mirror of
https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git
synced 2025-04-10 15:48:06 -05:00
Note side-channel resistance of probable primes.
This came in around d8fda3b6da.
This commit is contained in:
parent
f0162af6a5
commit
39d1515ea6
@ -177,6 +177,13 @@ are prime, because it generates the output number together with a
|
||||
proof of its primality. This takes more effort, but it eliminates that
|
||||
theoretical risk in the probabilistic method.
|
||||
|
||||
There in one way in which PuTTYgen's proven-primes method is not
|
||||
strictly better than its probable-primes method. If you use PuTTYgen
|
||||
to generate RSA or DSA keys on a computer that is potentially
|
||||
susceptible to timing- or cache-based \i{side-channel attacks}, such
|
||||
as a shared computer, the \q{probable primes} method is designed to
|
||||
resist such attacks, whereas the \q{proven primes} methods are not.
|
||||
|
||||
You might choose to switch from probable to proven primes if you have
|
||||
a local security standard that demands it, or if you don't trust the
|
||||
probabilistic argument for the safety of the usual method.
|
||||
@ -389,8 +396,8 @@ These options only affect PPK version 3.
|
||||
\dt Key derivation function
|
||||
|
||||
\dd The variant of the \i{Argon2} key derivation function to use.
|
||||
You might change this if you consider your exposure to side-channel
|
||||
attacks to be different to the norm.
|
||||
You might change this if you consider your exposure to \i{side-channel
|
||||
attacks} to be different to the norm.
|
||||
|
||||
\dt Memory to use for passphrase hash
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user