This commit adds the capability in principle to ppk_save_sb, by adding
a fmt_version field in the save parameters structure. As yet it's not
connected up to any user interface in PuTTYgen, but I think I'll need
to, because currently there's no way at all to convert PPK v3 back to
v2, and surely people will need to interoperate with older
installations of PuTTY, or with other PPK-consuming software.
This removes both uses of SHA-1 in the file format: it was used as the
MAC protecting the key file against tamperproofing, and also used in
the key derivation step that converted the user's passphrase to cipher
and MAC keys.
The MAC is simply upgraded from HMAC-SHA-1 to HMAC-SHA-256; it is
otherwise unchanged in how it's applied (in particular, to what data).
The key derivation is totally reworked, to be based on Argon2, which
I've just added to the code base. This should make stolen encrypted
key files more resistant to brute-force attack.
Argon2 has assorted configurable parameters for memory and CPU usage;
the new key format includes all those parameters. So there's no reason
we can't have them under user control, if a user wants to be
particularly vigorous or particularly lightweight with their own key
files. They could even switch to one of the other flavours of Argon2,
if they thought side channels were an especially large or small risk
in their particular environment. In this commit I haven't added any UI
for controlling that kind of thing, but the PPK loading function is
all set up to cope, so that can all be added in a future commit
without having to change the file format.
While I'm at it, I've also switched the CBC encryption to using a
random IV (or rather, one derived from the passphrase along with the
cipher and MAC keys). That's more like normal SSH-2 practice.
This is going to be used in the new version of the PPK file format. It
was the winner of the Password Hashing Context, which I think makes it
a reasonable choice.
Argon2 comes in three flavours: one with no data dependency in its
memory addressing, one with _deliberate_ data dependency (intended to
serialise computation, to hinder parallel brute-forcing), and a hybrid
form that starts off data-independent and then switches over to the
dependent version once the sensitive input data has been adequately
mixed around. I test all three in the test suite; the side-channel
tester can only expect Argon2i to pass; and, following the spec's
recommendation, I'll be using Argon2id for the actual key file
encryption.
No functional change: currently, the IV passed in is always zero
(except in the test suite). But this prepares to change that in a
future revision of the key file format.
A 'strong' prime, as defined by the Handbook of Applied Cryptography,
is a prime p such that each of p-1 and p+1 has a large prime factor,
and that the large factor q of p-1 is such that q-1 in turn _also_ has
a large prime factor.
HoAC says that making your RSA key using primes of this form defeats
some factoring algorithms - but there are other faster algorithms to
which it makes no difference. So this is probably not a useful
precaution in practice. However, it has been recommended in the past
by some official standards, and it's easy to implement given the new
general facility in PrimeCandidateSource that lets you ask for your
prime to satisfy an arbitrary modular congruence. (And HoAC also says
there's no particular reason _not_ to use strong primes.) So I provide
it as an option, just in case anyone wants to select it.
The change to the key generation algorithm is entirely in sshrsag.c,
and is neatly independent of the prime-generation system in use. If
you're using Maurer provable prime generation, then the known factor q
of p-1 can be used to help certify p, and the one for q-1 to help with
q in turn; if you switch to probabilistic prime generation then you
still get an RSA key with the right structure, except that every time
the definition says 'prime factor' you just append '(probably)'.
(The probabilistic version of this procedure is described as 'Gordon's
algorithm' in HoAC section 4.4.2.)
If you want to generate a Sophie Germain / safe prime pair with this
code, then after you've made p, you need to test the primality of
2p+1.
The easiest way to do that is to make a PrimeCandidateSource that is
so constrained as to only be able to deliver 2p+1 as a candidate, and
then run the ordinary prime generation system. The problem is that the
prime generation loops forever, so if 2p+1 _isn't_ prime, it will just
keep testing the same number over and over again and failing the test.
