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Add implementation of the Argon2 password hash.
This is going to be used in the new version of the PPK file format. It was the winner of the Password Hashing Context, which I think makes it a reasonable choice. Argon2 comes in three flavours: one with no data dependency in its memory addressing, one with _deliberate_ data dependency (intended to serialise computation, to hinder parallel brute-forcing), and a hybrid form that starts off data-independent and then switches over to the dependent version once the sensitive input data has been adequately mixed around. I test all three in the test suite; the side-channel tester can only expect Argon2i to pass; and, following the spec's recommendation, I'll be using Argon2id for the actual key file encryption.
This commit is contained in:
parent
5c8f3bf924
commit
0faeb82ccd
2
Recipe
2
Recipe
@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ NONSSH = telnet raw rlogin supdup ldisc pinger
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# SSH back end (putty, plink, pscp, psftp).
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ARITH = mpint ecc
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SSHCRYPTO = ARITH sshmd5 sshsha sshsh256 sshsh512 sshsha3 sshblake2
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SSHCRYPTO = ARITH sshmd5 sshsha sshsh256 sshsh512 sshsha3 sshblake2 sshargon2
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+ sshrsa sshdss sshecc
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+ sshdes sshblowf sshaes sshccp ssharcf
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+ sshdh sshcrc sshcrcda sshauxcrypt
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12
ssh.h
12
ssh.h
@ -930,6 +930,18 @@ struct ssh2_userkey {
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char *comment; /* the key comment */
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};
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/* Argon2 password hashing function */
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typedef enum { Argon2d = 0, Argon2i = 1, Argon2id = 2 } Argon2Flavour;
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void argon2(Argon2Flavour, uint32_t mem, uint32_t passes,
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uint32_t parallel, uint32_t taglen,
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ptrlen P, ptrlen S, ptrlen K, ptrlen X, strbuf *out);
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void argon2_choose_passes(
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Argon2Flavour, uint32_t mem, uint32_t milliseconds, uint32_t *passes,
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uint32_t parallel, uint32_t taglen, ptrlen P, ptrlen S, ptrlen K, ptrlen X,
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strbuf *out);
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/* The H' hash defined in Argon2, exposed just for testcrypt */
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strbuf *argon2_long_hash(unsigned length, ptrlen data);
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/* The maximum length of any hash algorithm. (bytes) */
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#define MAX_HASH_LEN (114) /* longest is SHAKE256 with 114-byte output */
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582
sshargon2.c
Normal file
582
sshargon2.c
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
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/*
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* Implementation of the Argon2 password hash function.
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*
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* My sources for the algorithm description and test vectors (the latter in
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* test/cryptsuite.py) were the reference implementation on Github, and also
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* the Internet-Draft description:
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*
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* https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2
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* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-12
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*
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* Note on the spec: I believe draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-12 has an error in the
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* description. When making the pseudorandom data used for calculating Argon2i
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* block indices, the spec in the Github repository says that you make a block
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* of preimage data and then apply the block-mixing function G to it _twice_
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* in iteration. But draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-12 only mentions applying it once.
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*
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* The test vectors and reference implementation settle the difference: the
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* reference implementation also applies G twice, and comes with a program
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* that regenerates the test vectors as found in draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-12. So
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* draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-12 is not consistent within itself - the algorithm
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* with G applied just once does not pass its own test vectors. I'm convinced
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* that the intention was to apply G twice.
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "putty.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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#include "marshal.h"
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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* Argon2 uses data marshalling rules similar to SSH but with 32-bit integers
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* stored little-endian. Start with some local BinarySink routines for storing
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* a uint32 and a string in that fashion.
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*/
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static void BinarySink_put_uint32_le(BinarySink *bs, unsigned long val)
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{
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unsigned char data[4];
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PUT_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(data, val);
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bs->write(bs, data, sizeof(data));
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}
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static void BinarySink_put_stringpl_le(BinarySink *bs, ptrlen pl)
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{
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/* Check that the string length fits in a uint32, without doing a
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* potentially implementation-defined shift of more than 31 bits */
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assert((pl.len >> 31) < 2);
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BinarySink_put_uint32_le(bs, pl.len);
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bs->write(bs, pl.ptr, pl.len);
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}
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#define put_uint32_le(bs, val) \
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BinarySink_put_uint32_le(BinarySink_UPCAST(bs), val)
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#define put_stringpl_le(bs, val) \
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BinarySink_put_stringpl_le(BinarySink_UPCAST(bs), val)
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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* Argon2 defines a hash-function family that's an extension of BLAKE2b to
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* generate longer output digests, by repeatedly outputting half of a BLAKE2
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* hash output and then re-hashing the whole thing until there are 64 or fewer
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* bytes left to output. The spec calls this H' (a variant of the original
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* hash it calls H, which is the unmodified BLAKE2b).
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*/
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static ssh_hash *hprime_new(unsigned length)
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{
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ssh_hash *h = blake2b_new_general(length > 64 ? 64 : length);
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put_uint32_le(h, length);
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return h;
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}
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static void hprime_final(ssh_hash *h, unsigned length, void *vout)
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{
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uint8_t *out = (uint8_t *)vout;
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while (length > 64) {
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uint8_t hashbuf[64];
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ssh_hash_final(h, hashbuf);
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unsigned chunk = 32;
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if (chunk > length)
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chunk = length;
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memcpy(out, hashbuf, chunk);
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out += chunk;
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length -= chunk;
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h = blake2b_new_general(length > 64 ? 64 : length);
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put_data(h, hashbuf, 64);
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smemclr(hashbuf, sizeof(hashbuf));
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}
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ssh_hash_final(h, out);
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}
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/* Externally visible entry point for the long hash function. This is only
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* used by testcrypt, so it would be overkill to set it up like a proper
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* ssh_hash. */
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strbuf *argon2_long_hash(unsigned length, ptrlen data)
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{
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ssh_hash *h = hprime_new(length);
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put_datapl(h, data);
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strbuf *out = strbuf_new();
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hprime_final(h, length, strbuf_append(out, length));
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return out;
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}
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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* Argon2's own mixing function G, which operates on 1Kb blocks of data.
