by other methods. There are lots of examples of such
channels:
- a userv(1) invocation
- the console of a UML kernel
- the stdio channels into other kinds of container, such as Docker
- the 'adb shell' channel (although it seems quite hard to run a
custom binary at the far end of that)
- a pair of pipes between PuTTY and a Cygwin helper process
- and so on.
So this protocol is intended as a convenient way to get a client at
one end of any those to run a shell session at the other end. Unlike
other approaches, it will give you all the SSH-flavoured amenities
you're already used to, like forwarding your SSH agent into the
container, or forwarding selected network ports in or out of it, or
letting it open a window on your X server, or doing SCP/SFTP style
file transfer.
Of course another way to get all those amenities would be to run an
ordinary SSH server over the same channel - but this approach avoids
having to manage a phony password or authentication key, or taking up
your CPU time with pointless crypto.
2020-02-16 12:07:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-17 12:22:56 +00:00
|
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|
\b See \k{using-serial} for information about using a serial line.
|
|
|
|
|
New protocol: PROT_SSHCONN, bare ssh-connection.
This is the same protocol that PuTTY's connection sharing has been
using for years, to communicate between the downstream and upstream
PuTTYs. I'm now promoting it to be a first-class member of the
protocols list: if you have a server for it, you can select it in the
GUI or on the command line, and write out a saved session that
specifies it.
This would be completely insecure if you used it as an ordinary
network protocol, of course. Not only is it non-cryptographic and wide
open to eavesdropping and hijacking, but it's not even _authenticated_
- it begins after the userauth phase of SSH. So there isn't even the
mild security theatre of entering an easy-to-eavesdrop password, as
there is with, say, Telnet.
However, that's not what I want to use it for. My aim is to use it for
various specialist and niche purposes, all of which involve speaking
it over an 8-bit-clean data channel that is already set up, secured
and authenticated by other methods. There are lots of examples of such
channels:
- a userv(1) invocation
- the console of a UML kernel
- the stdio channels into other kinds of container, such as Docker
- the 'adb shell' channel (although it seems quite hard to run a
custom binary at the far end of that)
- a pair of pipes between PuTTY and a Cygwin helper process
- and so on.
So this protocol is intended as a convenient way to get a client at
one end of any those to run a shell session at the other end. Unlike
other approaches, it will give you all the SSH-flavoured amenities
you're already used to, like forwarding your SSH agent into the
container, or forwarding selected network ports in or out of it, or
letting it open a window on your X server, or doing SCP/SFTP style
file transfer.
Of course another way to get all those amenities would be to run an
ordinary SSH server over the same channel - but this approach avoids
having to manage a phony password or authentication key, or taking up
your CPU time with pointless crypto.
2020-02-16 12:07:43 +00:00
|
|
|
\b See \k{using-rawprot} for an explanation of \q{raw}
|
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|
|
connections.
|
|
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|
|
2021-04-17 12:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
\b See \k{using-telnet} for a little information about Telnet.
|
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|
\b See \k{using-rlogin} for information about using Rlogin.
|
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|
2019-04-04 13:48:56 +00:00
|
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|
\b See \k{using-supdup} for information about using SUPDUP.
|
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|
2021-04-17 12:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
\b The \q{Bare ssh-connection} option in the \q{Connection type}
|
|
|
|
control is intended for specialist uses not involving network
|
|
|
|
connections. See \k{config-psusan} for some information about it.
|
New protocol: PROT_SSHCONN, bare ssh-connection.
This is the same protocol that PuTTY's connection sharing has been
using for years, to communicate between the downstream and upstream
PuTTYs. I'm now promoting it to be a first-class member of the
protocols list: if you have a server for it, you can select it in the
GUI or on the command line, and write out a saved session that
specifies it.
This would be completely insecure if you used it as an ordinary
network protocol, of course. Not only is it non-cryptographic and wide
open to eavesdropping and hijacking, but it's not even _authenticated_
- it begins after the userauth phase of SSH. So there isn't even the
mild security theatre of entering an easy-to-eavesdrop password, as
there is with, say, Telnet.
However, that's not what I want to use it for. My aim is to use it for
various specialist and niche purposes, all of which involve speaking
it over an 8-bit-clean data channel that is already set up, secured
and authenticated by other methods. There are lots of examples of such
channels:
- a userv(1) invocation
- the console of a UML kernel
- the stdio channels into other kinds of container, such as Docker
- the 'adb shell' channel (although it seems quite hard to run a
custom binary at the far end of that)
- a pair of pipes between PuTTY and a Cygwin helper process
- and so on.
So this protocol is intended as a convenient way to get a client at
one end of any those to run a shell session at the other end. Unlike
other approaches, it will give you all the SSH-flavoured amenities
you're already used to, like forwarding your SSH agent into the
container, or forwarding selected network ports in or out of it, or
letting it open a window on your X server, or doing SCP/SFTP style
file transfer.
Of course another way to get all those amenities would be to run an
ordinary SSH server over the same channel - but this approach avoids
having to manage a phony password or authentication key, or taking up
your CPU time with pointless crypto.
2020-02-16 12:07:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-08-28 10:35:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b The \q{Port} box lets you specify which \i{port number} on the
|
2019-04-04 13:48:56 +00:00
|
|
|
server to connect to. If you select Telnet, Rlogin, SUPDUP, or SSH,
|
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|
this box will be filled in automatically to the usual value, and you
|
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|
will only need to change it if you have an unusual server. If you
|
|
|
|
select Raw mode, you will almost certainly need to fill in the
|
|
|
|
\q{Port} box yourself.
|
2006-08-28 10:35:12 +00:00
|
|
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|
|
|
|
If you select \q{Serial} from the \q{Connection type} radio buttons,
|
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|
the \q{Host Name} and \q{Port} boxes are replaced by \q{Serial line}
|
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|
and \q{Speed}; see \k{config-serial} for more details of these.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
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|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-saving} \ii{Loading and storing saved sessions}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
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|
|
The next part of the Session configuration panel allows you to save
|
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|
|
your preferred PuTTY options so they will appear automatically the
|
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|
|
next time you start PuTTY. It also allows you to create \e{saved
|
|
|
|
sessions}, which contain a full set of configuration options plus a
|
|
|
|
host name and protocol. A saved session contains all the information
|
|
|
|
PuTTY needs to start exactly the session you want.
|
|
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|
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|
|
\b To save your default settings: first set up the settings the way
|
|
|
|
you want them saved. Then come back to the Session panel. Select the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\q{\i{Default Settings}} entry in the saved sessions list, with a single
|
2001-11-25 17:32:39 +00:00
|
|
|
click. Then press the \q{Save} button.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-23 12:48:14 +00:00
|
|
|
If there is a specific host you want to store the details of how to
|
|
|
|
connect to, you should create a saved session, which will be
|
|
|
|
separate from the Default Settings.
|
|
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|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\b To save a session: first go through the rest of the configuration
|
|
|
|
box setting up all the options you want. Then come back to the
|
2001-11-25 17:32:39 +00:00
|
|
|
Session panel. Enter a name for the saved session in the \q{Saved
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
Sessions} input box. (The server name is often a good choice for a
|
2001-11-25 17:32:39 +00:00
|
|
|
saved session name.) Then press the \q{Save} button. Your saved
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
session name should now appear in the list box.
|
|
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|
2005-02-10 01:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
You can also save settings in mid-session, from the \q{Change Settings}
|
|
|
|
dialog. Settings changed since the start of the session will be saved
|
|
|
|
with their current values; as well as settings changed through the
|
|
|
|
dialog, this includes changes in window size, window title changes
|
|
|
|
sent by the server, and so on.
|
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|
|
}
|
|
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|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\b To reload a saved session: single-click to select the session
|
2001-11-25 17:32:39 +00:00
|
|
|
name in the list box, and then press the \q{Load} button. Your saved
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
settings should all appear in the configuration panel.
|
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|
\b To modify a saved session: first load it as described above. Then
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
make the changes you want. Come back to the Session panel, and press
|
2001-11-25 17:32:39 +00:00
|
|
|
the \q{Save} button. The new settings will be saved over the top of
|
2005-02-10 01:25:50 +00:00
|
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|
the old ones.
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
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|
\lcont{
|
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|
To save the new settings under a different name, you can enter the new
|
|
|
|
name in the \q{Saved Sessions} box, or single-click to select a
|
|
|
|
session name in the list box to overwrite that session. To save
|
|
|
|
\q{Default Settings}, you must single-click the name before saving.
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
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|
\b To start a saved session immediately: double-click on the session
|
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|
name in the list box.
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|
\b To delete a saved session: single-click to select the session
|
2001-11-25 17:32:39 +00:00
|
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|
name in the list box, and then press the \q{Delete} button.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
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|
|
Each saved session is independent of the Default Settings
|
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|
configuration. If you change your preferences and update Default
|
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|
|
Settings, you must also update every saved session separately.
|
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|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
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|
Saved sessions are stored in the \i{Registry}, at the location
|
2003-04-11 17:39:48 +00:00
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|
\c HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
|
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|
If you need to store them in a file, you could try the method
|
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|
described in \k{config-file}.
|
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|
2019-04-19 14:33:35 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-closeonexit} \q{\ii{Close window} on exit}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
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|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Finally in the Session panel, there is an option labelled \q{Close
|
2019-04-19 14:33:35 +00:00
|
|
|
window on exit}. This controls whether the PuTTY \i{terminal window}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
disappears as soon as the session inside it terminates. If you are
|
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|
likely to want to copy and paste text out of the session after it
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
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|
has terminated, or restart the session, you should arrange for this
|
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option to be off.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
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|
2019-04-19 14:33:35 +00:00
|
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|
\q{Close window on exit} has three settings. \q{Always} means always
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
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|
close the window on exit; \q{Never} means never close on exit
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
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|
(always leave the window open, but \I{inactive window}inactive). The
|
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|
third setting, and the default one, is \q{Only on clean exit}. In this
|
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|
mode, a session which terminates normally will cause its window to
|
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close, but one which is aborted unexpectedly by network trouble or a
|
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|
confusing message from the server will leave the window up.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
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|
|
\H{config-logging} The Logging panel
|
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|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Logging configuration panel allows you to save \i{log file}s of your
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY sessions, for debugging, analysis or future reference.
|
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|
The main option is a radio-button set that specifies whether PuTTY
|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
will log anything at all. The options are:
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
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|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{None}. This is the default option; in this mode PuTTY will not
|
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|
create a log file at all.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
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|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Printable output}. In this mode, a log file will be
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
created and written to, but only printable text will be saved into
|
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|
it. The various terminal control codes that are typically sent down
|
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|
an interactive session alongside the printable text will be omitted.
|
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|
This might be a useful mode if you want to read a log file in a text
|
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|
|
editor and hope to be able to make sense of it.
|
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|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
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|
\b \q{All session output}. In this mode, \e{everything} sent by
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
the server into your terminal session is logged. If you view the log
|
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|
|
file in a text editor, therefore, you may well find it full of
|
|
|
|
strange control characters. This is a particularly useful mode if
|
|
|
|
you are experiencing problems with PuTTY's terminal handling: you
|
|
|
|
can record everything that went to the terminal, so that someone
|
|
|
|
else can replay the session later in slow motion and watch to see
|
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|
what went wrong.
|
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|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
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|
\b \I{SSH packet log}\q{SSH packets}. In this mode (which is only used
|
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|
by SSH connections), the SSH message packets sent over the encrypted
|
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|
|
connection are written to the log file (as well as \i{Event Log}
|
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|
|
entries). You might need this to debug a network-level problem, or
|
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|
|
more likely to send to the PuTTY authors as part of a bug report.
|
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|
\e{BE WARNED} that if you log in using a password, the password can
|
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|
appear in the log file; see \k{config-logssh} for options that may
|
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|
help to remove sensitive material from the log file before you send it
|
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|
to anyone else.
|
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|
\b \q{SSH packets and raw data}. In this mode, as well as the
|
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|
|
decrypted packets (as in the previous mode), the \e{raw} (encrypted,
|
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|
|
compressed, etc) packets are \e{also} logged. This could be useful to
|
|
|
|
diagnose corruption in transit. (The same caveats as the previous mode
|
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|
|
apply, of course.)
|
2001-12-14 14:57:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-01-14 21:50:44 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that the non-SSH logging options (\q{Printable output} and
|
|
|
|
\q{All session output}) only work with PuTTY proper; in programs
|
|
|
|
without terminal emulation (such as Plink), they will have no effect,
|
|
|
|
even if enabled via saved settings.
|
|
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|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-logfilename} \q{Log file name}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In this edit box you enter the name of the file you want to log the
|
|
|
|
session to. The \q{Browse} button will let you look around your file
|
|
|
|
system to find the right place to put the file; or if you already
|
|
|
|
know exactly where you want it to go, you can just type a pathname
|
|
|
|
into the edit box.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
There are a few special features in this box. If you use the \c{&}
|
|
|
|
character in the file name box, PuTTY will insert details of the
|
|
|
|
current session in the name of the file it actually opens. The
|
|
|
|
precise replacements it will do are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \c{&Y} will be replaced by the current year, as four digits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \c{&M} will be replaced by the current month, as two digits.
|
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|
\b \c{&D} will be replaced by the current day of the month, as two
|
|
|
|
digits.
|
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|
|
|
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|
|
\b \c{&T} will be replaced by the current time, as six digits
|
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|
(HHMMSS) with no punctuation.
|
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|
2023-07-16 15:03:24 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \c{&H} will be replaced by the host name you are connecting to
|
|
|
|
(or the serial line, for a serial connection).
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-08-08 12:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \c{&P} will be replaced by the port number you are connecting to on
|
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|
|
the target host.
|
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|
|
|
2023-07-16 15:01:02 +00:00
|
|
|
(These are all case-insensitive.)
|
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|
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|
|
For example, if you enter the file name
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
\c{c:\\puttylogs\\log-&h-&y&m&d-&t.dat}, you will end up with files looking
|
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|
|
like
|
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|
|
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|
|
\c log-server1.example.com-20010528-110859.dat
|
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|
\c log-unixbox.somewhere.org-20010611-221001.dat
|
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|
|
|
\S{config-logfileexists} \q{What to do if the log file already exists}
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
This control allows you to specify what PuTTY should do if it tries
|
|
|
|
to start writing to a log file and it finds the file already exists.
|
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|
|
You might want to automatically destroy the existing log file and
|
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|
|
start a new one with the same name. Alternatively, you might want to
|
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|
|
open the existing log file and add data to the \e{end} of it.
|
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|
|
Finally (the default option), you might not want to have any
|
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|
|
automatic behaviour, but to ask the user every time the problem
|
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|
|
comes up.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-logflush} \I{log file, flushing}\q{Flush log file frequently}
|
2004-12-16 15:22:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
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|
|
This option allows you to control how frequently logged data is
|
|
|
|
flushed to disc. By default, PuTTY will flush data as soon as it is
|
|
|
|
displayed, so that if you view the log file while a session is still
|
|
|
|
open, it will be up to date; and if the client system crashes, there's
|
|
|
|
a greater chance that the data will be preserved.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
However, this can incur a performance penalty. If PuTTY is running
|
|
|
|
slowly with logging enabled, you could try unchecking this option. Be
|
|
|
|
warned that the log file may not always be up to date as a result
|
|
|
|
(although it will of course be flushed when it is closed, for instance
|
|
|
|
at the end of a session).
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 10:48:11 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-logheader} \I{log file, header}\q{Include header}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option allows you to choose whether to include a header line
|
|
|
|
with the date and time when the log file is opened. It may be useful to
|
|
|
|
disable this if the log file is being used as realtime input to other
|
|
|
|
programs that don't expect the header line.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-logssh} Options specific to \i{SSH packet log}ging
|
2004-10-02 00:33:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
These options only apply if SSH packet data is being logged.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following options allow particularly sensitive portions of
|
|
|
|
unencrypted packets to be automatically left out of the log file.
|
|
|
|
They are only intended to deter casual nosiness; an attacker could
|
|
|
|
glean a lot of useful information from even these obfuscated logs
|
|
|
|
(e.g., length of password).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S2{config-logssh-omitpw} \q{Omit known password fields}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
When checked, decrypted password fields are removed from the log of
|
|
|
|
transmitted packets. (This includes any user responses to
|
|
|
|
challenge-response authentication methods such as
|
|
|
|
\q{keyboard-interactive}.) This does not include X11 authentication
|
|
|
|
data if using X11 forwarding.
|
2004-10-02 00:33:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that this will only omit data that PuTTY \e{knows} to be a
|
|
|
|
password. However, if you start another login session within your
|
|
|
|
PuTTY session, for instance, any password used will appear in the
|
|
|
|
clear in the packet log. The next option may be of use to protect
|
|
|
|
against this.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is enabled by default.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S2{config-logssh-omitdata} \q{Omit session data}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
When checked, all decrypted \q{session data} is omitted; this is
|
|
|
|
defined as data in terminal sessions and in forwarded channels (TCP,
|
|
|
|
X11, and authentication agent). This will usually substantially reduce
|
|
|
|
the size of the resulting log file.
|
2004-10-02 00:33:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is disabled by default.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-terminal} The Terminal panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Terminal configuration panel allows you to control the behaviour
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
of PuTTY's \i{terminal emulation}.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-autowrap} \q{Auto wrap mode initially on}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\ii{Auto wrap mode} controls what happens when text printed in a PuTTY
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
window reaches the right-hand edge of the window.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
With auto wrap mode on, if a long line of text reaches the
|
|
|
|
right-hand edge, it will wrap over on to the next line so you can
|
|
|
|
still see all the text. With auto wrap mode off, the cursor will
|
|
|
|
stay at the right-hand edge of the screen, and all the characters in
|
|
|
|
the line will be printed on top of each other.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are running a full-screen application and you occasionally
|
|
|
|
find the screen scrolling up when it looks as if it shouldn't, you
|
|
|
|
could try turning this option off.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Auto wrap mode can be turned on and off by \i{control sequence}s sent by
|
2003-01-12 14:30:02 +00:00
|
|
|
the server. This configuration option controls the \e{default}
|
|
|
|
state, which will be restored when you reset the terminal (see
|
|
|
|
\k{reset-terminal}). However, if you modify this option in
|
|
|
|
mid-session using \q{Change Settings}, it will take effect
|
|
|
|
immediately.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-decom} \q{DEC Origin Mode initially on}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{DEC Origin Mode} is a minor option which controls how PuTTY
|
|
|
|
interprets cursor-position \i{control sequence}s sent by the server.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The server can send a control sequence that restricts the \i{scrolling
|
|
|
|
region} of the display. For example, in an editor, the server might
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
reserve a line at the top of the screen and a line at the bottom,
|
|
|
|
and might send a control sequence that causes scrolling operations
|
|
|
|
to affect only the remaining lines.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
With DEC Origin Mode on, \i{cursor coordinates} are counted from the top
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
of the scrolling region. With it turned off, cursor coordinates are
|
|
|
|
counted from the top of the whole screen regardless of the scrolling
|
|
|
|
region.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It is unlikely you would need to change this option, but if you find
|
|
|
|
a full-screen application is displaying pieces of text in what looks
|
|
|
|
like the wrong part of the screen, you could try turning DEC Origin
|
|
|
|
Mode on to see whether that helps.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
DEC Origin Mode can be turned on and off by control sequences sent
|
2003-01-12 14:30:02 +00:00
|
|
|
by the server. This configuration option controls the \e{default}
|
|
|
|
state, which will be restored when you reset the terminal (see
|
|
|
|
\k{reset-terminal}). However, if you modify this option in
|
|
|
|
mid-session using \q{Change Settings}, it will take effect
|
|
|
|
immediately.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-crlf} \q{Implicit CR in every LF}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Most servers send two control characters, \i{CR} and \i{LF}, to start a
|
|
|
|
\i{new line} of the screen. The CR character makes the cursor return to the
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
left-hand side of the screen. The LF character makes the cursor move
|
|
|
|
one line down (and might make the screen scroll).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some servers only send LF, and expect the terminal to move the
|
|
|
|
cursor over to the left automatically. If you come across a server
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
that does this, you will see a \I{stair-stepping}stepped effect on the
|
|
|
|
screen, like this:
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c First line of text
|
|
|
|
\c Second line
|
|
|
|
\c Third line
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this happens to you, try enabling the \q{Implicit CR in every LF}
|
|
|
|
option, and things might go back to normal:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c First line of text
|
|
|
|
\c Second line
|
|
|
|
\c Third line
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-04 19:16:46 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-lfcr} \q{Implicit LF in every CR}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Most servers send two control characters, \i{CR} and \i{LF}, to start a
|
|
|
|
\i{new line} of the screen. The CR character makes the cursor return to the
|
|
|
|
left-hand side of the screen. The LF character makes the cursor move
|
|
|
|
one line down (and might make the screen scroll).
|
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
Some servers only send CR, and so the newly
|
|
|
|
written line is overwritten by the following line. This option causes
|
2007-08-04 19:16:46 +00:00
|
|
|
a line feed so that all lines are displayed.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-erase} \q{Use \i{background colour} to erase screen}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Not all terminals agree on what colour to turn the screen when the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
server sends a \q{\i{clear screen}} sequence. Some terminals believe the
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
screen should always be cleared to the \e{default} background
|
|
|
|
colour. Others believe the screen should be cleared to whatever the
|
|
|
|
server has selected as a background colour.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
There exist applications that expect both kinds of behaviour.
|
|
|
|
Therefore, PuTTY can be configured to do either.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
With this option disabled, screen clearing is always done in the
|
|
|
|
default background colour. With this option enabled, it is done in
|
|
|
|
the \e{current} background colour.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Background-colour erase can be turned on and off by \i{control
|
|
|
|
sequences} sent by the server. This configuration option controls the
|
2003-01-12 14:30:02 +00:00
|
|
|
\e{default} state, which will be restored when you reset the
|
|
|
|
terminal (see \k{reset-terminal}). However, if you modify this
|
|
|
|
option in mid-session using \q{Change Settings}, it will take effect
|
|
|
|
immediately.
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-blink} \q{Enable \i{blinking text}}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The server can ask PuTTY to display text that blinks on and off.
|
|
|
|
This is very distracting, so PuTTY allows you to turn blinking text
|
|
|
|
off completely.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
When blinking text is disabled and the server attempts to make some
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
text blink, PuTTY will instead display the text with a \I{background
|
|
|
|
colour, bright}bolded background colour.
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Blinking text can be turned on and off by \i{control sequence}s sent by
|
2003-01-12 14:30:02 +00:00
|
|
|
the server. This configuration option controls the \e{default}
|
|
|
|
state, which will be restored when you reset the terminal (see
|
|
|
|
\k{reset-terminal}). However, if you modify this option in
|
|
|
|
mid-session using \q{Change Settings}, it will take effect
|
|
|
|
immediately.
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-answerback} \q{\ii{Answerback} to ^E}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option controls what PuTTY will send back to the server if the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
server sends it the ^E \i{enquiry character}. Normally it just sends
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
the string \q{PuTTY}.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
If you accidentally write the contents of a binary file to your
|
|
|
|
terminal, you will probably find that it contains more than one ^E
|
|
|
|
character, and as a result your next command line will probably read
|
|
|
|
\q{PuTTYPuTTYPuTTY...} as if you had typed the answerback string
|
|
|
|
multiple times at the keyboard. If you set the answerback string to
|
|
|
|
be empty, this problem should go away, but doing so might cause
|
|
|
|
other problems.
|
|
|
|
|
2002-02-04 13:18:54 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that this is \e{not} the feature of PuTTY which the server will
|
|
|
|
typically use to determine your terminal type. That feature is the
|
2005-09-10 17:36:52 +00:00
|
|
|
\q{\ii{Terminal-type} string} in the Connection panel; see
|
2002-02-04 13:18:54 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-termtype} for details.
|
|
|
|
|
2002-05-22 21:18:06 +00:00
|
|
|
You can include control characters in the answerback string using
|
|
|
|
\c{^C} notation. (Use \c{^~} to get a literal \c{^}.)
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-localecho} \q{\ii{Local echo}}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
With local echo disabled, characters you type into the PuTTY window
|
|
|
|
are not echoed in the window \e{by PuTTY}. They are simply sent to
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
the server. (The \e{server} might choose to \I{remote echo}echo them
|
|
|
|
back to you; this can't be controlled from the PuTTY control panel.)
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Some types of session need local echo, and many do not. In its
|
|
|
|
default mode, PuTTY will automatically attempt to deduce whether or
|
|
|
|
not local echo is appropriate for the session you are working in. If
|
|
|
|
you find it has made the wrong decision, you can use this
|
|
|
|
configuration option to override its choice: you can force local
|
|
|
|
echo to be turned on, or force it to be turned off, instead of
|
|
|
|
relying on the automatic detection.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-localedit} \q{\ii{Local line editing}}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Normally, every character you type into the PuTTY window is sent
|
|
|
|
immediately to the server the moment you type it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you enable local line editing, this changes. PuTTY will let you
|
|
|
|
edit a whole line at a time locally, and the line will only be sent
|
|
|
|
to the server when you press Return. If you make a mistake, you can
|
|
|
|
use the Backspace key to correct it before you press Return, and the
|
|
|
|
server will never see the mistake.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Since it is hard to edit a line locally without being able to see
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
it, local line editing is mostly used in conjunction with \i{local echo}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
(\k{config-localecho}). This makes it ideal for use in raw mode
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\#{FIXME} or when connecting to \i{MUD}s or \i{talker}s. (Although some more
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
advanced MUDs do occasionally turn local line editing on and turn
|
|
|
|
local echo off, in order to accept a password from the user.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some types of session need local line editing, and many do not. In
|
|
|
|
its default mode, PuTTY will automatically attempt to deduce whether
|
|
|
|
or not local line editing is appropriate for the session you are
|
|
|
|
working in. If you find it has made the wrong decision, you can use
|
|
|
|
this configuration option to override its choice: you can force
|
|
|
|
local line editing to be turned on, or force it to be turned off,
|
|
|
|
instead of relying on the automatic detection.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-printing} \ii{Remote-controlled printing}
|
2002-03-09 17:59:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A lot of VT100-compatible terminals support printing under control
|
2017-06-06 08:34:21 +00:00
|
|
|
of the remote server (sometimes called \q{passthrough printing}).
|
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|
PuTTY supports this feature as well, but it is turned off by default.
|
2002-03-09 17:59:15 +00:00
|
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To enable remote-controlled printing, choose a printer from the
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|
\q{Printer to send ANSI printer output to} drop-down list box. This
|
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|
should allow you to select from all the printers you have installed
|
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|
|
drivers for on your computer. Alternatively, you can type the
|
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|
|
network name of a networked printer (for example,
|
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|
|
\c{\\\\printserver\\printer1}) even if you haven't already
|
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|
|
installed a driver for it on your own machine.
|
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When the remote server attempts to print some data, PuTTY will send
|
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|
that data to the printer \e{raw} - without translating it,
|
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|
|
attempting to format it, or doing anything else to it. It is up to
|
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you to ensure your remote server knows what type of printer it is
|
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|
|
talking to.
|
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Since PuTTY sends data to the printer raw, it cannot offer options
|
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|
such as portrait versus landscape, print quality, or paper tray
|
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|
selection. All these things would be done by your PC printer driver
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(which PuTTY bypasses); if you need them done, you will have to find
|
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|
a way to configure your remote server to do them.
|
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To disable remote printing again, choose \q{None (printing
|
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|
|
disabled)} from the printer selection list. This is the default
|
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|
state.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-keyboard} The Keyboard panel
|
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|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
The Keyboard configuration panel allows you to control the behaviour
|
2005-09-10 17:36:52 +00:00
|
|
|
of the \i{keyboard} in PuTTY. The correct state for many of these
|
|
|
|
settings depends on what the server to which PuTTY is connecting
|
|
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|
expects. With a \i{Unix} server, this is likely to depend on the
|
|
|
|
\i\c{termcap} or \i\c{terminfo} entry it uses, which in turn is likely to
|
|
|
|
be controlled by the \q{\ii{Terminal-type} string} setting in the Connection
|
|
|
|
panel; see \k{config-termtype} for details. If none of the settings here
|
|
|
|
seems to help, you may find \k{faq-keyboard} to be useful.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
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|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-backspace} Changing the action of the \ii{Backspace key}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
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|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
Some terminals believe that the Backspace key should send the same
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
thing to the server as \i{Control-H} (ASCII code 8). Other terminals
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
believe that the Backspace key should send ASCII code 127 (usually
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
known as \i{Control-?}) so that it can be distinguished from Control-H.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
This option allows you to choose which code PuTTY generates when you
|
|
|
|
press Backspace.
|
|
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|
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
If you are connecting over SSH, PuTTY by default tells the server
|
|
|
|
the value of this option (see \k{config-ttymodes}), so you may find
|
|
|
|
that the Backspace key does the right thing either way. Similarly,
|
|
|
|
if you are connecting to a \i{Unix} system, you will probably find that
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
the Unix \i\c{stty} command lets you configure which the server
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
expects to see, so again you might not need to change which one PuTTY
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
generates. On other systems, the server's expectation might be fixed
|
|
|
|
and you might have no choice but to configure PuTTY.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
If you do have the choice, we recommend configuring PuTTY to
|
|
|
|
generate Control-? and configuring the server to expect it, because
|
|
|
|
that allows applications such as \c{emacs} to use Control-H for
|
|
|
|
help.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
(Typing \i{Shift-Backspace} will cause PuTTY to send whichever code
|
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|
|
isn't configured here as the default.)
|
|
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|
|
2005-11-13 12:13:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-homeend} Changing the action of the \i{Home and End keys}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Unix terminal emulator \i\c{rxvt} disagrees with the rest of the
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
world about what character sequences should be sent to the server by
|
|
|
|
the Home and End keys.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i\c{xterm}, and other terminals, send \c{ESC [1~} for the Home key,
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
and \c{ESC [4~} for the End key. \c{rxvt} sends \c{ESC [H} for the
|
|
|
|
Home key and \c{ESC [Ow} for the End key.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
If you find an application on which the Home and End keys aren't
|
|
|
|
working, you could try switching this option to see if it helps.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-funkeys} Changing the action of the \i{function keys} and
|
|
|
|
\i{keypad}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
This option affects the function keys (F1 to F12) and the top row of
|
|
|
|
the numeric keypad.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b In the default mode, labelled \c{ESC [n~}, the function keys
|
|
|
|
generate sequences like \c{ESC [11~}, \c{ESC [12~} and so on. This
|
|
|
|
matches the general behaviour of Digital's terminals.