To solve this, I add a 'one-shot mode' to the PrimeCandidateSource
itself, which will cause it to return NULL if asked to generate a
second candidate. Then the prime-generation loops all detect that and
return NULL in turn. However, for clients that _don't_ set a pcs into
one-shot mode, the API remains unchanged: pcs_generate will not return
until it's found a prime (by its own criteria).
This feels like a bit of a bodge, API-wise. But the other two obvious
approaches turn out more awkward.
One option is to extract the Pockle from the PrimeGenerationContext
and use that to directly test primality of 2p+1 based on p - but that
way you don't get to _probabilistically_ generate safe primes, because
that kind of PGC has no Pockle in the first place. (And you can't make
one separately, because you can't convince it that an only
probabilistically generated p is prime!)
Another option is to add a test() method to PrimeGenerationPolicy,
that sits alongside generate(). Then, having generated p, you just
_test_ 2p+1. But then in the provable case you have to explain to it
that it should use p as part of the proof, so that API would get
awkward in its own way.
So this is actually the least disruptive way to do it!
A Sophie Germain prime is a prime p such that 2p+1 is also prime. The
larger prime of the pair 2p+1 is also known as a 'safe prime', and is
the preferred kind of modulus for conventional Diffie-Hellman.
Generating these is harder work than normal prime generation. There's
not really much of a technique except to just keep generating
candidate primes p and then testing 2p+1. But what you _can_ do to
speed things up is to get the prime-candidate generator to help a bit:
it's already enforcing that no small prime divides p, and it's easy to
get it to also enforce that no small prime divides 2p+1. That check
can filter out a lot of bad candidates early, before you waste time on
the more expensive checks, so you have a better chance of success with
each number that gets as far as Miller-Rabin.
Here I add an extra setup function for PrimeCandidateSource which
enables those extra checks. After you call pcs_try_sophie_germain(),
the PCS will only deliver you numbers for which both p and 2p+1 are
free of small factors.
Conveniently checkable certificates of primality aren't a new concept.
I didn't invent them, and I wasn't the first to implement them. Given
that, I thought it might be useful to be able to independently verify
a prime generated by PuTTY's provable prime system. Then, even if you
don't trust _this_ code, you might still trust someone else's
verifier, or at least be less willing to believe that both were
colluding.
The Perl module Math::Prime::Util is the only free software I've found
that defines a specific text-file format for certificates of
primality. The MPU format (as it calls it) supports various different
methods of certifying the primality of a number (most of which, like
Pockle's, depend on having previously proved some smaller number(s) to
be prime). The system implemented by Pockle is on its list: MPU calls
it by the name "BLS5".
So this commit introduces extra stored data inside Pockle so that it
remembers not just _that_ it believes certain numbers to be prime, but
also _why_ it believed each one to be prime. Then there's an extra
method in the Pockle API to translate its internal data structures
into the text of an MPU certificate for any number it knows about.
Math::Prime::Util doesn't come with a command-line verification tool,
unfortunately; only a Perl function which you feed a string argument.
So also in this commit I add test/mpu-check.pl, which is a trivial
command-line client of that function.
At the moment, this new piece of API is only exposed via testcrypt. I
could easily put some user interface into the key generation tools
that would save a few primality certificates alongside the private
key, but I have yet to think of any good reason to do it. Mostly this
facility is intended for debugging and cross-checking of the
_algorithm_, not of any particular prime.
We already had a function pcs_require_residue_1() which lets you ask
PrimeCandidateSource to ensure it only returns numbers congruent to 1
mod a given value. pcs_require_residue_1_mod_prime() is the same, but
it also records the number in a list of prime factors of n-1, which
can be queried later.
The idea is that if you're generating a DSA key, in which the small
prime q must divide p-1, the upcoming provable generation algorithm
will be able to recover q from the PrimeCandidateSource and use it as
part of the primality certificate, which reduces the number of bits of
extra prime factors it also has to make up.
This implements an extended form of primality verification using
certificates based on Pocklington's theorem. You make a Pockle object,
and then try to convince it that one number after another is prime, by
means of providing it with a list of prime factors of p-1 and a
primitive root. (Or just by saying 'this prime is small enough for you
to check yourself'.)
