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Added a large comment describing the transformations between the DES
specification and the optimised implementation given. [originally from svn r399]
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sshdes.c
141
sshdes.c
@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
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/*
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* Description of DES
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* ------------------
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*
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* Unlike the description in FIPS 46, I'm going to use _sensible_ indices:
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* bits in an n-bit word are numbered from 0 at the LSB to n-1 at the MSB.
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@ -142,6 +143,138 @@
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* 15 4 25 19 9 1 26 16 5 11 23 8 12 7 17 0 22 3 10 14 6 20 27 24
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*/
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/*
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* Implementation details
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* ----------------------
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*
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* If you look at the code in this module, you'll find it looks
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* nothing _like_ the above algorithm. Here I explain the
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* differences...
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*
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* Key setup has not been heavily optimised here. We are not
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* concerned with key agility: we aren't codebreakers. We don't
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* mind a little delay (and it really is a little one; it may be a
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* factor of five or so slower than it could be but it's still not
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* an appreciable length of time) while setting up. The only tweaks
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* in the key setup are ones which change the format of the key
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* schedule to speed up the actual encryption. I'll describe those
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* below.
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*
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* The first and most obvious optimisation is the S-boxes. Since
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* each S-box always targets the same four bits in the final 32-bit
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* word, so the output from (for example) S-box 0 must always be
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* shifted left 28 bits, we can store the already-shifted outputs
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* in the lookup tables. This reduces lookup-and-shift to lookup,
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* so the S-box step is now just a question of ORing together eight
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* table lookups.
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*
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* The permutation P is just a bit order change; it's invariant
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* with respect to OR, in that P(x)|P(y) = P(x|y). Therefore, we
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* can apply P to every entry of the S-box tables and then we don't
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* have to do it in the code of f(). This yields a set of tables
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* which might be called SP-boxes.
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*
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* The bit-selection function E is our next target. Note that E is
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* immediately followed by the operation of splitting into 6-bit
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* chunks. Examining the 6-bit chunks coming out of E we notice
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* they're all contiguous within the word (speaking cyclically -
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* the end two wrap round); so we can extract those bit strings
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* individually rather than explicitly running E. This would yield
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* code such as
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*
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* y |= SPboxes[0][ (rotl(R, 5) ^ top6bitsofK) & 0x3F ];
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* t |= SPboxes[1][ (rotl(R,11) ^ next6bitsofK) & 0x3F ];
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*
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* and so on; and the key schedule preparation would have to
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* provide each 6-bit chunk separately.
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*
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* Really we'd like to XOR in the key schedule element before
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* looking up bit strings in R. This we can't do, naively, because
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* the 6-bit strings we want overlap. But look at the strings:
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*
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* 3322222222221111111111
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* bit 10987654321098765432109876543210
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*
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* box0 XXXXX X
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* box1 XXXXXX
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* box2 XXXXXX
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* box3 XXXXXX
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* box4 XXXXXX
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* box5 XXXXXX
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* box6 XXXXXX
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* box7 X XXXXX
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*
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* The bit strings we need to XOR in for boxes 0, 2, 4 and 6 don't
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* overlap with each other. Neither do the ones for boxes 1, 3, 5
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* and 7. So we could provide the key schedule in the form of two
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* words that we can separately XOR into R, and then every S-box
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* index is available as a (cyclically) contiguous 6-bit substring
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* of one or the other of the results.
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*
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* The comments in Eric Young's libdes implementation point out
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* that two of these bit strings require a rotation (rather than a
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* simple shift) to extract. It's unavoidable that at least _one_
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* must do; but we can actually run the whole inner algorithm (all
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* 16 rounds) rotated one bit to the left, so that what the `real'
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* DES description sees as L=0x80000001 we see as L=0x00000003.
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* This requires rotating all our SP-box entries one bit to the
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* left, and rotating each word of the key schedule elements one to
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* the left, and rotating L and R one bit left just after IP and
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* one bit right again just before FP. And in each round we convert
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* a rotate into a shift, so we've saved a few per cent.
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*
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* That's about it for the inner loop; the SP-box tables as listed
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* below are what I've described here (the original S value,
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* shifted to its final place in the input to P, run through P, and
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* then rotated one bit left). All that remains is to optimise the
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* initial permutation IP.
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*
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* IP is not an arbitrary permutation. It has the nice property
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* that if you take any bit number, write it in binary (6 bits),
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* permute those 6 bits and invert some of them, you get the final
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* position of that bit. Specifically, the bit whose initial
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* position is given (in binary) as fedcba ends up in position
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* AcbFED (where a capital letter denotes the inverse of a bit).
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*
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* We have the 64-bit data in two 32-bit words L and R, where bits
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* in L are those with f=1 and bits in R are those with f=0. We
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* note that we can do a simple transformation: suppose we exchange
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* the bits with f=1,c=0 and the bits with f=0,c=1. This will cause
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* the bit fedcba to be in position cedfba - we've `swapped' bits c
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* and f in the position of each bit!
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*
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* Better still, this transformation is easy. In the example above,
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* bits in L with c=0 are bits 0x0F0F0F0F, and those in R with c=1
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* are 0xF0F0F0F0. So we can do
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*
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* difference = ((R >> 4) ^ L) & 0x0F0F0F0F
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* R ^= (difference << 4)
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* L ^= difference
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*
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* to perform the swap. Let's denote this by bitswap(4,0x0F0F0F0F).
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* Also, we can invert the bit at the top just by exchanging L and
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* R. So in a few swaps and a few of these bit operations we can
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* do:
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*
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* Initially the position of bit fedcba is fedcba
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* Swap L with R to make it Fedcba
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* Perform bitswap( 4,0x0F0F0F0F) to make it cedFba
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* Perform bitswap(16,0x0000FFFF) to make it ecdFba
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* Swap L with R to make it EcdFba
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* Perform bitswap( 2,0x33333333) to make it bcdFEa
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* Perform bitswap( 8,0x00FF00FF) to make it dcbFEa
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* Swap L with R to make it DcbFEa
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* Perform bitswap( 1,0x55555555) to make it acbFED
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* Swap L with R to make it AcbFED
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*
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* (In the actual code the four swaps are implicit: R and L are
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* simply used the other way round in the first, second and last
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* bitswap operations.)
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*
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* The final permutation is just the inverse of IP, so it can be
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* performed by a similar set of operations.
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*/
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typedef struct {
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word32 k0246[16], k1357[16];
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word32 eiv0, eiv1;
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@ -172,6 +305,14 @@ void des_key_setup(word32 key_msw, word32 key_lsw, DESContext *sched) {
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1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41, 49, 57, 2, 10, 18, 26, 34, 42,
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50, 58, 3, 11, 19, 27, 35, 43, 51, 59, 36, 44, 52, 60
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};
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/*
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* The bit numbers in the two lists below don't correspond to
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* the ones in the above description of PC2, because in the
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* above description C and D are concatenated so `bit 28' means
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* bit 0 of C. In this implementation we're using the standard
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* `bitsel' function above and C is in the second word, so bit
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* 0 of C is addressed by writing `32' here.
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*/
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static const int PC2_0246[] = {
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49, 36, 59, 55, -1, -1, 37, 41, 48, 56, 34, 52, -1, -1, 15, 4,
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25, 19, 9, 1, -1, -1, 12, 7, 17, 0, 22, 3, -1, -1, 46, 43
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