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
\b In Linux mode, F6 to F12 behave just like the default mode, but
|
|
|
|
F1 to F5 generate \c{ESC [[A} through to \c{ESC [[E}. This mimics the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{Linux virtual console}.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b In \I{xterm}Xterm R6 mode, F5 to F12 behave like the default mode, but F1
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
to F4 generate \c{ESC OP} through to \c{ESC OS}, which are the
|
|
|
|
sequences produced by the top row of the \e{keypad} on Digital's
|
|
|
|
terminals.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b In \i{VT400} mode, all the function keys behave like the default
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
mode, but the actual top row of the numeric keypad generates \c{ESC
|
|
|
|
OP} through to \c{ESC OS}.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b In \i{VT100+} mode, the function keys generate \c{ESC OP} through to
|
2001-06-03 11:10:20 +00:00
|
|
|
\c{ESC O[}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b In \i{SCO} mode, the function keys F1 to F12 generate \c{ESC [M}
|
2001-06-03 11:10:20 +00:00
|
|
|
through to \c{ESC [X}. Together with shift, they generate \c{ESC [Y}
|
|
|
|
through to \c{ESC [j}. With control they generate \c{ESC [k} through
|
|
|
|
to \c{ESC [v}, and with shift and control together they generate
|
|
|
|
\c{ESC [w} through to \c{ESC [\{}.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-23 10:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
\b In \I{xterm}Xterm 216 mode, the unshifted function keys behave the
|
|
|
|
same as Xterm R6 mode. But pressing a function key together with Shift
|
|
|
|
or Alt or Ctrl generates a different sequence containing an extra
|
|
|
|
numeric parameter of the form (1 for Shift) + (2 for Alt) + (4 for
|
|
|
|
Ctrl) + 1. For F1-F4, the basic sequences like \c{ESC OP} become
|
|
|
|
\cw{ESC [1;}\e{bitmap}\cw{P} and similar; for F5 and above,
|
|
|
|
\cw{ESC[}\e{index}\cw{~} becomes
|
|
|
|
\cw{ESC[}\e{index}\cw{;}\e{bitmap}\cw{~}.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
If you don't know what any of this means, you probably don't need to
|
|
|
|
fiddle with it.
|
|
|
|
|
New config option for shifted arrow key handling.
This commit introduces a new config option for how to handle shifted
arrow keys.
In the default mode (SHARROW_APPLICATION), we do what we've always
done: Ctrl flips the arrow keys between sending their most usual
escape sequences (ESC [ A ... ESC [ D) and sending the 'application
cursor keys' sequences (ESC O A ... ESC O D). Whichever of those modes
is currently configured, Ctrl+arrow sends the other one.
In the new mode (SHARROW_BITMAP), application cursor key mode is
unaffected by any shift keys, but the default sequences acquire two
numeric arguments. The first argument is 1 (reflecting the fact that a
shifted arrow key still notionally moves just 1 character cell); the
second is the bitmap (1 for Shift) + (2 for Alt) + (4 for Ctrl),
offset by 1. (Except that if _none_ of those modifiers is pressed,
both numeric arguments are simply omitted.)
The new bitmap mode is what current xterm generates, and also what
Windows ConPTY seems to expect. If you start an ordinary Command
Prompt and launch into WSL, those are the sequences it will generate
for shifted arrow keys; conversely, if you run a Command Prompt within
a ConPTY, then these sequences for Ctrl+arrow will have the effect you
expect in cmd.exe command-line editing (going backward or forward a
word). For that reason, I enable this mode unconditionally when
launching Windows pterm.
2021-10-18 19:00:25 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-sharrow} Changing the action of the \i{shifted arrow keys}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option affects the arrow keys, if you press one with any of the
|
|
|
|
modifier keys Shift, Ctrl or Alt held down.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b In the default mode, labelled \c{Ctrl toggles app mode}, the Ctrl
|
2022-01-03 06:38:07 +00:00
|
|
|
key toggles between the default arrow-key sequences like \c{ESC [A} and
|
New config option for shifted arrow key handling.
This commit introduces a new config option for how to handle shifted
arrow keys.
In the default mode (SHARROW_APPLICATION), we do what we've always
done: Ctrl flips the arrow keys between sending their most usual
escape sequences (ESC [ A ... ESC [ D) and sending the 'application
cursor keys' sequences (ESC O A ... ESC O D). Whichever of those modes
is currently configured, Ctrl+arrow sends the other one.
In the new mode (SHARROW_BITMAP), application cursor key mode is
unaffected by any shift keys, but the default sequences acquire two
numeric arguments. The first argument is 1 (reflecting the fact that a
shifted arrow key still notionally moves just 1 character cell); the
second is the bitmap (1 for Shift) + (2 for Alt) + (4 for Ctrl),
offset by 1. (Except that if _none_ of those modifiers is pressed,
both numeric arguments are simply omitted.)
The new bitmap mode is what current xterm generates, and also what
Windows ConPTY seems to expect. If you start an ordinary Command
Prompt and launch into WSL, those are the sequences it will generate
for shifted arrow keys; conversely, if you run a Command Prompt within
a ConPTY, then these sequences for Ctrl+arrow will have the effect you
expect in cmd.exe command-line editing (going backward or forward a
word). For that reason, I enable this mode unconditionally when
launching Windows pterm.
2021-10-18 19:00:25 +00:00
|
|
|
\c{ESC [B}, and the sequences Digital's terminals generate in
|
|
|
|
\q{application cursor keys} mode, i.e. \c{ESC O A} and so on. Shift
|
|
|
|
and Alt have no effect.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b In the \q{xterm-style bitmap} mode, Shift, Ctrl and Alt all
|
|
|
|
generate different sequences, with a number indicating which set of
|
|
|
|
modifiers is active.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you don't know what any of this means, you probably don't need to
|
|
|
|
fiddle with it.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-appcursor} Controlling \i{Application Cursor Keys} mode
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
Application Cursor Keys mode is a way for the server to change the
|
|
|
|
control sequences sent by the arrow keys. In normal mode, the arrow
|
|
|
|
keys send \c{ESC [A} through to \c{ESC [D}. In application mode,
|
|
|
|
they send \c{ESC OA} through to \c{ESC OD}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Application Cursor Keys mode can be turned on and off by the server,
|
|
|
|
depending on the application. PuTTY allows you to configure the
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
initial state.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can also disable application cursor keys mode completely, using
|
|
|
|
the \q{Features} configuration panel; see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-features-application}.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-appkeypad} Controlling \i{Application Keypad} mode
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
Application Keypad mode is a way for the server to change the
|
|
|
|
behaviour of the numeric keypad.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In normal mode, the keypad behaves like a normal Windows keypad:
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
with \i{NumLock} on, the number keys generate numbers, and with NumLock
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
off they act like the arrow keys and Home, End etc.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In application mode, all the keypad keys send special control
|
|
|
|
sequences, \e{including} Num Lock. Num Lock stops behaving like Num
|
|
|
|
Lock and becomes another function key.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Depending on which version of Windows you run, you may find the Num
|
|
|
|
Lock light still flashes on and off every time you press Num Lock,
|
|
|
|
even when application mode is active and Num Lock is acting like a
|
|
|
|
function key. This is unavoidable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Application keypad mode can be turned on and off by the server,
|
|
|
|
depending on the application. PuTTY allows you to configure the
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
initial state.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can also disable application keypad mode completely, using the
|
|
|
|
\q{Features} configuration panel; see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-features-application}.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-nethack} Using \i{NetHack keypad mode}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY has a special mode for playing NetHack. You can enable it by
|
|
|
|
selecting \q{NetHack} in the \q{Initial state of numeric keypad}
|
|
|
|
control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In this mode, the numeric keypad keys 1-9 generate the NetHack
|
|
|
|
movement commands (\cw{hjklyubn}). The 5 key generates the \c{.}
|
|
|
|
command (do nothing).
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-08 18:15:16 +00:00
|
|
|
In addition, pressing Shift or Ctrl with the keypad keys generate
|
|
|
|
the Shift- or Ctrl-keys you would expect (e.g. keypad-7 generates
|
|
|
|
\cq{y}, so Shift-keypad-7 generates \cq{Y} and Ctrl-keypad-7
|
|
|
|
generates Ctrl-Y); these commands tell NetHack to keep moving you in
|
|
|
|
the same direction until you encounter something interesting.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
For some reason, this feature only works properly when \i{Num Lock} is
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
on. We don't know why.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-compose} Enabling a DEC-like \ii{Compose key}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
DEC terminals have a Compose key, which provides an easy-to-remember
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
way of typing \i{accented characters}. You press Compose and then type
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
two more characters. The two characters are \q{combined} to produce
|
|
|
|
an accented character. The choices of character are designed to be
|
|
|
|
easy to remember; for example, composing \q{e} and \q{`} produces
|
|
|
|
the \q{\u00e8{e-grave}} character.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If your keyboard has a Windows \i{Application key}, it acts as a Compose
|
|
|
|
key in PuTTY. Alternatively, if you enable the \q{\i{AltGr} acts as
|
2002-05-30 12:41:07 +00:00
|
|
|
Compose key} option, the AltGr key will become a Compose key.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ctrlalt} \q{Control-Alt is different from \i{AltGr}}
|
2001-06-03 11:46:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Some old keyboards do not have an AltGr key, which can make it
|
|
|
|
difficult to type some characters. PuTTY can be configured to treat
|
|
|
|
the key combination Ctrl + Left Alt the same way as the AltGr key.
|
2001-06-03 11:46:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
By default, this checkbox is checked, and the key combination Ctrl +
|
|
|
|
Left Alt does something completely different. PuTTY's usual handling
|
|
|
|
of the left Alt key is to prefix the Escape (Control-\cw{[})
|
|
|
|
character to whatever character sequence the rest of the keypress
|
|
|
|
would generate. For example, Alt-A generates Escape followed by
|
|
|
|
\c{a}. So Alt-Ctrl-A would generate Escape, followed by Control-A.
|
2001-06-03 11:46:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
If you uncheck this box, Ctrl-Alt will become a synonym for AltGr,
|
|
|
|
so you can use it to type extra graphic characters if your keyboard
|
|
|
|
has any.
|
2001-06-03 11:46:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-05-30 12:41:07 +00:00
|
|
|
(However, Ctrl-Alt will never act as a Compose key, regardless of the
|
|
|
|
setting of \q{AltGr acts as Compose key} described in
|
|
|
|
\k{config-compose}.)
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-bell} The Bell panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Bell panel controls the \i{terminal bell} feature: the server's
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ability to cause PuTTY to beep at you.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In the default configuration, when the server sends the character
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
with ASCII code 7 (Control-G), PuTTY will play the \i{Windows Default
|
|
|
|
Beep} sound. This is not always what you want the terminal bell
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
feature to do; the Bell panel allows you to configure alternative
|
|
|
|
actions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-bellstyle} \q{Set the style of bell}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This control allows you to select various different actions to occur
|
|
|
|
on a terminal bell:
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Selecting \q{None} \I{terminal bell, disabling}disables the bell
|
|
|
|
completely. In this mode, the server can send as many Control-G
|
|
|
|
characters as it likes and nothing at all will happen.
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-03-05 22:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Make default system alert sound} is the default setting. It
|
|
|
|
causes the Windows \q{Default Beep} sound to be played. To change
|
|
|
|
what this sound is, or to test it if nothing seems to be happening,
|
|
|
|
use the Sound configurer in the Windows Control Panel.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{\ii{Visual bell}} is a silent alternative to a beeping computer. In
|
2003-03-05 22:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
this mode, when the server sends a Control-G, the whole PuTTY window
|
|
|
|
will flash white for a fraction of a second.
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Beep using the \i{PC speaker}} is self-explanatory.
|
2004-06-15 11:11:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Play a custom \i{sound file}} allows you to specify a particular
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
sound file to be used by PuTTY alone, or even by a particular
|
|
|
|
individual PuTTY session. This allows you to distinguish your PuTTY
|
|
|
|
beeps from any other beeps on the system. If you select this option,
|
|
|
|
you will also need to enter the name of your sound file in the edit
|
|
|
|
control \q{Custom sound file to play as a bell}.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-belltaskbar} \q{\ii{Taskbar}/\I{window caption}caption
|
|
|
|
indication on bell}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This feature controls what happens to the PuTTY window's entry in
|
|
|
|
the Windows Taskbar if a bell occurs while the window does not have
|
|
|
|
the input focus.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In the default state (\q{Disabled}) nothing unusual happens.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you select \q{Steady}, then when a bell occurs and the window is
|
|
|
|
not in focus, the window's Taskbar entry and its title bar will
|
|
|
|
change colour to let you know that PuTTY session is asking for your
|
|
|
|
attention. The change of colour will persist until you select the
|
|
|
|
window, so you can leave several PuTTY windows minimised in your
|
|
|
|
terminal, go away from your keyboard, and be sure not to have missed
|
|
|
|
any important beeps when you get back.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\q{Flashing} is even more eye-catching: the Taskbar entry will
|
|
|
|
continuously flash on and off until you select the window.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-bellovl} \q{Control the \i{bell overload} behaviour}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A common user error in a terminal session is to accidentally run the
|
|
|
|
Unix command \c{cat} (or equivalent) on an inappropriate file type,
|
|
|
|
such as an executable, image file, or ZIP file. This produces a huge
|
|
|
|
stream of non-text characters sent to the terminal, which typically
|
|
|
|
includes a lot of bell characters. As a result of this the terminal
|
|
|
|
often doesn't stop beeping for ten minutes, and everybody else in
|
|
|
|
the office gets annoyed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To try to avoid this behaviour, or any other cause of excessive
|
|
|
|
beeping, PuTTY includes a bell overload management feature. In the
|
|
|
|
default configuration, receiving more than five bell characters in a
|
|
|
|
two-second period will cause the overload feature to activate. Once
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
the overload feature is active, further bells will \I{terminal bell,
|
|
|
|
disabling} have no effect at all, so the rest of your binary file
|
|
|
|
will be sent to the screen in silence. After a period of five seconds
|
|
|
|
during which no further bells are received, the overload feature will
|
|
|
|
turn itself off again and bells will be re-enabled.
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you want this feature completely disabled, you can turn it off
|
|
|
|
using the checkbox \q{Bell is temporarily disabled when over-used}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, if you like the bell overload feature but don't agree
|
|
|
|
with the settings, you can configure the details: how many bells
|
|
|
|
constitute an overload, how short a time period they have to arrive
|
|
|
|
in to do so, and how much silent time is required before the
|
|
|
|
overload feature will deactivate itself.
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-20 13:23:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Bell overload mode is always deactivated by any keypress in the
|
|
|
|
terminal. This means it can respond to large unexpected streams of
|
|
|
|
data, but does not interfere with ordinary command-line activities
|
|
|
|
that generate beeps (such as filename completion).
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-features} The Features panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY's \i{terminal emulation} is very highly featured, and can do a lot
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
of things under remote server control. Some of these features can
|
|
|
|
cause problems due to buggy or strangely configured server
|
|
|
|
applications.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Features configuration panel allows you to disable some of
|
|
|
|
PuTTY's more advanced terminal features, in case they cause trouble.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-features-application} Disabling application keypad and cursor keys
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\I{Application Keypad}Application keypad mode (see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-appkeypad}) and \I{Application Cursor Keys}application
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
cursor keys mode (see \k{config-appcursor}) alter the behaviour of
|
|
|
|
the keypad and cursor keys. Some applications enable these modes but
|
|
|
|
then do not deal correctly with the modified keys. You can force
|
|
|
|
these modes to be permanently disabled no matter what the server
|
|
|
|
tries to do.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-mouse} Disabling \cw{xterm}-style \i{mouse reporting}
|
2002-03-09 11:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY allows the server to send \i{control codes} that let it take over
|
|
|
|
the mouse and use it for purposes other than \i{copy and paste}.
|
2002-03-09 11:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
Applications which use this feature include the text-mode web
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
browser \i\c{links}, the Usenet newsreader \i\c{trn} version 4, and the
|
|
|
|
file manager \i\c{mc} (Midnight Commander).
|
2002-03-09 11:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you find this feature inconvenient, you can disable it using the
|
|
|
|
\q{Disable xterm-style mouse reporting} control. With this box
|
|
|
|
ticked, the mouse will \e{always} do copy and paste in the normal
|
|
|
|
way.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that even if the application takes over the mouse, you can
|
|
|
|
still manage PuTTY's copy and paste by holding down the Shift key
|
|
|
|
while you select and paste, unless you have deliberately turned this
|
|
|
|
feature off (see \k{config-mouseshift}).
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-resize} Disabling remote \i{terminal resizing}
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY has the ability to change the terminal's size and position in
|
|
|
|
response to commands from the server. If you find PuTTY is doing
|
|
|
|
this unexpectedly or inconveniently, you can tell PuTTY not to
|
|
|
|
respond to those server commands.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-altscreen} Disabling switching to the \i{alternate screen}
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Many terminals, including PuTTY, support an \q{alternate screen}.
|
|
|
|
This is the same size as the ordinary terminal screen, but separate.
|
|
|
|
Typically a screen-based program such as a text editor might switch
|
|
|
|
the terminal to the alternate screen before starting up. Then at the
|
|
|
|
end of the run, it switches back to the primary screen, and you see
|
|
|
|
the screen contents just as they were before starting the editor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some people prefer this not to happen. If you want your editor to
|
|
|
|
run in the same screen as the rest of your terminal activity, you
|
|
|
|
can disable the alternate screen feature completely.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-retitle} Disabling remote \i{window title} changing
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY has the ability to change the window title in response to
|
|
|
|
commands from the server. If you find PuTTY is doing this
|
|
|
|
unexpectedly or inconveniently, you can tell PuTTY not to respond to
|
|
|
|
those server commands.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-12-31 15:33:33 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-qtitle} Response to remote \i{window title} querying
|
2003-04-12 08:59:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY can optionally provide the xterm service of allowing server
|
|
|
|
applications to find out the local window title. This feature is
|
|
|
|
disabled by default, but you can turn it on if you really want it.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
NOTE that this feature is a \e{potential \i{security hazard}}. If a
|
2003-04-12 08:59:06 +00:00
|
|
|
malicious application can write data to your terminal (for example,
|
|
|
|
if you merely \c{cat} a file owned by someone else on the server
|
|
|
|
machine), it can change your window title (unless you have disabled
|
|
|
|
this as mentioned in \k{config-features-retitle}) and then use this
|
|
|
|
service to have the new window title sent back to the server as if
|
|
|
|
typed at the keyboard. This allows an attacker to fake keypresses
|
|
|
|
and potentially cause your server-side applications to do things you
|
|
|
|
didn't want. Therefore this feature is disabled by default, and we
|
2006-12-31 15:33:33 +00:00
|
|
|
recommend you do not set it to \q{Window title} unless you \e{really}
|
|
|
|
know what you are doing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
There are three settings for this option:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\dt \q{None}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\dd PuTTY makes no response whatsoever to the relevant escape
|
|
|
|
sequence. This may upset server-side software that is expecting some
|
|
|
|
sort of response.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\dt \q{Empty string}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\dd PuTTY makes a well-formed response, but leaves it blank. Thus,
|
|
|
|
server-side software that expects a response is kept happy, but an
|
|
|
|
attacker cannot influence the response string. This is probably the
|
|
|
|
setting you want if you have no better ideas.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\dt \q{Window title}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\dd PuTTY responds with the actual window title. This is dangerous for
|
|
|
|
the reasons described above.
|
2003-04-12 08:59:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-17 20:25:27 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-clearscroll} Disabling remote \i{scrollback clearing}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY has the ability to clear the terminal's scrollback buffer in
|
|
|
|
response to a command from the server. If you find PuTTY is doing this
|
|
|
|
unexpectedly or inconveniently, you can tell PuTTY not to respond to
|
|
|
|
that server command.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-dbackspace} Disabling \i{destructive backspace}
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Normally, when PuTTY receives character 127 (^?) from the server, it
|
|
|
|
will perform a \q{destructive backspace}: move the cursor one space
|
|
|
|
left and delete the character under it. This can apparently cause
|
|
|
|
problems in some applications, so PuTTY provides the ability to
|
|
|
|
configure character 127 to perform a normal backspace (without
|
|
|
|
deleting a character) instead.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-charset} Disabling remote \i{character set}
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
configuration
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY has the ability to change its character set configuration in
|
|
|
|
response to commands from the server. Some programs send these
|
2008-10-13 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
commands unexpectedly or inconveniently. In particular, \i{BitchX} (an
|
2002-03-06 23:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
IRC client) seems to have a habit of reconfiguring the character set
|
|
|
|
to something other than the user intended.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you find that accented characters are not showing up the way you
|
|
|
|
expect them to, particularly if you're running BitchX, you could try
|
|
|
|
disabling the remote character set configuration commands.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-shaping} Disabling \i{Arabic text shaping}
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY supports shaping of Arabic text, which means that if your
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
server sends text written in the basic \i{Unicode} Arabic alphabet then
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
it will convert it to the correct display forms before printing it
|
|
|
|
on the screen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are using full-screen software which was not expecting this
|
|
|
|
to happen (especially if you are not an Arabic speaker and you
|
|
|
|
unexpectedly find yourself dealing with Arabic text files in
|
|
|
|
applications which are not Arabic-aware), you might find that the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{display becomes corrupted}. By ticking this box, you can disable
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
Arabic text shaping so that PuTTY displays precisely the characters
|
|
|
|
it is told to display.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You may also find you need to disable bidirectional text display;
|
2004-05-22 11:04:35 +00:00
|
|
|
see \k{config-features-bidi}.
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-bidi} Disabling \i{bidirectional text} display
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY supports bidirectional text display, which means that if your
|
|
|
|
server sends text written in a language which is usually displayed
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
from right to left (such as \i{Arabic} or \i{Hebrew}) then PuTTY will
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
automatically flip it round so that it is displayed in the right
|
|
|
|
direction on the screen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are using full-screen software which was not expecting this
|
|
|
|
to happen (especially if you are not an Arabic speaker and you
|
|
|
|
unexpectedly find yourself dealing with Arabic text files in
|
|
|
|
applications which are not Arabic-aware), you might find that the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{display becomes corrupted}. By ticking this box, you can disable
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
bidirectional text display, so that PuTTY displays text from left to
|
|
|
|
right in all situations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You may also find you need to disable Arabic text shaping;
|
2004-05-22 11:04:35 +00:00
|
|
|
see \k{config-features-shaping}.
|
2004-05-22 10:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-08-10 11:11:28 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-features-bracketed paste} Disabling \i{bracketed paste} mode
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, when you paste text into the terminal window, it's sent to
|
|
|
|
the server as terminal input, exactly as if you'd typed the same text
|
|
|
|
into the terminal window using the keyboard (except that it's all sent
|
|
|
|
at once, much faster than you could type it).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
However, a terminal application can change that, by asking the
|
|
|
|
terminal to enable \q{bracketed paste mode}. In this mode, pasted data
|
|
|
|
is marked in the input stream, by sending a special control sequence
|
|
|
|
before the paste, and another one at the end.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A terminal application can use this information to treat pasted data
|
|
|
|
differently from keyboard input. For example, a terminal-based text
|
|
|
|
editor can treat the input as literal data, even if some of its
|
|
|
|
characters would normally trigger special editor functions. A shell
|
|
|
|
can treat pasted input as less trusted, in case another application
|
|
|
|
somehow sneaked a malicious shell command into your clipboard: modern
|
|
|
|
versions of \cw{bash} will highlight pasted data on the command line,
|
|
|
|
and not run it until you've confirmed it by pressing Return, even if
|
|
|
|
the pasted data contained a newline character.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In edge cases, it's possible that bracketed paste mode introduces
|
|
|
|
bigger problems than the ones it solves. So you can use this checkbox
|
|
|
|
to turn it off completely. If you do that, then PuTTY will always send
|
|
|
|
your paste data exactly as if it had been typed at the keyboard,
|
|
|
|
whether or not the server asked for bracketed paste mode.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-window} The Window panel
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
The Window configuration panel allows you to control aspects of the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{PuTTY window}.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-winsize} Setting the \I{window size}size of the PuTTY window
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-02-01 23:24:30 +00:00
|
|
|
The \q{\ii{Columns}} and \q{\ii{Rows}} boxes let you set the PuTTY
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
window to a precise size. Of course you can also \I{window resizing}drag
|
|
|
|
the window to a new size while a session is running.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-winsizelock} What to do when the window is resized
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
These options allow you to control what happens when the user tries
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
to \I{window resizing}resize the PuTTY window using its window furniture.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
There are four options here:
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Change the number of rows and columns}: the font size will not
|
|
|
|
change. (This is the default.)
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Change the size of the font}: the number of rows and columns in
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
the terminal will stay the same, and the \i{font size} will change.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Change font size when maximised}: when the window is resized,
|
|
|
|
the number of rows and columns will change, \e{except} when the window
|
2010-12-23 22:19:13 +00:00
|
|
|
is \i{maximise}d (or restored), when the font size will change. (In
|
|
|
|
this mode, holding down the Alt key while resizing will also cause the
|
|
|
|
font size to change.)
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Forbid resizing completely}: the terminal will refuse to be
|
|
|
|
resized at all.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-scrollback} Controlling \i{scrollback}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-11-25 18:59:12 +00:00
|
|
|
These options let you configure the way PuTTY keeps text after it
|
|
|
|
scrolls off the top of the screen (see \k{using-scrollback}).
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Lines of scrollback} box lets you configure how many lines of
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
text PuTTY keeps. The \q{Display scrollbar} options allow you to
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
hide the \i{scrollbar} (although you can still view the scrollback using
|
2004-06-15 11:31:30 +00:00
|
|
|
the keyboard as described in \k{using-scrollback}). You can separately
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
configure whether the scrollbar is shown in \i{full-screen} mode and in
|
2004-06-15 11:31:30 +00:00
|
|
|
normal modes.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are viewing part of the scrollback when the server sends more
|
|
|
|
text to PuTTY, the screen will revert to showing the current
|
|
|
|
terminal contents. You can disable this behaviour by turning off
|
|
|
|
\q{Reset scrollback on display activity}. You can also make the
|
|
|
|
screen revert when you press a key, by turning on \q{Reset
|
|
|
|
scrollback on keypress}.
|
|
|
|
|
2003-03-07 09:03:11 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-erasetoscrollback} \q{Push erased text into scrollback}
|
2003-03-06 12:51:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When this option is enabled, the contents of the terminal screen
|
|
|
|
will be pushed into the scrollback when a server-side application
|
|
|
|
clears the screen, so that your scrollback will contain a better
|
|
|
|
record of what was on your screen in the past.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If the application switches to the \i{alternate screen} (see
|
2003-03-06 12:51:12 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-features-altscreen} for more about this), then the
|
|
|
|
contents of the primary screen will be visible in the scrollback
|
|
|
|
until the application switches back again.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is enabled by default.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-appearance} The Appearance panel
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
The Appearance configuration panel allows you to control aspects of
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
the appearance of \I{PuTTY window}PuTTY's window.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-cursor} Controlling the appearance of the \i{cursor}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-29 17:26:20 +00:00
|
|
|
The \q{Cursor appearance} option lets you configure the cursor to be
|
|
|
|
a block, an underline, or a vertical line. A block cursor becomes an
|
|
|
|
empty box when the window loses focus; an underline or a vertical
|
|
|
|
line becomes dotted.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The \q{\ii{Cursor blinks}} option makes the cursor blink on and off. This
|
2001-01-29 17:26:20 +00:00
|
|
|
works in any of the cursor modes.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-font} Controlling the \i{font} used in the terminal window
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
This option allows you to choose what font, in what \I{font size}size,
|
2010-12-29 14:11:25 +00:00
|
|
|
the PuTTY terminal window uses to display the text in the session.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, you will be offered a choice from all the fixed-width
|
|
|
|
fonts installed on the system, since VT100-style terminal handling
|
|
|
|
expects a fixed-width font. If you tick the box marked \q{Allow
|
|
|
|
selection of variable-pitch fonts}, however, PuTTY will offer
|
|
|
|
variable-width fonts as well: if you select one of these, the font
|
|
|
|
will be coerced into fixed-size character cells, which will probably
|
|
|
|
not look very good (but can work OK with some fonts).
|
2001-01-29 17:26:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-mouseptr} \q{Hide \i{mouse pointer} when typing in window}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you enable this option, the mouse pointer will disappear if the
|
|
|
|
PuTTY window is selected and you press a key. This way, it will not
|
|
|
|
obscure any of the text in the window while you work in your
|
|
|
|
session. As soon as you move the mouse, the pointer will reappear.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is disabled by default, so the mouse pointer remains
|
|
|
|
visible at all times.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-winborder} Controlling the \i{window border}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY allows you to configure the appearance of the window border to
|
|
|
|
some extent.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The checkbox marked \q{Sunken-edge border} changes the appearance of
|
|
|
|
the window border to something more like a DOS box: the inside edge
|
|
|
|
of the border is highlighted as if it sank down to meet the surface
|
|
|
|
inside the window. This makes the border a little bit thicker as
|
|
|
|
well. It's hard to describe well. Try it and see if you like it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can also configure a completely blank gap between the text in
|
|
|
|
the window and the border, using the \q{Gap between text and window
|
|
|
|
edge} control. By default this is set at one pixel. You can reduce
|
|
|
|
it to zero, or increase it further.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-behaviour} The Behaviour panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Behaviour configuration panel allows you to control aspects of
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
the behaviour of \I{PuTTY window}PuTTY's window.
