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SSH back end should now be tolerant of garbage appearing in the data
stream after the actual SSH connection is finished. Some firewalls add this for no good reason. [originally from svn r1271]
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parent
3d3ef9b8a4
commit
2e4480d6b6
21
ssh.c
21
ssh.c
@ -607,12 +607,6 @@ static int ssh1_rdpkt(unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
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(*data)++, (*datalen)--;
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}
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#ifdef FWHACK
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if (st->len == 0x52656d6f) { /* "Remo"te server has closed ... */
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st->len = 0x300; /* big enough to carry to end */
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}
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#endif
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st->pad = 8 - (st->len % 8);
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st->biglen = st->len + st->pad;
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pktin.length = st->len - 5;
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@ -770,11 +764,7 @@ static int ssh2_rdpkt(unsigned char **data, int *datalen)
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pktin.data[st->i] = *(*data)++;
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(*datalen)--;
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}
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#ifdef FWHACK
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if (!memcmp(pktin.data, "Remo", 4)) { /* "Remo"te server has closed ... */
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/* FIXME */
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}
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#endif
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if (sccipher)
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sccipher->decrypt(pktin.data, st->cipherblk);
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@ -3005,6 +2995,15 @@ static void ssh1_protocol(unsigned char *in, int inlen, int ispkt)
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* if no pty is available or in other odd cases. Ignore */
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} else if (pktin.type == SSH1_SMSG_EXIT_STATUS) {
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send_packet(SSH1_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION, PKT_END);
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/*
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* In case `helpful' firewalls or proxies tack
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* extra human-readable text on the end of the
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* session which we might mistake for another
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* encrypted packet, we close the session once
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* we've sent EXIT_CONFIRMATION.
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*/
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ssh_state = SSH_STATE_CLOSED;
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crReturnV;
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} else {
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bombout(("Strange packet received: type %d", pktin.type));
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crReturnV;
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