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*
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* The definition of G in the spec takes two 1Kb blocks as input and produces
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* a 1Kb output block. The first thing that happens to the input blocks is
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* that they get XORed together, and then only the XOR output is used, so you
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* could perfectly well regard G as a 1Kb->1Kb function.
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*/
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static inline uint64_t ror(uint64_t x, unsigned rotation)
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{
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unsigned lshift = 63 & -rotation, rshift = 63 & rotation;
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return (x << lshift) | (x >> rshift);
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}
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static inline uint64_t trunc32(uint64_t x)
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{
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return x & 0xFFFFFFFF;
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}
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/* Internal function similar to the BLAKE2b round, which mixes up four 64-bit
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* words */
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static inline void GB(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint64_t *c, uint64_t *d)
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{
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*a += *b + 2 * trunc32(*a) * trunc32(*b);
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*d = ror(*d ^ *a, 32);
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*c += *d + 2 * trunc32(*c) * trunc32(*d);
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*b = ror(*b ^ *c, 24);
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*a += *b + 2 * trunc32(*a) * trunc32(*b);
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*d = ror(*d ^ *a, 16);
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*c += *d + 2 * trunc32(*c) * trunc32(*d);
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*b = ror(*b ^ *c, 63);
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}
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/* Higher-level internal function which mixes up sixteen 64-bit words. This is
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* applied to different subsets of the 128 words in a kilobyte block, and the
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* API here is designed to make it easy to apply in the circumstances the spec
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* requires. In every call, the sixteen words form eight pairs adjacent in
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* memory, whose addresses are in arithmetic progression. So the 16 input
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* words are in[0], in[1], in[instep], in[instep+1], ..., in[7*instep],
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* in[7*instep+1], and the 16 output words similarly. */
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static inline void P(uint64_t *out, unsigned outstep,
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uint64_t *in, unsigned instep)
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{
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for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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out[i*outstep] = in[i*instep];
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out[i*outstep+1] = in[i*instep+1];
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}
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GB(out+0*outstep+0, out+2*outstep+0, out+4*outstep+0, out+6*outstep+0);
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GB(out+0*outstep+1, out+2*outstep+1, out+4*outstep+1, out+6*outstep+1);
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GB(out+1*outstep+0, out+3*outstep+0, out+5*outstep+0, out+7*outstep+0);
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GB(out+1*outstep+1, out+3*outstep+1, out+5*outstep+1, out+7*outstep+1);
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GB(out+0*outstep+0, out+2*outstep+1, out+5*outstep+0, out+7*outstep+1);
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GB(out+0*outstep+1, out+3*outstep+0, out+5*outstep+1, out+6*outstep+0);
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GB(out+1*outstep+0, out+3*outstep+1, out+4*outstep+0, out+6*outstep+1);
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GB(out+1*outstep+1, out+2*outstep+0, out+4*outstep+1, out+7*outstep+0);
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}
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/* The full G function, taking input blocks X and Y. The result of G is most
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* often XORed into an existing output block, so this API is designed with
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* that in mind: the mixing function's output is always XORed into whatever
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* 1Kb of data is already at 'out'. */
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static void G_xor(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *X, const uint8_t *Y)
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{
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uint64_t R[128], Q[128], Z[128];
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for (unsigned i = 0; i < 128; i++)
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R[i] = GET_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(X + 8*i) ^ GET_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(Y + 8*i);
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for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++)
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P(Q+16*i, 2, R+16*i, 2);
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for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++)
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P(Z+2*i, 16, Q+2*i, 16);
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for (unsigned i = 0; i < 128; i++)
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PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(out + 8*i,
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GET_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(out + 8*i) ^ R[i] ^ Z[i]);
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smemclr(R, sizeof(R));
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smemclr(Q, sizeof(Q));
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smemclr(Z, sizeof(Z));
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}
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/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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* The main Argon2 function.
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*/
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static void argon2_internal(uint32_t p, uint32_t T, uint32_t m, uint32_t t,
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uint32_t y, ptrlen P, ptrlen S, ptrlen K, ptrlen X,
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uint8_t *out)
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{
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/*
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* Start by hashing all the input data together: the four string arguments
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* (password P, salt S, optional secret key K, optional associated data
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* X), plus all the parameters for the function's memory and time usage.
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*
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* The output of this hash is the sole input to the subsequent mixing
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* step: Argon2 does not preserve any more entropy from the inputs, it
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* just makes it extra painful to get the final answer.
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*/
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uint8_t h0[64];
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{
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ssh_hash *h = blake2b_new_general(64);
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put_uint32_le(h, p);
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put_uint32_le(h, T);
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put_uint32_le(h, m);
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put_uint32_le(h, t);
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put_uint32_le(h, 0x13); /* hash function version number */
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put_uint32_le(h, y);
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put_stringpl_le(h, P);
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put_stringpl_le(h, S);
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put_stringpl_le(h, K);
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put_stringpl_le(h, X);
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ssh_hash_final(h, h0);
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}
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struct blk { uint8_t data[1024]; };
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/*
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* Array of 1Kb blocks. The total size is (approximately) m, the
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* caller-specified parameter for how much memory to use; the blocks are
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* regarded as a rectangular array of p rows ('lanes') by q columns, where
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* p is the 'parallelism' input parameter (the lanes can be processed
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* concurrently up to a point) and q is whatever makes the product pq come
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* to m.
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*
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* Additionally, each row is divided into four equal 'segments', which are
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* important to the way the algorithm decides which blocks to use as input
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* to each step of the function.
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*
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* The term 'slice' refers to a whole set of vertically aligned segments,
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* i.e. slice 0 is the whole left quarter of the array, and slice 3 the
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* whole right quarter.
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*/
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size_t SL = m / (4*p); /* segment length: # of 1Kb blocks in a segment */
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size_t q = 4 * SL; /* width of the array: 4 segments times SL */
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size_t mprime = q * p; /* total size of the array, approximately m */
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/* Allocate the memory. */
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struct blk *B = snewn(mprime, struct blk);
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memset(B, 0, mprime * sizeof(struct blk));
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/*
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* Initial setup: fill the first two full columns of the array with data
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* expanded from the starting hash h0. Each block is the result of using
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* the long-output hash function H' to hash h0 itself plus the block's
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* coordinates in the array.