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-title} Controlling the \i{window title}
|
2003-03-05 22:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Window title} edit box allows you to set the title of the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY window. By default the window title will contain the \i{host name}
|
2003-03-05 22:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
followed by \q{PuTTY}, for example \c{server1.example.com - PuTTY}.
|
|
|
|
If you want a different window title, this is where to set it.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY allows the server to send \c{xterm} \i{control sequence}s which
|
2004-06-10 10:01:11 +00:00
|
|
|
modify the title of the window in mid-session (unless this is disabled -
|
|
|
|
see \k{config-features-retitle}); the title string set here
|
|
|
|
is therefore only the \e{initial} window title.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
As well as the \e{window} title, there is also an \c{xterm}
|
|
|
|
sequence to modify the \I{icon title}title of the window's \e{icon}.
|
2003-03-05 22:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
This makes sense in a windowing system where the window becomes an
|
|
|
|
icon when minimised, such as Windows 3.1 or most X Window System
|
|
|
|
setups; but in the Windows 95-like user interface it isn't as
|
|
|
|
applicable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, PuTTY only uses the server-supplied \e{window} title, and
|
|
|
|
ignores the icon title entirely. If for some reason you want to see
|
|
|
|
both titles, check the box marked \q{Separate window and icon titles}.
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If you do this, PuTTY's window title and Taskbar \I{window caption}caption will
|
|
|
|
change into the server-supplied icon title if you \i{minimise} the PuTTY
|
2003-03-05 22:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
window, and change back to the server-supplied window title if you
|
|
|
|
restore it. (If the server has not bothered to supply a window or
|
|
|
|
icon title, none of this will happen.)
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-warnonclose} \q{Warn before \i{closing window}}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If you press the \i{Close button} in a PuTTY window that contains a
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
running session, PuTTY will put up a warning window asking if you
|
|
|
|
really meant to close the window. A window whose session has already
|
|
|
|
terminated can always be closed without a warning.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you want to be able to close a window quickly, you can disable
|
|
|
|
the \q{Warn before closing window} option.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-altf4} \q{Window closes on \i{ALT-F4}}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
By default, pressing ALT-F4 causes the \I{closing window}window to
|
|
|
|
close (or a warning box to appear; see \k{config-warnonclose}). If you
|
|
|
|
disable the \q{Window closes on ALT-F4} option, then pressing ALT-F4
|
|
|
|
will simply send a key sequence to the server.
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-altspace} \q{\ii{System menu} appears on \i{ALT-Space}}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this option is enabled, then pressing ALT-Space will bring up the
|
|
|
|
PuTTY window's menu, like clicking on the top left corner. If it is
|
|
|
|
disabled, then pressing ALT-Space will just send \c{ESC SPACE} to
|
|
|
|
the server.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Some \i{accessibility} programs for Windows may need this option
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
enabling to be able to control PuTTY's window successfully. For
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
instance, \i{Dragon NaturallySpeaking} requires it both to open the
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
system menu via voice, and to close, minimise, maximise and restore
|
|
|
|
the window.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-altonly} \q{\ii{System menu} appears on \i{Alt} alone}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this option is enabled, then pressing and releasing ALT will
|
|
|
|
bring up the PuTTY window's menu, like clicking on the top left
|
|
|
|
corner. If it is disabled, then pressing and releasing ALT will have
|
|
|
|
no effect.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-alwaysontop} \q{Ensure window is \i{always on top}}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this option is enabled, the PuTTY window will stay on top of all
|
|
|
|
other windows.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-fullscreen} \q{\ii{Full screen} on Alt-Enter}
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this option is enabled, then pressing Alt-Enter will cause the
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY window to become full-screen. Pressing Alt-Enter again will
|
|
|
|
restore the previous window size.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The full-screen feature is also available from the \ii{System menu}, even
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
when it is configured not to be available on the Alt-Enter key. See
|
|
|
|
\k{using-fullscreen}.
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-translation} The Translation panel
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
The Translation configuration panel allows you to control the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
translation between the \i{character set} understood by the server and
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
the character set understood by PuTTY.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-charset} Controlling character set translation
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
During an interactive session, PuTTY receives a stream of 8-bit
|
|
|
|
bytes from the server, and in order to display them on the screen it
|
2008-10-13 22:34:57 +00:00
|
|
|
needs to know what character set to interpret them in. Similarly,
|
|
|
|
PuTTY needs to know how to translate your keystrokes into the encoding
|
|
|
|
the server expects. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory
|
|
|
|
mechanism for PuTTY and the server to communicate this information,
|
|
|
|
so it must usually be manually configured.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
There are a lot of character sets to choose from. The \q{Remote
|
2013-05-28 23:46:44 +00:00
|
|
|
character set} option lets you select one.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-05-28 23:46:44 +00:00
|
|
|
By default PuTTY will use the \i{UTF-8} encoding of \i{Unicode}, which
|
|
|
|
can represent pretty much any character; data coming from the server
|
|
|
|
is interpreted as UTF-8, and keystrokes are sent UTF-8 encoded. This
|
|
|
|
is what most modern distributions of Linux will expect by default.
|
|
|
|
However, if this is wrong for your server, you can select a different
|
|
|
|
character set using this control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A few other notable character sets are:
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b The \i{ISO-8859} series are all standard character sets that include
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
various accented characters appropriate for different sets of
|
|
|
|
languages.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b The \i{Win125x} series are defined by Microsoft, for similar
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
purposes. In particular Win1252 is almost equivalent to ISO-8859-1,
|
|
|
|
but contains a few extra characters such as matched quotes and the
|
|
|
|
Euro symbol.
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
\b If you want the old IBM PC character set with block graphics and
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
line-drawing characters, you can select \q{\i{CP437}}.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If you need support for a numeric \i{code page} which is not listed in
|
2003-09-26 13:04:56 +00:00
|
|
|
the drop-down list, such as code page 866, then you can try entering
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
its name manually (\c{\i{CP866}} for example) in the list box. If the
|
2003-09-26 13:04:56 +00:00
|
|
|
underlying version of Windows has the appropriate translation table
|
|
|
|
installed, PuTTY will use it.
|
2002-04-03 18:24:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-cjk-ambig-wide} \q{Treat \i{CJK} ambiguous characters as wide}
|
2005-03-22 23:20:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
There are \I{East Asian Ambiguous characters}some Unicode characters
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
whose \I{character width}width is not well-defined. In most contexts, such
|
|
|
|
characters should be treated as single-width for the purposes of \I{wrapping,
|
|
|
|
terminal}wrapping and so on; however, in some CJK contexts, they are better
|
|
|
|
treated as double-width for historical reasons, and some server-side
|
|
|
|
applications may expect them to be displayed as such. Setting this option
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
will cause PuTTY to take the double-width interpretation.
|
2005-03-22 23:20:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you use legacy CJK applications, and you find your lines are
|
|
|
|
wrapping in the wrong places, or you are having other display
|
|
|
|
problems, you might want to play with this setting.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
This option only has any effect in \i{UTF-8} mode (see \k{config-charset}).
|
2005-03-22 23:20:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-cyr} \q{\i{Caps Lock} acts as \i{Cyrillic} switch}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This feature allows you to switch between a US/UK keyboard layout
|
|
|
|
and a Cyrillic keyboard layout by using the Caps Lock key, if you
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
need to type (for example) \i{Russian} and English side by side in the
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
same document.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Currently this feature is not expected to work properly if your
|
|
|
|
native keyboard layout is not US or UK.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-linedraw} Controlling display of \i{line-drawing characters}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
VT100-series terminals allow the server to send \i{control sequence}s that
|
2004-10-19 13:54:50 +00:00
|
|
|
shift temporarily into a separate character set for drawing simple
|
|
|
|
lines and boxes. However, there are a variety of ways in which PuTTY
|
|
|
|
can attempt to find appropriate characters, and the right one to use
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on the locally configured \i{font}. In general you should probably
|
2004-10-19 13:54:50 +00:00
|
|
|
try lots of options until you find one that your particular font
|
|
|
|
supports.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Use Unicode line drawing code points} tries to use the box
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
characters that are present in \i{Unicode}. For good Unicode-supporting
|
2004-10-19 13:54:50 +00:00
|
|
|
fonts this is probably the most reliable and functional option.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Poor man's line drawing} assumes that the font \e{cannot}
|
|
|
|
generate the line and box characters at all, so it will use the
|
|
|
|
\c{+}, \c{-} and \c{|} characters to draw approximations to boxes.
|
|
|
|
You should use this option if none of the other options works.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Font has XWindows encoding} is for use with fonts that have a
|
|
|
|
special encoding, where the lowest 32 character positions (below the
|
|
|
|
ASCII printable range) contain the line-drawing characters. This is
|
|
|
|
unlikely to be the case with any standard Windows font; it will
|
|
|
|
probably only apply to custom-built fonts or fonts that have been
|
|
|
|
automatically converted from the X Window System.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Use font in both ANSI and OEM modes} tries to use the same
|
|
|
|
font in two different character sets, to obtain a wider range of
|
|
|
|
characters. This doesn't always work; some fonts claim to be a
|
|
|
|
different size depending on which character set you try to use.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Use font in OEM mode only} is more reliable than that, but can
|
|
|
|
miss out other characters from the main character set.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-linedrawpaste} Controlling \i{copy and paste} of line drawing
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
characters
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, when you copy and paste a piece of the PuTTY screen that
|
2003-04-26 13:22:25 +00:00
|
|
|
contains VT100 line and box drawing characters, PuTTY will paste
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
them in the form they appear on the screen: either \i{Unicode} line
|
2003-04-26 13:22:25 +00:00
|
|
|
drawing code points, or the \q{poor man's} line-drawing characters
|
2003-11-20 18:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
\c{+}, \c{-} and \c{|}. The checkbox \q{Copy and paste VT100 line
|
|
|
|
drawing chars as lqqqk} disables this feature, so line-drawing
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
characters will be pasted as the \i{ASCII} characters that were printed
|
2003-11-20 18:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
to produce them. This will typically mean they come out mostly as
|
|
|
|
\c{q} and \c{x}, with a scattering of \c{jklmntuvw} at the corners.
|
|
|
|
This might be useful if you were trying to recreate the same box
|
|
|
|
layout in another program, for example.
|
2003-04-26 13:22:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that this option only applies to line-drawing characters which
|
|
|
|
\e{were} printed by using the VT100 mechanism. Line-drawing
|
2004-10-19 13:54:50 +00:00
|
|
|
characters that were received as Unicode code points will paste as
|
|
|
|
Unicode always.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Option to support VT100 line drawing in UTF-8 mode.
Thanks to Jiri Kaspar for sending this patch (apart from the new docs
section, which is in my own words), which implements a feature we've
had as a wishlist item ('utf8-plus-vt100') for a long time.
I was actually surprised it was possible to implement it in so few
lines of code! I'd forgotten, or possibly never noticed in the first
place, that even in UTF-8 mode PuTTY not only accepts but still
_processes_ all the ISO 2022 control sequences and shift characters,
and keeps running track of all the same state in term->cset and
term->cset_attrs that it tracks in IS0-2022-enabled modes. It's just
that in UTF-8 mode, at the very last minute when a character+attribute
pair is about to be written into the terminal's character buffer, it
deliberately ignores the contents of those variables.
So all that was needed was a new flag checked at that last moment
which causes it not quite to ignore them after all, and bingo,
utf8-plus-vt100 is supported. And it works no matter which ISO 2022
sequences you're using; whether you're using ESC ( 0 to select the
line drawing set directly into GL and ESC ( B to get back when you're
done, or whether you send a preliminary ESC ( B ESC ) 0 to get GL/GR
to be ASCII and line drawing respectively so you can use SI and SO as
one-byte mode switches thereafter, both work just as well.
This implementation strategy has a couple of consequences, which I
don't think matter very much one way or the other but I document them
just in case they turn out to be important later:
- if an application expecting this mode has already filled your
terminal window with lqqqqqqqqk, then enabling this mode in Change
Settings won't retroactively turn them into the line drawing
characters you wanted, because no memory is preserved in the screen
buffer of what the ISO 2022 state was when they were printed. So
the application still has to do a screen refresh.
- on the other hand, if you already sent the ESC ( 0 or whatever to
put the terminal _into_ line drawing mode, and then you turn on
this mode in Change Settings, you _will_ still be in line drawing
mode, because the system _does_ remember your current ISO 2022
state at all times, whether it's currently applying it to output
printing characters or not.
2018-05-12 07:43:52 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-utf8linedraw} Combining VT100 line-drawing with UTF-8
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If PuTTY is configured to treat data from the server as encoded in
|
|
|
|
UTF-8, then by default it disables the older VT100-style system of
|
|
|
|
control sequences that cause the lower-case letters to be temporarily
|
|
|
|
replaced by line drawing characters.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The rationale is that in UTF-8 mode you don't need those control
|
|
|
|
sequences anyway, because all the line-drawing characters they access
|
|
|
|
are available as Unicode characters already, so there's no need for
|
|
|
|
applications to put the terminal into a special state to get at them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Also, it removes a risk of the terminal \e{accidentally} getting into
|
|
|
|
that state: if you accidentally write uncontrolled binary data to a
|
|
|
|
non-UTF-8 terminal, it can be surprisingly common to find that your
|
|
|
|
next shell prompt appears as a sequence of line-drawing characters and
|
|
|
|
then you have to remember or look up how to get out of that mode. So
|
|
|
|
by default, UTF-8 mode simply doesn't \e{have} a confusing mode like
|
|
|
|
that to get into, accidentally or on purpose.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
However, not all applications will see it that way. Even UTF-8
|
|
|
|
terminal users will still sometimes have to run software that tries to
|
|
|
|
print line-drawing characters in the old-fashioned way. So the
|
|
|
|
configuration option \q{Enable VT100 line drawing even in UTF-8 mode}
|
|
|
|
puts PuTTY into a hybrid mode in which it understands the VT100-style
|
|
|
|
control sequences that change the meaning of the ASCII lower case
|
|
|
|
letters, \e{and} understands UTF-8.
|
|
|
|
|
2003-11-20 18:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-selection} The Selection panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Selection panel allows you to control the way \i{copy and paste}
|
2003-11-20 18:33:22 +00:00
|
|
|
work in the PuTTY window.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-mouse} Changing the actions of the mouse buttons
|
|
|
|
|
2004-02-07 23:49:21 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY's copy and paste mechanism is by default modelled on the Unix
|
2018-02-04 12:27:17 +00:00
|
|
|
\i\c{xterm} application. The X Window System uses a three-button mouse,
|
2019-03-24 13:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
and the convention in that system is that the \i{left button}
|
|
|
|
\I{selecting text}selects, the \i{right button} extends an existing
|
|
|
|
selection, and the \i{middle button} pastes.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-24 13:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
Windows often only has two mouse buttons, so when run on Windows,
|
|
|
|
PuTTY is configurable. In PuTTY's default configuration
|
|
|
|
(\q{Compromise}), the \e{right} button pastes, and the \e{middle}
|
|
|
|
button (if you have one) \I{adjusting a selection}extends a
|
|
|
|
selection.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If you have a \i{three-button mouse} and you are already used to the
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
\c{xterm} arrangement, you can select it using the \q{Action of
|
|
|
|
mouse buttons} control.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-02-07 23:49:21 +00:00
|
|
|
Alternatively, with the \q{Windows} option selected, the middle
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
button extends, and the right button brings up a \i{context menu} (on
|
2004-02-07 23:49:21 +00:00
|
|
|
which one of the options is \q{Paste}). (This context menu is always
|
|
|
|
available by holding down Ctrl and right-clicking, regardless of the
|
|
|
|
setting of this option.)
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-03 06:38:07 +00:00
|
|
|
(When PuTTY itself is running on Unix, it follows the X Window System
|
2019-03-24 13:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
convention.)
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-mouseshift} \q{Shift overrides application's use of mouse}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY allows the server to send \i{control codes} that let it
|
|
|
|
\I{mouse reporting}take over the mouse and use it for purposes other
|
|
|
|
than \i{copy and paste}.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Applications which use this feature include the text-mode web
|
|
|
|
browser \c{links}, the Usenet newsreader \c{trn} version 4, and the
|
|
|
|
file manager \c{mc} (Midnight Commander).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When running one of these applications, pressing the mouse buttons
|
|
|
|
no longer performs copy and paste. If you do need to copy and paste,
|
|
|
|
you can still do so if you hold down Shift while you do your mouse
|
|
|
|
clicks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
However, it is possible in theory for applications to even detect
|
|
|
|
and make use of Shift + mouse clicks. We don't know of any
|
|
|
|
applications that do this, but in case someone ever writes one,
|
|
|
|
unchecking the \q{Shift overrides application's use of mouse}
|
|
|
|
checkbox will cause Shift + mouse clicks to go to the server as well
|
|
|
|
(so that mouse-driven copy and paste will be completely disabled).
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-09 11:47:39 +00:00
|
|
|
If you want to prevent the application from taking over the mouse at
|
|
|
|
all, you can do this using the Features control panel; see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-features-mouse}.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-rectselect} Default selection mode
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As described in \k{using-selection}, PuTTY has two modes of
|
|
|
|
selecting text to be copied to the clipboard. In the default mode
|
|
|
|
(\q{Normal}), dragging the mouse from point A to point B selects to
|
|
|
|
the end of the line containing A, all the lines in between, and from
|
|
|
|
the very beginning of the line containing B. In the other mode
|
|
|
|
(\q{Rectangular block}), dragging the mouse between two points
|
|
|
|
defines a rectangle, and everything within that rectangle is copied.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Normally, you have to hold down Alt while dragging the mouse to
|
|
|
|
select a rectangular block. Using the \q{Default selection mode}
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
control, you can set \i{rectangular selection} as the default, and then
|
2001-11-25 19:22:47 +00:00
|
|
|
you have to hold down Alt to get the \e{normal} behaviour.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-10 17:16:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-clipboards} Assigning copy and paste actions to clipboards
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Here you can configure which clipboard(s) are written or read by
|
|
|
|
PuTTY's various copy and paste actions.
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-24 13:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
Most platforms, including Windows, have a single system clipboard.
|
|
|
|
On these platforms, PuTTY provides a second clipboard-like facility by
|
|
|
|
permitting you to paste the text you last selected in \e{this window},
|
|
|
|
whether or not it is currently also in the system clipboard. This is
|
|
|
|
not enabled by default.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-04 12:27:17 +00:00
|
|
|
The X Window System (which underlies most Unix graphical interfaces)
|
|
|
|
provides multiple clipboards (or \q{\i{selections}}), and many
|
|
|
|
applications support more than one of them by a different user
|
2019-03-24 13:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
interface mechanism. When PuTTY itself is running on Unix, it has
|
|
|
|
more configurability relating to these selections.
|
2018-02-04 12:27:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The two most commonly used selections are called \cq{\i{PRIMARY}} and
|
|
|
|
\cq{\I{CLIPBOARD selection}CLIPBOARD}; in applications supporting both,
|
|
|
|
the usual behaviour is that \cw{PRIMARY} is used by mouse-only actions
|
|
|
|
(selecting text automatically copies it to \cw{PRIMARY}, and
|
|
|
|
\i{middle-clicking} pastes from \cw{PRIMARY}), whereas \cw{CLIPBOARD}
|
|
|
|
is used by explicit Copy and Paste menu items or keypresses such as
|
|
|
|
\i{Ctrl-C} and \i{Ctrl-V}.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-10 17:16:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\S2{config-selection-autocopy} \q{Auto-copy selected text}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The checkbox \q{Auto-copy selected text to system clipboard} controls
|
|
|
|
whether or not selecting text in the PuTTY terminal window
|
|
|
|
automatically has the side effect of copying it to the system
|
|
|
|
clipboard, without requiring a separate user interface action.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
On X, the wording of this option is changed slightly so that
|
|
|
|
\cq{CLIPBOARD} is mentioned in place of the \q{system clipboard}. Text
|
|
|
|
selected in the terminal window will \e{always} be automatically
|
2019-03-24 13:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
placed in the \cw{PRIMARY} selection, as is conventional, but if you
|
|
|
|
tick this box, it will \e{also} be placed in \cq{CLIPBOARD} at the
|
|
|
|
same time.
|
2017-12-10 17:16:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S2{config-selection-clipactions} Choosing a clipboard for UI actions
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY has three user-interface actions which can be configured to
|
|
|
|
paste into the terminal (not counting menu items). You can click
|
|
|
|
whichever mouse button (if any) is configured to paste (see
|
2018-02-04 12:27:17 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-mouse}); you can press \i{Shift-Ins}; or you can press
|
|
|
|
\i{Ctrl-Shift-V}, although that action is not enabled by default.
|
2017-12-10 17:16:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can configure which of the available clipboards each of these
|
|
|
|
actions pastes from (including turning the paste action off
|
2019-03-24 13:28:29 +00:00
|
|
|
completely). On platforms with a single system clipboard (such as
|
|
|
|
Windows), the available options are to paste from that clipboard or
|
|
|
|
to paste from PuTTY's internal memory of the \i{last selected text}
|
|
|
|
within that window. On X, the standard options are \cw{CLIPBOARD} or
|
|
|
|
\cw{PRIMARY}.
|
2017-12-10 17:16:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(\cw{PRIMARY} is conceptually similar in that it \e{also} refers to
|
|
|
|
the last selected text \dash just across all applications instead of
|
|
|
|
just this window.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The two keyboard options each come with a corresponding key to copy
|
|
|
|
\e{to} the same clipboard. Whatever you configure Shift-Ins to paste
|
2018-02-04 12:27:17 +00:00
|
|
|
from, \i{Ctrl-Ins} will copy to the same location; similarly,
|
|
|
|
\i{Ctrl-Shift-C} will copy to whatever Ctrl-Shift-V pastes from.
|
2017-12-10 17:16:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-17 18:44:27 +00:00
|
|
|
On X, you can also enter a selection name of your choice. For example,
|
2018-02-04 12:27:17 +00:00
|
|
|
there is a rarely-used standard selection called \cq{\i{SECONDARY}}, which
|
2017-12-17 18:44:27 +00:00
|
|
|
Emacs (for example) can work with if you hold down the Meta key while
|
|
|
|
dragging to select or clicking to paste; if you configure a PuTTY
|
|
|
|
keyboard action to access this clipboard, then you can interoperate
|
|
|
|
with other applications' use of it. Another thing you could do would
|
|
|
|
be to invent a clipboard name yourself, to create a special clipboard
|
|
|
|
shared \e{only} between instances of PuTTY, or between just instances
|
|
|
|
configured in that particular way.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-24 15:35:46 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-paste-ctrl-char} \q{Permit control characters in pasted text}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-24 15:35:46 +00:00
|
|
|
It is possible for the clipboard to contain not just text (with
|
|
|
|
newlines and tabs) but also control characters such as ESC which could
|
|
|
|
have surprising effects if pasted into a terminal session, depending
|
|
|
|
on what program is running on the server side. Copying text from a
|
|
|
|
mischievous web page could put such characters onto the clipboard.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, PuTTY filters out the more unusual control characters,
|
|
|
|
only letting through the more obvious text-formatting characters
|
|
|
|
(newlines, tab, backspace, and DEL).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Setting this option stops this filtering; on paste, any character on
|
|
|
|
the clipboard is sent to the session uncensored. This might be useful
|
|
|
|
if you are deliberately using control character pasting as a simple
|
|
|
|
form of scripting, for instance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\H{config-selection-copy} The Copy panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Copy configuration panel controls behaviour specifically related to
|
|
|
|
copying from the terminal window to the clipboard.
|
2017-12-16 11:13:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-charclasses} Character classes
|
2001-12-06 13:28:02 +00:00
|
|
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|
2018-03-24 15:35:46 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY will \I{word-by-word selection}select a word at a time in the
|
|
|
|
terminal window if you \i{double-click} to begin the drag. This section
|
|
|
|
allows you to control precisely what is considered to be a word.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
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|
|
Each character is given a \e{class}, which is a small number
|
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|
|
(typically 0, 1 or 2). PuTTY considers a single word to be any
|
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|
|
number of adjacent characters in the same class. So by modifying the
|
|
|
|
assignment of characters to classes, you can modify the word-by-word
|
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|
|
selection behaviour.
|
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|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
In the default configuration, the \i{character classes} are:
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Class 0 contains \i{white space} and control characters.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
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|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
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\b Class 1 contains most \i{punctuation}.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
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|
\b Class 2 contains letters, numbers and a few pieces of punctuation
|
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|
(the double quote, minus sign, period, forward slash and
|
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|
|
underscore).
