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Add manual cross-certification of new host keys.

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If a server offers host key algorithms that we don't have a stored key
for, they will now appear in a submenu of the Special Commands menu.
Selecting one will force a repeat key exchange with that key, and if
it succeeds, will add the new host key to the cache. The idea is that
the new key sent by the server is protected by the crypto established
in the previous key exchange, so this is just as safe as typing some
command like 'ssh-keygen -lf /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub' at the
server prompt and transcribing the results manually.

This allows switching over to newer host key algorithms if the client
has begun to support them (e.g. people using PuTTY's new ECC
functionality for the first time), or if the server has acquired a new
key (e.g. due to a server OS upgrade).

At the moment, it's only available manually, for a single host key
type at a time. Automating it is potentially controversial for
security policy reasons (what if someone doesn't agree this is what
they want in their host key cache, or doesn't want to switch over to
using whichever of the keys PuTTY would now put top of the list?), for
code plumbing reasons (chaining several of these rekeys might be more
annoying than doing one at a time) and for CPU usage reasons (rekeys
are expensive), but even so, it might turn out to be a good idea in
future.
This commit is contained in:
Simon Tatham 2016-03-21 07:25:31 +00:00
parent 75fdfed80b
commit e786452cb2
1 changed files with 78 additions and 0 deletions
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78
ssh.c
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "putty.h"
#include "tree234.h"
#include "storage.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
#include "sshgssc.h"
@ -959,6 +960,19 @@ struct ssh_tag {
* The last list returned from get_specials.
*/
struct telnet_special *specials;
/*
* List of host key algorithms for which we _don't_ have a stored
* host key. These are indices into the main hostkey_algs[] array
*/
int uncert_hostkeys[lenof(hostkey_algs)];
int n_uncert_hostkeys;
/*
* Flag indicating that the current rekey is intended to finish
* with a newly cross-certified host key.
*/
int cross_certifying;
};
#define logevent(s) logevent(ssh->frontend, s)
@ -6675,6 +6689,27 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
kexlist_descr[i], len, str));
crStopV;
matched:;
if (i == KEXLIST_HOSTKEY) {
int j;
/*
* In addition to deciding which host key we're
* actually going to use, we should make a list of the
* host keys offered by the server which we _don't_
* have cached. These will be offered as cross-
* certification options by ssh_get_specials.
*/
ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys = 0;
for (j = 0; j < lenof(hostkey_algs); j++) {
if (in_commasep_string(hostkey_algs[j]->name, str, len) &&
!have_ssh_host_key(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
hostkey_algs[j]->keytype)) {
ssh->uncert_hostkeys[ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys++] = j;
}
}
}
}
if (s->pending_compression) {
@ -7182,6 +7217,18 @@ static void do_ssh2_transport(Ssh ssh, const void *vin, int inlen,
* subsequent rekeys.
*/
ssh->hostkey_str = s->keystr;
} else if (ssh->cross_certifying) {
s->fingerprint = ssh2_fingerprint(ssh->hostkey, s->hkey);
logevent("Storing additional host key for this host:");
logevent(s->fingerprint);
store_host_key(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
ssh->hostkey->keytype, s->keystr);
ssh->cross_certifying = FALSE;
/*
* Don't forget to store the new key as the one we'll be
* re-checking in future normal rekeys.
*/
ssh->hostkey_str = s->keystr;
} else {
/*
* In a rekey, we never present an interactive host key
@ -11010,6 +11057,8 @@ static const char *ssh_init(void *frontend_handle, void **backend_handle,
ssh->attempting_connshare = FALSE;
ssh->session_started = FALSE;
ssh->specials = NULL;
ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys = 0;
ssh->cross_certifying = FALSE;
*backend_handle = ssh;
@ -11403,6 +11452,28 @@ static const struct telnet_special *ssh_get_specials(void *handle)
ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_rekey_special);
if (ssh->mainchan)
ADD_SPECIALS(ssh2_session_specials);
if (ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys) {
static const struct telnet_special uncert_start[] = {
{NULL, TS_SEP},
{"Cache new host key type", TS_SUBMENU},
};
static const struct telnet_special uncert_end[] = {
{NULL, TS_EXITMENU},
};
int i;
ADD_SPECIALS(uncert_start);
for (i = 0; i < ssh->n_uncert_hostkeys; i++) {
struct telnet_special uncert[1];
const struct ssh_signkey *alg =
hostkey_algs[ssh->uncert_hostkeys[i]];
uncert[0].name = alg->name;
uncert[0].code = TS_LOCALSTART + i;
ADD_SPECIALS(uncert);
}
ADD_SPECIALS(uncert_end);
}
} /* else we're not ready yet */
if (nspecials)
@ -11463,6 +11534,13 @@ static void ssh_special(void *handle, Telnet_Special code)
ssh->version == 2) {
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "at user request", -1, NULL);
}
} else if (code >= TS_LOCALSTART) {
ssh->hostkey = hostkey_algs[code - TS_LOCALSTART];
ssh->cross_certifying = TRUE;
if (!ssh->kex_in_progress && !ssh->bare_connection &&
ssh->version == 2) {
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "cross-certifying new host key", -1, NULL);
}
} else if (code == TS_BRK) {
if (ssh->state == SSH_STATE_CLOSED
|| ssh->state == SSH_STATE_PREPACKET) return;