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*/
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for (size_t i = 0; i < p; i++) {
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ssh_hash *h = hprime_new(1024);
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put_data(h, h0, 64);
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put_uint32_le(h, 0);
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put_uint32_le(h, i);
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hprime_final(h, 1024, B[i].data);
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < p; i++) {
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ssh_hash *h = hprime_new(1024);
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put_data(h, h0, 64);
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put_uint32_le(h, 1);
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put_uint32_le(h, i);
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hprime_final(h, 1024, B[i+p].data);
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}
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/*
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* Declarations for the main loop.
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*
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* The basic structure of the main loop is going to involve processing the
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* array one whole slice (vertically divided quarter) at a time. Usually
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* we'll write a new value into every single block in the slice, except
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* that in the initial slice on the first pass, we've already written
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* values into the first two columns during the initial setup above. So
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* 'jstart' indicates the starting index in each segment we process; it
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* starts off as 2 so that we don't overwrite the inital setup, and then
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* after the first slice is done, we set it to 0, and it stays there.
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*
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* d_mode indicates whether we're being data-dependent (true) or
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* data-independent (false). In the hybrid Argon2id mode, we start off
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* independent, and then once we've mixed things up enough, switch over to
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* dependent mode to force long serial chains of computation.
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*/
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size_t jstart = 2;
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bool d_mode = (y == 0);
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struct blk out2i, tmp2i, in2i;
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/* Outermost loop: t whole passes from left to right over the array */
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for (size_t pass = 0; pass < t; pass++) {
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/* Within that, we process the array in its four main slices */
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for (unsigned slice = 0; slice < 4; slice++) {
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/* In Argon2id mode, if we're half way through the first pass,
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* this is the moment to switch d_mode from false to true */
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if (pass == 0 && slice == 2 && y == 2)
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d_mode = true;
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/* Loop over every segment in the slice (i.e. every row). So i is
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* the y-coordinate of each block we process. */
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for (size_t i = 0; i < p; i++) {
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/* And within that segment, process the blocks from left to
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* right, starting at 'jstart' (usually 0, but 2 in the first
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* slice). */
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for (size_t jpre = jstart; jpre < SL; jpre++) {
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/* j is the x-coordinate of each block we process, made up
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* of the slice number and the index 'jpre' within the
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* segment. */
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size_t j = slice * SL + jpre;
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/* jm1 is j-1 (mod q) */
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uint32_t jm1 = (j == 0 ? q-1 : j-1);
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/*
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* Construct two 32-bit pseudorandom integers J1 and J2.
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* This is the part of the algorithm that varies between
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* the data-dependent and independent modes.
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*/
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uint32_t J1, J2;
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if (d_mode) {
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/*
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* Data-dependent: grab the first 64 bits of the block
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* to the left of this one.
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*/
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J1 = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(B[i + p * jm1].data);
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J2 = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(B[i + p * jm1].data + 4);
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} else {
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/*
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* Data-independent: generate pseudorandom data by
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* hashing a sequence of preimage blocks that include
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* all our input parameters, plus the coordinates of
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* this point in the algorithm (array position and
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* pass number) to make all the hash outputs distinct.
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*
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* The hash we use is G itself, applied twice (see
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* comment at top of file). So we generate 1Kb of data
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* at a time, which is enough for 128 (J1,J2) pairs.
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* Hence we only need to do the hashing if our index
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* within the segment is a multiple of 128, or if
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* we're at the very start of the algorithm (in which
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* case we started at 2 rather than 0). After that we
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* can just keep picking data out of our most recent
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* hash output.
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*/
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if (jpre == jstart || jpre % 128 == 0) {
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/*
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* Hash preimage is mostly zeroes, with a
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* collection of assorted integer values we had
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* anyway.
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*/
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memset(in2i.data, 0, sizeof(in2i.data));
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PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(in2i.data + 0, pass);
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PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(in2i.data + 8, i);
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PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(in2i.data + 16, slice);
|
||||
PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(in2i.data + 24, mprime);
|
||||
PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(in2i.data + 32, t);
|
||||
PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(in2i.data + 40, y);
|
||||
PUT_64BIT_LSB_FIRST(in2i.data + 48, jpre / 128 + 1);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Now apply G twice to generate the hash output
|
||||
* in out2i.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
memset(tmp2i.data, 0, sizeof(tmp2i.data));
|
||||
G_xor(tmp2i.data, tmp2i.data, in2i.data);
|
||||
memset(out2i.data, 0, sizeof(out2i.data));
|
||||
G_xor(out2i.data, out2i.data, tmp2i.data);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Extract J1 and J2 from the most recent hash output
|
||||
* (whether we've just computed it or not).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
J1 = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(
|
||||
out2i.data + 8 * (jpre % 128));
|
||||
J2 = GET_32BIT_LSB_FIRST(
|
||||
out2i.data + 8 * (jpre % 128) + 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Now convert J1 and J2 into the index of an existing
|
||||
* block of the array to use as input to this step. This
|
||||
* is fairly fiddly.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The easy part: the y-coordinate of the input block is
|
||||
* obtained by reducing J2 mod p, except that at the very
|
||||
* start of the algorithm (processing the first slice on
|
||||
* the first pass) we simply use the same y-coordinate as
|
||||
* our output block.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note that it's safe to use the ordinary % operator
|
||||
* here, without any concern for timing side channels: in
|
||||
* data-independent mode J2 is not correlated to any
|
||||
* secrets, and in data-dependent mode we're going to be
|
||||
* giving away side-channel data _anyway_ when we use it
|
||||
* as an array index (and by assumption we don't care,
|
||||
* because it's already massively randomised from the real
|
||||
* inputs).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
uint32_t index_l = (pass == 0 && slice == 0) ? i : J2 % p;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The hard part: which block in this array row do we use?