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|
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|
|
So, for example, if you assign the \c{@} symbol into character class
|
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|
2, you will be able to select an e-mail address with just a double
|
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|
|
click.
|
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|
|
In order to adjust these assignments, you start by selecting a group
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|
|
of characters in the list box. Then enter a class number in the edit
|
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|
|
box below, and press the \q{Set} button.
|
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|
|
This mechanism currently only covers ASCII characters, because it
|
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|
|
isn't feasible to expand the list to cover the whole of Unicode.
|
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|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Character class definitions can be modified by \i{control sequence}s
|
2003-01-12 14:30:02 +00:00
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|
|
sent by the server. This configuration option controls the
|
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|
|
\e{default} state, which will be restored when you reset the
|
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|
|
terminal (see \k{reset-terminal}). However, if you modify this
|
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|
|
option in mid-session using \q{Change Settings}, it will take effect
|
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|
|
immediately.
|
2002-02-24 15:25:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-24 15:35:46 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-rtfcopy} Copying in \i{Rich Text Format}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you enable \q{Copy to clipboard in RTF as well as plain text},
|
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|
|
PuTTY will write formatting information to the clipboard as well as
|
|
|
|
the actual text you copy. The effect of this is
|
|
|
|
that if you paste into (say) a word processor, the text will appear
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
in the word processor in the same \i{font}, \i{colour}, and style
|
2018-03-24 15:35:46 +00:00
|
|
|
(e.g. bold, underline) PuTTY was using to display it.
|
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|
|
This option can easily be inconvenient, so by default it is
|
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|
|
disabled.
|
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|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-colours} The Colours panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Colours panel allows you to control PuTTY's use of \i{colour}.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ansicolour} \q{Allow terminal to specify \i{ANSI colours}}
|
2004-11-09 17:57:32 +00:00
|
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|
|
This option is enabled by default. If it is disabled, PuTTY will
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ignore any \i{control sequence}s sent by the server to request coloured
|
2004-11-09 17:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
text.
|
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|
|
If you have a particularly garish application, you might want to
|
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|
|
turn this option off and make PuTTY only use the default foreground
|
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|
|
and background colours.
|
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|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-xtermcolour} \q{Allow terminal to use xterm \i{256-colour mode}}
|
2004-11-28 15:13:34 +00:00
|
|
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|
|
This option is enabled by default. If it is disabled, PuTTY will
|
|
|
|
ignore any control sequences sent by the server which use the
|
|
|
|
extended 256-colour mode supported by recent versions of \cw{xterm}.
|
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|
|
2004-11-29 11:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
If you have an application which is supposed to use 256-colour mode
|
|
|
|
and it isn't working, you may find you need to tell your server that
|
|
|
|
your terminal supports 256 colours. On Unix, you do this by ensuring
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
that the setting of \i\cw{TERM} describes a 256-colour-capable
|
2004-11-29 11:31:21 +00:00
|
|
|
terminal. You can check this using a command such as \c{infocmp}:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c $ infocmp | grep colors
|
|
|
|
\c colors#256, cols#80, it#8, lines#24, pairs#256,
|
|
|
|
\e bbbbbbbbbb
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you do not see \cq{colors#256} in the output, you may need to
|
|
|
|
change your terminal setting. On modern Linux machines, you could
|
|
|
|
try \cq{xterm-256color}.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-05 19:27:27 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-truecolour} \q{Allow terminal to use 24-bit colour}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is enabled by default. If it is disabled, PuTTY will
|
|
|
|
ignore any control sequences sent by the server which use the control
|
|
|
|
sequences supported by modern terminals to specify arbitrary 24-bit
|
|
|
|
RGB colour value.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-30 20:01:26 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-boldcolour} \q{Indicate bolded text by changing...}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
When the server sends a \i{control sequence} indicating that some text
|
2012-06-09 15:09:22 +00:00
|
|
|
should be displayed in \i{bold}, PuTTY can handle this in several
|
|
|
|
ways. It can either change the \i{font} for a bold version, or use the
|
|
|
|
same font in a brighter colour, or it can do both (brighten the colour
|
|
|
|
\e{and} embolden the font). This control lets you choose which.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default bold is indicated by colour, so non-bold text is displayed
|
|
|
|
in light grey and bold text is displayed in bright white (and
|
|
|
|
similarly in other colours). If you change the setting to \q{The font}
|
|
|
|
box, bold and non-bold text will be displayed in the same colour, and
|
|
|
|
instead the font will change to indicate the difference. If you select
|
|
|
|
\q{Both}, the font and the colour will both change.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-30 20:01:26 +00:00
|
|
|
Some applications rely on \q{\i{bold black}} being distinguishable
|
|
|
|
from a black background; if you choose \q{The font}, their text may
|
|
|
|
become invisible.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-logpalette} \q{Attempt to use \i{logical palettes}}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Logical palettes are a mechanism by which a Windows application
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
running on an \i{8-bit colour} display can select precisely the colours
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
it wants instead of going with the Windows standard defaults.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are not getting the colours you ask for on an 8-bit display,
|
|
|
|
you can try enabling this option. However, be warned that it's never
|
|
|
|
worked very well.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-syscolour} \q{Use \i{system colours}}
|
2003-09-03 20:14:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enabling this option will cause PuTTY to ignore the configured colours
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
for \I{default background}\I{default foreground}\q{Default
|
|
|
|
Background/Foreground} and \I{cursor colour}\q{Cursor Colour/Text} (see
|
2003-09-03 20:14:38 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-colourcfg}), instead going with the system-wide defaults.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that non-bold and \i{bold text} will be the same colour if this
|
2003-09-03 20:14:38 +00:00
|
|
|
option is enabled. You might want to change to indicating bold text
|
|
|
|
by font changes (see \k{config-boldcolour}).
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-colourcfg} Adjusting the colours in the \i{terminal window}
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
The main colour control allows you to specify exactly what colours
|
|
|
|
things should be displayed in. To modify one of the PuTTY colours,
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
use the list box to select which colour you want to modify. The \i{RGB
|
|
|
|
values} for that colour will appear on the right-hand side of the
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
list box. Now, if you press the \q{Modify} button, you will be
|
|
|
|
presented with a colour selector, in which you can choose a new
|
2006-06-20 21:10:33 +00:00
|
|
|
colour to go in place of the old one. (You may also edit the RGB
|
|
|
|
values directly in the edit boxes, if you wish; each value is an
|
|
|
|
integer from 0 to 255.)
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY allows you to set the \i{cursor colour}, the \i{default foreground}
|
|
|
|
and \I{default background}background, and the precise shades of all the
|
|
|
|
\I{ANSI colours}ANSI configurable colours (black, red, green, yellow, blue,
|
|
|
|
magenta, cyan, and white). You can also modify the precise shades used for
|
|
|
|
the \i{bold} versions of these colours; these are used to display bold text
|
2013-11-30 20:01:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if you have chosen to indicate that by colour (see \k{config-boldcolour}),
|
|
|
|
and can also be used if the server asks specifically to use them. (Note
|
|
|
|
that \q{Default Bold Background} is \e{not} the background colour used for
|
|
|
|
bold text; it is only used if the server specifically asks for a bold
|
2004-10-24 18:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
background.)
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-connection} The Connection panel
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
The Connection panel allows you to configure options that apply to
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
more than one type of \i{connection}.
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-keepalive} Using \i{keepalives} to prevent disconnection
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-18 19:44:26 +00:00
|
|
|
If you find your sessions are closing unexpectedly (most often with
|
|
|
|
\q{Connection reset by peer}) after they have been idle for a while,
|
|
|
|
you might want to try using this option.
|
2001-08-04 13:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Some network \i{routers} and \i{firewalls} need to keep track of all
|
2001-08-04 13:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
connections through them. Usually, these firewalls will assume a
|
|
|
|
connection is dead if no data is transferred in either direction
|
|
|
|
after a certain time interval. This can cause PuTTY sessions to be
|
|
|
|
unexpectedly closed by the firewall if no traffic is seen in the
|
|
|
|
session for some time.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The keepalive option (\q{Seconds between keepalives}) allows you to
|
|
|
|
configure PuTTY to send data through the session at regular
|
|
|
|
intervals, in a way that does not disrupt the actual terminal
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
session. If you find your firewall is cutting \i{idle connections} off,
|
2001-08-04 13:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
you can try entering a non-zero value in this field. The value is
|
|
|
|
measured in seconds; so, for example, if your firewall cuts
|
|
|
|
connections off after ten minutes then you might want to enter 300
|
|
|
|
seconds (5 minutes) in the box.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that keepalives are not always helpful. They help if you have a
|
|
|
|
firewall which drops your connection after an idle period; but if
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
the network between you and the server suffers from \i{breaks in
|
|
|
|
connectivity} then keepalives can actually make things worse. If a
|
2001-08-04 13:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
session is idle, and connectivity is temporarily lost between the
|
|
|
|
endpoints, but the connectivity is restored before either side tries
|
|
|
|
to send anything, then there will be no problem - neither endpoint
|
|
|
|
will notice that anything was wrong. However, if one side does send
|
|
|
|
something during the break, it will repeatedly try to re-send, and
|
|
|
|
eventually give up and abandon the connection. Then when
|
|
|
|
connectivity is restored, the other side will find that the first
|
|
|
|
side doesn't believe there is an open connection any more.
|
|
|
|
Keepalives can make this sort of problem worse, because they
|
|
|
|
increase the probability that PuTTY will attempt to send data during
|
2005-09-30 14:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
a break in connectivity. (Other types of periodic network activity
|
2005-10-03 10:24:06 +00:00
|
|
|
can cause this behaviour; in particular, SSH-2 re-keys can have
|
2005-09-30 14:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
this effect. See \k{config-ssh-kex-rekey}.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Therefore, you might find that keepalives help
|
2001-08-04 13:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
connection loss, or you might find they make it worse, depending on
|
|
|
|
what \e{kind} of network problems you have between you and the
|
|
|
|
server.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-21 16:01:05 +00:00
|
|
|
Keepalives are only supported in Telnet and SSH; the Rlogin, SUPDUP, and
|
|
|
|
Raw protocols offer no way of implementing them. (For an alternative, see
|
2004-06-20 17:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-tcp-keepalives}.)
|
2001-08-04 13:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-28 19:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that if you are using SSH-1 and the server has a bug that makes
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
it unable to deal with SSH-1 ignore messages (see
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-bug-ignore1}), enabling keepalives will have no effect.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-nodelay} \q{Disable \i{Nagle's algorithm}}
|
2001-11-29 22:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nagle's algorithm is a detail of TCP/IP implementations that tries
|
|
|
|
to minimise the number of small data packets sent down a network
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
connection. With Nagle's algorithm enabled, PuTTY's \i{bandwidth} usage
|
2001-11-29 22:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
will be slightly more efficient; with it disabled, you may find you
|
|
|
|
get a faster response to your keystrokes when connecting to some
|
|
|
|
types of server.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Nagle algorithm is disabled by default for \i{interactive connections}.
|
2001-11-29 22:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-tcp-keepalives} \q{Enable \i{TCP keepalives}}
|
2004-06-20 17:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\e{NOTE:} TCP keepalives should not be confused with the
|
|
|
|
application-level keepalives described in \k{config-keepalive}. If in
|
|
|
|
doubt, you probably want application-level keepalives; TCP keepalives
|
|
|
|
are provided for completeness.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The idea of TCP keepalives is similar to application-level keepalives,
|
|
|
|
and the same caveats apply. The main differences are:
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-17 12:21:43 +00:00
|
|
|
\b TCP keepalives are available on \e{all} network connection types,
|
|
|
|
including Raw, Rlogin, and SUPDUP.
|
2004-06-20 17:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b The interval between TCP keepalives is usually much longer,
|
|
|
|
typically two hours; this is set by the operating system, and cannot
|
|
|
|
be configured within PuTTY.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b If the operating system does not receive a response to a keepalive,
|
2005-03-08 14:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
it may send out more in quick succession and terminate the connection
|
2004-06-20 17:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if no response is received.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
TCP keepalives may be more useful for ensuring that \i{half-open connections}
|
2004-06-20 17:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
are terminated than for keeping a connection alive.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TCP keepalives are disabled by default.
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:33:35 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-address-family} \q{\i{Internet protocol version}}
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option allows the user to select between the old and new
|
2008-02-23 23:56:22 +00:00
|
|
|
Internet protocols and addressing schemes (\i{IPv4} and \i{IPv6}).
|
|
|
|
The selected protocol will be used for most outgoing network
|
|
|
|
connections (including connections to \I{proxy}proxies); however,
|
|
|
|
tunnels have their own configuration, for which see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-portfwd-address-family}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The default setting is \q{Auto}, which means PuTTY will do something
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
sensible and try to guess which protocol you wanted. (If you specify
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
a literal \i{Internet address}, it will use whichever protocol that
|
|
|
|
address implies. If you provide a \i{hostname}, it will see what kinds
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
of address exist for that hostname; it will use IPv6 if there is an
|
|
|
|
IPv6 address available, and fall back to IPv4 if not.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you need to force PuTTY to use a particular protocol, you can
|
|
|
|
explicitly set this to \q{IPv4} or \q{IPv6}.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-01 11:16:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-loghost} \I{logical host name}\q{Logical name of remote host}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This allows you to tell PuTTY that the host it will really end up
|
|
|
|
connecting to is different from where it thinks it is making a
|
|
|
|
network connection.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You might use this, for instance, if you had set up an SSH port
|
|
|
|
forwarding in one PuTTY session so that connections to some
|
|
|
|
arbitrary port (say, \cw{localhost} port 10022) were forwarded to a
|
|
|
|
second machine's SSH port (say, \cw{foovax} port 22), and then
|
|
|
|
started a second PuTTY connecting to the forwarded port.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-25 15:42:42 +00:00
|
|
|
In normal usage, the second PuTTY will access the \i{host key cache}
|
2008-06-01 11:16:32 +00:00
|
|
|
under the host name and port it actually connected to (i.e.
|
|
|
|
\cw{localhost} port 10022 in this example). Using the logical host
|
|
|
|
name option, however, you can configure the second PuTTY to cache
|
|
|
|
the host key under the name of the host \e{you} know that it's
|
|
|
|
\e{really} going to end up talking to (here \c{foovax}).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This can be useful if you expect to connect to the same actual
|
|
|
|
server through many different channels (perhaps because your port
|
|
|
|
forwarding arrangements keep changing): by consistently setting the
|
|
|
|
logical host name, you can arrange that PuTTY will not keep asking
|
|
|
|
you to reconfirm its host key. Conversely, if you expect to use the
|
|
|
|
same local port number for port forwardings to lots of different
|
|
|
|
servers, you probably didn't want any particular server's host key
|
2014-11-08 18:34:24 +00:00
|
|
|
cached under that local port number. (For this latter case, you
|
2016-03-25 10:40:03 +00:00
|
|
|
could instead explicitly configure host keys in the relevant sessions;
|
2014-11-08 18:34:24 +00:00
|
|
|
see \k{config-ssh-kex-manual-hostkeys}.)
|
2008-06-01 11:16:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you just enter a host name for this option, PuTTY will cache the
|
|
|
|
SSH host key under the default SSH port for that host, irrespective
|
|
|
|
of the port you really connected to (since the typical scenario is
|
|
|
|
like the above example: you connect to a silly real port number and
|
|
|
|
your connection ends up forwarded to the normal port-22 SSH server
|
|
|
|
of some other machine). To override this, you can append a port
|
|
|
|
number to the logical host name, separated by a colon. E.g. entering
|
|
|
|
\cq{foovax:2200} as the logical host name will cause the host key to
|
|
|
|
be cached as if you had connected to port 2200 of \c{foovax}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you provide a host name using this option, it is also displayed
|
|
|
|
in other locations which contain the remote host name, such as the
|
|
|
|
default window title and the default SSH password prompt. This
|
|
|
|
reflects the fact that this is the host you're \e{really} connecting
|
|
|
|
to, which is more important than the mere means you happen to be
|
|
|
|
using to contact that host. (This applies even if you're using a
|
|
|
|
protocol other than SSH.)
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-data} The Data panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Data panel allows you to configure various pieces of data which
|
|
|
|
can be sent to the server to affect your connection at the far end.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-08 14:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
Each option on this panel applies to more than one protocol.
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
Options which apply to only one protocol appear on that protocol's
|
|
|
|
configuration panels.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-username} \q{\ii{Auto-login username}}
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-21 16:01:05 +00:00
|
|
|
All three of the SSH, Telnet, and Rlogin protocols allow you to
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
specify what user name you want to log in as, without having to type
|
|
|
|
it explicitly every time. (Some Telnet servers don't support this.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In this box you can type that user name.
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-25 16:18:02 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-username-from-env} Use of system username
|
2008-11-24 17:51:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When the previous box (\k{config-username}) is left blank, by default,
|
|
|
|
PuTTY will prompt for a username at the time you make a connection.
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-25 16:18:02 +00:00
|
|
|
In some environments, such as the networks of large organisations
|
|
|
|
implementing \i{single sign-on}, a more sensible default may be to use
|
|
|
|
the name of the user logged in to the local operating system (if any);
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
this is particularly likely to be useful with \i{GSSAPI} key exchange
|
|
|
|
and user authentication (see \k{config-ssh-auth-gssapi} and
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-gssapi-kex}). This control allows you to change the default
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
behaviour.
|
2008-11-24 17:51:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The current system username is displayed in the dialog as a
|
|
|
|
convenience. It is not saved in the configuration; if a saved session
|
|
|
|
is later used by a different user, that user's name will be used.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-termtype} \q{\ii{Terminal-type} string}
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Most servers you might connect to with PuTTY are designed to be
|
|
|
|
connected to from lots of different types of terminal. In order to
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
send the right \i{control sequence}s to each one, the server will need
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
to know what type of terminal it is dealing with. Therefore, each of
|
2021-02-21 16:01:05 +00:00
|
|
|
the SSH, Telnet, and Rlogin protocols allow a text string to be sent
|
2005-09-10 17:36:52 +00:00
|
|
|
down the connection describing the terminal. On a \i{Unix} server,
|
|
|
|
this selects an entry from the \i\c{termcap} or \i\c{terminfo} database
|
|
|
|
that tells applications what \i{control sequences} to send to the
|
|
|
|
terminal, and what character sequences to expect the \i{keyboard}
|
|
|
|
to generate.
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY attempts to emulate the Unix \i\c{xterm} program, and by default
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
it reflects this by sending \c{xterm} as a terminal-type string. If
|
|
|
|
you find this is not doing what you want - perhaps the remote
|
|
|
|
system reports \q{Unknown terminal type} - you could try setting
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
this to something different, such as \i\c{vt220}.
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you're not sure whether a problem is due to the terminal type
|
|
|
|
setting or not, you probably need to consult the manual for your
|
|
|
|
application or your server.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-termspeed} \q{\ii{Terminal speed}s}
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Telnet, Rlogin, and SSH protocols allow the client to specify
|
|
|
|
terminal speeds to the server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This parameter does \e{not} affect the actual speed of the connection,
|
|
|
|
which is always \q{as fast as possible}; it is just a hint that is
|
|
|
|
sometimes used by server software to modify its behaviour. For
|
|
|
|
instance, if a slow speed is indicated, the server may switch to a
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
less \i{bandwidth}-hungry display mode.
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The value is usually meaningless in a network environment, but
|
|
|
|
PuTTY lets you configure it, in case you find the server is reacting
|
|
|
|
badly to the default value.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The format is a pair of numbers separated by a comma, for instance,
|
|
|
|
\c{38400,38400}. The first number represents the output speed
|
|
|
|
(\e{from} the server) in bits per second, and the second is the input
|
|
|
|
speed (\e{to} the server). (Only the first is used in the Rlogin
|
|
|
|
protocol.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option has no effect on Raw connections.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-environ} Setting \i{environment variables} on the server
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Telnet protocol provides a means for the client to pass
|
|
|
|
environment variables to the server. Many Telnet servers have
|
|
|
|
stopped supporting this feature due to security flaws, but PuTTY
|
|
|
|
still supports it for the benefit of any servers which have found
|
|
|
|
other ways around the security problems than just disabling the
|
|
|
|
whole mechanism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Version 2 of the SSH protocol also provides a similar mechanism,
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
which is easier to implement without security flaws. Newer \i{SSH-2}
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
servers are more likely to support it than older ones.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
This configuration data is not used in the SSH-1, rlogin or raw
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
protocols.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To add an environment variable to the list transmitted down the
|
|
|
|
connection, you enter the variable name in the \q{Variable} box,
|
|
|
|
enter its value in the \q{Value} box, and press the \q{Add} button.
|
|
|
|
To remove one from the list, select it in the list box and press
|
|
|
|
\q{Remove}.
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-proxy} The Proxy panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The \ii{Proxy} panel allows you to configure PuTTY to use various types
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
of proxy in order to make its network connections. The settings in
|
|
|
|
this panel affect the primary network connection forming your PuTTY
|
2006-08-27 11:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
session, and also any extra connections made as a result of SSH \i{port
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
forwarding} (see \k{using-port-forwarding}).
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-07-22 14:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that unlike some software (such as web browsers), PuTTY does not
|
|
|
|
attempt to automatically determine whether to use a proxy and (if so)
|
|
|
|
which one to use for a given destination. If you need to use a proxy,
|
|
|
|
it must always be explicitly configured.
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-proxy-type} Setting the proxy type
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
The \q{Proxy type} drop-down allows you to configure what type of
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proxy you want PuTTY to use for its network connections. The default
|
|
|
|
setting is \q{None}; in this mode no proxy is used for any
|
|
|
|
connection.
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Selecting \I{HTTP proxy}\q{HTTP CONNECT} allows you to proxy your
|
|
|
|
connections through a web server supporting the HTTP \cw{CONNECT} command,
|
2022-09-11 22:59:12 +00:00
|
|
|
as documented in \W{https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2817}{RFC 2817}.
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-05-07 12:07:23 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Selecting \q{SOCKS 4} or \q{SOCKS 5} allows you to proxy your
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
connections through a \i{SOCKS server}.
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b Many firewalls implement a less formal type of proxy in which a
|
2022-04-29 17:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
user can make a Telnet or TCP connection directly to the firewall machine
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
and enter a command such as \c{connect myhost.com 22} to connect
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
through to an external host. Selecting \I{Telnet proxy}\q{Telnet}
|
2022-04-29 17:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
allows you to tell PuTTY to use this type of proxy, with the precise
|
|
|
|
command specified as described in \k{config-proxy-command}.
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
\b There are several ways to use a SSH server as a proxy. All of
|
|
|
|
these cause PuTTY to make a secondary SSH connection to the proxy host
|
|
|
|
(sometimes called a \q{\i{jump host}} in this context).
|
2022-01-12 01:16:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
The \q{Proxy hostname} field will be interpreted as the name of a
|
|
|
|
PuTTY saved session if one exists, or a hostname if not. This
|
|
|
|
allows multi-hop jump paths, if the referenced saved session is
|
|
|
|
itself configured to use an SSH proxy; and it allows combining SSH
|
|
|
|
and non-SSH proxying.
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{SSH to proxy and use port forwarding} causes PuTTY to use the
|
|
|
|
secondary SSH connection to open a port-forwarding channel to the
|
|
|
|
final destination host (similar to OpenSSH's \cw{-J} option).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{SSH to proxy and execute a command} causes PuTTY to run an
|
|
|
|
arbitrary remote command on the proxy SSH server and use that
|
|
|
|
command's standard input and output streams to run the primary
|
|
|
|
connection over. The remote command line is specified as described in
|
|
|
|
\k{config-proxy-command}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{SSH to proxy and invoke a subsystem} is similar but causes PuTTY
|
|
|
|
to start an SSH \q{\i{subsystem}} rather than an ordinary command line.
|
|
|
|
This might be useful with a specially set up SSH proxy server.
|
2022-01-12 01:16:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-12-30 11:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-27 11:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Selecting \I{Local proxy}\q{Local} allows you to specify an arbitrary
|
|
|
|
command on the local machine to act as a proxy. When the session is
|
|
|
|
started, instead of creating a TCP connection, PuTTY runs the command
|
|
|
|
(specified in \k{config-proxy-command}), and uses its standard input and
|
|
|
|
output streams.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
This could be used, for instance, to talk to some kind of network proxy
|
|
|
|
that PuTTY does not natively support; or you could tunnel a connection
|
|
|
|
over something other than TCP/IP entirely.
|
2006-08-28 15:12:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-04 12:05:14 +00:00
|
|
|
You can also enable this mode on the command line; see
|
|
|
|
\k{using-cmdline-proxycmd}.
|
2006-08-27 11:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-proxy-exclude} Excluding parts of the network from proxying
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Typically you will only need to use a proxy to connect to non-local
|
|
|
|
parts of your network; for example, your proxy might be required for
|
|
|
|
connections outside your company's internal network. In the
|
|
|
|
\q{Exclude Hosts/IPs} box you can enter ranges of IP addresses, or
|
|
|
|
ranges of DNS names, for which PuTTY will avoid using the proxy and
|
|
|
|
make a direct connection instead.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Exclude Hosts/IPs} box may contain more than one exclusion
|
|
|
|
range, separated by commas. Each range can be an IP address or a DNS
|
|
|
|
name, with a \c{*} character allowing wildcards. For example:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c *.example.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This excludes any host with a name ending in \c{.example.com} from
|
|
|
|
proxying.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c 192.168.88.*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This excludes any host with an IP address starting with 192.168.88
|
|
|
|
from proxying.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c 192.168.88.*,*.example.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This excludes both of the above ranges at once.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Connections to the local host (the host name \i\c{localhost}, and any
|
|
|
|
\i{loopback IP address}) are never proxied, even if the proxy exclude
|
2002-12-18 12:18:54 +00:00
|
|
|
list does not explicitly contain them. It is very unlikely that this
|
|
|
|
behaviour would ever cause problems, but if it does you can change
|
|
|
|
it by enabling \q{Consider proxying local host connections}.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that if you are doing \I{proxy DNS}DNS at the proxy (see
|
2002-12-18 16:23:11 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-proxy-dns}), you should make sure that your proxy
|
|
|
|
exclusion settings do not depend on knowing the IP address of a
|
|
|
|
host. If the name is passed on to the proxy without PuTTY looking it
|
|
|
|
up, it will never know the IP address and cannot check it against
|
|
|
|
your list.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-proxy-dns} \I{proxy DNS}\ii{Name resolution} when using a proxy
|
2002-12-18 16:23:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are using a proxy to access a private network, it can make a
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
difference whether \i{DNS} name resolution is performed by PuTTY itself
|
2002-12-18 16:23:11 +00:00
|
|
|
(on the client machine) or performed by the proxy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Do DNS name lookup at proxy end} configuration option allows
|
|
|
|
you to control this. If you set it to \q{No}, PuTTY will always do
|
|
|
|
its own DNS, and will always pass an IP address to the proxy. If you
|
|
|
|
set it to \q{Yes}, PuTTY will always pass host names straight to the
|
|
|
|
proxy without trying to look them up first.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you set this option to \q{Auto} (the default), PuTTY will do
|
2022-01-12 01:16:53 +00:00
|
|
|
something it considers appropriate for each type of proxy. Most
|
|
|
|
types of proxy (HTTP, SOCK5, SSH, Telnet, and local) will have host
|
|
|
|
names passed straight to them; SOCKS4 proxies will not.
|
2002-12-18 16:23:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that if you are doing DNS at the proxy, you should make sure
|
|
|
|
that your proxy exclusion settings (see \k{config-proxy-exclude}) do
|
|
|
|
not depend on knowing the IP address of a host. If the name is
|
|
|
|
passed on to the proxy without PuTTY looking it up, it will never
|
|
|
|
know the IP address and cannot check it against your list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The original SOCKS 4 protocol does not support proxy-side DNS. There
|
|
|
|
is a protocol extension (SOCKS 4A) which does support it, but not
|
|
|
|
all SOCKS 4 servers provide this extension. If you enable proxy DNS
|
|
|
|
and your SOCKS 4 server cannot deal with it, this might be why.
|
|
|
|
|
Add a docs note about DNS performed by GSSAPI.
I recently noticed a mysterious delay at connection startup while
using an SSH jump host, and investigated it in case it was a bug in
the new jump host code that ought to be fixed before 0.77 goes out.
strace showed that at the time of the delay PuTTY was doing a DNS
lookup for the destination host, which was hanging due to the
authoritative DNS server in question not being reachable. But that was
odd, because I'd configured it to leave DNS lookup to the proxy,
anticipating exactly that problem.
But on closer investigation, the _proxy_ code was doing exactly what
I'd told it. The DNS lookup was coming from somewhere else: namely, an
(unsuccessful) attempt to set up a GSSAPI context. The GSSAPI library
had called gethostbyname, completely separately from PuTTY's own use
of DNS.
Simple workaround for me: turn off GSSAPI, which doesn't work for that
particular SSH connection anyway, and there's no point spending 30
seconds faffing just to find that out.
But also, if that puzzled me, it's worth documenting!
2022-02-22 18:43:53 +00:00
|
|
|
If you want to avoid PuTTY making \e{any} DNS query related to your
|
|
|
|
destination host name (for example, because your local DNS resolver is
|
|
|
|
very slow to return a negative response in that situation), then as
|
|
|
|
well as setting this control to \q{Yes}, you may also need to turn off
|
|
|
|
GSSAPI authentication and GSSAPI key exchange in SSH (see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-auth-gssapi} and \k{config-ssh-gssapi-kex}
|
|
|
|
respectively). This is because GSSAPI setup also involves a DNS query
|
|
|
|
for the destination host name, and that query is performed by the
|
|
|
|
separate GSSAPI library, so PuTTY can't override or reconfigure it.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-proxy-auth} \I{proxy username}Username and \I{proxy password}password
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-04-29 17:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
You can enter a username and a password in the \q{Username} and
|
|
|
|
\q{Password} boxes, which will be used if your proxy requires
|
|
|
|
\I{proxy authentication}authentication.
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\I{security hazard}Note that if you save your session, the proxy
|
|
|
|
password will be saved in plain text, so anyone who can access your PuTTY
|
2004-03-01 18:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
configuration data will be able to discover it.
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-29 17:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
If PuTTY discovers that it needs a proxy username or password and you
|
|
|
|
have not specified one here, PuTTY will prompt for it interactively in
|
|
|
|
the terminal window.
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-01 02:09:02 +00:00
|
|
|
Authentication is not fully supported for all forms of proxy:
|
2002-09-21 14:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-09-21 16:07:43 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Username and password authentication is supported for HTTP
|
|
|
|
proxies and SOCKS 5 proxies.
|
2002-09-21 14:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-09-01 10:12:41 +00:00
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b With SOCKS 5, authentication is via \i{CHAP} if the proxy
|
|
|
|
supports it (this is not supported in \i{PuTTYtel}); otherwise the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
password is sent to the proxy in \I{plaintext password}plain text.
|
2004-09-01 10:12:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-12-30 11:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
\b With HTTP proxying, authentication is via \q{\i{HTTP Digest}} if
|
|
|
|
possible (again, not supported in PuTTYtel), or \q{\i{HTTP Basic}}. In
|
|
|
|
the latter case, the password is sent to the proxy in \I{plaintext
|
|
|
|
password}plain text.
|
2004-09-01 10:12:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-21 14:03:05 +00:00
|
|
|
\b SOCKS 4 can use the \q{Username} field, but does not support
|
|
|
|
passwords.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-12-30 11:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
\b SSH proxying can use all the same forms of SSH authentication
|
|
|
|
supported by PuTTY for its main connection. If the SSH server requests
|
2022-04-29 17:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
password authentication, any configured proxy password will be used,
|
|
|
|
but other authentication methods such as public keys and GSSAPI will
|
|
|
|
be tried first, just as for a primary SSH connection, and if they
|
|
|
|
require credentials such as a key passphrase, PuTTY will interactively
|
|
|
|
prompt for these.
|
2021-12-30 11:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-10-22 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
\b You can specify a way to include a username and password in the
|
2022-04-29 17:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
Telnet/Local proxy command (see \k{config-proxy-command}). If you do
|
|
|
|
so, and don't also specify the actual username and/or password in the
|
|
|
|
configuration, PuTTY will interactively prompt for them.
|
2021-12-30 11:49:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-proxy-command} Specifying the Telnet, SSH, or Local proxy command
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If you are using the \i{Telnet proxy} type, the usual command required
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
by the firewall's Telnet server is \c{connect}, followed by a host
|
|
|
|
name and a port number. If your proxy needs a different command,
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
you can enter an alternative in the \q{Command to send to proxy} box.