Pocklington's theorem requires you to have factors of p-1 whose
product is at least the square root of p. I've extended that to
support factorisations only as big as the cube root, via an extension
of the theorem given in Maurer's paper on generating provable primes.
The Pockle object is more or less write-only: it has no methods for
reading out its contents. Its only output channel is the return value
when you try to insert a prime into it: if it isn't sufficiently
convinced that your prime is prime, it will return an error code. So
anything for which it returns POCKLE_OK you can be confident of.
I'm going to use this for provable prime generation. But exposing this
part of the system as an object in its own right means I can write a
set of unit tests for this specifically. My negative tests exercise
all the different ways a certification can be erroneous or inadequate;
the positive tests include proofs of primality of various primes used
in elliptic-curve crypto. The Poly1305 proof in particular is taken
from a proof in DJB's paper, which has exactly the form of a
Pocklington certificate only written in English.
The functions primegen() and primegen_add_progress_phase() are gone.
In their place is a small vtable system with two methods corresponding
to them, plus the usual admin of allocating and freeing contexts.
This API change is the starting point for being able to drop in
different prime generation algorithms at run time in response to user
configuration.
The more features and options I add to PrimeCandidateSource, the more
cumbersome it will be to replicate each one in a command-line option
to the ultimate primegen() function. So I'm moving to an API in which
the client of primegen() constructs a PrimeCandidateSource themself,
and passes it in to primegen().
Also, changed the API for pcs_new() so that you don't have to pass
'firstbits' unless you really want to. The net effect is that even
though we've added flexibility, we've also simplified the call sites
of primegen() in the simple case: if you want a 1234-bit prime, you
just need to pass pcs_new(1234) as the argument to primegen, and
you're done.
The new declaration of primegen() lives in ssh_keygen.h, along with
all the types it depends on. So I've had to #include that header in a
few new files.
This expands our previous check for the public value being zero, to
take in all the values that will _become_ zero after not many steps.
The actual check at run time is done using the new is_infinite query
method for Montgomery curve points. Test cases in cryptsuite.py cover
all the dangerous values I generated via all that fiddly quartic-
solving code.
(DJB's page http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate also lists these same
constants. But working them out again for myself makes me confident I
can do it again for other similar curves, such as Curve448.)
In particular, this makes us fully compliant with RFC 7748's demand to
check we didn't generate a trivial output key, which can happen if the
other end sends any of those low-order values.
I don't actually see why this is a vital check to perform for security
purposes, for the same reason that we didn't classify the bug
'diffie-hellman-range-check' as a vulnerability: I can't really see
what the other end's incentive might be to deliberately send one of
these nonsense values (and you can't do it by accident - none of these
values is a power of the canonical base point). It's not that a DH
participant couldn't possible want to secretly expose the session
traffic - but there are plenty of more subtle (and less subtle!) ways
to do it, so you don't really gain anything by forcing them to use one
of those instead. But the RFC says to check, so we check.
I've replaced the random number generation and small delta-finding
loop in primegen() with a much more elaborate system in its own source
file, with unit tests and everything.
Immediate benefits:
- fixes a theoretical possibility of overflowing the target number of
bits, if the random number was so close to the top of the range
that the addition of delta * factor pushed it over. However, this
only happened with negligible probability.
- fixes a directional bias in delta-finding. The previous code
incremented the number repeatedly until it found a value coprime to
all the right things, which meant that a prime preceded by a
particularly long sequence of numbers with tiny factors was more
likely to be chosen. Now we select candidate delta values at
random, that bias should be eliminated.
- changes the semantics of the outermost primegen() function to make
them easier to use, because now the caller specifies the 'bits' and
'firstbits' values for the actual returned prime, rather than
having to account for the factor you're multiplying it by in DSA.
DSA client code is correspondingly adjusted.