|
||||
*
|
||||
* First, we decide what the possible candidates are. This
|
||||
* requires some case analysis, and depends on whether the
|
||||
* array row is the same one we're writing into or not.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If it's not the same row: we can't use any block from
|
||||
* the current slice (because the segments within a slice
|
||||
* have to be processable in parallel, so in a concurrent
|
||||
* implementation those blocks are potentially in the
|
||||
* process of being overwritten by other threads). But the
|
||||
* other three slices are fair game, except that in the
|
||||
* first pass, slices to the right of us won't have had
|
||||
* any values written into them yet at all.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If it is the same row, we _are_ allowed to use blocks
|
||||
* from the current slice, but only the ones before our
|
||||
* current position.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* In both cases, we also exclude the individual _column_
|
||||
* just to the left of the current one. (The block
|
||||
* immediately to our left is going to be the _other_
|
||||
* input to G, but the spec also says that we avoid that
|
||||
* column even in a different row.)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* All of this means that we end up choosing from a
|
||||
* cyclically contiguous interval of blocks within this
|
||||
* lane, but the start and end points require some thought
|
||||
* to get them right.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Start position is the beginning of the _next_ slice
|
||||
* (containing data from the previous pass), unless we're
|
||||
* on pass 0, where the start position has to be 0. */
|
||||
uint32_t Wstart = (pass == 0 ? 0 : (slice + 1) % 4 * SL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* End position splits up by cases. */
|
||||
uint32_t Wend;
|
||||
if (index_l == i) {
|
||||
/* Same lane as output: we can use anything up to (but
|
||||
* not including) the block immediately left of us. */
|
||||
Wend = jm1;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Different lane from output: we can use anything up
|
||||
* to the previous slice boundary, or one less than
|
||||
* that if we're at the very left edge of our slice
|
||||
* right now. */
|
||||
Wend = SL * slice;
|
||||
if (jpre == 0)
|
||||
Wend = (Wend + q-1) % q;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Total number of blocks available to choose from */
|
||||
uint32_t Wsize = (Wend + q - Wstart) % q;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Fiddly computation from the spec that chooses from the
|
||||
* available blocks, in a deliberately non-uniform
|
||||
* fashion, using J1 as pseudorandom input data. Output is
|
||||
* zz which is the index within our contiguous interval. */
|
||||
uint32_t x = ((uint64_t)J1 * J1) >> 32;
|
||||
uint32_t y = ((uint64_t)Wsize * x) >> 32;
|
||||
uint32_t zz = Wsize - 1 - y;
|
||||
|
||||
/* And index_z is the actual x coordinate of the block we
|
||||
* want. */
|
||||
uint32_t index_z = (Wstart + zz) % q;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Phew! Combine that block with the one immediately to
|
||||
* our left, and XOR over the top of whatever is already
|
||||
* in our current output block. */
|
||||
G_xor(B[i + p * j].data, B[i + p * jm1].data,
|
||||
B[index_l + p * index_z].data);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We've finished processing a slice. Reset jstart to 0. It will
|
||||
* onily _not_ have been 0 if this was pass 0 slice 0, in which
|
||||
* case it still had its initial value of 2 to avoid the starting
|
||||
* data. */
|
||||
jstart = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The main output is all done. Final output works by taking the XOR of
|
||||
* all the blocks in the rightmost column of the array, and then using
|
||||
* that as input to our long hash H'. The output of _that_ is what we
|
||||
* deliver to the caller.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
struct blk C = B[p * (q-1)];
|
||||
for (size_t i = 1; i < p; i++)
|
||||
memxor(C.data, C.data, B[i + p * (q-1)].data, 1024);
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
ssh_hash *h = hprime_new(T);
|
||||
put_data(h, C.data, 1024);
|
||||
hprime_final(h, T, out);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Clean up.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
smemclr(out2i.data, sizeof(out2i.data));
|
||||
smemclr(tmp2i.data, sizeof(tmp2i.data));
|
||||
smemclr(in2i.data, sizeof(in2i.data));
|
||||
smemclr(C.data, sizeof(C.data));
|
||||
smemclr(B, mprime * sizeof(struct blk));
|
||||
sfree(B);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Wrapper function that appends to a strbuf (which sshpubk.c will want).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void argon2(Argon2Flavour flavour, uint32_t mem, uint32_t passes,
|
||||
uint32_t parallel, uint32_t taglen,
|
||||
ptrlen P, ptrlen S, ptrlen K, ptrlen X, strbuf *out)
|
||||
{
|
||||
argon2_internal(parallel, taglen, mem, passes, flavour,
|
||||
P, S, K, X, strbuf_append(out, taglen));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Wrapper function which dynamically chooses the number of passes to run in
|
||||
* order to hit an approximate total amount of CPU time. Writes the result
|
||||
* into 'passes'.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void argon2_choose_passes(
|
||||
Argon2Flavour flavour, uint32_t mem,
|
||||
uint32_t milliseconds, uint32_t *passes,
|
||||
uint32_t parallel, uint32_t taglen,
|
||||
ptrlen P, ptrlen S, ptrlen K, ptrlen X,
|
||||
strbuf *out)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned long desired_time = (TICKSPERSEC * milliseconds) / 1000;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We only need the time taken to be approximately right, so we
|
||||
* scale up the number of passes geometrically, which avoids
|
||||
* taking O(t^2) time to find a pass count taking time t.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Using the Fibonacci numbers is slightly nicer than the obvious
|
||||
* approach of powers of 2, because it's still very easy to
|
||||
* compute, and grows less fast (powers of 1.6 instead of 2), so
|
||||
* you get just a touch more precision.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
uint32_t a = 1, b = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
unsigned long start_time = GETTICKCOUNT();
|
||||
argon2(flavour, mem, b, parallel, taglen, P, S, K, X, out);
|
||||
unsigned long ticks = GETTICKCOUNT() - start_time;
|
||||
|
||||
/* But just in case computers get _too_ fast, we have to cap
|
||||
* the growth before it gets past the uint32_t upper bound! So
|
||||
* if computing a+b would overflow, stop here. */
|
||||
|
||||
if (ticks >= desired_time || a > (uint32_t)~b) {
|
||||
*passes = b;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
strbuf_clear(out);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Next Fibonacci number: replace (a, b) with (b, a+b) */
|
||||
b += a;
|
||||
a = b - a;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
@ -1757,6 +1757,199 @@ culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.