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-27 11:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
If you are using the \i{Local proxy} type, the local command to run
|
|
|
|
is specified here.
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
If you are using the \q{SSH to proxy and execute a command} type, the
|
|
|
|
command to run on the SSH proxy server is specified here. Similarly, if
|
|
|
|
you are using \q{SSH to proxy and invoke a subsystem}, the subsystem
|
|
|
|
name is constructed as specified here.
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
In this string, you can use \c{\\n} to represent a new-line, \c{\\r}
|
|
|
|
to represent a carriage return, \c{\\t} to represent a tab
|
|
|
|
character, and \c{\\x} followed by two hex digits to represent any
|
|
|
|
other character. \c{\\\\} is used to encode the \c{\\} character
|
|
|
|
itself.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Also, the special strings \c{%host} and \c{%port} will be replaced
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
by the host name and port number you want to connect to. For Telnet
|
|
|
|
and Local proxy types, the strings \c{%user} and \c{%pass} will be
|
|
|
|
replaced by the proxy username and password (which, if not specified
|
|
|
|
in the configuration, will be prompted for) \dash this does not happen
|
|
|
|
with SSH proxy types (because the proxy username/password are used
|
|
|
|
for SSH authentication). The strings \c{%proxyhost} and \c{%proxyport}
|
2006-08-27 11:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
will be replaced by the host details specified on the \e{Proxy} panel,
|
2022-04-29 18:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if any (this is most likely to be useful for proxy types using a
|
|
|
|
local or remote command). To get a literal \c{%} sign, enter \c{%%}.
|
2002-10-22 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-27 11:55:30 +00:00
|
|
|
If a Telnet proxy server prompts for a username and password
|
2002-10-22 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
before commands can be sent, you can use a command such as:
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-01 02:09:02 +00:00
|
|
|
\c %user\n%pass\nconnect %host %port\n
|
2002-10-22 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
This will send your username and password as the first two lines to
|
|
|
|
the proxy, followed by a command to connect to the desired host and
|
2002-10-22 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
port. Note that if you do not include the \c{%user} or \c{%pass}
|
2022-04-29 17:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
tokens in the Telnet command, then anything specified in \q{Username}
|
|
|
|
and \q{Password} configuration fields will be ignored.
|
2002-03-27 21:09:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-11 23:30:52 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-proxy-logging} Controlling \i{proxy logging}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Often the proxy interaction has its own diagnostic output; this is
|
|
|
|
particularly the case for local proxy commands.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The setting \q{Print proxy diagnostics in the terminal window} lets
|
|
|
|
you control how much of the proxy's diagnostics are printed to the main
|
|
|
|
terminal window, along with output from your main session.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default (\q{No}), proxy diagnostics are only sent to the Event Log;
|
|
|
|
with \q{Yes} they are also printed to the terminal, where they may get
|
|
|
|
mixed up with your main session. \q{Only until session starts} is a
|
|
|
|
compromise; proxy messages will go to the terminal window until the main
|
|
|
|
session is deemed to have started (in a protocol-dependent way), which
|
|
|
|
is when they're most likely to be interesting; any further proxy-related
|
|
|
|
messages during the session will only go to the Event Log.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh} The SSH panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The \i{SSH} panel allows you to configure options that only apply to
|
2001-01-17 16:33:26 +00:00
|
|
|
SSH sessions.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-17 12:46:50 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-command} Executing a specific command on the server
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
In SSH, you don't have to run a general shell session on the server.
|
|
|
|
Instead, you can choose to run a single specific command (such as a
|
|
|
|
mail user agent, for example). If you want to do this, enter the
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
command in the \q{\ii{Remote command}} box.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-08-31 16:14:21 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that most servers will close the session after executing the
|
|
|
|
command.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-noshell} \q{Don't start a \I{remote shell}shell or
|
|
|
|
\I{remote command}command at all}
|
2004-10-13 13:43:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you tick this box, PuTTY will not attempt to run a shell or
|
|
|
|
command after connecting to the remote server. You might want to use
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
this option if you are only using the SSH connection for \i{port
|
|
|
|
forwarding}, and your user account on the server does not have the
|
2004-10-13 13:43:11 +00:00
|
|
|
ability to run a shell.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
This feature is only available in \i{SSH protocol version 2} (since the
|
2004-10-13 13:43:11 +00:00
|
|
|
version 1 protocol assumes you will always want to run a shell).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This feature can also be enabled using the \c{-N} command-line
|
|
|
|
option; see \k{using-cmdline-noshell}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you use this feature in Plink, you will not be able to terminate
|
|
|
|
the Plink process by any graceful means; the only way to kill it
|
|
|
|
will be by pressing Control-C or sending a kill signal from another
|
|
|
|
program.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-comp} \q{Enable \i{compression}}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This enables data compression in the SSH connection: data sent by
|
|
|
|
the server is compressed before sending, and decompressed at the
|
|
|
|
client end. Likewise, data sent by PuTTY to the server is compressed
|
|
|
|
first and the server decompresses it at the other end. This can help
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
make the most of a low-\i{bandwidth} connection.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-28 19:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-prot} \q{\i{SSH protocol version}}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-28 19:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
This allows you to select whether to use \i{SSH protocol version 2}
|
|
|
|
or the older \I{SSH-1}version 1.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-28 19:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
You should normally leave this at the default of \q{2}. As well as
|
|
|
|
having fewer features, the older SSH-1 protocol is no longer
|
|
|
|
developed, has many known cryptographic weaknesses, and is generally
|
|
|
|
not considered to be secure. PuTTY's protocol 1 implementation is
|
|
|
|
provided mainly for compatibility, and is no longer being enhanced.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-28 19:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
If a server offers both versions, prefer \q{2}. If you have some
|
|
|
|
server or piece of equipment that only talks SSH-1, select \q{1}
|
|
|
|
here, and do not treat the resulting connection as secure.
|
2002-05-11 13:03:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-28 19:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY will not automatically fall back to the other version of the
|
|
|
|
protocol if the server turns out not to match your selection here;
|
|
|
|
instead, it will put up an error message and abort the connection.
|
|
|
|
This prevents an active attacker downgrading an intended SSH-2
|
|
|
|
connection to SSH-1.
|
2014-11-08 18:37:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-11-17 14:05:41 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-sharing} Sharing an SSH connection between PuTTY tools
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The controls in this box allow you to configure PuTTY to reuse an
|
|
|
|
existing SSH connection, where possible.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The SSH-2 protocol permits you to run multiple data channels over the
|
|
|
|
same SSH connection, so that you can log in just once (and do the
|
|
|
|
expensive encryption setup just once) and then have more than one
|
|
|
|
terminal window open.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Each instance of PuTTY can still run at most one terminal session, but
|
|
|
|
using the controls in this box, you can configure PuTTY to check if
|
|
|
|
another instance of itself has already connected to the target host,
|
|
|
|
and if so, share that instance's SSH connection instead of starting a
|
|
|
|
separate new one.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To enable this feature, just tick the box \q{Share SSH connections if
|
|
|
|
possible}. Then, whenever you start up a PuTTY session connecting to a
|
|
|
|
particular host, it will try to reuse an existing SSH connection if
|
|
|
|
one is available. For example, selecting \q{Duplicate Session} from
|
|
|
|
the system menu will launch another session on the same host, and if
|
|
|
|
sharing is enabled then it will reuse the existing SSH connection.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When this mode is in use, the first PuTTY that connected to a given
|
|
|
|
server becomes the \q{upstream}, which means that it is the one
|
|
|
|
managing the real SSH connection. All subsequent PuTTYs which reuse
|
|
|
|
the connection are referred to as \q{downstreams}: they do not connect
|
|
|
|
to the real server at all, but instead connect to the upstream PuTTY
|
|
|
|
via local inter-process communication methods.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For this system to be activated, \e{both} the upstream and downstream
|
|
|
|
instances of PuTTY must have the sharing option enabled.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The upstream PuTTY can therefore not terminate until all its
|
|
|
|
downstreams have closed. This is similar to the effect you get with
|
|
|
|
port forwarding or X11 forwarding, in which a PuTTY whose terminal
|
|
|
|
session has already finished will still remain open so as to keep
|
|
|
|
serving forwarded connections.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In case you need to configure this system in more detail, there are
|
|
|
|
two additional checkboxes which allow you to specify whether a
|
|
|
|
particular PuTTY can act as an upstream or a downstream or both.
|
|
|
|
(These boxes only take effect if the main \q{Share SSH connections if
|
|
|
|
possible} box is also ticked.) By default both of these boxes are
|
|
|
|
ticked, so that multiple PuTTYs started from the same configuration
|
|
|
|
will designate one of themselves as the upstream and share a single
|
|
|
|
connection; but if for some reason you need a particular PuTTY
|
|
|
|
configuration \e{not} to be an upstream (e.g. because you definitely
|
|
|
|
need it to close promptly) or not to be a downstream (e.g. because it
|
|
|
|
needs to do its own authentication using a special private key) then
|
|
|
|
you can untick one or the other of these boxes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I have referred to \q{PuTTY} throughout the above discussion, but all
|
|
|
|
the other PuTTY tools which make SSH connections can use this
|
|
|
|
mechanism too. For example, if PSCP or PSFTP loads a configuration
|
|
|
|
with sharing enabled, then it can act as a downstream and use an
|
|
|
|
existing SSH connection set up by an instance of GUI PuTTY. The one
|
|
|
|
special case is that PSCP and PSFTP will \e{never} act as upstreams.
|
2001-11-29 22:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-22 00:48:35 +00:00
|
|
|
It is possible to test programmatically for the existence of a live
|
|
|
|
upstream using Plink. See \k{plink-option-shareexists}.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-kex} The Kex panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Kex panel (short for \q{\i{key exchange}}) allows you to configure
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
options related to SSH-2 key exchange.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Key exchange occurs at the start of an SSH connection (and
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
occasionally thereafter); it establishes a \i{shared secret} that is used
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
as the basis for all of SSH's security features. It is therefore very
|
|
|
|
important for the security of the connection that the key exchange is
|
|
|
|
secure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Key exchange is a cryptographically intensive process; if either the
|
|
|
|
client or the server is a relatively slow machine, the slower methods
|
|
|
|
may take several tens of seconds to complete.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If connection startup is too slow, or the connection hangs
|
|
|
|
periodically, you may want to try changing these settings.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you don't understand what any of this means, it's safe to leave
|
|
|
|
these settings alone.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This entire panel is only relevant to SSH protocol version 2; none of
|
|
|
|
these settings affect SSH-1 at all.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-kex-order} \ii{Key exchange algorithm} selection
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY supports a variety of SSH-2 key exchange methods, and allows you
|
|
|
|
to choose which one you prefer to use; configuration is similar to
|
|
|
|
cipher selection (see \k{config-ssh-encryption}).
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-28 19:08:15 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY currently supports the following key exchange methods:
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 16:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{NTRU Prime / Curve25519 hybrid}: \q{\i{Streamlined NTRU Prime}}
|
|
|
|
is a lattice-based algorithm intended to resist \i{quantum attacks}.
|
|
|
|
In this key exchange method, it is run in parallel with a conventional
|
|
|
|
Curve25519-based method (one of those included in \q{ECDH}), in such
|
|
|
|
a way that it should be no \e{less} secure than that commonly-used
|
|
|
|
method, and hopefully also resistant to a new class of attacks.
|
|
|
|
|
2024-12-08 11:41:02 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{ML-KEM / Curve25519 hybrid} and \q{ML-KEM NIST ECDH hybrid}:
|
|
|
|
similar hybrid constructs of \i{ML-KEM}, another lattice-based key
|
|
|
|
exchange method intended to be \i{quantum-resistant}. In the former,
|
|
|
|
ML-KEM is hybridised with Curve25519; in the latter, with NIST P384
|
|
|
|
or P256.
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 16:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{\i{ECDH}}: elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
|
2022-09-10 19:47:16 +00:00
|
|
|
with a variety of standard curves and hash algorithms.
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-21 16:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
\b The original form of \i{Diffie-Hellman key exchange}, with a
|
2022-09-11 21:37:47 +00:00
|
|
|
variety of well-known groups and hashes:
|
2015-02-28 19:08:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-10 19:47:16 +00:00
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Group 18}, a well-known 8192-bit group, used with the SHA-512
|
|
|
|
hash function.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Group 17}, a well-known 6144-bit group, used with the SHA-512
|
|
|
|
hash function.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Group 16}, a well-known 4096-bit group, used with the SHA-512
|
|
|
|
hash function.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Group 15}, a well-known 3072-bit group, used with the SHA-512
|
|
|
|
hash function.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Group 14}: a well-known 2048-bit group, used with the SHA-256
|
|
|
|
hash function or, if the server doesn't support that, SHA-1.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Group 1}: a well-known 1024-bit group, used with the SHA-1
|
|
|
|
hash function. Neither we nor current SSH standards recommend using
|
|
|
|
this method any longer, and it's not used by default in new
|
|
|
|
installations; however, it may be the only method supported by very
|
|
|
|
old server software.
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-11 21:37:47 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Diffie-Hellman \i{group exchange}}: with this method, instead
|
|
|
|
of using a fixed group, PuTTY requests that the server suggest a group
|
|
|
|
to use for a subsequent Diffie-Hellman key exchange; the server can
|
|
|
|
avoid groups known to be weak, and possibly invent new ones over time,
|
|
|
|
without any changes required to PuTTY's configuration. This key
|
|
|
|
exchange method uses the SHA-256 hash or, if the server doesn't
|
|
|
|
support that, SHA-1.
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-10 19:47:16 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{\i{RSA-based key exchange}}: this requires much less computational
|
2015-02-28 19:08:15 +00:00
|
|
|
effort on the part of the client, and somewhat less on the part of
|
|
|
|
the server, than Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
|
2007-04-30 22:09:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{GSSAPI key exchange}: see \k{config-ssh-gssapi-kex}.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
If the first algorithm PuTTY finds is below the \q{warn below here}
|
|
|
|
line, you will see a warning box when you make the connection, similar
|
|
|
|
to that for cipher selection (see \k{config-ssh-encryption}).
|
|
|
|
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
\S2{config-ssh-gssapi-kex} GSSAPI-based key exchange
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY supports a set of key exchange methods that also incorporates
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
GSSAPI-based authentication. They are enabled with the
|
|
|
|
\q{Attempt GSSAPI key exchange} checkbox (which also appears on the
|
|
|
|
\q{GSSAPI} panel).
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY can only perform the GSSAPI-authenticated key exchange methods
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
when using Kerberos V5, and not other GSSAPI mechanisms. If the user
|
|
|
|
running PuTTY has current Kerberos V5 credentials, then PuTTY will
|
|
|
|
select the GSSAPI key exchange methods in preference to any of the
|
|
|
|
ordinary SSH key exchange methods configured in the preference list.
|
2022-09-10 19:47:16 +00:00
|
|
|
There's a GSSAPI-based equivalent to most of the ordinary methods
|
|
|
|
listed in \k{config-ssh-kex-order}; server support determines which
|
|
|
|
one will be used. (PuTTY's preference order for GSSAPI-authenticated
|
|
|
|
key exchange methods is fixed, not controlled by the preference list.)
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The advantage of doing GSSAPI authentication as part of the SSH key
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
exchange is apparent when you are using credential delegation (see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-auth-gssapi-delegation}). The SSH key exchange can be
|
|
|
|
repeated later in the session, and this allows your Kerberos V5
|
|
|
|
credentials (which are typically short-lived) to be automatically
|
|
|
|
re-delegated to the server when they are refreshed on the client.
|
|
|
|
(This feature is commonly referred to as \q{\i{cascading credentials}}.)
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If your server doesn't support GSSAPI key exchange, it may still
|
|
|
|
support GSSAPI in the SSH user authentication phase. This will still
|
|
|
|
let you log in using your Kerberos credentials, but will only allow
|
|
|
|
you to delegate the credentials that are active at the beginning of
|
|
|
|
the session; they can't be refreshed automatically later, in a
|
2022-09-10 19:46:14 +00:00
|
|
|
long-running session. See \k{config-ssh-auth-gssapi} for how to
|
|
|
|
control GSSAPI user authentication in PuTTY.
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-04-26 18:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
Another effect of GSSAPI key exchange is that it replaces the usual
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
SSH mechanism of permanent host keys described in \k{gs-hostkey}.
|
|
|
|
So if you use this method, then you won't be asked any interactive
|
|
|
|
questions about whether to accept the server's host key. Instead, the
|
|
|
|
Kerberos exchange will verify the identity of the host you connect to,
|
|
|
|
at the same time as verifying your identity to it.
|
2018-04-26 18:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-kex-rekey} \ii{Repeat key exchange}
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-12-24 13:39:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If the session key negotiated at connection startup is used too much
|
|
|
|
or for too long, it may become feasible to mount attacks against the
|
|
|
|
SSH connection. Therefore, the SSH-2 protocol specifies that a new key
|
|
|
|
exchange should take place every so often; this can be initiated by
|
|
|
|
either the client or the server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
While this renegotiation is taking place, no data can pass through
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
the SSH connection, so it may appear to \q{freeze}. (The occurrence of
|
|
|
|
repeat key exchange is noted in the Event Log; see
|
|
|
|
\k{using-eventlog}.) Usually the same algorithm is used as at the
|
|
|
|
start of the connection, with a similar overhead.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-24 13:39:32 +00:00
|
|
|
These options control how often PuTTY will initiate a repeat key
|
|
|
|
exchange (\q{rekey}). You can also force a key exchange at any time
|
|
|
|
from the Special Commands menu (see \k{using-specials}).
|
|
|
|
|
2006-11-08 00:55:13 +00:00
|
|
|
\# FIXME: do we have any additions to the SSH-2 specs' advice on
|
2004-12-24 13:39:32 +00:00
|
|
|
these values? Do we want to enforce any limits?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Max minutes before rekey} specifies the amount of time that is
|
|
|
|
allowed to elapse before a rekey is initiated. If this is set to zero,
|
|
|
|
PuTTY will not rekey due to elapsed time. The SSH-2 protocol
|
|
|
|
specification recommends a timeout of at most 60 minutes.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-28 13:47:37 +00:00
|
|
|
You might have a need to disable time-based rekeys completely for the same
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
reasons that \i{keepalives} aren't always helpful. If you anticipate
|
2005-01-28 13:47:37 +00:00
|
|
|
suffering a network dropout of several hours in the middle of an SSH
|
|
|
|
connection, but were not actually planning to send \e{data} down
|
|
|
|
that connection during those hours, then an attempted rekey in the
|
|
|
|
middle of the dropout will probably cause the connection to be
|
|
|
|
abandoned, whereas if rekeys are disabled then the connection should
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
in principle survive (in the absence of interfering \i{firewalls}). See
|
2005-01-28 13:47:37 +00:00
|
|
|
\k{config-keepalive} for more discussion of these issues; for these
|
|
|
|
purposes, rekeys have much the same properties as keepalives.
|
|
|
|
(Except that rekeys have cryptographic value in themselves, so you
|
|
|
|
should bear that in mind when deciding whether to turn them off.)
|
|
|
|
Note, however, the the SSH \e{server} can still initiate rekeys.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Minutes between GSSAPI checks}, if you're using GSSAPI key
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
exchange, specifies how often the GSSAPI credential cache is checked
|
|
|
|
to see whether new tickets are available for delegation, or current
|
|
|
|
ones are near expiration. If forwarding of GSSAPI credentials is
|
|
|
|
enabled, PuTTY will try to rekey as necessary to keep the delegated
|
|
|
|
credentials from expiring. Frequent checks are recommended; rekeying
|
|
|
|
only happens when needed.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-24 13:39:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{Max data before rekey} specifies the amount of data (in bytes)
|
|
|
|
that is permitted to flow in either direction before a rekey is
|
|
|
|
initiated. If this is set to zero, PuTTY will not rekey due to
|
|
|
|
transferred data. The SSH-2 protocol specification recommends a limit
|
|
|
|
of at most 1 gigabyte.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As well as specifying a value in bytes, the following shorthand can be
|
|
|
|
used:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \cq{1k} specifies 1 kilobyte (1024 bytes).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \cq{1M} specifies 1 megabyte (1024 kilobytes).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \cq{1G} specifies 1 gigabyte (1024 megabytes).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Disabling data-based rekeys entirely is a bad idea. The \i{integrity},
|
|
|
|
and to a lesser extent, \i{confidentiality} of the SSH-2 protocol depend
|
2017-04-15 08:06:22 +00:00
|
|
|
in part on rekeys occurring before a 32-bit packet sequence number
|
2005-01-28 13:47:37 +00:00
|
|
|
wraps around. Unlike time-based rekeys, data-based rekeys won't occur
|
|
|
|
when the SSH connection is idle, so they shouldn't cause the same
|
|
|
|
problems. The SSH-1 protocol, incidentally, has even weaker integrity
|
|
|
|
protection than SSH-2 without rekeys.
|
2004-12-23 02:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-hostkey} The Host Keys panel
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-16 12:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
The Host Keys panel allows you to configure options related to
|
2016-03-26 17:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{host key management}.
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Host keys are used to prove the server's identity, and assure you that
|
|
|
|
the server is not being spoofed (either by a man-in-the-middle attack
|
2016-03-26 17:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
or by completely replacing it on the network). See \k{gs-hostkey} for
|
|
|
|
a basic introduction to host keys.
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-01-16 12:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
Much of this panel is only relevant to SSH protocol version 2; SSH-1
|
|
|
|
only supports one type of host key.
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-hostkey-order} \ii{Host key type} selection
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY supports a variety of SSH-2 host key types, and allows you to
|
|
|
|
choose which one you prefer to use to identify the server.
|
|
|
|
Configuration is similar to cipher selection (see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-encryption}).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY currently supports the following host key types:
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-02 23:36:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{\i{Ed25519}}: \I{EdDSA}Edwards-curve DSA using a twisted Edwards
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
curve with modulus \cw{2^255-19}.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-11 14:06:44 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{\i{Ed448}}: another \I{EdDSA}Edwards-curve DSA type, using a
|
|
|
|
larger elliptic curve with a 448-bit instead of 255-bit modulus (so it
|
|
|
|
has a higher security level than Ed25519).
|
2020-03-02 23:36:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \q{ECDSA}: \i{elliptic curve} \i{DSA} using one of the
|
2022-10-21 10:55:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{NIST}-standardised elliptic curves.
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{DSA}: straightforward \i{DSA} using modular exponentiation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{RSA}: the ordinary \i{RSA} algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-26 17:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
If PuTTY already has one or more host keys stored for the server,
|
2021-03-27 18:35:43 +00:00
|
|
|
it will by default prefer to use one of those, even if the server has
|
|
|
|
a key type that is higher in the preference order. You can add such a
|
2016-03-26 17:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
key to PuTTY's cache from within an existing session using the
|
|
|
|
\q{Special Commands} menu; see \k{using-specials}.
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-26 17:38:49 +00:00
|
|
|
Otherwise, PuTTY will choose a key type based purely on the
|
|
|
|
preference order you specify in the configuration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the first key type PuTTY finds is below the \q{warn below here}
|
2016-03-25 15:56:31 +00:00
|
|
|
line, you will see a warning box when you make the connection, similar
|
|
|
|
to that for cipher selection (see \k{config-ssh-encryption}).
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-11 14:57:18 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-prefer-known-hostkeys} Preferring known host keys
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-16 12:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
By default, PuTTY will adjust the preference order for SSH-2 host key
|
2020-06-11 14:57:18 +00:00
|
|
|
algorithms so that any host keys it already knows are moved to the top
|
|
|
|
of the list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This prevents you from having to check and confirm a new host key for
|
|
|
|
a server you already had one for (e.g. because the server has
|
|
|
|
generated an alternative key of a type higher in PuTTY's preference
|
|
|
|
order, or because you changed the preference order itself).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
However, on the other hand, it can leak information to a listener in
|
|
|
|
the network about \e{whether} you already know a host key for this
|
|
|
|
server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For this reason, this policy is configurable. By turning this checkbox
|
|
|
|
off, you can reset PuTTY to always use the exact order of host key
|
|
|
|
algorithms configured in the preference list described in
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-hostkey-order}, so that a listener will find out nothing
|
|
|
|
about what keys you had stored.
|
|
|
|
|
New option to manually configure the expected host key(s).
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
2014-09-09 11:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-kex-manual-hostkeys} \ii{Manually configuring host keys}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In some situations, if PuTTY's automated host key management is not
|
|
|
|
doing what you need, you might need to manually configure PuTTY to
|
|
|
|
accept a specific host key, or one of a specific set of host keys.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
One reason why you might want to do this is because the host name
|
|
|
|
PuTTY is connecting to is using round-robin DNS to return one of
|
|
|
|
multiple actual servers, and they all have different host keys. In
|
|
|
|
that situation, you might need to configure PuTTY to accept any of a
|
|
|
|
list of host keys for the possible servers, while still rejecting any
|
|
|
|
key not in that list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Another reason is if PuTTY's automated host key management is
|
|
|
|
completely unavailable, e.g. because PuTTY (or Plink or PSFTP, etc) is
|
|
|
|
running in a Windows environment without access to the Registry. In
|
|
|
|
that situation, you will probably want to use the \cw{-hostkey}
|
2014-09-09 15:08:33 +00:00
|
|
|
command-line option to configure the expected host key(s); see
|
|
|
|
\k{using-cmdline-hostkey}.
|
New option to manually configure the expected host key(s).
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
2014-09-09 11:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-08 18:34:24 +00:00
|
|
|
For situations where PuTTY's automated host key management simply
|
|
|
|
picks the wrong host name to store a key under, you may want to
|
|
|
|
consider setting a \q{logical host name} instead; see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-loghost}.
|
|
|
|
|
New option to manually configure the expected host key(s).
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
2014-09-09 11:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
To configure manual host keys via the GUI, enter some text describing
|
|
|
|
the host key into the edit box in the \q{Manually configure host keys
|
|
|
|
for this connection} container, and press the \q{Add} button. The text
|
2014-09-09 15:08:33 +00:00
|
|
|
will appear in the \q{Host keys or fingerprints to accept} list box.
|
New option to manually configure the expected host key(s).
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
2014-09-09 11:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
You can remove keys again with the \q{Remove} button.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The text describing a host key can be in one of the following formats:
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-27 18:35:43 +00:00
|
|
|
\b An \I{SHA256 fingerprint}SHA-256-based host key fingerprint of the
|
|
|
|
form displayed in PuTTY's Event Log and host key dialog boxes,
|
|
|
|
i.e. \cq{SHA256:} followed by 43 case-sensitive characters.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b An \I{MD5 fingerprint}MD5-based host key fingerprint, i.e. sixteen
|
|
|
|
2-digit hex numbers separated by colons, optionally preceded by the
|
|
|
|
prefix \cq{MD5:}. (The case of the characters does not matter.)
|
New option to manually configure the expected host key(s).
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
2014-09-09 11:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-18 14:44:45 +00:00
|
|
|
\b A base64-encoded blob describing an SSH-2 public key in
|
|
|
|
OpenSSH's one-line public key format. How you acquire a public key in
|
|
|
|
this format is server-dependent; on an OpenSSH server it can typically
|
|
|
|
be found in a location like \c{/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub}.
|
New option to manually configure the expected host key(s).
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
2014-09-09 11:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this box contains at least one host key or fingerprint when PuTTY
|
|
|
|
makes an SSH connection, then PuTTY's automated host key management is
|
|
|
|
completely bypassed: the connection will be permitted if and only if
|
|
|
|
the host key presented by the server is one of the keys listed in this
|
2016-03-25 15:42:42 +00:00
|
|
|
box, and the \I{host key cache}host key store in the Registry will be
|
|
|
|
neither read \e{nor written}, unless you explicitly do so.
|
New option to manually configure the expected host key(s).
This option is available from the command line as '-hostkey', and is
also configurable through the GUI. When enabled, it completely
replaces all of the automated host key management: the server's host
key will be checked against the manually configured list, and the
connection will be allowed or disconnected on that basis, and the host
key store in the registry will not be either consulted or updated.
The main aim is to provide a means of automatically running Plink,
PSCP or PSFTP deep inside Windows services where HKEY_CURRENT_USER
isn't available to have stored the right host key in. But it also
permits you to specify a list of multiple host keys, which means a
second use case for the same mechanism will probably be round-robin
DNS names that select one of several servers with different host keys.
