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Note side-channel resistance of probable primes.

This came in around d8fda3b6da.
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Jacob Nevins 2022-01-11 23:57:20 +00:00
parent f0162af6a5
commit 39d1515ea6

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@ -177,6 +177,13 @@ are prime, because it generates the output number together with a
proof of its primality. This takes more effort, but it eliminates that proof of its primality. This takes more effort, but it eliminates that
theoretical risk in the probabilistic method. theoretical risk in the probabilistic method.
There in one way in which PuTTYgen's proven-primes method is not
strictly better than its probable-primes method. If you use PuTTYgen
to generate RSA or DSA keys on a computer that is potentially
susceptible to timing- or cache-based \i{side-channel attacks}, such
as a shared computer, the \q{probable primes} method is designed to
resist such attacks, whereas the \q{proven primes} methods are not.
You might choose to switch from probable to proven primes if you have You might choose to switch from probable to proven primes if you have
a local security standard that demands it, or if you don't trust the a local security standard that demands it, or if you don't trust the
probabilistic argument for the safety of the usual method. probabilistic argument for the safety of the usual method.
@ -389,8 +396,8 @@ These options only affect PPK version 3.
\dt Key derivation function \dt Key derivation function
\dd The variant of the \i{Argon2} key derivation function to use. \dd The variant of the \i{Argon2} key derivation function to use.
You might change this if you consider your exposure to side-channel You might change this if you consider your exposure to \i{side-channel
attacks to be different to the norm. attacks} to be different to the norm.
\dt Memory to use for passphrase hash \dt Memory to use for passphrase hash