|
||||
"daafcf2bd6fccf976cbc234b71cd9f4f7d56fe0eb33a40018707089a215c44a8"
|
||||
"4b272d0329ae6d85a0f8acc7e964dc2facb715ba472bb6"))
|
||||
|
||||
def testArgon2LongHash(self):
|
||||
# Unit-test the Argon2 long hash function H', which starts off
|
||||
# the same as BLAKE2b, but comes with its own method of
|
||||
# extending the output length past 64 bytes.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# I generated these test values using a test program linked
|
||||
# against the reference implementation's libargon2.a and
|
||||
# calling its blake2b_long function.
|
||||
preimage = b'hello, world'
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(1, preimage), unhex("8b"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(2, preimage), unhex("1ff9"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(63, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"e2c997721f1d64aa8c25e588fb8ab19646ce6d5c2a431fa560fcb813e55dd481"
|
||||
"322d2630d95ca6b1b63317b13d6b111e5816170c80c3ca7d5b4bf894096de4"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(64, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"0c7ba7ee6d510b4bb5c9b69ac91e25e0b11aa30dd6234b8e61b0fe1537c037b8"
|
||||
"8ed5aa59a277e8cc07095c81aff26d08967e4dfdabd32db8b6af6ceb78cf8c47"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(65, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"680941abbd8fc80f28c38d623e90903f08709bf76575e2775d4ce01c31b192c8"
|
||||
"73038d9a31af8991c8b1ad4f2b1991f4d15f73ab0f4f3add415c297a12eb9ddb"
|
||||
"76"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(95, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"4be28c51850fed70d9403e1406b6ba68a83d98cf222a4ee162beef60fd3384df"
|
||||
"eba3fce9d95f646982eb384ac943ce5263cb03428fd8d261cc41ffdb7ba328fe"
|
||||
"098526f2b49593f9e7f38188598ce4693b59f4dd32db30c1be9a9d35784fa0"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(96, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"20295ea01e822cca113f668f33e5e481ed5879bfd7de6359ea42d497da97be52"
|
||||
"2cdd518d34ae32c44cabd45249b4e697626b0b14b6a33a2bd138be0a4bceeaf4"
|
||||
"9528f93acef01b093ee84d8d871d1ee6cf7c10e83ad0619631aed19345166f03"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(97, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"d24b31f3ac0baad168d524efc4bafee55fef743fd60b14e28b860d7523e319c7"
|
||||
"520e2d5457cc3d06dc1044530afdf6990fa12e38d5802eb642f8e77fcfee2c0b"
|
||||
"1f84a28877f2f2f049ed9299e1e0230f98af3a161185970aad21f0ea0f5184cf"
|
||||
"90"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(127, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"5d1e8380450dbc985418ed1f3700b925ae0719e4486e29131c81bca7083ac6b8"
|
||||
"f535c3398488e34d3dc1390de44097f1eee498f10ebe85b579e99a7672023b01"
|
||||
"ca5c20e63c595b640e00d80f113a52e3773719889b266ab4c65269c11fb212e4"
|
||||
"75f2b769bb26321bb60ecc0d490821e5056d7dfc9def3cd065d3ba90360764"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(128, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"be15b316f3483c4d0d00f71a65b974894a2025f441b79b9fe461bc740cb0b039"
|
||||
"c4fe914f61c05a612d63ebc50a662b2d59b1996091e5e3474340544ea46a46cb"
|
||||
"25c41ff700fafcd96c4f12ddc698cd2426558f960696837ea8170fd2fe284b54"
|
||||
"8f585f97919ef14f2b3cbb351eb98872add7ba6d08c1401232df6cc878fbeb22"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(129, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"83da464c278dcb12c29b6685fee6d32f0b461337c155369ad0d56b58b0aa5f80"
|
||||
"9aa7b56bd41b664c8d768957f8f0e40999fb0178eb53cf83f31d725bf92881bc"
|
||||
"900774bce4cdf56b6386ad3de6891d11a0ccd4564a3431fc4c24105a02d0a6a2"
|
||||
"434712b9a7471f3223c72a6e64912200d0a3d149a19d06fe9dc8ec09d7ed5a48"
|
||||
"bb"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(511, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"30c0c0d0467e7665368db0b40a2324a61fb569d35172de2df53a9739a8d18e60"
|
||||
"b4f25d521c8855604be3e24ea56302566074323d94c0bd3a33d08f185d8ba5ac"
|
||||
"a2bc3fb2e4c4e5ffec5778daea67c6b5913c9cac16f2e5c7b7818e757fa747b3"
|
||||
"69e586d616010a752762f69c604238ed8738430366fbdb7493454fa02391a76b"
|
||||
"30f241695b9fa8d3a3116227c6bb6f72d325cf104ab153d15f928b22767d467d"
|
||||
"4bf7e16176aaa7315954b7872061933c12d548f1f93a8abb9d73791661bee521"
|
||||
"b2ae51be373a229dfef32787234c1be5846d133563002b9a029178716ad41e70"
|
||||
"1539d3fad300c77607c5217701e3e485d72c980f3f71d525c8148375a2f8d22c"
|
||||
"a211ba165330a90b7e0e6baa6073833925c23bdd388ee904f38463c7e6b85475"
|
||||
"09b810aae5c9ffc5dd902c2ffe049c338e3ae2c6416d3b874d6a9d384089564c"
|
||||
"0d8e4dce9b6e47e1d5ec9087bf526cc9fa35aab1893a0588d31b77fea37e0799"
|
||||
"468deacde47629d2960a3519b3bcd4e22364a9cccd3b128cba21cac27f140d53"
|
||||
"f79c11e4157e4cb48272eecdf62f52084a27e5b0933bbe66ded17e2df6f8d398"
|
||||
"f6c479c3c716457820ad177b8bd9334cb594e03d09fcc4f82d4385e141eacd7d"
|
||||
"9ad1e1c4cb42788af70bac0509f0a891e662960955490abf2763373803e8c89c"
|
||||