Host keys can be specified as the standard MD5 fingerprint or as an
SSH-2 base64 blob, and are canonicalised on input. (The base64 blob is
more unwieldy, especially with Windows command-line length limits, but
provides a means of specifying the _whole_ public key in case you
don't trust MD5. I haven't bothered to provide an analogous mechanism
for SSH-1, on the basis that anyone worrying about MD5 should have
stopped using SSH-1 already!)
[originally from svn r10220]
2014-09-09 11:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the box is empty (as it usually is), then PuTTY's automated host
|
|
|
|
key management will work as normal.
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-07 11:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-kex-cert} Configuring PuTTY to accept host \i{certificates}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In some environments, the SSH host keys for a lot of servers will all
|
|
|
|
be signed in turn by a central \q{certification authority} (\q{CA} for
|
|
|
|
short). This simplifies host key configuration for users, because if
|
|
|
|
they configure their SSH client to accept host keys certified by that
|
|
|
|
CA, then they don't need to individually confirm each host key the
|
|
|
|
first time they connect to that server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In order to do this, press the \q{Configure host CAs} button in the
|
|
|
|
\q{Host keys} configuration panel. This will launch a secondary
|
|
|
|
configuration dialog box where you can configure what CAs PuTTY will
|
|
|
|
accept signatures from.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\s{Note that this configuration is common to all saved sessions}.
|
|
|
|
Everything in the main PuTTY configuration is specific to one saved
|
|
|
|
session, and you can prepare a separate session with all the
|
|
|
|
configuration different. But there's only one copy of the host CA
|
|
|
|
configuration, and it applies to all sessions PuTTY runs, whether
|
|
|
|
saved or not.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(Otherwise, it would be useless \dash configuring a CA by hand for
|
|
|
|
each new host wouldn't be any more convenient than pressing the
|
|
|
|
\q{confirm} button for each new host's host key.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To set up a new CA using this config box:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
First, load the CA's public key from a file, or paste it directly into
|
|
|
|
the \q{Public key of certification authority} edit box. If your
|
|
|
|
organisation signs its host keys in this way, they will publish the
|
|
|
|
public key of their CA so that SSH users can include it in their
|
|
|
|
configuration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Next, in the \q{Valid hosts this key is trusted to certify} box,
|
|
|
|
configure at least one hostname wildcard to say what servers PuTTY
|
|
|
|
should trust this CA to speak for. For example, suppose you work for
|
|
|
|
Example Corporation (\cw{example.com}), and the Example Corporation IT
|
|
|
|
department has advertised a CA that signs all the Example internal
|
|
|
|
machines' host keys. Then probably you want to trust that CA to sign
|
|
|
|
host keys for machines in the domain \cw{example.com}, but not for
|
|
|
|
anything else. So you might enter \cq{*.example.com} into the \q{Valid
|
|
|
|
hosts} box.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\s{It's important to limit what the CA key is allowed to sign}. Don't
|
|
|
|
just enter \cq{*} in that box! If you do that, you're saying that
|
|
|
|
Example Corporation IT department is authorised to sign a host key for
|
|
|
|
\e{anything at all} you might decide to connect to \dash even if
|
|
|
|
you're connecting out of the company network to a machine somewhere
|
|
|
|
else, such as your own personal server. So that configuration would
|
|
|
|
enable the Example IT department to act as a \q{man-in-the-middle}
|
|
|
|
between your PuTTY process and your server, and listen in to your
|
|
|
|
communications \dash exactly the thing SSH is supposed to avoid.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
So, if the CA was provided to you by the sysadmins responsible for
|
|
|
|
\cw{example.com} (or whatever), make sure PuTTY will \e{only} trust it
|
|
|
|
for machines in the \cw{example.com} domain.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For the full syntax of the \q{Valid hosts} expression, see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-cert-valid-expr}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finally, choose an identifying name for this CA; enter that name in
|
|
|
|
the \q{Name for this CA} edit box at the top of the window, and press
|
|
|
|
\q{Save} to record the CA in your configuration. The name you chose
|
|
|
|
will appear in the list of saved CAs to the left of the \q{Save}
|
|
|
|
button.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The identifying name can be anything you like. It's there so that if
|
|
|
|
you store multiple certificates you can tell which is which later when
|
|
|
|
you want to edit or delete them. It also appears in the PuTTY Event
|
|
|
|
Log when a server presents a certificate signed by that CA.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To reload an existing CA configuration, select it in the list box and
|
|
|
|
press \q{Load}. Then you can make changes, and save it again.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To remove a CA from your configuration completely, select it in the
|
|
|
|
list and press \q{Delete}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S2{config-ssh-cert-valid-expr} Expressions you can enter in \q{Valid
|
|
|
|
hosts}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The simplest thing you can enter in the \q{Valid hosts this key is
|
|
|
|
trusted to certify} edit box is just a hostname wildcard such as
|
2022-10-22 00:16:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\cq{*.example.com}. This matches any host in any subdomain, so
|
|
|
|
both \cq{ssh.example.com} and \cq{login.dept.example.com} would
|
|
|
|
match, but \cq{prod.example.net} would not.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
But you can also enter multiple host name wildcards, and port number
|
|
|
|
ranges, and make complicated Boolean expressions out of them using the
|
|
|
|
operators \cq{&&} for \q{and}, \cq{||} for \q{or}, \cq{!} for \q{not},
|
|
|
|
and parentheses.
|
2022-08-07 11:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For example, here are some other things you could enter.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \cq{*.foo.example.com || *.bar.example.com}. This means the CA is
|
|
|
|
trusted to sign the host key for a connection if the host name matches
|
|
|
|
\q{*.foo.example.com} \e{or} it matches \q{*.bar.example.com}. In
|
|
|
|
other words, the CA has authority over those two particular subdomains
|
|
|
|
of \cw{example.com}, but not for anything else, like
|
|
|
|
\cw{www.example.com}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \cq{*.example.com && ! *.extrasecure.example.com}. This means the
|
|
|
|
CA is trusted to sign the host key for a connection if the host name
|
|
|
|
matches \q{*.example.com} \e{but does not} match
|
|
|
|
\q{*.extrasecure.example.com}. (Imagine if there was one top-secret
|
|
|
|
set of servers in your company that the main IT department didn't have
|
|
|
|
security clearance to administer.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \cq{*.example.com && port:22}. This means the CA is trusted to sign
|
|
|
|
the host key for a connection if the host name matches
|
|
|
|
\q{*.example.com} \e{and} the port number is 22. SSH servers running
|
|
|
|
on other ports would not be covered.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \cq{(*.foo.example.com || *.bar.example.com) && port:0-1023}. This
|
|
|
|
matches two subdomains of \cw{example.com}, as before, but \e{also}
|
|
|
|
restricts the port number to the range 0-1023.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A certificate configuration expression consists of one or more
|
|
|
|
individual requirements which can each be a hostname wildcard, a
|
|
|
|
single port number, or a port number range, combined together with
|
|
|
|
these Boolean operators.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unlike other languages such as C, there is no implied priority between
|
|
|
|
\cq{&&} and \cq{||}. If you write \cq{A && B || C} (where \cw{A},
|
|
|
|
\cw{B} and \cw{C} are some particular requirements), then PuTTY will
|
|
|
|
report a syntax error, because you haven't said which of the \cq{&&}
|
|
|
|
and \cq{||} takes priority tightly. You will have to write either
|
|
|
|
\cq{(A && B) || C}, meaning \q{both of \cw{A} and \cw{B}, or
|
|
|
|
alternatively just \cw{C}}, or \cq{A && (B || C)} (\q{\cw{A}, and also
|
|
|
|
at least one of \cw{B} and \cw{C}}), to make it clear.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S2{config-ssh-cert-rsa-hash} RSA signature types in certificates
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RSA keys can be used to generate signatures with a choice of secure
|
|
|
|
hash function. Typically, any version of OpenSSH new enough to support
|
|
|
|
certificates at all will also be new enough to avoid using SHA-1, so
|
|
|
|
the default settings of accepting the more modern SHA-256 and SHA-512
|
|
|
|
should be suitable for nearly all cases. For completeness, however,
|
|
|
|
you can configure which types of RSA signature PuTTY will accept in a
|
|
|
|
certificate from a CA using an RSA key.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-17 14:03:25 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-encryption} The Cipher panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY supports a variety of different \i{encryption algorithm}s, and
|
|
|
|
allows you to choose which one you prefer to use. You can do this by
|
|
|
|
dragging the algorithms up and down in the list box (or moving them
|
|
|
|
using the Up and Down buttons) to specify a preference order. When
|
|
|
|
you make an SSH connection, PuTTY will search down the list from the
|
|
|
|
top until it finds an algorithm supported by the server, and then
|
|
|
|
use that.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY currently supports the following algorithms:
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-22 00:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \i{ChaCha20-Poly1305}, a combined cipher and \i{MAC} (SSH-2 only)
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-19 12:33:52 +00:00
|
|
|
\b \i{AES} (Rijndael) - 256, 192, or 128-bit SDCTR or CBC, or
|
|
|
|
256 or 128-bit GCM (SSH-2 only)
|
2013-11-17 14:03:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \i{Arcfour} (RC4) - 256 or 128-bit stream cipher (SSH-2 only)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \i{Blowfish} - 256-bit SDCTR (SSH-2 only) or 128-bit CBC
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \ii{Triple-DES} - 168-bit SDCTR (SSH-2 only) or CBC
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \ii{Single-DES} - 56-bit CBC (see below for SSH-2)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the algorithm PuTTY finds is below the \q{warn below here} line,
|
|
|
|
you will see a warning box when you make the connection:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c The first cipher supported by the server
|
|
|
|
\c is single-DES, which is below the configured
|
|
|
|
\c warning threshold.
|
|
|
|
\c Do you want to continue with this connection?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This warns you that the first available encryption is not a very
|
|
|
|
secure one. Typically you would put the \q{warn below here} line
|
|
|
|
between the encryptions you consider secure and the ones you
|
|
|
|
consider substandard. By default, PuTTY supplies a preference order
|
|
|
|
intended to reflect a reasonable preference in terms of security and
|
|
|
|
speed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In SSH-2, the encryption algorithm is negotiated independently for
|
|
|
|
each direction of the connection, although PuTTY does not support
|
|
|
|
separate configuration of the preference orders. As a result you may
|
|
|
|
get two warnings similar to the one above, possibly with different
|
|
|
|
encryptions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Single-DES is not recommended in the SSH-2 protocol
|
|
|
|
standards, but one or two server implementations do support it.
|
|
|
|
PuTTY can use single-DES to interoperate with
|
|
|
|
these servers if you enable the \q{Enable legacy use of single-DES in
|
|
|
|
SSH-2} option; by default this is disabled and PuTTY will stick to
|
|
|
|
recommended ciphers.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-auth} The Auth panel
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The Auth panel allows you to configure \i{authentication} options for
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
SSH sessions.
|
|
|
|
|
2010-12-27 01:19:13 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-banner} \q{Display pre-authentication banner}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSH-2 servers can provide a message for clients to display to the
|
|
|
|
prospective user before the user logs in; this is sometimes known as a
|
|
|
|
pre-authentication \q{\i{banner}}. Typically this is used to provide
|
|
|
|
information about the server and legal notices.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, PuTTY displays this message before prompting for a
|
|
|
|
password or similar credentials (although, unfortunately, not before
|
|
|
|
prompting for a login name, due to the nature of the protocol design).
|
|
|
|
By unchecking this option, display of the banner can be suppressed
|
|
|
|
entirely.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-25 13:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-noauth} \q{Bypass authentication entirely}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In SSH-2, it is in principle possible to establish a connection
|
|
|
|
without using SSH's mechanisms to identify or prove who you are
|
|
|
|
to the server. An SSH server could prefer to handle authentication
|
|
|
|
in the data channel, for instance, or simply require no user
|
|
|
|
authentication whatsoever.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, PuTTY assumes the server requires authentication (we've
|
|
|
|
never heard of one that doesn't), and thus must start this process
|
|
|
|
with a username. If you find you are getting username prompts that
|
|
|
|
you cannot answer, you could try enabling this option. However,
|
|
|
|
most SSH servers will reject this.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is not the option you want if you have a username and just want
|
|
|
|
PuTTY to remember it; for that see \k{config-username}.
|
|
|
|
It's also probably not what if you're trying to set up passwordless
|
|
|
|
login to a mainstream SSH server; depending on the server, you
|
|
|
|
probably wanted public-key authentication (\k{pubkey})
|
|
|
|
or perhaps GSSAPI authentication (\k{config-ssh-auth-gssapi}).
|
|
|
|
(These are still forms of authentication, even if you don't have to
|
|
|
|
interact with them.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option only affects SSH-2 connections. SSH-1 connections always
|
|
|
|
require an authentication step.
|
|
|
|
|
New option to reject 'trivial' success of userauth.
Suggested by Manfred Kaiser, who also wrote most of this patch
(although outlying parts, like documentation and SSH-1 support, are by
me).
This is a second line of defence against the kind of spoofing attacks
in which a malicious or compromised SSH server rushes the client
through the userauth phase of SSH without actually requiring any auth
inputs (passwords or signatures or whatever), and then at the start of
the connection phase it presents something like a spoof prompt,
intended to be taken for part of userauth by the user but in fact with
some more sinister purpose.
Our existing line of defence against this is the trust sigil system,
and as far as I know, that's still working. This option allows a bit of
extra defence in depth: if you don't expect your SSH server to
trivially accept authentication in the first place, then enabling this
option will cause PuTTY to disconnect if it unexpectedly does so,
without the user having to spot the presence or absence of a fiddly
little sigil anywhere.
Several types of authentication count as 'trivial'. The obvious one is
the SSH-2 "none" method, which clients always try first so that the
failure message will tell them what else they can try, and which a
server can instead accept in order to authenticate you unconditionally.
But there are two other ways to do it that we know of: one is to run
keyboard-interactive authentication and send an empty INFO_REQUEST
packet containing no actual prompts for the user, and another even
weirder one is to send USERAUTH_SUCCESS in response to the user's
preliminary *offer* of a public key (instead of sending the usual PK_OK
to request an actual signature from the key).
This new option detects all of those, by clearing the 'is_trivial_auth'
flag only when we send some kind of substantive authentication response
(be it a password, a k-i prompt response, a signature, or a GSSAPI
token). So even if there's a further path through the userauth maze we
haven't spotted, that somehow avoids sending anything substantive, this
strategy should still pick it up.
2021-06-19 14:39:15 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-notrivialauth} \q{Disconnect if authentication succeeds
|
|
|
|
trivially}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option causes PuTTY to abandon an SSH session and disconnect from
|
|
|
|
the server, if the server accepted authentication without ever having
|
|
|
|
asked for any kind of password or signature or token.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This might be used as a security measure. There are some forms of
|
|
|
|
attack against an SSH client user which work by terminating the SSH
|
|
|
|
authentication stage early, and then doing something in the main part
|
|
|
|
of the SSH session which \e{looks} like part of the authentication,
|
|
|
|
but isn't really.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For example, instead of demanding a signature from your public key,
|
|
|
|
for which PuTTY would ask for your key's passphrase, a compromised or
|
|
|
|
malicious server might allow you to log in with no signature or
|
|
|
|
password at all, and then print a message that \e{imitates} PuTTY's
|
|
|
|
request for your passphrase, in the hope that you would type it in.
|
|
|
|
(In fact, the passphrase for your public key should not be sent to any
|
|
|
|
server.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY's main defence against attacks of this type is the \q{trust
|
|
|
|
sigil} system: messages in the PuTTY window that are truly originated
|
|
|
|
by PuTTY itself are shown next to a small copy of the PuTTY icon,
|
|
|
|
which the server cannot fake when it tries to imitate the same message
|
|
|
|
using terminal output.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
However, if you think you might be at risk of this kind of thing
|
|
|
|
anyway (if you don't watch closely for the trust sigils, or if you
|
|
|
|
think you're at extra risk of one of your servers being malicious),
|
|
|
|
then you could enable this option as an extra defence. Then, if the
|
|
|
|
server tries any of these attacks involving letting you through the
|
|
|
|
authentication stage, PuTTY will disconnect from the server before it
|
|
|
|
can send a follow-up fake prompt or other type of attack.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
On the other hand, some servers \e{legitimately} let you through the
|
|
|
|
SSH authentication phase trivially, either because they are genuinely
|
|
|
|
public, or because the important authentication step happens during
|
|
|
|
the terminal session. (An example might be an SSH server that connects
|
|
|
|
you directly to the terminal login prompt of a legacy mainframe.) So
|
|
|
|
enabling this option might cause some kinds of session to stop
|
|
|
|
working. It's up to you.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-19 12:05:12 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-tryagent} \q{Attempt authentication using Pageant}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this option is enabled, then PuTTY will look for Pageant (the SSH
|
|
|
|
private-key storage agent) and attempt to authenticate with any
|
|
|
|
suitable public keys Pageant currently holds.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This behaviour is almost always desirable, and is therefore enabled
|
|
|
|
by default. In rare cases you might need to turn it off in order to
|
|
|
|
force authentication by some non-public-key method such as
|
|
|
|
passwords.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option can also be controlled using the \c{-noagent}
|
|
|
|
command-line option. See \k{using-cmdline-agentauth}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See \k{pageant} for more information about Pageant in general.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-tis} \q{Attempt \I{TIS authentication}TIS or
|
|
|
|
\i{CryptoCard authentication}}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 18:20:17 +00:00
|
|
|
TIS and CryptoCard authentication are (despite their names) generic
|
|
|
|
forms of simple \I{challenge/response authentication}challenge/response
|
|
|
|
authentication available in SSH protocol version 1 only. You might use
|
|
|
|
them if you were using \i{S/Key} \i{one-time passwords}, for example,
|
|
|
|
or if you had a physical \i{security token} that generated responses
|
2007-09-22 13:55:25 +00:00
|
|
|
to authentication challenges. They can even be used to prompt for
|
|
|
|
simple passwords.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
With this switch enabled, PuTTY will attempt these forms of
|
|
|
|
authentication if the server is willing to try them. You will be
|
2007-09-22 13:55:25 +00:00
|
|
|
presented with a challenge string (which may be different every
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
time) and must supply the correct response in order to log in. If
|
|
|
|
your server supports this, you should talk to your system
|
|
|
|
administrator about precisely what form these challenges and
|
|
|
|
responses take.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-ki} \q{Attempt \i{keyboard-interactive authentication}}
|
2001-11-29 22:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
The SSH-2 equivalent of TIS authentication is called
|
2001-11-29 22:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
\q{keyboard-interactive}. It is a flexible authentication method
|
|
|
|
using an arbitrary sequence of requests and responses; so it is not
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
only useful for \I{challenge/response authentication}challenge/response
|
|
|
|
mechanisms such as \i{S/Key}, but it can also be used for (for example)
|
|
|
|
asking the user for a \I{password expiry}new password when the old one
|
|
|
|
has expired.
|
2001-11-29 22:32:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY leaves this option enabled by default, but supplies a switch
|
|
|
|
to turn it off in case you should have trouble with it.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-agentfwd} \q{Allow \i{agent forwarding}}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option allows the SSH server to open forwarded connections back
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
to your local copy of \i{Pageant}. If you are not running Pageant, this
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
option will do nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See \k{pageant} for general information on Pageant, and
|
|
|
|
\k{pageant-forward} for information on agent forwarding. Note that
|
|
|
|
there is a security risk involved with enabling this option; see
|
|
|
|
\k{pageant-security} for details.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-changeuser} \q{Allow attempted \i{changes of username} in SSH-2}
|
2001-12-11 21:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
In the SSH-1 protocol, it is impossible to change username after
|
2001-12-11 21:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
failing to authenticate. So if you mis-type your username at the
|
|
|
|
PuTTY \q{login as:} prompt, you will not be able to change it except
|
|
|
|
by restarting PuTTY.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
The SSH-2 protocol \e{does} allow changes of username, in principle,
|
|
|
|
but does not make it mandatory for SSH-2 servers to accept them. In
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
particular, \i{OpenSSH} does not accept a change of username; once you
|
2001-12-11 21:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
have sent one username, it will reject attempts to try to
|
|
|
|
authenticate as another user. (Depending on the version of OpenSSH,
|
|
|
|
it may quietly return failure for all login attempts, or it may send
|
|
|
|
an error message.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For this reason, PuTTY will by default not prompt you for your
|
|
|
|
username more than once, in case the server complains. If you know
|
|
|
|
your server can cope with it, you can enable the \q{Allow attempted
|
|
|
|
changes of username} option to modify PuTTY's behaviour.
|
|
|
|
|
New feature: k-i authentication helper plugins.
In recent months I've had two requests from different people to build
support into PuTTY for automatically handling complicated third-party
auth protocols layered on top of keyboard-interactive - the kind of
thing where you're asked to enter some auth response, and you have to
refer to some external source like a web server to find out what the
right response _is_, which is a pain to do by hand, so you'd prefer it
to be automated in the SSH client.
That seems like a reasonable thing for an end user to want, but I
didn't think it was a good idea to build support for specific
protocols of that kind directly into PuTTY, where there would no doubt
be an ever-lengthening list, and maintenance needed on all of them.
So instead, in collaboration with one of my correspondents, I've
designed and implemented a protocol to be spoken between PuTTY and a
plugin running as a subprocess. The plugin can opt to handle the
keyboard-interactive authentication loop on behalf of the user, in
which case PuTTY passes on all the INFO_REQUEST packets to it, and
lets it make up responses. It can also ask questions of the user if
necessary.
The protocol spec is provided in a documentation appendix. The entire
configuration for the end user consists of providing a full command
line to use as the subprocess.
In the contrib directory I've provided an example plugin written in
Python. It gives a set of fixed responses suitable for getting through
Uppity's made-up k-i system, because that was a reasonable thing I
already had lying around to test against. But it also provides example
code that someone else could pick up and insert their own live
response-provider into the middle of, assuming they were happy with it
being in Python.
2022-09-01 18:38:46 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-auth-creds} The Credentials panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This subpane of the Auth panel contains configuration options that
|
|
|
|
specify actual \e{credentials} to present to the server: key files and
|
|
|
|
certificates.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-privkey} \q{\ii{Private key} file for authentication}
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This box is where you enter the name of your private key file if you
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
are using \i{public key authentication}. See \k{pubkey} for information
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
about public key authentication in SSH.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
This key must be in PuTTY's native format (\c{*.\i{PPK}}). If you have a
|
2005-03-08 14:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
private key in another format that you want to use with PuTTY, see
|
|
|
|
\k{puttygen-conversions}.
|
2003-01-16 15:43:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-08 18:32:31 +00:00
|
|
|
You can use the authentication agent \i{Pageant} so that you do not
|
2016-03-19 20:24:51 +00:00
|
|
|
need to explicitly configure a key here; see \k{pageant}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If a private key file is specified here with Pageant running, PuTTY
|
|
|
|
will first try asking Pageant to authenticate with that key, and
|
|
|
|
ignore any other keys Pageant may have. If that fails, PuTTY will ask
|
|
|
|
for a passphrase as normal. You can also specify a \e{public} key file
|
|
|
|
in this case (in RFC 4716 or OpenSSH format), as that's sufficient to
|
|
|
|
identify the key to Pageant, but of course if Pageant isn't present
|
|
|
|
PuTTY can't fall back to using this file itself.
|
2005-11-13 16:06:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-07 11:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-cert} \q{\ii{Certificate} to use with the private key}
|
|
|
|
|
2023-07-19 16:15:23 +00:00
|
|
|
(This is optional. If you don't know you need it, you can leave this
|
|
|
|
blank.)
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-07 11:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
In some environments, user authentication keys can be signed in turn
|
|
|
|
by a \q{certifying authority} (\q{CA} for short), and user accounts on
|
|
|
|
an SSH server can be configured to automatically trust any key that's
|
|
|
|
certified by the right signature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This can be a convenient setup if you have a very large number of
|
|
|
|
servers. When you change your key pair, you might otherwise have to
|
|
|
|
edit the \cw{authorized_keys} file on every server individually, to
|
|
|
|
make them all accept the new key. But if instead you configure all
|
|
|
|
those servers \e{once} to accept keys signed as yours by a CA, then
|
|
|
|
when you change your public key, all you have to do is to get the new
|
|
|
|
key certified by the same CA as before, and then all your servers will
|
|
|
|
automatically accept it without needing individual reconfiguration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
One way to use a certificate is to incorporate it into your private
|
|
|
|
key file. \K{puttygen-cert} explains how to do that using PuTTYgen.
|
|
|
|
But another approach is to tell PuTTY itself where to find the public
|
|
|
|
certificate file, and then it will automatically present that
|
|
|
|
certificate when authenticating with the corresponding private key.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To do this, enter the pathname of the certificate file into the
|
|
|
|
\q{Certificate to use with the private key} file selector.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When this setting is configured, PuTTY will honour it no matter
|
|
|
|
whether the private key is found in a file, or loaded into Pageant.
|
|
|
|
|
New feature: k-i authentication helper plugins.
In recent months I've had two requests from different people to build
support into PuTTY for automatically handling complicated third-party
auth protocols layered on top of keyboard-interactive - the kind of
thing where you're asked to enter some auth response, and you have to
refer to some external source like a web server to find out what the
right response _is_, which is a pain to do by hand, so you'd prefer it
to be automated in the SSH client.
That seems like a reasonable thing for an end user to want, but I
didn't think it was a good idea to build support for specific
protocols of that kind directly into PuTTY, where there would no doubt
be an ever-lengthening list, and maintenance needed on all of them.
So instead, in collaboration with one of my correspondents, I've
designed and implemented a protocol to be spoken between PuTTY and a
plugin running as a subprocess. The plugin can opt to handle the
keyboard-interactive authentication loop on behalf of the user, in
which case PuTTY passes on all the INFO_REQUEST packets to it, and
lets it make up responses. It can also ask questions of the user if
necessary.
The protocol spec is provided in a documentation appendix. The entire
configuration for the end user consists of providing a full command
line to use as the subprocess.
In the contrib directory I've provided an example plugin written in
Python. It gives a set of fixed responses suitable for getting through
Uppity's made-up k-i system, because that was a reasonable thing I
already had lying around to test against. But it also provides example
code that someone else could pick up and insert their own live
response-provider into the middle of, assuming they were happy with it
being in Python.
2022-09-01 18:38:46 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-authplugin} \q{\ii{Plugin} to provide authentication responses}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
An SSH server can use the \q{keyboard-interactive} protocol to present
|
|
|
|
a series of arbitrary questions and answers. Sometimes this is used
|
|
|
|
for ordinary passwords, but sometimes the server will use the same
|
|
|
|
mechanism for something more complicated, such as a one-time password
|
|
|
|
system.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some of these systems can be automated. For this purpose, PuTTY allows
|
|
|
|
you to provide a separate program to act as a \q{plugin} which will
|
|
|
|
take over the authentication and send answers to the questions on your
|
|
|
|
behalf.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you have been provided with a plugin of this type, you can
|
|
|
|
configure it here, by entering a full command line in the \q{Plugin
|
|
|
|
command to run} box.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(If you want to \e{write} a plugin of this type, see \k{authplugin}
|
|
|
|
for the full specification of how the plugin is expected to behave.)
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-25 16:18:02 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-auth-gssapi} The \i{GSSAPI} panel
|
2010-09-25 07:16:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{GSSAPI} subpanel of the \q{Auth} panel controls the use of
|
|
|
|
GSSAPI authentication. This is a mechanism which delegates the
|
|
|
|
authentication exchange to a library elsewhere on the client
|
|
|
|
machine, which in principle can authenticate in many different ways
|
2010-09-25 16:18:02 +00:00
|
|
|
but in practice is usually used with the \i{Kerberos} \i{single sign-on}
|
2016-03-25 13:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
protocol to implement \i{passwordless login}.
|
2010-09-25 07:16:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Support GSS key exchange, for Kerberos 5 only.
This is a heavily edited (by me) version of a patch originally due to
Nico Williams and Viktor Dukhovni. Their comments:
* Don't delegate credentials when rekeying unless there's a new TGT
or the old service ticket is nearly expired.
* Check for the above conditions more frequently (every two minutes
by default) and rekey when we would delegate credentials.
* Do not rekey with very short service ticket lifetimes; some GSSAPI
libraries may lose the race to use an almost expired ticket. Adjust
the timing of rekey checks to try to avoid this possibility.
My further comments:
The most interesting thing about this patch to me is that the use of
GSS key exchange causes a switch over to a completely different model
of what host keys are for. This comes from RFC 4462 section 2.1: the
basic idea is that when your session is mostly bidirectionally
authenticated by the GSSAPI exchanges happening in initial kex and
every rekey, host keys become more or less vestigial, and their
remaining purpose is to allow a rekey to happen if the requirements of
the SSH protocol demand it at an awkward moment when the GSS
credentials are not currently available (e.g. timed out and haven't
been renewed yet). As such, there's no need for host keys to be
_permanent_ or to be a reliable identifier of a particular host, and
RFC 4462 allows for the possibility that they might be purely
transient and only for this kind of emergency fallback purpose.
