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mirror of https://git.tartarus.org/simon/putty.git synced 2025-01-09 17:38:00 +00:00

Ooh. Actually, that vulnerability is further-reaching than I

thought. As well as the ".." attack in recursive copies, the name
sent by the client was also trusted in a single-file implicit-
destination copy such as "pscp host:foo .". (The result was ./foo,
where foo is what the server claimed the file was rather than what
the user asked for. I think it's not unreasonable that if the user
requests file `foo' from the host, he should get the result in a
file called `foo' no matter what the host thinks.)

[originally from svn r743]
This commit is contained in:
Simon Tatham 2000-10-21 17:52:54 +00:00
parent b78c5699d1
commit 882f653081

15
scp.c
View File

@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static char *gui_hwnd = NULL;
static void source(char *src);
static void rsource(char *src);
static void sink(char *targ);
static void sink(char *targ, char *src);
/* GUI Adaptation - Sept 2000 */
static void tell_char(FILE *stream, char c);
static void tell_str(FILE *stream, char *str);
@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static void rsource(char *src)
/*
* Execute the sink part of the SCP protocol.
*/
static void sink(char *targ)
static void sink(char *targ, char *src)
{
char buf[2048];
char namebuf[2048];
@ -822,6 +822,13 @@ static void sink(char *targ)
if (sscanf(buf+1, "%u %lu %[^\n]", &mode, &size, namebuf) != 3)
bump("Protocol error: Illegal file descriptor format");
/* Security fix: ensure the file ends up where we asked for it. */
if (src) {
char *p = src + strlen(src);
while (p > src && p[-1] != '/' && p[-1] != '\\')
p--;
strcpy(namebuf, p);
}
if (targisdir) {
char t[2048];
char *p;
@ -851,7 +858,7 @@ static void sink(char *targ)
continue;
}
}
sink(namebuf);
sink(namebuf, NULL);
/* can we set the timestamp for directories ? */
continue;
}
@ -1064,7 +1071,7 @@ static void tolocal(int argc, char *argv[])
do_cmd(host, user, cmd);
sfree(cmd);
sink(targ);
sink(targ, src);
}
/*