"df632579cb9c647634b30df214a3d67b92fd55d283c42c63b470a48a78cd5b"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(512, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"79a6974e29a9a6c069e0156774d35c5014a409f5ffc60013725367a7208d4929"
|
||||
"7d228637751768a31a59e27aa89372f1bcc095a6fa331198a5bd5ad053ba2ebb"
|
||||
"cbcc501ea55cf142e8d95209228c9ab60cd104d5077472f2a9ecaa071aed6ee9"
|
||||
"5de29e188b7399d5b6b7ed897b2bc4dd1ea745eb9974e39ca6fb983380cc537a"
|
||||
"c04dfe6caefe85faf206b1613092ebadf791eaa8a5b814c9a79a73a5733b0505"
|
||||
"a47163c10a0f7309df6663896df6079a7c88c6879bb591a40abd398c6deda792"
|
||||
"1cc3986435b1c840a768b2fa507446f2f77a406b1b2f739f7795db24789c8927"
|
||||
"24b4c84b7005445123154f8cd2ba63a7ede672af5d197f846700732025c9931d"
|
||||
"1c67c5493417ca394a8f68ba532645815cf7b5102af134ecb4fd9e326f53779a"
|
||||
"3039dbef6a0880db9e38b6b61d2f9ead969e4224c2d9c69b5897e5eeb7032e83"
|
||||
"334e192ff50017056ccb84d4cc8eee3ab248d2614643d0174fe18c72186dd967"
|
||||
"92d8545645ddf4a9b2c7a91c9a71857a399449d7154077a8e9580f1a2d20227d"
|
||||
"671b455ccb897cba0491e50892120d7877f7776d653cfdb176fa3f64a9e6f848"
|
||||
"cd681c487b488775aaf698294eec813b2cca90d68d63b5d886d61c1a8e922aaa"
|
||||
"330fd658ede56e34bcd288048e845eba7b8e2e7cc22ba6c91b523e48017aa878"
|
||||
"8ce4f91d0e6d6c6706762fb0cc7f465cee3916684fb21e337cfe1b583e0b1e92"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(513, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"32243cfbd7eca582d60b3b8ea3ba3d93783537689c7cbcd1d1cbde46200b8c86"
|
||||
"617fc00e8a9ae991a1e2f91c67e07d5f0a777d982c1461d0c5474e4e164b053c"
|
||||
"2808559e2b8a5ac4a46a5fcbc825b1d5302c7b0611940194eb494d45ce7113a2"
|
||||
"3424b51c199c6a5100ab159ff323eda5feffee4da4155a028a81da9d44e4286b"
|
||||
"ac3dab4ffce43a80b6ce97a47ea0ac51ee16e8b4d3b68942afdc20e1c21747c4"
|
||||
"94859c3d3883e7dc19ea416a393a3507683d9d03e6a3a91f8f1cb8a7d5d9892e"
|
||||
"80c8fb0222527a73a1f59b9dd41770982f2af177a6e96093064534803edd0713"
|
||||
"71ede53024cedc291d768325bb4e4def9af1b5569c349b64816496c37a8787b5"
|
||||
"4fbe248372ebadb5ce20e03eaa935dc55ff4b8cbe5d6d844c7b71d4656fef22c"
|
||||
"5a49f13d75a7a8368a2dbc1e78d732b879bfc5c9467eda2bf4918f0c59037ae3"
|
||||
"dee7880a171409dd1a4e143c814e60301ac77237f261fa7519a04e68000530f9"
|
||||
"708ed9fda5609d655560a9491f80f5875ad5725e3120686b73319c6a727932e3"
|
||||
"20a2174422523498c38fea47aeb20d135ff9fd93c6fa6db0005e0001685d7577"
|
||||
"33a82a4dc9dd6556b938f7b8dafd0d670846780b9931b815063708189b17877b"
|
||||
"825533bcc250fb576a28be4caa107e6a3a6f7b0c60fb51b0def27008b7e272ac"
|
||||
"95d610bfa912339799a2e537ce543d7862dddbe31bb224fda4ae283571847a28"
|
||||
"54"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(1024, preimage), unhex(
|
||||
"951252f6fa152124f381266a358d9b78b88e469d08d5fc78e4ea32253c7fc26c"
|
||||
"3ff1c93529ab4ee6fcf00acf29bbaba934a4014ce2625e0806601c55e6ce70d7"
|
||||
"121fd82f0904f335c5c7ba07dc6e6adf7582c92f7f255072203ea85844b4fe54"
|
||||
"817476a20bb742710ffc42750361be94332d0fc721b192309acfa70da43db6ae"
|
||||
"1d0f0bbe8a3250966a4532b36728162073c9eb3e119ea4c1c187c775dbb25a5d"
|
||||
"d883e3f65706a5fca897cdc4a8aa7b68ba3f57940c72f3a3396c417e758ba071"
|
||||
"95be4afba325237c0e2738a74d96fd1350fb623cb2ad40ea8b1e070cf398b98c"
|
||||
"2865ea40225b81f031f2b405409ca01dc5d9903d3d8e1d6381fbe7ccfc8f3dab"
|
||||
"eadafd7c976c0ba84a936f78ff7df0f112c089ba88f82bed7f9a6e31a91e5fee"
|
||||
"f675755454b948de22695660b243b9eca3bcc89608f83d2baa1d73dd6b8bd4f9"
|
||||
"b995ed9cb0f1edc6e98a49ed841b506c1bf59b43f4b3457a376bbff116c1a4f6"
|
||||
"07cc62381fc5c19953c68f300c1b51198d40784d812d25810ba404862f04b680"
|
||||
"6039a074f612ad8b84e0941ba23c915c3e7162c225fbecffdb7dc1ab559b2b54"
|
||||
"32fe8a498c32e918d8e7e33254ff75077f648827705e987f4d90fba971e78e1a"
|
||||
"6896b4d775c7359dc950f1e964fa04621aacf3c0988969490f4c72c54caf79e8"
|
||||
"481053cc0a27ffcd3580aabf9ef1268d498d8a18bd70e9b8402e011753bb7dc7"
|
||||
"e856c00d988fca924ee7cf61979c38cda8a872e4cc4fbdc90c23a0ded71eb944"
|
||||
"bb816ab22d9a4380e3e9d1cec818165c2fba6c5d51dcbf452c0cb1779a384937"
|
||||
"64d695370e13a301eca7be68d4112d2177381514efbb36fe08fc5bc2970301b8"
|
||||
"06f8e5a57a780e894d5276e2025bb775b6d1861e33c54ab6e3eb72947fbe6f91"
|
||||
"8174ce24eb4682efbb3c4f01233dc7ce9ef44792e9e876bb03e6751b3d559047"
|
||||
"d045127d976aa042fc55c690c9048e200065e7b7de19d9353aa9ac9b3e7611f0"
|
||||
"d1c42d069a300455ca1f7420a352bace89215e705106927510c11b3b1c1486d9"
|
||||
"f3ab006d2de2ee2c94574f760ce8c246bca229f98c66f06042b14f1fff9a16c0"
|
||||
"1550237e16d108ce5597299b1eb406a9ee505a29a6e0fa526b3e6beafd336aea"
|
||||
"138b2f31971586f67c5ffffbd6826d1c75666038c43d0bdff4edfc294e064a49"
|
||||
"2eed43e2dc78d00abc4e85edcd9563b8251b66f57b0f4b6d17f5a3f35c87c488"
|
||||
"dbeeb84fd720286197c2dec8290eccf3a313747de285b9cd3548e90cf81b3838"
|
||||
"3ffcc8c2a7f582feb369d05cb96b9b224d05902b3e39e5b96536032e9dddeb9b"
|
||||
"9d4f40a9c8f544ca37cf8d39d7c8c6a33880e9184ed017bd642db9590759bd10"
|
||||
"7362048ede5c0257feecc4984584592c566f37fba8469c064015339fb4f03023"
|
||||
"56ece37fd3655aae2bfc989b9b4c1384efc3503c8866db901802cb36eda9fb00"))
|
||||
|
||||
def testArgon2(self):