Therefore, once PuTTY has done a GSS key exchange, it disconnects
itself completely from the permanent host key cache functions in
storage.h, and instead switches to a _transient_ host key cache stored
in memory with the lifetime of just that SSH session. That cache is
populated with keys received from the server as a side effect of GSS
kex (via the optional SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY message), and used if
later in the session we have to fall back to a non-GSS key exchange.
However, in practice servers we've tested against do not send a host
key in that way, so we also have a fallback method of populating the
transient cache by triggering an immediate non-GSS rekey straight
after userauth (reusing the code path we also use to turn on OpenSSH
delayed encryption without the race condition).
2018-04-26 06:18:59 +00:00
|
|
|
GSSAPI authentication is only available in the SSH-2 protocol.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY supports two forms of GSSAPI-based authentication. In one of
|
|
|
|
them, the SSH key exchange happens in the normal way, and GSSAPI is
|
2018-04-26 18:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
only involved in authenticating the user. The checkbox labelled
|
|
|
|
\q{Attempt GSSAPI authentication} controls this form.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In the other method, GSSAPI-based authentication is combined with the
|
|
|
|
SSH key exchange phase. If this succeeds, then the SSH authentication
|
|
|
|
step has nothing left to do. See \k{config-ssh-gssapi-kex} for more
|
|
|
|
information about this method. The checkbox labelled \q{Attempt GSSAPI
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
key exchange} controls this form. (The same checkbox appears on the
|
|
|
|
\q{Kex} panel.)
|
2018-04-26 18:15:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If one or both of these controls is enabled, then GSSAPI
|
|
|
|
authentication will be attempted in one form or the other, and
|
|
|
|
(typically) if your client machine has valid Kerberos credentials
|
|
|
|
loaded, then PuTTY should be able to authenticate automatically to
|
|
|
|
servers that support Kerberos logins.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If both of those checkboxes are disabled, PuTTY will not try any form
|
|
|
|
of GSSAPI at all, and the rest of this panel will be unused.
|
2010-09-25 07:16:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-auth-gssapi-delegation} \q{Allow GSSAPI credential
|
|
|
|
delegation}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-25 16:18:02 +00:00
|
|
|
\i{GSSAPI credential delegation} is a mechanism for passing on your
|
2010-09-25 07:16:56 +00:00
|
|
|
Kerberos (or other) identity to the session on the SSH server. If
|
|
|
|
you enable this option, then not only will PuTTY be able to log in
|
|
|
|
automatically to a server that accepts your Kerberos credentials,
|
|
|
|
but also you will be able to connect out from that server to other
|
|
|
|
Kerberos-supporting services and use the same credentials just as
|
|
|
|
automatically.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(This option is the Kerberos analogue of SSH agent forwarding; see
|
|
|
|
\k{pageant-forward} for some information on that.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that, like SSH agent forwarding, there is a security
|
|
|
|
implication in the use of this option: the administrator of the
|
|
|
|
server you connect to, or anyone else who has cracked the
|
|
|
|
administrator account on that server, could fake your identity when
|
|
|
|
connecting to further Kerberos-supporting services. However,
|
|
|
|
Kerberos sites are typically run by a central authority, so the
|
|
|
|
administrator of one server is likely to already have access to the
|
|
|
|
other services too; so this would typically be less of a risk than
|
|
|
|
SSH agent forwarding.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
If your connection is not using GSSAPI key exchange, it is possible
|
|
|
|
for the delegation to expire during your session. See
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-gssapi-kex} for more information.
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-25 07:16:56 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-auth-gssapi-libraries} Preference order for GSSAPI
|
|
|
|
libraries
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GSSAPI is a mechanism which allows more than one authentication
|
|
|
|
method to be accessed through the same interface. Therefore, more
|
|
|
|
than one authentication library may exist on your system which can
|
|
|
|
be accessed using GSSAPI.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-25 20:31:56 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY contains native support for a few well-known such libraries
|
2018-05-20 12:57:35 +00:00
|
|
|
(including Windows' \i{SSPI}), and will look for all of them on your system
|
2018-04-25 20:31:56 +00:00
|
|
|
and use whichever it finds. If more than one exists on your system and
|
|
|
|
you need to use a specific one, you can adjust the order in which it
|
|
|
|
will search using this preference list control.
|
2010-09-25 07:16:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
One of the options in the preference list is to use a user-specified
|
|
|
|
GSSAPI library. If the library you want to use is not mentioned by
|
|
|
|
name in PuTTY's list of options, you can enter its full pathname in
|
|
|
|
the \q{User-supplied GSSAPI library path} field, and move the
|
|
|
|
\q{User-supplied GSSAPI library} option in the preference list to
|
|
|
|
make sure it is selected before anything else.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-19 16:46:23 +00:00
|
|
|
On Windows, such libraries are files with a \I{DLL}\cw{.dll}
|
|
|
|
extension, and must have been built in the same way as the PuTTY
|
|
|
|
executable you're running; if you have a 32-bit DLL, you must run a
|
|
|
|
32-bit version of PuTTY, and the same with 64-bit (see
|
|
|
|
\k{faq-32bit-64bit}). On Unix, shared libraries generally have a
|
|
|
|
\cw{.so} extension.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-tty} The TTY panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The TTY panel lets you configure the remote pseudo-terminal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-pty} \I{pseudo-terminal allocation}\q{Don't allocate
|
|
|
|
a pseudo-terminal}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When connecting to a \i{Unix} system, most \I{interactive
|
|
|
|
connections}interactive shell sessions are run in a \e{pseudo-terminal},
|
|
|
|
which allows the Unix system to pretend it's talking to a real physical
|
|
|
|
terminal device but allows the SSH server to catch all the data coming
|
|
|
|
from that fake device and send it back to the client.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Occasionally you might find you have a need to run a session \e{not}
|
|
|
|
in a pseudo-terminal. In PuTTY, this is generally only useful for
|
|
|
|
very specialist purposes; although in Plink (see \k{plink}) it is
|
|
|
|
the usual way of working.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-ttymodes} Sending \i{terminal modes}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The SSH protocol allows the client to send \q{terminal modes} for
|
|
|
|
the remote pseudo-terminal. These usually control the server's
|
|
|
|
expectation of the local terminal's behaviour.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If your server does not have sensible defaults for these modes, you
|
2017-03-06 10:36:26 +00:00
|
|
|
may find that changing them here helps, although the server is at
|
|
|
|
liberty to ignore your changes. If you don't understand any of this,
|
|
|
|
it's safe to leave these settings alone.
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(None of these settings will have any effect if no pseudo-terminal
|
|
|
|
is requested or allocated.)
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-06 10:36:26 +00:00
|
|
|
You can change what happens for a particular mode by selecting it in
|
|
|
|
the list, choosing one of the options and specifying the exact value
|
|
|
|
if necessary, and hitting \q{Set}. The effect of the options is as
|
|
|
|
follows:
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b If the \q{Auto} option is selected, the PuTTY tools will decide
|
|
|
|
whether to specify that mode to the server, and if so, will send
|
|
|
|
a sensible value.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY proper will send modes that it has an opinion on (currently only
|
2016-05-07 10:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
the code for the Backspace key, \cw{ERASE}, and whether the character
|
|
|
|
set is UTF-8, \cw{IUTF8}). Plink on Unix will propagate appropriate
|
|
|
|
modes from the local terminal, if any.
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-29 13:24:17 +00:00
|
|
|
\b If \q{Nothing} is selected, no value for the mode will be
|
2017-03-06 10:36:26 +00:00
|
|
|
specified to the server under any circumstances.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
\b If a value is specified, it will be sent to the server under all
|
|
|
|
circumstances. The precise syntax of the value box depends on the
|
|
|
|
mode.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By default, all of the available modes are listed as \q{Auto},
|
|
|
|
which should do the right thing in most circumstances.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The precise effect of each setting, if any, is up to the server. Their
|
|
|
|
names come from \i{POSIX} and other Unix systems, and they are most
|
|
|
|
likely to have a useful effect on such systems. (These are the same
|
|
|
|
settings that can usually be changed using the \i\c{stty} command once
|
|
|
|
logged in to such servers.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some notable modes are described below; for fuller explanations, see
|
|
|
|
your server documentation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \I{ERASE special character}\cw{ERASE} is the character that when typed
|
|
|
|
by the user will delete one space to the left. When set to \q{Auto}
|
|
|
|
(the default setting), this follows the setting of the local Backspace
|
|
|
|
key in PuTTY (see \k{config-backspace}).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\lcont{
|
|
|
|
This and other \i{special character}s are specified using \c{^C} notation
|
|
|
|
for Ctrl-C, and so on. Use \c{^<27>} or \c{^<0x1B>} to specify a
|
|
|
|
character numerically, and \c{^~} to get a literal \c{^}. Other
|
|
|
|
non-control characters are denoted by themselves. Leaving the box
|
|
|
|
entirely blank indicates that \e{no} character should be assigned to
|
|
|
|
the specified function, although this may not be supported by all
|
|
|
|
servers.
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \I{QUIT special character}\cw{QUIT} is a special character that
|
|
|
|
usually forcefully ends the current process on the server
|
|
|
|
(\cw{SIGQUIT}). On many servers its default setting is Ctrl-backslash
|
|
|
|
(\c{^\\}), which is easy to accidentally invoke on many keyboards. If
|
|
|
|
this is getting in your way, you may want to change it to another
|
|
|
|
character or turn it off entirely.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b Boolean modes such as \cw{ECHO} and \cw{ICANON} can be specified in
|
|
|
|
PuTTY in a variety of ways, such as \cw{true}/\cw{false},
|
2017-03-06 10:36:26 +00:00
|
|
|
\cw{yes}/\cw{no}, and \cw{0}/\cw{1}. (Explicitly specifying a value of
|
|
|
|
\cw{no} is different from not sending the mode at all.)
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-07 10:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
\b The boolean mode \I{IUTF8 terminal mode}\cw{IUTF8} signals to the
|
2017-04-30 09:42:02 +00:00
|
|
|
server whether the terminal character set is \i{UTF-8} or not, for
|
|
|
|
purposes such as basic line editing; if this is set incorrectly,
|
|
|
|
the backspace key may erase the wrong amount of text, for instance.
|
|
|
|
However, simply setting this is not usually sufficient for the server
|
|
|
|
to use UTF-8; POSIX servers will generally also require the locale to
|
|
|
|
be set (by some server-dependent means), although many newer
|
|
|
|
installations default to UTF-8. Also, since this mode was added to the
|
|
|
|
SSH protocol much later than the others, \#{circa 2016} many servers
|
|
|
|
(particularly older servers) do not honour this mode sent over SSH;
|
|
|
|
indeed, a few poorly-written servers object to its mere presence, so
|
|
|
|
you may find you need to set it to not be sent at all. When set to
|
|
|
|
\q{Auto}, this follows the local configured character set (see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-charset}).
|
2016-05-07 10:36:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-21 13:57:08 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Terminal speeds are configured elsewhere; see \k{config-termspeed}.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-x11} The X11 panel
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
The X11 panel allows you to configure \i{forwarding of X11} over an
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
SSH connection.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-08 18:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
If your server lets you run X Window System \i{graphical applications},
|
|
|
|
X11 forwarding allows you to securely give those applications access to
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
a local X display on your PC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To enable X11 forwarding, check the \q{Enable X11 forwarding} box.
|
2004-10-06 22:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
If your X display is somewhere unusual, you will need to enter its
|
|
|
|
location in the \q{X display location} box; if this is left blank,
|
2005-03-08 14:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY will try to find a sensible default in the environment, or use the
|
2004-10-06 22:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
primary local display (\c{:0}) if that fails.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
See \k{using-x-forwarding} for more information about X11
|
|
|
|
forwarding.
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-x11auth} Remote \i{X11 authentication}
|
2003-01-12 14:11:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are using X11 forwarding, the virtual X server created on the
|
|
|
|
SSH server machine will be protected by authorisation data. This
|
|
|
|
data is invented, and checked, by PuTTY.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The usual authorisation method used for this is called
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\i\cw{MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1}. This is a simple password-style protocol:
|
2003-01-12 14:11:38 +00:00
|
|
|
the X client sends some cookie data to the server, and the server
|
|
|
|
checks that it matches the real cookie. The cookie data is sent over
|
|
|
|
an unencrypted X11 connection; so if you allow a client on a third
|
|
|
|
machine to access the virtual X server, then the cookie will be sent
|
|
|
|
in the clear.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY offers the alternative protocol \i\cw{XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1}. This
|
2003-01-12 14:11:38 +00:00
|
|
|
is a cryptographically authenticated protocol: the data sent by the
|
|
|
|
X client is different every time, and it depends on the IP address
|
|
|
|
and port of the client's end of the connection and is also stamped
|
|
|
|
with the current time. So an eavesdropper who captures an
|
|
|
|
\cw{XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1} string cannot immediately re-use it for
|
|
|
|
their own X connection.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY's support for \cw{XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1} is a somewhat
|
|
|
|
experimental feature, and may encounter several problems:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b Some X clients probably do not even support
|
|
|
|
\cw{XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1}, so they will not know what to do with the
|
|
|
|
data PuTTY has provided.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 17:06:29 +00:00
|
|
|
\b This authentication mechanism will only work in SSH-2. In SSH-1,
|
|
|
|
the SSH server does not tell the client the source address of
|
2003-01-12 14:11:38 +00:00
|
|
|
a forwarded connection in a machine-readable format, so it's
|
|
|
|
impossible to verify the \cw{XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1} data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b You may find this feature causes problems with some SSH servers,
|
|
|
|
which will not clean up \cw{XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1} data after a
|
|
|
|
session, so that if you then connect to the same server using
|
|
|
|
a client which only does \cw{MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1} and are allocated
|
|
|
|
the same remote display number, you might find that out-of-date
|
|
|
|
authentication data is still present on your server and your X
|
|
|
|
connections fail.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY's default is \cw{MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1}. If you change it, you
|
|
|
|
should be sure you know what you're doing.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-17 18:38:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-xauthority} X authority file for local display
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you are using X11 forwarding, the local X server to which your
|
|
|
|
forwarded connections are eventually directed may itself require
|
|
|
|
authorisation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some Windows X servers do not require this: they do authorisation by
|
|
|
|
simpler means, such as accepting any connection from the local
|
|
|
|
machine but not from anywhere else. However, if your X server does
|
|
|
|
require authorisation, then PuTTY needs to know what authorisation
|
|
|
|
is required.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
One way in which this data might be made available is for the X
|
|
|
|
server to store it somewhere in a file which has the same format
|
|
|
|
as the Unix \c{.Xauthority} file. If this is how your Windows X
|
|
|
|
server works, then you can tell PuTTY where to find this file by
|
|
|
|
configuring this option. By default, PuTTY will not attempt to find
|
|
|
|
any authorisation for your local display.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-portfwd} \I{port forwarding}The Tunnels panel
|
2001-09-22 17:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
The Tunnels panel allows you to configure tunnelling of arbitrary
|
|
|
|
connection types through an SSH connection.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Port forwarding allows you to tunnel other types of \i{network
|
|
|
|
connection} down an SSH session. See \k{using-port-forwarding} for a
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
general discussion of port forwarding and how it works.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The port forwarding section in the Tunnels panel shows a list of all
|
|
|
|
the port forwardings that PuTTY will try to set up when it connects
|
|
|
|
to the server. By default no port forwardings are set up, so this
|
|
|
|
list is empty.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To add a port forwarding:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b Set one of the \q{Local} or \q{Remote} radio buttons, depending
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
on whether you want to \I{local port forwarding}forward a local port
|
|
|
|
to a remote destination (\q{Local}) or \I{remote port forwarding}forward
|
|
|
|
a remote port to a local destination (\q{Remote}). Alternatively,
|
|
|
|
select \q{Dynamic} if you want PuTTY to \I{dynamic port forwarding}provide
|
2006-09-15 14:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
a local SOCKS 4/4A/5 proxy on a local port (note that this proxy only
|
|
|
|
supports TCP connections; the SSH protocol does not support forwarding
|
|
|
|
\i{UDP}).
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\b Enter a source \i{port number} into the \q{Source port} box. For
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
local forwardings, PuTTY will listen on this port of your PC. For
|
|
|
|
remote forwardings, your SSH server will listen on this port of the
|
|
|
|
remote machine. Note that most servers will not allow you to listen
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
on \I{privileged port}port numbers less than 1024.
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-04-05 11:52:42 +00:00
|
|
|
\b If you have selected \q{Local} or \q{Remote} (this step is not
|
|
|
|
needed with \q{Dynamic}), enter a hostname and port number separated
|
|
|
|
by a colon, in the \q{Destination} box. Connections received on the
|
|
|
|
source port will be directed to this destination. For example, to
|
|
|
|
connect to a POP-3 server, you might enter
|
2014-11-08 23:37:59 +00:00
|
|
|
\c{popserver.example.com:110}. (If you need to enter a literal
|
|
|
|
\i{IPv6 address}, enclose it in square brackets, for instance
|
|
|
|
\cq{[::1]:2200}.)
|
2001-12-06 20:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b Click the \q{Add} button. Your forwarding details should appear
|
|
|
|
in the list box.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To remove a port forwarding, simply select its details in the list
|
|
|
|
box, and click the \q{Remove} button.
|
2001-04-17 10:39:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
In the \q{Source port} box, you can also optionally enter an \I{listen
|
|
|
|
address}IP address to listen on, by specifying (for instance)
|
|
|
|
\c{127.0.0.5:79}.
|
2004-01-20 12:46:36 +00:00
|
|
|
See \k{using-port-forwarding} for more information on how this
|
|
|
|
works and its restrictions.
|
2002-12-18 11:39:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
In place of port numbers, you can enter \i{service names}, if they are
|
2005-02-10 01:04:06 +00:00
|
|
|
known to the local system. For instance, in the \q{Destination} box,
|
|
|
|
you could enter \c{popserver.example.com:pop3}.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-29 21:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
You can \I{port forwarding, changing mid-session}modify the currently
|
|
|
|
active set of port forwardings in mid-session using \q{Change
|
|
|
|
Settings} (see \k{using-changesettings}). If you delete a local or
|
|
|
|
dynamic port forwarding in mid-session, PuTTY will stop listening for
|
|
|
|
connections on that port, so it can be re-used by another program. If
|
|
|
|
you delete a remote port forwarding, note that:
|
2004-12-28 14:07:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
\b The SSH-1 protocol contains no mechanism for asking the server to
|
2004-12-28 14:07:05 +00:00
|
|
|
stop listening on a remote port.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
\b The SSH-2 protocol does contain such a mechanism, but not all SSH
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
servers support it. (In particular, \i{OpenSSH} does not support it in
|
2004-12-28 14:07:05 +00:00
|
|
|
any version earlier than 3.9.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you ask to delete a remote port forwarding and PuTTY cannot make
|
|
|
|
the server actually stop listening on the port, it will instead just
|
|
|
|
start refusing incoming connections on that port. Therefore,
|
|
|
|
although the port cannot be reused by another program, you can at
|
|
|
|
least be reasonably sure that server-side programs can no longer
|
|
|
|
access the service at your end of the port forwarding.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-10 01:04:06 +00:00
|
|
|
If you delete a forwarding, any existing connections established using
|
|
|
|
that forwarding remain open. Similarly, changes to global settings
|
|
|
|
such as \q{Local ports accept connections from other hosts} only take
|
|
|
|
effect on new forwardings.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-01 11:16:32 +00:00
|
|
|
If the connection you are forwarding over SSH is itself a second SSH
|
|
|
|
connection made by another copy of PuTTY, you might find the
|
|
|
|
\q{logical host name} configuration option useful to warn PuTTY of
|
|
|
|
which host key it should be expecting. See \k{config-loghost} for
|
|
|
|
details of this.
|
|
|
|
|
2001-12-15 12:15:24 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-portfwd-localhost} Controlling the visibility of
|
|
|
|
forwarded ports
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The source port for a forwarded connection usually does not accept
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
connections from any machine except the \I{localhost}SSH client or
|
|
|
|
server machine itself (for local and remote forwardings respectively).
|
|
|
|
There are controls in the Tunnels panel to change this:
|
2001-12-15 12:15:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b The \q{Local ports accept connections from other hosts} option
|
|
|
|
allows you to set up local-to-remote port forwardings in such a way
|
|
|
|
that machines other than your client PC can connect to the forwarded
|
2003-04-05 11:52:42 +00:00
|
|
|
port. (This also applies to dynamic SOCKS forwarding.)
|
2001-12-15 12:15:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b The \q{Remote ports do the same} option does the same thing for
|
|
|
|
remote-to-local port forwardings (so that machines other than the
|
|
|
|
SSH server machine can connect to the forwarded port.) Note that
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
this feature is only available in the SSH-2 protocol, and not all
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSH-2 servers support it (\i{OpenSSH} 3.0 does not, for example).
|
2001-12-15 12:15:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-portfwd-address-family} Selecting \i{Internet protocol
|
|
|
|
version} for forwarded ports
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
This switch allows you to select a specific Internet protocol (\i{IPv4}
|
|
|
|
or \i{IPv6}) for the local end of a forwarded port. By default, it is
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
set on \q{Auto}, which means that:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b for a local-to-remote port forwarding, PuTTY will listen for
|
|
|
|
incoming connections in both IPv4 and (if available) IPv6
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b for a remote-to-local port forwarding, PuTTY will choose a
|
|
|
|
sensible protocol for the outgoing connection.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-23 23:56:22 +00:00
|
|
|
This overrides the general Internet protocol version preference
|
|
|
|
on the Connection panel (see \k{config-address-family}).
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-08 14:45:26 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that some operating systems may listen for incoming connections
|
|
|
|
in IPv4 even if you specifically asked for IPv6, because their IPv4
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
and IPv6 protocol stacks are linked together. Apparently \i{Linux} does
|
2005-01-08 14:45:26 +00:00
|
|
|
this, and Windows does not. So if you're running PuTTY on Windows
|
|
|
|
and you tick \q{IPv6} for a local or dynamic port forwarding, it
|
|
|
|
will \e{only} be usable by connecting to it using IPv6; whereas if
|
|
|
|
you do the same on Linux, you can also use it with IPv4. However,
|
|
|
|
ticking \q{Auto} should always give you a port which you can connect
|
|
|
|
to using either protocol.
|
2004-12-30 16:45:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-25 09:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-ssh-bugs} \I{SSH server bugs}The Bugs and More Bugs panels
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Not all SSH servers work properly. Various existing servers have
|
|
|
|
bugs in them, which can make it impossible for a client to talk to
|
|
|
|
them unless it knows about the bug and works around it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Since most servers announce their software version number at the
|
|
|
|
beginning of the SSH connection, PuTTY will attempt to detect which
|
|
|
|
bugs it can expect to see in the server and automatically enable
|
|
|
|
workarounds. However, sometimes it will make mistakes; if the server
|
|
|
|
has been deliberately configured to conceal its version number, or
|
|
|
|
if the server is a version which PuTTY's bug database does not know
|
|
|
|
about, then PuTTY will not know what bugs to expect.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-25 09:46:56 +00:00
|
|
|
The Bugs and More Bugs panels (there are two because we have so many
|
|
|
|
bug compatibility modes) allow you to manually configure the bugs
|
|
|
|
PuTTY expects to see in the server. Each bug can be configured in
|
|
|
|
three states:
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Off}: PuTTY will assume the server does not have the bug.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{On}: PuTTY will assume the server \e{does} have the bug.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Auto}: PuTTY will use the server's version number announcement
|
Bug workaround to delay sending our SSH greeting.
Ian Jackson recently tried to use the recipe in the psusan manpage for
talking to UML, and found that the connection was not successfully set
up, because at some point during startup, UML read the SSH greeting
(ok, the bare-ssh-connection greeting) from its input fd and threw it
away. So by the time psusan was run by the guest init process, the
greeting wasn't there to be read.
Ian's report: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=991958
I was also able to reproduce this locally, which makes me wonder why I
_didn't_ notice it when I originally wrote that part of the psusan man
page. It worked for me before, honest! But now it doesn't.
Anyway. The ssh verstring module already has a mode switch to decide
whether we ought to send our greeting before or after waiting for the
other side's greeting (because that decision varies between client and
server, and between SSH-1 and SSH-2). So it's easy to implement an
override that forces it to 'wait for the server greeting first'.
I've added this as yet another bug workaround flag. But unlike all the
others, it can't be autodetected from the server's version string,
because, of course, we have to act on it _before_ seeing the server's
greeting and version string! So it's a manual-only flag.
However, I've mentioned it in the UML section of the psusan man page,
since that's the place where I _know_ people are likely to need to use
this flag.
2021-08-14 09:56:20 +00:00
|
|
|
to try to guess whether or not the server has the bug. (This option is
|
|
|
|
not available for bugs that \e{cannot} be detected from the server
|
|
|
|
version, e.g. because they must be acted on before the server version
|
|
|
|
is known.)
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-02-28 18:58:14 +00:00
|
|
|
(The PuTTY project has a defined policy about when we're prepared to
|
|
|
|
add auto-detection for a bug workaround. See \k{feedback-workarounds}.)
|
|
|
|
|
2010-04-23 18:32:15 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-ignore2} \q{Chokes on SSH-2 \i{ignore message}s}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
An ignore message (SSH_MSG_IGNORE) is a message in the SSH protocol
|
|
|
|
which can be sent from the client to the server, or from the server
|
|
|
|
to the client, at any time. Either side is required to ignore the
|
|
|
|
message whenever it receives it. PuTTY uses ignore messages in SSH-2
|
|
|
|
to confuse the encrypted data stream and make it harder to
|
|
|
|
cryptanalyse. It also uses ignore messages for connection
|
|
|
|
\i{keepalives} (see \k{config-keepalive}).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If it believes the server to have this bug, PuTTY will stop using
|
|
|
|
ignore messages. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct
|
|
|
|
server, the session will succeed, but keepalives will not work and
|
|
|
|
the session might be less cryptographically secure than it could be.
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-rekey} \q{Handles SSH-2 key re-exchange badly}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some SSH servers cannot cope with \i{repeat key exchange} at
|
|
|
|
all, and will ignore attempts by the client to start one. Since
|
|
|
|
PuTTY pauses the session while performing a repeat key exchange, the
|
|
|
|
effect of this would be to cause the session to hang after an hour
|
|
|
|
(unless you have your rekey timeout set differently; see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-ssh-kex-rekey} for more about rekeys).
|
|
|
|
Other, very old, SSH servers handle repeat key exchange even more
|
|
|
|
badly, and disconnect upon receiving a repeat key exchange request.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will never initiate a repeat key
|
|
|
|
exchange. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct server,
|
|
|
|
the session should still function, but may be less secure than you
|
|
|
|
would expect.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is an SSH-2-specific bug.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-08 18:31:15 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-winadj} \q{Chokes on PuTTY's SSH-2 \cq{winadj} requests}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY sometimes sends a special request to SSH servers in the middle
|
|
|
|
of channel data, with the name \cw{winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org}
|
|
|
|
(see \k{sshnames-channel}). The purpose of this request is to measure
|
|
|
|
the round-trip time to the server, which PuTTY uses to tune its flow
|
|
|
|
control. The server does not actually have to \e{understand} the
|
|
|
|
message; it is expected to send back a \cw{SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE}
|
|
|
|
message indicating that it didn't understand it. (All PuTTY needs for
|
|
|
|
its timing calculations is \e{some} kind of response.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It has been known for some SSH servers to get confused by this message
|
|
|
|
in one way or another \dash because it has a long name, or because
|
|
|
|
they can't cope with unrecognised request names even to the extent of
|
|
|
|
sending back the correct failure response, or because they handle it
|
|
|
|
sensibly but fill up the server's log file with pointless spam, or
|
|
|
|
whatever. PuTTY therefore supports this bug-compatibility flag: if it
|
|
|
|
believes the server has this bug, it will never send its
|
|
|
|
\cq{winadj@putty.projects.tartarus.org} request, and will make do
|
|
|
|
without its timing data.
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-chanreq} \q{Replies to requests on closed channels}
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
The SSH protocol as published in RFC 4254 has an ambiguity which
|
|
|
|
arises if one side of a connection tries to close a channel, while the
|
|
|
|
other side simultaneously sends a request within the channel and asks
|
|
|
|
for a reply. RFC 4254 leaves it unclear whether the closing side
|
|
|
|
should reply to the channel request after having announced its
|
|
|
|
intention to close the channel.
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
Discussion on the \cw{ietf-ssh} mailing list in April 2014 formed a
|
|
|
|
clear consensus that the right answer is no. However, because of the
|
|
|
|
ambiguity in the specification, some SSH servers have implemented the
|
|
|
|
other policy; for example,
|
|
|
|
\W{https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1818}{OpenSSH used to}
|
|
|
|
until it was fixed.
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
Because PuTTY sends channel requests with the \q{want reply} flag
|
|
|
|
throughout channels' lifetime (see \k{config-ssh-bug-winadj}), it's
|
|
|
|
possible that when connecting to such a server it might receive a
|
|
|
|
reply to a request after it thinks the channel has entirely closed,
|
|
|
|
and terminate with an error along the lines of \q{Received
|
|
|
|
\cw{SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE} for nonexistent channel 256}.
