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Someone complained that their keyboard-interactive password prompt was being

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truncated - it was from OpenSSH on HP/UX and had all sorts of stuff in it
("last successful login" etc).

Bodged it by bumping up the space allocated in the fixed array for a password
prompt. Also added an indication that the prompt is being truncated, as
required by draft-ietf-secsh-auth-kbdinteract-06.

(NB that before this checkin, there was a more-or-less harmless buffer overread
where if we ever received a keyboard-interactive prompt with echo=1, we'd
probably spew goo on the terminal; fixed now.)

[originally from svn r4476]
This commit is contained in:
Jacob Nevins 2004-08-17 14:08:05 +00:00
parent e8b2b6a5dc
commit 1af5523edc
1 changed files with 11 additions and 4 deletions
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15
ssh.c
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@ -4610,7 +4610,7 @@ static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen, int ispkt)
int num_prompts, curr_prompt, echo;
char username[100];
int got_username;
char pwprompt[200];
char pwprompt[512];
char password[100];
void *publickey_blob;
int publickey_bloblen;
@ -5189,9 +5189,16 @@ static void do_ssh2_authconn(Ssh ssh, unsigned char *in, int inlen, int ispkt)
ssh_pkt_getstring(ssh, &prompt, &prompt_len);
if (prompt_len > 0) {
strncpy(s->pwprompt, prompt, sizeof(s->pwprompt));
s->pwprompt[prompt_len < sizeof(s->pwprompt) ?
prompt_len : sizeof(s->pwprompt)-1] = '\0';
static const char trunc[] = "<prompt truncated>: ";
static const int prlen = sizeof(s->pwprompt) -
lenof(trunc);
if (prompt_len > prlen) {
memcpy(s->pwprompt, prompt, prlen);
strcpy(s->pwprompt + prlen, trunc);
} else {
memcpy(s->pwprompt, prompt, prompt_len);
s->pwprompt[prompt_len] = '\0';
}
} else {
strcpy(s->pwprompt,
"<server failed to send prompt>: ");