|
||||
# A few tests of my own of Argon2, derived from the reference
|
||||
# implementation.
|
||||
pwd = b"password"
|
||||
salt = b"salt of at least 16 bytes"
|
||||
secret = b"secret"
|
||||
assoc = b"associated data"
|
||||
|
||||
# Smallest memory (8Kb) and parallelism (1) parameters the
|
||||
# reference implementation will accept, but lots of passes
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('i', 8, 16, 1, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"314da280240a3ca1eedd1f1db417a76eb0741e7df64b8cdf"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('d', 8, 16, 1, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"9cc961cf43e0f86c2d4e202b816dc5bc5b2177e68faa0b08"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('id', 8, 16, 1, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"6cd6c490c582fa597721d772d4e3de166987792491b48c51"))
|
||||
|
||||
# Test a memory cost value that isn't a power of 2. This
|
||||
# checks a wraparound case during the conversion of J1 to a
|
||||
# block index, and is a regression test for a bug that nearly
|
||||
# got past me during original development.
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('i', 104, 16, 2, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"a561963623f1073c9aa8caecdb600c73ffc6de677ba8d97c"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('d', 104, 16, 2, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"a9014db7f1d468fb25b88fa7fc0deac0f2e7f27e25d2cf6e"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('id', 104, 16, 2, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"64f3212b1e7725ffcf9ae2d1753d63e763bcd6970061a435"))
|
||||
|
||||
# Larger parameters that should exercise the pseudorandom
|
||||
# block indexing reasonably thoroughly. Also generate plenty
|
||||
# of output data.
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('i', 1024, 5, 16, 77, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"b008a685ff57730fad0e6f3ef3b9189282c0d9b05303675f43b5f3054724"
|
||||
"733fcbe8e2639cc2c930535b31b723339041bcd703bf2483455acf86c0e6"
|
||||
"9ed88c545ad40f1f2068855e4d61e99407"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('d', 1024, 5, 16, 111, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"399ffbcd720c47745b9deb391ed0de7d5e0ffe53aef9f8ef7a7918cfa212"
|
||||
"53df8cc577affbd5e0c0f8bf6d93c11b2f63973f8fc8f89dccd832fc587e"
|
||||
"5d61717be6e88ca33eef5d1e168c028bae632a2a723c6c83f8e755f39171"
|
||||
"5eda1c77c8e2fe06fbdd4e56d35262587e7df73cd7"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('id', 1024, 5, 16, 123, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
|
||||
"6636807289cb9b9c032f48dcc31ffed1de4ca6c1b97e1ce768d690486341"
|
||||
"2ac84b39d568a81dd01d9ee3ceec6cc23441d95e6abeb4a2024f1f540d56"
|
||||
"9b799277c4037ddc7195ba783c9158a901adc7d4a5df8357b34a3869e5d6"
|
||||
"aeae2a21201eef5e347de22c922192e8f46274b0c9d33e965155a91e7686"
|
||||
"9d530e"))
|
||||
|
||||
def testRSAVerify(self):
|
||||
def blobs(n, e, d, p, q, iqmp):
|
||||
pubblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-rsa") + ssh2_mpint(e) + ssh2_mpint(n)
|
||||
@ -2471,6 +2664,24 @@ class standard_test_vectors(MyTestBase):
|
||||
digest = ssh_hash_digest(h)
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(digest, unhex(vector['out']))
|
||||
|
||||
def testArgon2(self):
|
||||
# draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-12 section 5
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('d', 32, 3, 4, 32, b'\x01' * 32, b'\x02' * 16,
|
||||
b'\x03' * 8, b'\x04' * 12),
|
||||
unhex("512b391b6f1162975371d30919734294"
|
||||
"f868e3be3984f3c1a13a4db9fabe4acb"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('i', 32, 3, 4, 32, b'\x01' * 32, b'\x02' * 16,
|
||||
b'\x03' * 8, b'\x04' * 12),
|
||||
unhex("c814d9d1dc7f37aa13f0d77f2494bda1"
|
||||
"c8de6b016dd388d29952a4c4672b6ce8"))
|
||||
self.assertEqualBin(
|
||||
argon2('id', 32, 3, 4, 32, b'\x01' * 32, b'\x02' * 16,
|
||||
b'\x03' * 8, b'\x04' * 12),
|
||||
unhex("0d640df58d78766c08c037a34a8b53c9"
|
||||
"d01ef0452d75b65eb52520e96b01e659"))
|
||||
|
||||
def testHmacSHA(self):