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-maxpkt2} \q{Ignores SSH-2 \i{maximum packet size}}
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
When an SSH-2 channel is set up, each end announces the maximum size
|
|
|
|
of data packet that it is willing to receive for that channel. Some
|
|
|
|
servers ignore PuTTY's announcement and send packets larger than PuTTY
|
|
|
|
is willing to accept, causing it to report \q{Incoming packet was
|
|
|
|
garbled on decryption}.
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY never allows the channel's
|
|
|
|
\i{flow-control window} to grow large enough to allow the server to
|
|
|
|
send an over-sized packet. If this bug is enabled when talking to a
|
|
|
|
correct server, the session will work correctly, but download
|
|
|
|
performance will be less than it could be.
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Bug workaround to delay sending our SSH greeting.
Ian Jackson recently tried to use the recipe in the psusan manpage for
talking to UML, and found that the connection was not successfully set
up, because at some point during startup, UML read the SSH greeting
(ok, the bare-ssh-connection greeting) from its input fd and threw it
away. So by the time psusan was run by the guest init process, the
greeting wasn't there to be read.
Ian's report: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=991958
I was also able to reproduce this locally, which makes me wonder why I
_didn't_ notice it when I originally wrote that part of the psusan man
page. It worked for me before, honest! But now it doesn't.
Anyway. The ssh verstring module already has a mode switch to decide
whether we ought to send our greeting before or after waiting for the
other side's greeting (because that decision varies between client and
server, and between SSH-1 and SSH-2). So it's easy to implement an
override that forces it to 'wait for the server greeting first'.
I've added this as yet another bug workaround flag. But unlike all the
others, it can't be autodetected from the server's version string,
because, of course, we have to act on it _before_ seeing the server's
greeting and version string! So it's a manual-only flag.
However, I've mentioned it in the UML section of the psusan man page,
since that's the place where I _know_ people are likely to need to use
this flag.
2021-08-14 09:56:20 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-dropstart} \q{Discards data sent before its greeting}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Just occasionally, an SSH connection can be established over some
|
|
|
|
channel that will accidentally discard outgoing data very early in the
|
|
|
|
connection.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is not typically seen as a bug in an actual SSH server, but it
|
|
|
|
can sometimes occur in situations involving a complicated proxy
|
|
|
|
process. An example is
|
|
|
|
\W{https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=991958}{Debian
|
|
|
|
bug #991958}, in which a connection going over the console of a User
|
|
|
|
Mode Linux kernel can lose outgoing data before the kernel has fully
|
|
|
|
booted.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can work around this problem by manually enabling this bug flag,
|
|
|
|
which will cause PuTTY to wait to send its initial SSH greeting until
|
|
|
|
after it sees the greeting from the server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that this bug flag can never be automatically detected, since
|
|
|
|
auto-detection relies on the version string in the server's greeting,
|
|
|
|
and PuTTY has to decide whether to expect this bug \e{before} it sees
|
|
|
|
the server's greeting. So this is a manual workaround only.
|
|
|
|
|
New bug workaround: KEXINIT filtering.
We've occasionally had reports of SSH servers disconnecting as soon as
they receive PuTTY's KEXINIT. I think all such reports have involved
the kind of simple ROM-based SSH server software you find in small
embedded devices.
I've never been able to prove it, but I've always suspected that one
possible cause of this is simply that PuTTY's KEXINIT is _too long_,
either in number of algorithms listed or in total length (especially
given all the ones that end in @very.long.domain.name suffixes).
If I'm right about either of those being the cause, then it's just
become even more likely to happen, because of all the extra
Diffie-Hellman groups and GSSAPI algorithms we just threw into our
already-long list in the previous few commits.
A workaround I've had in mind for ages is to wait for the server's
KEXINIT, and then filter our own down to just the algorithms the
server also mentioned. Then our KEXINIT is no longer than that of the
server, and hence, presumably fits in whatever buffer it has. So I've
implemented that workaround, in anticipation of it being needed in the
near future.
(Well ... it's not _quite_ true that our KEXINIT is at most the same
length as the server. In fact I had to leave in one KEXINIT item that
won't match anything in the server's list, namely "ext-info-c" which
gates access to SHA-2 based RSA. So if we turn out to support
absolutely everything on all the server's lists, then our KEXINIT
would be a few bytes longer than the server's, even with this
workaround. But that would only cause trouble if the server's outgoing
KEXINIT was skating very close to whatever buffer size it has for the
incoming one, and I'm guessing that's not very likely.)
((Another possible cause of this kind of disconnection would be a
server that simply objects to seeing any KEXINIT string it doesn't
know how to speak. But _surely_ no such server would have survived
initial testing against any full-featured client at all!))
2022-08-30 17:51:33 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-filter-kexinit} \q{Chokes on PuTTY's full \cw{KEXINIT}}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At the start of an SSH connection, the client and server exchange long
|
|
|
|
messages of type \cw{SSH_MSG_KEXINIT}, containing lists of all the
|
|
|
|
cryptographic algorithms they're prepared to use. This is used to
|
|
|
|
negotiate a set of algorithms that both ends can speak.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Occasionally, a badly written server might have a length limit on the
|
|
|
|
list it's prepared to receive, and refuse to make a connection simply
|
|
|
|
because PuTTY is giving it too many choices.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A workaround is to enable this flag, which will make PuTTY wait to
|
|
|
|
send \cw{KEXINIT} until after it receives the one from the server, and
|
|
|
|
then filter its own \cw{KEXINIT} to leave out any algorithm the server
|
|
|
|
doesn't also announce support for. This will generally make PuTTY's
|
|
|
|
\cw{KEXINIT} at most the size of the server's, and will otherwise make
|
|
|
|
no difference to the algorithm negotiation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This flag is a minor violation of the SSH protocol, because both sides
|
|
|
|
are supposed to send \cw{KEXINIT} proactively. It still works provided
|
|
|
|
\e{one} side sends its \cw{KEXINIT} without waiting, but if both
|
|
|
|
client and server waited for the other one to speak first, the
|
|
|
|
connection would deadlock. We don't know of any servers that do this,
|
|
|
|
but if there is one, then this flag will make PuTTY unable to speak to
|
|
|
|
them at all.
|
|
|
|
|
2023-05-05 22:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-rsa-sha2-cert-userauth} \q{Old RSA/SHA2 cert
|
|
|
|
algorithm naming}
|
2023-05-04 17:24:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If PuTTY is trying to do SSH-2 user authentication using an RSA key,
|
|
|
|
and the server is using one of the newer SHA-2 based versions of the
|
|
|
|
SSH RSA protocol, and the user's key is also a certificate, then
|
|
|
|
earlier versions of OpenSSH (up to 7.7) disagree with later versions
|
|
|
|
about the right key algorithm string to send in the
|
|
|
|
\cw{SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST} packet. Modern versions send a string
|
|
|
|
that indicates both the SHA-2 nature and the certificate nature of the
|
|
|
|
key, such as \cq{rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com}. Earlier versions
|
|
|
|
would reject that, and insist on seeing
|
|
|
|
\cq{ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com} followed by a SHA-2 based signature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY should auto-detect the presence of this bug in earlier OpenSSH
|
|
|
|
and adjust to send the right string.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-sig} \q{Requires padding on SSH-2 \i{RSA} \i{signatures}}
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Versions below 3.3 of \i{OpenSSH} require SSH-2 RSA signatures to be
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
padded with zero bytes to the same length as the RSA key modulus.
|
2006-11-08 00:55:13 +00:00
|
|
|
The SSH-2 specification says that an unpadded signature MUST be
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
accepted, so this is a bug. A typical symptom of this problem is
|
|
|
|
that PuTTY mysteriously fails RSA authentication once in every few
|
|
|
|
hundred attempts, and falls back to passwords.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will pad its signatures in the way
|
|
|
|
OpenSSH expects. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct
|
|
|
|
server, it is likely that no damage will be done, since correct
|
|
|
|
servers usually still accept padded signatures because they're used
|
|
|
|
to talking to OpenSSH.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
This is an SSH-2-specific bug.
|
2002-09-08 13:28:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-oldgex2} \q{Only supports pre-RFC4419 SSH-2 DH GEX}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The SSH key exchange method that uses Diffie-Hellman group exchange
|
|
|
|
was redesigned after its original release, to use a slightly more
|
|
|
|
sophisticated setup message. Almost all SSH implementations switched
|
|
|
|
over to the new version. (PuTTY was one of the last.) A few old
|
|
|
|
servers still only support the old one.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, and the client and server negotiate
|
|
|
|
Diffie-Hellman group exchange, then PuTTY will send the old message
|
|
|
|
now known as \cw{SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD} in place of the new
|
|
|
|
\cw{SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is an SSH-2-specific bug.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-hmac2} \q{Miscomputes SSH-2 HMAC keys}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Versions 2.3.0 and below of the SSH server software from
|
|
|
|
\cw{ssh.com} compute the keys for their \i{HMAC} \i{message authentication
|
|
|
|
code}s incorrectly. A typical symptom of this problem is that PuTTY
|
|
|
|
dies unexpectedly at the beginning of the session, saying
|
|
|
|
\q{Incorrect MAC received on packet}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will compute its HMAC keys in the
|
|
|
|
same way as the buggy server, so that communication will still be
|
|
|
|
possible. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct server,
|
|
|
|
communication will fail.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is an SSH-2-specific bug.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-pksessid2} \q{Misuses the \i{session ID} in SSH-2 PK auth}
|
2003-02-04 13:02:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Versions below 2.3 of \i{OpenSSH} require SSH-2 \i{public-key authentication}
|
2003-02-04 13:02:51 +00:00
|
|
|
to be done slightly differently: the data to be signed by the client
|
|
|
|
contains the session ID formatted in a different way. If public-key
|
|
|
|
authentication mysteriously does not work but the Event Log (see
|
|
|
|
\k{using-eventlog}) thinks it has successfully sent a signature, it
|
|
|
|
might be worth enabling the workaround for this bug to see if it
|
|
|
|
helps.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will sign data in the way OpenSSH
|
|
|
|
expects. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct server,
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
SSH-2 public-key authentication will fail.
|
2003-02-04 13:02:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
This is an SSH-2-specific bug.
|
2003-02-04 13:02:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-derivekey2} \q{Miscomputes SSH-2 \i{encryption} keys}
|
2005-01-11 10:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
Versions below 2.0.11 of the SSH server software from \i\cw{ssh.com}
|
|
|
|
compute the keys for the session encryption incorrectly. This
|
|
|
|
problem can cause various error messages, such as \q{Incoming packet
|
|
|
|
was garbled on decryption}, or possibly even \q{Out of memory}.
|
2005-01-11 10:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will compute its encryption keys in
|
|
|
|
the same way as the buggy server, so that communication will still
|
|
|
|
be possible. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct
|
|
|
|
server, communication will fail.
|
2005-01-11 10:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-03-10 16:36:05 +00:00
|
|
|
This is an SSH-2-specific bug.
|
2005-01-11 10:37:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-ignore1} \q{Chokes on SSH-1 \i{ignore message}s}
|
2007-12-05 00:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
An ignore message (SSH_MSG_IGNORE) is a message in the SSH protocol
|
|
|
|
which can be sent from the client to the server, or from the server
|
|
|
|
to the client, at any time. Either side is required to ignore the
|
|
|
|
message whenever it receives it. PuTTY uses ignore messages to
|
|
|
|
\I{password camouflage}hide the password packet in SSH-1, so that
|
|
|
|
a listener cannot tell the length of the user's password; it also
|
|
|
|
uses ignore messages for connection \i{keepalives} (see
|
|
|
|
\k{config-keepalive}).
|
2007-12-05 00:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will stop using ignore messages. This
|
|
|
|
means that keepalives will stop working, and PuTTY will have to fall
|
|
|
|
back to a secondary defence against SSH-1 password-length
|
|
|
|
eavesdropping. See \k{config-ssh-bug-plainpw1}. If this bug is
|
|
|
|
enabled when talking to a correct server, the session will succeed,
|
|
|
|
but keepalives will not work and the session might be more
|
|
|
|
vulnerable to eavesdroppers than it could be.
|
2007-12-05 00:02:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-plainpw1} \q{Refuses all SSH-1 \i{password camouflage}}
|
2014-07-06 14:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
When talking to an SSH-1 server which cannot deal with ignore
|
|
|
|
messages (see \k{config-ssh-bug-ignore1}), PuTTY will attempt to
|
|
|
|
disguise the length of the user's password by sending additional
|
|
|
|
padding \e{within} the password packet. This is technically a
|
|
|
|
violation of the SSH-1 specification, and so PuTTY will only do it
|
|
|
|
when it cannot use standards-compliant ignore messages as
|
|
|
|
camouflage. In this sense, for a server to refuse to accept a padded
|
|
|
|
password packet is not really a bug, but it does make life
|
|
|
|
inconvenient if the server can also not handle ignore messages.
|
2014-07-06 14:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
If this \q{bug} is detected, PuTTY will assume that neither ignore
|
|
|
|
messages nor padding are acceptable, and that it thus has no choice
|
|
|
|
but to send the user's password with no form of camouflage, so that
|
|
|
|
an eavesdropping user will be easily able to find out the exact length
|
|
|
|
of the password. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct
|
|
|
|
server, the session will succeed, but will be more vulnerable to
|
|
|
|
eavesdroppers than it could be.
|
2014-07-06 14:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
This is an SSH-1-specific bug. SSH-2 is secure against this type of
|
|
|
|
attack.
|
2014-07-06 14:05:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
\S{config-ssh-bug-rsa1} \q{Chokes on SSH-1 \i{RSA} authentication}
|
2015-04-25 09:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
Some SSH-1 servers cannot deal with RSA authentication messages at
|
|
|
|
all. If \i{Pageant} is running and contains any SSH-1 keys, PuTTY will
|
|
|
|
normally automatically try RSA authentication before falling back to
|
|
|
|
passwords, so these servers will crash when they see the RSA attempt.
|
2015-04-25 09:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
If this bug is detected, PuTTY will go straight to password
|
|
|
|
authentication. If this bug is enabled when talking to a correct
|
|
|
|
server, the session will succeed, but of course RSA authentication
|
|
|
|
will be impossible.
|
2015-04-25 09:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-19 14:35:09 +00:00
|
|
|
This is an SSH-1-specific bug.
|
2015-04-25 09:46:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-19 15:22:33 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-psusan} The \q{Bare \cw{\i{ssh-connection}}} protocol
|
2021-04-17 12:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In addition to SSH itself, PuTTY also supports a second protocol that
|
|
|
|
is derived from SSH. It's listed in the PuTTY GUI under the name
|
|
|
|
\q{Bare \cw{ssh-connection}}.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-19 15:22:33 +00:00
|
|
|
This protocol consists of just the innermost of SSH-2's three layers: it
|
2021-04-17 12:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
leaves out the cryptography layer providing network security, and it
|
|
|
|
leaves out the authentication layer where you provide a username and
|
|
|
|
prove you're allowed to log in as that user.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It is therefore \s{completely unsuited to any network connection}.
|
|
|
|
Don't try to use it over a network!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The purpose of this protocol is for various specialist circumstances
|
|
|
|
in which the \q{connection} is not over a real network, but is a pipe
|
|
|
|
or IPC channel between different processes running on the \e{same}
|
|
|
|
computer. In these contexts, the operating system will already have
|
|
|
|
guaranteed that each of the two communicating processes is owned by
|
|
|
|
the expected user (so that no authentication is necessary), and that
|
|
|
|
the communications channel cannot be tapped by a hostile user on the
|
|
|
|
same machine (so that no cryptography is necessary either). Examples
|
|
|
|
of possible uses involve communicating with a strongly separated
|
|
|
|
context such as the inside of a container, or a VM, or a different
|
|
|
|
network namespace.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Explicit support for this protocol is new in PuTTY 0.75. As of
|
|
|
|
2021-04, the only known server for the bare \cw{ssh-connection}
|
2021-04-19 15:22:33 +00:00
|
|
|
protocol is the Unix program \cq{\i{psusan}} that is also part of the
|
2021-04-17 12:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY tool suite.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(However, this protocol is also the same one used between instances of
|
|
|
|
PuTTY to implement connection sharing: see \k{config-ssh-sharing}. In
|
|
|
|
fact, in the Unix version of PuTTY, when a sharing upstream records
|
|
|
|
\q{Sharing this connection at [pathname]} in the Event Log, it's
|
|
|
|
possible to connect another instance of PuTTY directly to that Unix
|
|
|
|
socket, by entering its pathname in the host name box and selecting
|
|
|
|
\q{Bare \cw{ssh-connection}} as the protocol!)
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-19 15:22:33 +00:00
|
|
|
Many of the options under the SSH panel also affect this protocol,
|
|
|
|
although options to do with cryptography and authentication do not,
|
|
|
|
for obvious reasons.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-17 12:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
I repeat, \s{DON'T TRY TO USE THIS PROTOCOL FOR NETWORK CONNECTIONS!}
|
|
|
|
That's not what it's for, and it's not at all safe to do it.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-28 10:35:12 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-serial} The Serial panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \i{Serial} panel allows you to configure options that only apply
|
|
|
|
when PuTTY is connecting to a local \I{serial port}\i{serial line}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-serial-line} Selecting a serial line to connect to
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Serial line to connect to} box allows you to choose which
|
|
|
|
serial line you want PuTTY to talk to, if your computer has more
|
|
|
|
than one serial port.
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-04 12:12:52 +00:00
|
|
|
On Windows, the first serial line is called \i\cw{COM1}, and if there
|
2007-02-28 21:30:06 +00:00
|
|
|
is a second it is called \cw{COM2}, and so on.
|
2006-08-28 10:35:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This configuration setting is also visible on the Session panel,
|
|
|
|
where it replaces the \q{Host Name} box (see \k{config-hostname}) if
|
|
|
|
the connection type is set to \q{Serial}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-serial-speed} Selecting the speed of your serial line
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Speed} box allows you to choose the speed (or \q{baud rate})
|
|
|
|
at which to talk to the serial line. Typical values might be 9600,
|
|
|
|
19200, 38400 or 57600. Which one you need will depend on the device
|
|
|
|
at the other end of the serial cable; consult the manual for that
|
|
|
|
device if you are in doubt.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This configuration setting is also visible on the Session panel,
|
|
|
|
where it replaces the \q{Port} box (see \k{config-hostname}) if the
|
|
|
|
connection type is set to \q{Serial}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-serial-databits} Selecting the number of data bits
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Data bits} box allows you to choose how many data bits are
|
|
|
|
transmitted in each byte sent or received through the serial line.
|
|
|
|
Typical values are 7 or 8.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-serial-stopbits} Selecting the number of stop bits
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Stop bits} box allows you to choose how many stop bits are
|
|
|
|
used in the serial line protocol. Typical values are 1, 1.5 or 2.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-serial-parity} Selecting the serial parity checking scheme
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Parity} box allows you to choose what type of parity checking
|
|
|
|
is used on the serial line. The settings are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{None}: no parity bit is sent at all.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Odd}: an extra parity bit is sent alongside each byte, and
|
|
|
|
arranged so that the total number of 1 bits is odd.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Even}: an extra parity bit is sent alongside each byte, and
|
|
|
|
arranged so that the total number of 1 bits is even.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Mark}: an extra parity bit is sent alongside each byte, and
|
|
|
|
always set to 1.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{Space}: an extra parity bit is sent alongside each byte, and
|
|
|
|
always set to 0.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-serial-flow} Selecting the serial flow control scheme
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The \q{Flow control} box allows you to choose what type of flow
|
|
|
|
control checking is used on the serial line. The settings are:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{None}: no flow control is done. Data may be lost if either
|
|
|
|
side attempts to send faster than the serial line permits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{XON/XOFF}: flow control is done by sending XON and XOFF
|
|
|
|
characters within the data stream.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{RTS/CTS}: flow control is done using the RTS and CTS wires on
|
|
|
|
the serial line.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b \q{DSR/DTR}: flow control is done using the DSR and DTR wires on
|
|
|
|
the serial line.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-05 13:30:39 +00:00
|
|
|
\H{config-telnet} The \i{Telnet} panel
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Telnet panel allows you to configure options that only apply to
|
|
|
|
Telnet sessions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-oldenviron} \q{Handling of OLD_ENVIRON ambiguity}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The original Telnet mechanism for passing \i{environment variables} was
|
|
|
|
badly specified. At the time the standard (RFC 1408) was written,
|
|
|
|
BSD telnet implementations were already supporting the feature, and
|
|
|
|
the intention of the standard was to describe the behaviour the BSD
|
|
|
|
implementations were already using.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sadly there was a typing error in the standard when it was issued,
|
|
|
|
and two vital function codes were specified the wrong way round. BSD
|
|
|
|
implementations did not change, and the standard was not corrected.
|
|
|
|
Therefore, it's possible you might find either \i{BSD} or \i{RFC}-compliant
|
|
|
|
implementations out there. This switch allows you to choose which
|
|
|
|
one PuTTY claims to be.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The problem was solved by issuing a second standard, defining a new
|
|
|
|
Telnet mechanism called \i\cw{NEW_ENVIRON}, which behaved exactly like
|
|
|
|
the original \i\cw{OLD_ENVIRON} but was not encumbered by existing
|
|
|
|
implementations. Most Telnet servers now support this, and it's
|
|
|
|
unambiguous. This feature should only be needed if you have trouble
|
|
|
|
passing environment variables to quite an old server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\S{config-ptelnet} Passive and active \i{Telnet negotiation} modes
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In a Telnet connection, there are two types of data passed between
|
|
|
|
the client and the server: actual text, and \e{negotiations} about
|
|
|
|
which Telnet extra features to use.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PuTTY can use two different strategies for negotiation:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b In \I{active Telnet negotiation}\e{active} mode, PuTTY starts to send
|
|
|
|
negotiations as soon as the connection is opened.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\b In \I{passive Telnet negotiation}\e{passive} mode, PuTTY will wait to
|
|
|
|
negotiate until it sees a negotiation from the server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The obvious disadvantage of passive mode is that if the server is
|
|
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also operating in a passive mode, then negotiation will never begin
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at all. For this reason PuTTY defaults to active mode.
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However, sometimes passive mode is required in order to successfully
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get through certain types of firewall and \i{Telnet proxy} server. If
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you have confusing trouble with a \i{firewall}, you could try enabling
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passive mode to see if it helps.
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\S{config-telnetkey} \q{Keyboard sends \i{Telnet special commands}}
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If this box is checked, several key sequences will have their normal
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actions modified:
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\b the Backspace key on the keyboard will send the \I{Erase Character,
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Telnet special command}Telnet special backspace code;
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\b Control-C will send the Telnet special \I{Interrupt Process, Telnet
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special command}Interrupt Process code;
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\b Control-Z will send the Telnet special \I{Suspend Process, Telnet
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special command}Suspend Process code.
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You probably shouldn't enable this
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unless you know what you're doing.
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\S{config-telnetnl} \q{Return key sends \i{Telnet New Line} instead of ^M}
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Unlike most other remote login protocols, the Telnet protocol has a
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special \q{\i{new line}} code that is not the same as the usual line
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endings of Control-M or Control-J. By default, PuTTY sends the
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Telnet New Line code when you press Return, instead of sending
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Control-M as it does in most other protocols.
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Most Unix-style Telnet servers don't mind whether they receive
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Telnet New Line or Control-M; some servers do expect New Line, and
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some servers prefer to see ^M. If you are seeing surprising
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behaviour when you press Return in a Telnet session, you might try
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turning this option off to see if it helps.
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\H{config-rlogin} The Rlogin panel
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The \i{Rlogin} panel allows you to configure options that only apply to
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Rlogin sessions.
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\S{config-rlogin-localuser} \I{local username in Rlogin}\q{Local username}
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Rlogin allows an automated (password-free) form of login by means of
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a file called \i\c{.rhosts} on the server. You put a line in your
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\c{.rhosts} file saying something like \c{jbloggs@pc1.example.com},
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and then when you make an Rlogin connection the client transmits the
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username of the user running the Rlogin client. The server checks
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the username and hostname against \c{.rhosts}, and if they match it
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\I{passwordless login}does not ask for a password.
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This only works because Unix systems contain a safeguard to stop a
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user from pretending to be another user in an Rlogin connection.
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Rlogin connections have to come from \I{privileged port}port numbers below
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1024, and Unix systems prohibit this to unprivileged processes; so when the
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server sees a connection from a low-numbered port, it assumes the
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client end of the connection is held by a privileged (and therefore
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trusted) process, so it believes the claim of who the user is.
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Windows does not have this restriction: \e{any} user can initiate an
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outgoing connection from a low-numbered port. Hence, the Rlogin
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\c{.rhosts} mechanism is completely useless for securely
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distinguishing several different users on a Windows machine. If you
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have a \c{.rhosts} entry pointing at a Windows PC, you should assume
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that \e{anyone} using that PC can \i{spoof} your username in
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an Rlogin connection and access your account on the server.
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The \q{Local username} control allows you to specify what user name
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PuTTY should claim you have, in case it doesn't match your \i{Windows
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user name} (or in case you didn't bother to set up a Windows user
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name).
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\H{config-supdup} The \i{SUPDUP} panel
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The SUPDUP panel allows you to configure options that only apply
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to SUPDUP sessions. See \k{using-supdup} for more about the SUPDUP
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protocol.
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\S{supdup-location} \q{Location string}
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In SUPDUP, the client sends a piece of text of its choice to the
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server giving the user's location. This is typically displayed in
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lists of logged-in users.
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By default, PuTTY just defaults this to "The Internet". If you want
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your location to show up as something more specific, you can configure
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it here.
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\S{supdup-ascii} \q{Extended ASCII Character set}
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This declares what kind of character set extension your terminal
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supports. If the server supports it, it will send text using that
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character set. \q{None} means the standard 95 printable ASCII
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characters. \q{ITS} means ASCII extended with printable characters in
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the control character range. This character set is documented in the
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SUPDUP protocol definition. \q{WAITS} is similar to \q{ITS} but uses
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some alternative characters in the extended set: most prominently, it
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will display arrows instead of \c{^} and \c{_}, and \c{\}} instead of
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\c{~}. \q{ITS} extended ASCII is used by ITS and Lisp machines,
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whilst \q{WAITS} is only used by the WAITS operating system from the
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Stanford AI Laboratory.
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\S{supdup-more} \q{**MORE** processing}
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When **MORE** processing is enabled, the server causes output to pause
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at the bottom of the screen, until a space is typed.
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\S{supdup-scroll} \q{Terminal scrolling}
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|
2022-11-02 23:58:23 +00:00
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This controls whether the terminal will perform scrolling when the
|
2021-04-05 13:30:39 +00:00
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|
cursor goes below the last line, or if the cursor will return to the
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|
first line.
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|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
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\H{config-file} \ii{Storing configuration in a file}
|
2001-04-17 10:39:19 +00:00
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|
PuTTY does not currently support storing its configuration in a file
|
2005-04-05 18:01:32 +00:00
|
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|
instead of the \i{Registry}. However, you can work around this with a
|
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|
couple of \i{batch file}s.
|
2001-04-17 10:39:19 +00:00
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|
You will need a file called (say) \c{PUTTY.BAT} which imports the
|
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|
|
contents of a file into the Registry, then runs PuTTY, exports the
|
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|
|
contents of the Registry back into the file, and deletes the
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|
|
Registry entries. This can all be done using the Regedit command
|
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|
|
line options, so it's all automatic. Here is what you need in
|
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|
\c{PUTTY.BAT}:
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|
\c @ECHO OFF
|
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|
|
\c regedit /s putty.reg
|
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|
|
\c regedit /s puttyrnd.reg
|
|
|
|
\c start /w putty.exe
|
2004-05-22 11:09:31 +00:00
|
|
|
\c regedit /ea new.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY
|
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|
|
\c copy new.reg putty.reg
|
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|
|
\c del new.reg
|
2001-04-17 10:39:19 +00:00
|
|
|
\c regedit /s puttydel.reg
|
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|
This batch file needs two auxiliary files: \c{PUTTYRND.REG} which
|
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|
|
sets up an initial safe location for the \c{PUTTY.RND} random seed
|
|
|
|
file, and \c{PUTTYDEL.REG} which destroys everything in the Registry
|
|
|
|
once it's been successfully saved back to the file.
|
|
|
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|
|
Here is \c{PUTTYDEL.REG}:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c REGEDIT4
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\c
|
2001-04-17 10:39:19 +00:00
|
|
|
\c [-HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Here is an example \c{PUTTYRND.REG} file:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\c REGEDIT4
|
2019-09-08 19:29:00 +00:00
|
|
|
\c
|
2001-04-17 10:39:19 +00:00
|
|
|
\c [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY]
|
2004-03-05 19:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
\c "RandSeedFile"="a:\\putty.rnd"
|
2001-04-17 10:39:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You should replace \c{a:\\putty.rnd} with the location where you
|
|
|
|
want to store your random number data. If the aim is to carry around
|
2014-05-26 09:27:54 +00:00
|
|
|
PuTTY and its settings on one USB stick, you probably want to store it
|
|
|
|
on the USB stick.
|