This replaces the pure radio-button setup that we've always had on the
Session config panel.
Since the last release, that set of radio buttons has been getting out
of hand. We've added two new protocols (SUPDUP, and the 'bare
ssh-connection' aka psusan protocol), neither of which is mainstream
enough to be a sensible thing to wave at all users on the front page
of the config GUI, so that they perhaps start wondering if that's the
protocol they want to use, or get sidetracked by going and looking it
up.
The replacement UI still has radio buttons, but only for the most
common protocols, which will typically be SSH and serial. Everything
else is relegated to a drop-down list sitting next to a third radio
button labelled "Other".
In every be_* module providing a backends[] list, there's also a
variable n_ui_backends which indicates how many of the backends ought
to appear as first-level radio buttons.
(Credit where due: this patch is a joint effort between Jacob and me,
and is one of those rare cases where it would be nice to be able to
put both our names into the Author field of the commit. Failing that,
I can at least mention it here.)
This will let us put two controls side by side (e.g. in disjoint
columns of a multi-col layout) and indicate that instead of the
default behaviour of aligning their top edges, their centreline (or,
even better if available, font baseline) should be aligned.
NFC: nothing uses this yet.
We never expect to be passed a NULL GtkFrontend pointer, and even if
we were, we'd have crashed several lines above this test.
It was benign, of course, but Coverity (which pointed it out) dislikes
this kind of thing on the basis that it's confusing - you ought to
either test it for NULL properly, or not at all - and I see its point.
Coverity points out that it's theoretically possible for the main loop
in radioline_common() to read r.bottom without having gone through the
conditional setup at the start of the function _or_ a previous
iteration of the main loop. I think this can only happen in some silly
case that doesn't actually come up, but on the other hand, it's easy
to add the necessary robustness.
Coverity pointed out that I'd checked if the LoadedFile was NULL, set
an error message ... and then accidentally fallen through to the
success handler anyway.
Coverity points out that if rsa_ssh1_public_blob_len sees data it
doesn't like, it returns -1 to indicate an error. But the code that
uses it to parse the SSH1_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER payload was
passing it directly to get_data() as a length field, without checking
for that case. Now we do check it, and use it to set the existing
kl->broken flag that indicates that the key list was not correctly
formatted.
Coverity was unhappy that I'd used the packet length as a loop bound
without sanitising it first (on the basis that it had decided anything
coming from GET_32BIT_MSB_FIRST was potentially tainted).
I think this is not a security issue: all that will happen if the
server sends a huge packet length is that we'll try to allocate space
for it. On a 64-bit machine we might even _succeed_; on 32-bit, we'll
fail, and snewn() will abort the program rather than return NULL. So
*technically* this is a remote-triggered crash. But it can only happen
in a situation where the same server could have triggered the
termination of the SFTP connection just as easily by simply closing it
- the only difference is that the client would die with a different
fatal error message.
(In particular, it isn't even a DoS against other processes
participating in a connection-shared SSH session. The upstream will
pass the SFTP data stream through without parsing it, so it and the
other downstreams will be unaffected. Only the particular downstream
operating the SFTP client will run into this problem.)
If named_pipe_agent_gotdata was called with an error or EOF status, it
would call agent_cancel_query(pq), but then accidentally fall through
to the non-error handler which would dereference pq. I meant to return
early in that situation, and Coverity spotted that I'd left out the
early return statement.
Coverity objected to several similar cases in this code in which I'd
checked a pointer for NULL after already having done things to it. I
think all the cases are benign, in that (as the comments tersely
mention) those checks could only fail if the unifontsel system had got
_really_ confused, in which case probably some other bug would have
been on the point of manifesting anyway. But Coverity has a point
anyway: if I'm _going_ to check those values for NULL, let's check
them consistently.
Commit d851df486f deleted a #if / #else / #endif on the grounds
that the condition would now always be true, without also deleting the
code inside the #else. Happily, the then-branch ended with a return,
so it was a benign mistake - the erroneously left-in else-clause code
was unreachable. But now Coverity has pointed it out, let's remove it.
Coverity points out that we don't need to check the output buffer
bound before writing out the first 32 bytes of each full-length
BLAKE2b invocation, because the only time we're doing a full-length
one in the first place is if the output buffer bound was at least 64
bytes.
(More specifically: whenever we're in the while loop, length > 64, so
setting chunk = 32 and then checking if chunk > length has a totally
predictable answer.)
The winelib headers don't have GWL_foo, only GWLP_foo (which, fair
enough, I should have been using already). And a side effect was to
point out some slightly incautious integer types in printf argument
lists.
This has apparently been missing more or less forever (though Unix
Plink does have it). Without this, ssh.c can't call ldisc_update,
which can't pass the current editing and echoing settings through to
seat_echoedit_update. Windows Plink has always _had_ an implementation
of that seat method (and the static function that preceded it), but it
was never able to be called, because of that missing link.
The result was that manual overrides in the Conf to force local
editing/echoing to a particular state were not honoured by Windows
Plink, and neither were mainchan.c's attempts to set the state
automatically based on whether a pty had been allocated at the far end
of the connection.
This seems more useful than the previous behaviour of not prompting for
a passphrase and only emitting the public part; if we want that back
I suppose we could invent a "-O text-public".
Also, document the text dump format a bit in the man page.