|
||||
# Test cases from RFC 6234 section 8.5.
|
||||
def vector(key, message, s1=None, s256=None):
|
||||
|
@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ def make_argword(arg, argtype, fnname, argindex, to_preserve):
|
||||
return "true" if arg else "false"
|
||||
if typename in {
|
||||
"hashalg", "macalg", "keyalg", "cipheralg",
|
||||
"dh_group", "ecdh_alg", "rsaorder", "primegenpolicy"}:
|
||||
"dh_group", "ecdh_alg", "rsaorder", "primegenpolicy",
|
||||
"argon2flavour"}:
|
||||
arg = coerce_to_bytes(arg)
|
||||
if isinstance(arg, bytes) and b" " not in arg:
|
||||
return arg
|
||||
|
37
testcrypt.c
37
testcrypt.c
@ -403,6 +403,32 @@ static const PrimeGenerationPolicy *get_primegenpolicy(BinarySource *in)
|
||||
fatal_error("primegenpolicy '%.*s': not found", PTRLEN_PRINTF(name));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static Argon2Flavour get_argon2flavour(BinarySource *in)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const struct {
|
||||
const char *key;
|
||||
Argon2Flavour value;
|
||||
} algs[] = {
|
||||
{"d", Argon2d},
|
||||
{"i", Argon2i},
|
||||
{"id", Argon2id},
|
||||
/* I expect to forget which spelling I chose, so let's support many */
|
||||
{"argon2d", Argon2d},
|
||||
{"argon2i", Argon2i},
|
||||
{"argon2id", Argon2id},
|
||||
{"Argon2d", Argon2d},
|
||||
{"Argon2i", Argon2i},
|
||||
{"Argon2id", Argon2id},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
ptrlen name = get_word(in);
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < lenof(algs); i++)
|
||||
if (ptrlen_eq_string(name, algs[i].key))
|
||||
return algs[i].value;
|
||||
|
||||
fatal_error("Argon2 flavour '%.*s': not found", PTRLEN_PRINTF(name));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static uintmax_t get_uint(BinarySource *in)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ptrlen word = get_word(in);
|
||||
@ -1219,6 +1245,16 @@ PockleStatus pockle_add_prime_wrapper(Pockle *pockle, mp_int *p,
|
||||
}
|
||||
#define pockle_add_prime pockle_add_prime_wrapper
|
||||
|
||||
strbuf *argon2_wrapper(Argon2Flavour flavour, uint32_t mem, uint32_t passes,
|
||||
uint32_t parallel, uint32_t taglen,
|
||||
ptrlen P, ptrlen S, ptrlen K, ptrlen X)
|
||||
{
|
||||
strbuf *out = strbuf_new();
|
||||
argon2(flavour, mem, passes, parallel, taglen, P, S, K, X, out);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#define argon2 argon2_wrapper
|
||||
|
||||
#define OPTIONAL_PTR_FUNC(type) \
|
||||
typedef TD_val_##type TD_opt_val_##type; \
|
||||
static TD_opt_val_##type get_opt_val_##type(BinarySource *in) { \
|
||||
@ -1254,6 +1290,7 @@ typedef key_components *TD_keycomponents;
|
||||
typedef const PrimeGenerationPolicy *TD_primegenpolicy;
|
||||
typedef struct mpint_list TD_mpint_list;
|
||||
typedef PockleStatus TD_pocklestatus;
|
||||
typedef Argon2Flavour TD_argon2flavour;
|
||||
|
||||
#define FUNC0(rettype, function) \
|
||||
static void handle_##function(BinarySource *in, strbuf *out) { \
|
||||
|
@ -261,6 +261,12 @@ FUNC5(int, rsa1_load_s, val_string_binarysource, val_rsa, out_opt_val_string_asc
|
||||
FUNC3(val_string, ppk_save_sb, val_key, opt_val_string_asciz, opt_val_string_asciz)
|
||||
FUNC3(val_string, rsa1_save_sb, val_rsa, opt_val_string_asciz, opt_val_string_asciz)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Password hashing.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
FUNC9(val_string, argon2, argon2flavour, uint, uint, uint, uint, val_string_ptrlen, val_string_ptrlen, val_string_ptrlen, val_string_ptrlen)
|
||||
FUNC2(val_string, argon2_long_hash, uint, val_string_ptrlen)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Key generation functions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
31
testsc.c
31
testsc.c
@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ VOLATILE_WRAPPED_DEFN(static, size_t, looplimit, (size_t x))
|
||||
CIPHERS(CIPHER_TESTLIST, X) \
|
||||
MACS(MAC_TESTLIST, X) \
|
||||
HASHES(HASH_TESTLIST, X) \
|
||||
X(argon2) \
|
||||
/* end of list */
|
||||
|
||||
static void test_mp_get_nbits(void)
|
||||
@ -1409,6 +1410,36 @@ struct test {
|
||||
void (*testfn)(void);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static void test_argon2(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We can only expect the Argon2i variant to pass this stringent
|
||||
* test for no data-dependency, because the other two variants of
|
||||
* Argon2 have _deliberate_ data-dependency.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
size_t inlen = 48+16+24+8;
|
||||
uint8_t *indata = snewn(inlen, uint8_t);
|
||||
ptrlen password = make_ptrlen(indata, 48);
|
||||
ptrlen salt = make_ptrlen(indata+48, 16);
|
||||
ptrlen secret = make_ptrlen(indata+48+16, 24);
|
||||
ptrlen assoc = make_ptrlen(indata+48+16+24, 8);
|
||||
|
||||
strbuf *outdata = strbuf_new();
|
||||
strbuf_append(outdata, 256);
|
||||
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < looplimit(16); i++) {
|
||||
strbuf_clear(outdata);
|
||||
random_read(indata, inlen);
|
||||
|
||||
log_start();
|
||||
argon2(Argon2i, 32, 2, 2, 144, password, salt, secret, assoc, outdata);
|
||||
log_end();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sfree(indata);
|
||||
strbuf_free(outdata);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const struct test tests[] = {
|
||||
#define STRUCT_TEST(X) { #X, test_##X },
|
||||
TESTLIST(STRUCT_TEST)
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user