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winpgnt: use pageant_enum_keys to update GUI key list.
The advantage of this API is that it gives us the extra flags saying whether each key is encrypted or re-encryptable. NFC: we don't yet do anything with that information, just make it available for future work.
This commit is contained in:
Simon Tatham
parent
443034090c
commit
c4dc78bd85
@ -293,104 +293,108 @@ void old_keyfile_warning(void)
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MessageBox(NULL, message, mbtitle, MB_OK);
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}
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static void keylist_update_callback(
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void *ctx, char **fingerprints, const char *comment, uint32_t ext_flags,
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struct pageant_pubkey *key)
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{
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FingerprintType this_type = ssh2_pick_fingerprint(fingerprints, fptype);
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const char *fingerprint = fingerprints[this_type];
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char *listentry;
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switch (key->ssh_version) {
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case 1: {
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listentry = dupprintf("ssh1\t%s\t%s", fingerprint, comment);
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/*
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* Replace the space in the fingerprint (between bit count and
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* hash) with a tab, for nice alignment in the box.
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*/
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char *p = strchr(listentry, ' ');
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if (p)
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*p = '\t';
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break;
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}
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case 2: {
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/*
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* For nice alignment in the list box, we would ideally want
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* every entry to align to the tab stop settings, and have a
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* column for algorithm name, one for bit count, one for hex
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* fingerprint, and one for key comment.
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*
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* Unfortunately, some of the algorithm names are so long that
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* they overflow into the bit-count field. Fortunately, at the
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* moment, those are _precisely_ the algorithm names that
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* don't need a bit count displayed anyway (because for
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* NIST-style ECDSA the bit count is mentioned in the
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* algorithm name, and for ssh-ed25519 there is only one
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* possible value anyway). So we fudge this by simply omitting
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* the bit count field in that situation.
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*
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* This is fragile not only in the face of further key types
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* that don't follow this pattern, but also in the face of
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* font metrics changes - the Windows semantics for list box
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* tab stops is that \t aligns to the next one you haven't
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* already exceeded, so I have to guess when the key type will
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* overflow past the bit-count tab stop and leave out a tab
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* character. Urgh.
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*/
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listentry = dupprintf("%s\t%s", fingerprint, comment);
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size_t pos = 0;
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while (1) {
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pos += strcspn(listentry + pos, " :");
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if (listentry[pos] == ':' || !listentry[pos])
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break;
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listentry[pos++] = '\t';
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}
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BinarySource src[1];
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BinarySource_BARE_INIT_PL(src, ptrlen_from_strbuf(key->blob));
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ptrlen algname = get_string(src);
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const ssh_keyalg *alg = find_pubkey_alg_len(algname);
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if (alg != &ssh_dss && alg != &ssh_rsa) {
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/*
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* Remove the bit-count field, which is between the
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* first and second \t.
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*/
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int outpos;
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pos = 0;
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while (listentry[pos] && listentry[pos] != '\t')
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pos++;
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outpos = pos;
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pos++;
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while (listentry[pos] && listentry[pos] != '\t')
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pos++;
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while (1) {
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if ((listentry[outpos] = listentry[pos]) == '\0')
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break;
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outpos++;
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pos++;
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}
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}
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break;
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}
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}
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SendDlgItemMessage(keylist, 100, LB_ADDSTRING, 0, (LPARAM)listentry);
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sfree(listentry);
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}
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/*
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* Update the visible key list.
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*/
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void keylist_update(void)
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{
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RSAKey *rkey;
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ssh2_userkey *skey;
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int i;
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if (keylist) {
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SendDlgItemMessage(keylist, 100, LB_RESETCONTENT, 0, 0);
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for (i = 0; NULL != (rkey = pageant_nth_ssh1_key(i)); i++) {
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char *listentry, *fp, *p;
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fp = rsa_ssh1_fingerprint(rkey);
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listentry = dupprintf("ssh1\t%s", fp);
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sfree(fp);
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char *errmsg;
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int status = pageant_enum_keys(keylist_update_callback, NULL, &errmsg);
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assert(status == PAGEANT_ACTION_OK);
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assert(!errmsg);
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/*
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* Replace two spaces in the fingerprint with tabs, for
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* nice alignment in the box.
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*/
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p = strchr(listentry, ' ');
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if (p)
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*p = '\t';
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p = strchr(listentry, ' ');
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if (p)
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*p = '\t';
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SendDlgItemMessage(keylist, 100, LB_ADDSTRING,
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0, (LPARAM) listentry);
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sfree(listentry);
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}
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for (i = 0; NULL != (skey = pageant_nth_ssh2_key(i)); i++) {
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char *listentry, *p;
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int pos;
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/*
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* For nice alignment in the list box, we would ideally
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* want every entry to align to the tab stop settings, and
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* have a column for algorithm name, one for bit count,
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* one for hex fingerprint, and one for key comment.
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*
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* Unfortunately, some of the algorithm names are so long
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* that they overflow into the bit-count field.
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* Fortunately, at the moment, those are _precisely_ the
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* algorithm names that don't need a bit count displayed
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* anyway (because for NIST-style ECDSA the bit count is
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* mentioned in the algorithm name, and for ssh-ed25519
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* there is only one possible value anyway). So we fudge
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* this by simply omitting the bit count field in that
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* situation.
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*
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* This is fragile not only in the face of further key
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* types that don't follow this pattern, but also in the
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* face of font metrics changes - the Windows semantics
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* for list box tab stops is that \t aligns to the next
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* one you haven't already exceeded, so I have to guess
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* when the key type will overflow past the bit-count tab
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* stop and leave out a tab character. Urgh.
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*/
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p = ssh2_fingerprint(skey->key, fptype);
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listentry = dupprintf("%s\t%s", p, skey->comment);
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sfree(p);
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pos = 0;
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while (1) {
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pos += strcspn(listentry + pos, " :");
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if (listentry[pos] == ':' || !listentry[pos])
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break;
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listentry[pos++] = '\t';
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}
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if (ssh_key_alg(skey->key) != &ssh_dss &&
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ssh_key_alg(skey->key) != &ssh_rsa) {
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/*
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* Remove the bit-count field, which is between the
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* first and second \t.
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*/
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int outpos;
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pos = 0;
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while (listentry[pos] && listentry[pos] != '\t')
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pos++;
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outpos = pos;
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pos++;
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while (listentry[pos] && listentry[pos] != '\t')
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pos++;
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while (1) {
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if ((listentry[outpos] = listentry[pos]) == '\0')
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break;
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outpos++;
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pos++;
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}
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}
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SendDlgItemMessage(keylist, 100, LB_ADDSTRING, 0,
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(LPARAM) listentry);
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sfree(listentry);
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}
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SendDlgItemMessage(keylist, 100, LB_SETCURSEL, (WPARAM) - 1, 0);
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}
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}
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@ -454,6 +458,27 @@ static void win_add_keyfile(Filename *filename)
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return;
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}
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static void win_add_keyfile_encrypted(Filename *filename)
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{
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char *err;
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int ret;
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ret = pageant_add_keyfile(filename, NULL, &err, true);
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if (ret == PAGEANT_ACTION_OK) {
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goto done;
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} else if (ret == PAGEANT_ACTION_FAILURE) {
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goto error;
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}
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error:
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message_box(traywindow, err, APPNAME, MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR,
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HELPCTXID(errors_cantloadkey));
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done:
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sfree(err);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Prompt for a key file to add, and add it.
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*/
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