Future benefits:
- having the candidate generation in a separate function makes it
easy to reuse in alternative prime generation strategies
- the available constraints support applications such as Maurer's
algorithm for generating provable primes, or strong primes for RSA
in which both p-1 and p+1 have a large factor. So those become
things we could experiment with in future.
This still isn't the true random generator used in the live tools:
it's deterministic, for repeatable testing. The Python side of
testcrypt can now call random_make_prng(), which will instantiate a
PRNG with the given seed. random_clear() still gets rid of it.
So I can still have some tests control the precise random numbers
received by the function under test, but for others (especially key
generation, with its uncertainty about how much randomness it will
actually use) I can just say 'here, have a seed, generate as much
stuff from that seed as you need'.
This is another application of the existing mp_bezout_into, which
needed a tweak or two to cope with the numbers not necessarily being
coprime, plus a wrapper function to deal with shared factors of 2.
It reindents the entire second half of mp_bezout_into, so the patch is
best viewed with whitespace differences ignored.
There was previously no safe left shift at all, which is an omission.
And rshift_safe_into was an odd thing to be missing, so while I'm
here, I've added it on the basis that it will probably be useful
sooner or later.
Also spelled '-O text', this takes a public or private key as input,
and produces on standard output a dump of all the actual numbers
involved in the key: the exponent and modulus for RSA, the p,q,g,y
parameters for DSA, the affine x and y coordinates of the public
elliptic curve point for ECC keys, and all the extra bits and pieces
in the private keys too.
Partly I expect this to be useful to me for debugging: I've had to
paste key files a few too many times through base64 decoders and hex
dump tools, then manually decode SSH marshalling and paste the result
into the Python REPL to get an integer object. Now I should be able to
get _straight_ to text I can paste into Python.
But also, it's a way that other applications can use the key
generator: if you need to generate, say, an RSA key in some format I
don't support (I've recently heard of an XML-based one, for example),
then you can run 'puttygen -t rsa --dump' and have it print the
elements of a freshly generated keypair on standard output, and then
all you have to do is understand the output format.
I carefully set up separate mechanisms for the "-96" suffix on the
hash name and the "bug-compatible" in parens after it, so that the
latter could share its parens with annotations from the underlying
hash. And then I forgot to _use_ the second mechanism!
Also added ssh2_mac_text_name to the testcrypt API so I could check it
easily. The result before this fix:
>>> ssh2_mac_text_name(ssh2_mac_new("hmac_sha1_96_buggy", None))
'HMAC-SHA-1-96 (bug-compatible) (unaccelerated)'
And after, which is what I intended all along:
>>> ssh2_mac_text_name(ssh2_mac_new("hmac_sha1_96_buggy", None))
'HMAC-SHA-1-96 (bug-compatible, unaccelerated)'
They're not much use for 'real' key generation, since like all the
other randomness-using testcrypt functions, they need you to have
explicitly queued up some random data. But for generating keys for
test purposes, they have the great virtue that they deliver the key in
the internal format, where we can generate all the various public and
private blobs from it as well as the on-disk formats.
A minor change to one of the keygen functions itself: rsa_generate now
fills in the 'bits' and 'bytes' fields of the returned RSAKey, without
which it didn't actually work to try to generate a public blob from
it. (We'd never noticed before, because no previous client of
rsa_generate even tried that.)
It wasn't expanding the output strbuf to the full size of the key
modulus, so the output delivered to Python was only a part of the
mpint it should have been.
(Also, that was logically speaking a buffer overrun - we were writing
to the strbuf buffer beyond its length - although in practice I think
the _physical_ size of the buffer was large enough not to show it up
even under ASan. In any case, a buffer overrun only in the test suite,
and in a function I hadn't even got round to testing, is about the
best place to have one.)
While I'm here, I've also changed the way that the testcrypt wrapper
on rsa_ssh1_encrypt indicates failure: now we have the 'opt_'
mechanism, it can do that by returning None rather than "".