Thanks to Jacob for spotting this one: when we hand a passphrase back
to pageant.c via pageant_passphrase_request_success(), if the key
doesn't decrypt successfully, pageant.c responds by immediately
issuing another passphrase prompt - and it does it _synchronously_, by
calling back from within pageant_passphrase_request_success(). In this
case, the effect is that we end up in ask_passphrase_common(), which
starts by asserting that nonmodal_passphrase_hwnd is NULL - but it
wasn't NULL _quite_ yet, because end_passphrase_dialog() was expecting
to clean it up immediately after pageant_passphrase_request_success()
returned, i.e. just too late.
The heavyweight fix would be to arrange a toplevel callback to defer
opening the new window until after the old one had been cleaned up.
But in this case I don't think there's any need: it's enough to simply
do the operations in end_passphrase_dialog() in the opposite order, so
that first we destroy the old window and set nonmodal_passphrase_hwnd
back to NULL, and _then_ we call into pageant.c which might call us
back and open a fresh window.
Gives more helpful messages if Unix pageant ends up being a client for,
say, OpenSSH's ssh-agent, or indeed an older version of Pageant.
(Also, tweak a couple of other messages that still assumed that
pageant-as-client always talks to Pageant-as-agent.)
The protocol already allowed adding an encrypted form to a cleartext key
already held by the agent, and you might want to do so if, say, the key
happened to originally be added in cleartext-only form but you want to
be able to forget that with 'pageant -R' in future.
Now the Remove button is disabled if there aren't any keys at all
loaded, and the Re-encrypt button is disabled if no key is currently
in a state where it's decrypted but re-encryptable.
Not quite sure how that happened! But at some point in the past, a bunch
of other definitions in winpgnt.c managed to get in between the first
few IDM_FOO constants and the last few. Bring them all back together.
I'm tired of remembering all those fiddly magic numbers and copying
them back and forth between the .rc file and the source code. I'm even
more tired of having to remember that in the long string of numbers
after a dialog item definition, the first one of them _isn't_ one of
the position and size coordinates. I've given them all symbolic names,
like they should have had all along.
I think I originally didn't bother because this was such a small GUI
compared to the much larger one in PuTTY proper. But it's growing!
This causes the main key list window to open when Pageant starts up,
instead of waiting until you select 'View Keys' from the systray menu.
My main motivation for adding this option is for development: if I'm
_working_ on some detail of the key list window, it cuts down
keystrokes in my edit-compile-retry cycle if I can have it
automatically pop up in every new test run of Pageant.
Normally I'd solve that by hacking an extra couple of lines
temporarily into the code while I was doing that piece of development.
But it suddenly struck me that there's no reason _not_ to add an
option like this permanently (the space of word-length command-line
flags is huge, and that particular one is unlikely to be needed for a
different meaning), and who knows, it _might_ come in useful to
someone in normal use. And at the very least it'll save me doing
another temporary hack the next time I'm doing development work on the
Pageant GUI. So I'll leave it in.
I've decided that it was a mistake to use -E as the option for adding
keys encrypted, because it's better to use it as a fingerprint type
selector for the Pageant client side. That way it works the same as
command-line PuTTYgen, and also OpenSSH ssh-add (and ssh-keygen).
What spelling(s) to use instead for the option to add keys encrypted?
Obviously, the same ones I've just decided on for Windows Pageant;
there's no sensible reason to make them different.
On a system with 2 or more displays with different DPI settings,
moving the PuTTY window from one display to another will make Windows
resize the window using its "bitmap" strategy, stretching/compressing
the text, making it fuzzy and harder to read. This change makes PuTTY
resize its window and font size to accurately fit the DPI of the
display it is on.
We process the WM_DPICHANGED message, saving the new DPI, window size
and position. We proceed to then reset the window, recreating the
fonts using the new DPI and calculate the new window size and position
based on the new font size, user display options (ie. with/without
scrollbar) and the suggested window position provided by Windows. The
suggested window size is usually not a perfect fit, therefore we must
add a small offset to the new window position in order to avoid issues
with repeated DPI changes while dragging the window from one display
to another.
If the prompt got big enough to reach to the edges of the dialog box,
it looked ugly without any margins. Previously I hadn't noticed,
because the prompt text was never that big.
I've merged the two previous functions, with different return types
per SSH version, into a single one that returns the containing
PageantKey instead of pulling out one of its internal fields.
This actually fixes a bug, though it would only have come up in the
Unix Pageant debugging mode: an encrypted-only key would have
terminated the key list in the diagnostic messages, because
pageant_nth_ssh2_key would have returned pk->skey which was NULL. Now
it returns pk itself, which isn't.
We're no longer calling pageant_nth_ssh*_key or pageant_add_ssh*_key
from outside pageant.c. Remove them from pageant.h and turn them
static, so that we carry on not doing so.
The GUI loop that responded to the 'Remove Key' button in the key list
worked by actually trying to retrieve a pointer to the ssh_key for a
stored key, and then passing that back to the delete function. But
when a key is encrypted, that pointer is NULL, so we segfaulted.
Fixed by changing pageant_delete_ssh2_key() to take a numeric index in
the list instead of a key pointer.
This makes Windows Pageant's slightly ad-hoc command-line handling a
bit more like a standard option loop: we start by deciding whether we
think any given argument _is_ an option or not, and if we think it is,
we give an error message if it's one we don't recognise.