This commit switches as many ssh_hash_free / ssh_hash_new pairs as
possible to reuse the previous hash object via ssh_hash_reset. Also a
few other cleanups: use the wrapper function hash_simple() where
possible, and I've also introduced ssh_hash_digest_nondestructive()
and switched to that where possible as well.
It demonstrates a successful round trip from a source integer to
ciphertext and back, and also I've hardcoded the ciphertext I got from
the first attempt so that future changes to the code won't be able to
change it without me noticing.
The code that reads an SSH1_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY message and parses
an RSA private key out of it now does it by calling a BinarySource
function in sshrsa.c, instead of doing inline in the Pageant message
handler. This has no functional change, except that now I can expose
that separate function in the testcrypt API, where it provides me with
a mechanism for creating a bare RSAKey structure for purposes of
testing RSA key exchange.
The ssh_signkey vtable has grown a new method ssh_key_invalid(), which
checks whether the key is going to be usable for constructing a
signature at all. Currently the only way this can fail is if it's an
RSA key so short that there isn't room to put all the PKCS#1
formatting in the signature preimage integer, but the return value is
an arbitrary error message just in case more reasons are needed later.
This is tested separately rather than at key-creation time because of
the signature flags system: an RSA key of intermediate length could be
valid for SHA-1 signing but not for SHA-512. So really this method
should be called at the point where you've decided what sig flags you
want to use, and you're checking if _those flags_ are OK.
On the verification side, there's no need for a separate check. If
someone presents us with an RSA key so short that it's impossible to
encode a valid signature using it, then we simply regard all
signatures as invalid.
I just found I wanted to generate a prime with particular properties,
and I knew PuTTY's prime generator could manage it, so it was easier
to add this function to testcrypt for occasional manual use than to
look for another prime-generator with the same feature set!
I've wrapped the function so as to remove the three progress-
reporting parameters.
Like the AES code before it, I've now exposed the explicit _sw and _hw
vtables for SHA-256 and SHA-1 through the testcrypt system, and now
cryptsuite will run the standard test vectors for those hashes over
both implementations, on a platform where more than one is available.
This tears out the entire previous random-pool system in sshrand.c. In
its place is a system pretty close to Ferguson and Schneier's
'Fortuna' generator, with the main difference being that I use SHA-256
instead of AES for the generation side of the system (rationale given
in comment).
The PRNG implementation lives in sshprng.c, and defines a self-
contained data type with no state stored outside the object, so you
can instantiate however many of them you like. The old sshrand.c still
exists, but in place of the previous random pool system, it's just
become a client of sshprng.c, whose job is to hold a single global
instance of the PRNG type, and manage its reference count, save file,
noise-collection timers and similar administrative business.
Advantages of this change include:
- Fortuna is designed with a more varied threat model in mind than my
old home-grown random pool. For example, after any request for
random numbers, it automatically re-seeds itself, so that if the
state of the PRNG should be leaked, it won't give enough
information to find out what past outputs _were_.
- The PRNG type can be instantiated with any hash function; the
instance used by the main tools is based on SHA-256, an improvement
on the old pool's use of SHA-1.
- The new PRNG only uses the completely standard interface to the
hash function API, instead of having to have privileged access to
the internal SHA-1 block transform function. This will make it
easier to revamp the hash code in general, and also it means that
hardware-accelerated versions of SHA-256 will automatically be used
for the PRNG as well as for everything else.
- The new PRNG can be _tested_! Because it has an actual (if not
quite explicit) specification for exactly what the output numbers
_ought_ to be derived from the hashes of, I can (and have) put
tests in cryptsuite that ensure the output really is being derived
in the way I think it is. The old pool could have been returning
any old nonsense and it would have been very hard to tell for sure.
The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the
ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were
two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2
with different functionality.
Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old
ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on
the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and
adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API.
(The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the
sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to
make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher
automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has
to do by hand.)
The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed
completely, because when converted into the new API it became
identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one
vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1
ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely
different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure
versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between
the two.
(Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1
Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128.
In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length
SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually
Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
All the things like des_encrypt_xdmauth and aes256_encrypt_pubkey are
at risk of changing their behaviour if I rewrite the underlying code,
so even if I don't have any externally verified test cases, I should
still have _something_ to keep me confident that they work the same
way today that they worked yesterday.
I remembered the existence of that module while I was changing the API
of the CRC functions. It's still quite possibly the only code in PuTTY
not written specifically _for_ PuTTY, so it definitely deserves a bit
of a test suite.
In order to expose it through the ptrlen-centric testcrypt system,
I've added some missing 'const' in the detector module itself, but
otherwise I've left the detector code as it was.
Finding even semi-official test vectors for this CRC implementation
was hard, because it turns out not to _quite_ match any of the well
known ones catalogued on the web. Its _polynomial_ is well known, but
the combination of details that go alongside it (starting state,
post-hashing transformation) are not quite the same as any other hash
I know of.
After trawling catalogue websites for a while I finally worked out
that SSH-1's CRC and RFC 1662's CRC are basically the same except for
different choices of starting value and final adjustment. And RFC
1662's CRC is common enough that there _are_ test vectors.
So I've renamed the previous crc32_compute function to crc32_ssh1,
reflecting that it seems to be its own thing unlike any other CRC;
implemented the RFC 1662 CRC as well, as an alternative tiny wrapper
on the inner crc32_update function; and exposed all three functions to
testcrypt. That lets me run standard test vectors _and_ directed tests
of the internal update routine, plus one check that crc32_ssh1 itself
does what I expect.
While I'm here, I've also modernised the code to use uint32_t in place
of unsigned long, and ptrlen instead of separate pointer,length
arguments. And I've removed the general primer on CRC theory from the
header comment, in favour of the more specifically useful information
about _which_ CRC this is and how it matches up to anything else out
there.
(I've bowed to inevitability and put the directed CRC tests in the
'crypt' class in cryptsuite.py. Of course this is a misnomer, since
CRC isn't cryptography, but it falls into the same category in terms
of the role it plays in SSH-1, and I didn't feel like making a new
pointedly-named 'notreallycrypt' container class just for this :-)
No cipher construction function _currently_ returns NULL, but one's
about to start, so the testcrypt system will have to be able to cope.
This is the first time a function in the testcrypt API has had an
'opt' type as its return value rather than an argument. But it works
just the same in reverse: the wire protocol emits the special
identifer "NULL" when the optional return value is absent, and the
Python module catches that and rewrites it as Python 'None'.
The bulk of this commit is the changes necessary to make testcrypt
compile under Visual Studio. Unfortunately, I've had to remove my
fiddly clever uses of C99 variadic macros, because Visual Studio does
something unexpected when a variadic macro's expansion puts
__VA_ARGS__ in the argument list of a further macro invocation: the
commas don't separate further arguments. In other words, if you write
#define INNER(x,y,z) some expansion involving x, y and z
#define OUTER(...) INNER(__VA_ARGS__)
OUTER(1,2,3)
then gcc and clang will translate OUTER(1,2,3) into INNER(1,2,3) in
the obvious way, and the inner macro will be expanded with x=1, y=2
and z=3. But try this in Visual Studio, and you'll get the macro
parameter x expanding to the entire string 1,2,3 and the other two
empty (with warnings complaining that INNER didn't get the number of
arguments it expected).
It's hard to cite chapter and verse of the standard to say which of
those is _definitely_ right, though my reading leans towards the
gcc/clang behaviour. But I do know I can't depend on it in code that
has to compile under both!
So I've removed the system that allowed me to declare everything in
testcrypt.h as FUNC(ret,fn,arg,arg,arg), and now I have to use a
different macro for each arity (FUNC0, FUNC1, FUNC2 etc). Also, the
WRAPPED_NAME system is gone (because that too depended on the use of a
comma to shift macro arguments along by one), and now I put a custom C
wrapper around a function by simply re-#defining that function's own
name (and therefore the subsequent code has to be a little more
careful to _not_ pass functions' names between several macros before
stringifying them).
That's all a bit tedious, and commits me to a small amount of ongoing
annoyance because now I'll have to add an explicit argument count
every time I add something to testcrypt.h. But then again, perhaps it
will make the code less incomprehensible to someone trying to
understand it!
The type names 'val_foo' used in testcrypt.h work on a system where a
further underscore suffix is treated as a qualifier indicating
something about how the C version of the API represents that type.
(For example, plain 'val_string' means a strbuf, but if I write
'val_string_asciz' or 'val_string_ptrlen' in testcrypt.h it will cause
the wrapper for that function to pass a char * or a ptrlen derived
from that strbuf.)
But I forgot about this when I named the type val_ssh2_cipher (and
ditto ssh1), with the effect that the testcrypt system has considered
them all along to really be called 'ssh2' and 'ssh1', and the 'cipher'
to be some irrelevant API-adaptor suffix.
This hasn't caused a bug because I didn't have any other type called
val_ssh2_something. But it was a latent one. Now renamed sensibly!
This allows me to remove another diagnostic main() that I just found
lurking at the bottom of sshdes.c, which was there to allow manual
untangling of XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 strings when debugging X forwarding.
Now you can ask the same kind of question at the interactive Python
prompt, without having to manually compile anything. For example, the
query you might previously have asked by building the sshdes test
program and running
$ ./sshdes 090a0b0c0d0e0f10 0123456789abcd
decrypt(090a0b0c0d0e0f10,0123456789abcd) = ab53fd65ae7f4ec3
encrypt(090a0b0c0d0e0f10,0123456789abcd) = 7065d20441f5abe3
you can now run using the standard testcrypt (bearing in mind that the
actual library function takes the key argument first):
$ python -i test/testcrypt.py
>>> from binascii import hexlify as H, unhexlify as U
>>> H(des_decrypt_xdmauth(U('0123456789abcd'),U('090a0b0c0d0e0f10')))
'ab53fd65ae7f4ec3'
>>> H(des_encrypt_xdmauth(U('0123456789abcd'),U('090a0b0c0d0e0f10')))
'7065d20441f5abe3'
I've written a new standalone test program which incorporates all of
PuTTY's crypto code, including the mp_int and low-level elliptic curve
layers but also going all the way up to the implementations of the
MAC, hash, cipher, public key and kex abstractions.
The test program itself, 'testcrypt', speaks a simple line-oriented
protocol on standard I/O in which you write the name of a function
call followed by some inputs, and it gives you back a list of outputs
preceded by a line telling you how many there are. Dynamically
allocated objects are assigned string ids in the protocol, and there's
a 'free' function that tells testcrypt when it can dispose of one.
It's possible to speak that protocol by hand, but cumbersome. I've
also provided a Python module that wraps it, by running testcrypt as a
persistent subprocess and gatewaying all the function calls into
things that look reasonably natural to call from Python. The Python
module and testcrypt.c both read a carefully formatted header file
testcrypt.h which contains the name and signature of every exported
function, so it costs minimal effort to expose a given function
through this test API. In a few cases it's necessary to write a
wrapper in testcrypt.c that makes the function look more friendly, but
mostly you don't even need that. (Though that is one of the
motivations between a lot of API cleanups I've done recently!)
I considered doing Python integration in the more obvious way, by
linking parts of the PuTTY code directly into a native-code .so Python
module. I decided against it because this way is more flexible: I can
run the testcrypt program on its own, or compile it in a way that
Python wouldn't play nicely with (I bet compiling just that .so with
Leak Sanitiser wouldn't do what you wanted when Python loaded it!), or
attach a debugger to it. I can even recompile testcrypt for a
different CPU architecture (32- vs 64-bit, or even running it on a
different machine over ssh or under emulation) and still layer the
nice API on top of that via the local Python interpreter. All I need
is a bidirectional data channel.
