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putty-source/test/cryptsuite.py

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import unittest
import struct
import itertools
Expose CRC32 to testcrypt, and add tests for it. Finding even semi-official test vectors for this CRC implementation was hard, because it turns out not to _quite_ match any of the well known ones catalogued on the web. Its _polynomial_ is well known, but the combination of details that go alongside it (starting state, post-hashing transformation) are not quite the same as any other hash I know of. After trawling catalogue websites for a while I finally worked out that SSH-1's CRC and RFC 1662's CRC are basically the same except for different choices of starting value and final adjustment. And RFC 1662's CRC is common enough that there _are_ test vectors. So I've renamed the previous crc32_compute function to crc32_ssh1, reflecting that it seems to be its own thing unlike any other CRC; implemented the RFC 1662 CRC as well, as an alternative tiny wrapper on the inner crc32_update function; and exposed all three functions to testcrypt. That lets me run standard test vectors _and_ directed tests of the internal update routine, plus one check that crc32_ssh1 itself does what I expect. While I'm here, I've also modernised the code to use uint32_t in place of unsigned long, and ptrlen instead of separate pointer,length arguments. And I've removed the general primer on CRC theory from the header comment, in favour of the more specifically useful information about _which_ CRC this is and how it matches up to anything else out there. (I've bowed to inevitability and put the directed CRC tests in the 'crypt' class in cryptsuite.py. Of course this is a misnomer, since CRC isn't cryptography, but it falls into the same category in terms of the role it plays in SSH-1, and I didn't feel like making a new pointedly-named 'notreallycrypt' container class just for this :-)
2019-01-14 20:45:19 +00:00
import functools
import contextlib
import hashlib
import binascii
import base64
import json
try:
from math import gcd
except ImportError:
from fractions import gcd
from eccref import *
from testcrypt import *
from ssh import *
assert sys.version_info[:2] >= (3,0), "This is Python 3 code"
try:
base64decode = base64.decodebytes
except AttributeError:
base64decode = base64.decodestring
def unhex(s):
return binascii.unhexlify(s.replace(" ", "").replace("\n", ""))
def rsa_bare(e, n):
rsa = rsa_new()
get_rsa_ssh1_pub(ssh_uint32(nbits(n)) + ssh1_mpint(e) + ssh1_mpint(n),
rsa, 'exponent_first')
return rsa
def find_non_square_mod(p):
# Find a non-square mod p, using the Jacobi symbol
# calculation function from eccref.py.
return next(z for z in itertools.count(2) if jacobi(z, p) == -1)
def fibonacci_scattered(n=10):
# Generate a list of Fibonacci numbers with power-of-2 indices
# (F_1, F_2, F_4, ...), to be used as test inputs of varying
# sizes. Also put F_0 = 0 into the list as a bonus.
yield 0
a, b, c = 0, 1, 1
while True:
yield b
n -= 1
if n <= 0:
break
a, b, c = (a**2+b**2, b*(a+c), b**2+c**2)
def fibonacci(n=10):
# Generate the full Fibonacci sequence starting from F_0 = 0.
a, b = 0, 1
while True:
yield a
n -= 1
if n <= 0:
break
a, b = b, a+b
def mp_mask(mp):
# Return the value that mp would represent if all its bits
# were set. Useful for masking a true mathematical output
# value (e.g. from an operation that can over/underflow, like
# mp_sub or mp_anything_into) to check it's right within the
# ability of that particular mp_int to represent.
return ((1 << mp_max_bits(mp))-1)
def adjtuples(iterable, n):
# Return all the contiguous n-tuples of an iterable, including
# overlapping ones. E.g. if called on [0,1,2,3,4] with n=3 it
# would return (0,1,2), (1,2,3), (2,3,4) and then stop.
it = iter(iterable)
toret = [next(it) for _ in range(n-1)]
for element in it:
toret.append(element)
yield tuple(toret)
toret[:1] = []
def last(iterable):
# Return the last element of an iterable, or None if it is empty.
it = iter(iterable)
toret = None
for toret in it:
pass
return toret
def le_integer(x, nbits):
assert nbits % 8 == 0
return bytes([0xFF & (x >> (8*n)) for n in range(nbits//8)])
@contextlib.contextmanager
def queued_random_data(nbytes, seed):
hashsize = 512 // 8
data = b''.join(
hashlib.sha512("preimage:{:d}:{}".format(i, seed).encode('ascii'))
.digest() for i in range((nbytes + hashsize - 1) // hashsize))
data = data[:nbytes]
random_queue(data)
yield None
random_clear()
@contextlib.contextmanager
def queued_specific_random_data(data):
random_queue(data)
yield None
random_clear()
@contextlib.contextmanager
def random_prng(seed):
random_make_prng('sha256', seed)
yield None
random_clear()
def hash_str(alg, message):
h = ssh_hash_new(alg)
ssh_hash_update(h, message)
return ssh_hash_final(h)
def hash_str_iter(alg, message_iter):
h = ssh_hash_new(alg)
for string in message_iter:
ssh_hash_update(h, string)
return ssh_hash_final(h)
def mac_str(alg, key, message, cipher=None):
m = ssh2_mac_new(alg, cipher)
ssh2_mac_setkey(m, key)
ssh2_mac_start(m)
ssh2_mac_update(m, "dummy")
# Make sure ssh_mac_start erases previous state
ssh2_mac_start(m)
ssh2_mac_update(m, message)
return ssh2_mac_genresult(m)
Refactor generation of candidate integers in primegen. I've replaced the random number generation and small delta-finding loop in primegen() with a much more elaborate system in its own source file, with unit tests and everything. Immediate benefits: - fixes a theoretical possibility of overflowing the target number of bits, if the random number was so close to the top of the range that the addition of delta * factor pushed it over. However, this only happened with negligible probability. - fixes a directional bias in delta-finding. The previous code incremented the number repeatedly until it found a value coprime to all the right things, which meant that a prime preceded by a particularly long sequence of numbers with tiny factors was more likely to be chosen. Now we select candidate delta values at random, that bias should be eliminated. - changes the semantics of the outermost primegen() function to make them easier to use, because now the caller specifies the 'bits' and 'firstbits' values for the actual returned prime, rather than having to account for the factor you're multiplying it by in DSA. DSA client code is correspondingly adjusted. Future benefits: - having the candidate generation in a separate function makes it easy to reuse in alternative prime generation strategies - the available constraints support applications such as Maurer's algorithm for generating provable primes, or strong primes for RSA in which both p-1 and p+1 have a large factor. So those become things we could experiment with in future.
2020-02-23 14:30:03 +00:00
def lcm(a, b):
return a * b // gcd(a, b)
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
def get_implementations(alg):
return get_implementations_commasep(alg).decode("ASCII").split(",")
def get_aes_impls():
return [impl.rsplit("_", 1)[-1]
for impl in get_implementations("aes128_cbc")
if impl.startswith("aes128_cbc_")]
class MyTestBase(unittest.TestCase):
"Intermediate class that adds useful helper methods."
def assertEqualBin(self, x, y):
# Like assertEqual, but produces more legible error reports
# for random-looking binary data.
self.assertEqual(binascii.hexlify(x), binascii.hexlify(y))
class mpint(MyTestBase):
def testCreation(self):
self.assertEqual(int(mp_new(128)), 0)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_bytes_be(b'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP')),
0x4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f50)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_bytes_le(b'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP')),
0x504f4e4d4c4b4a494847464544434241)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_integer(12345)), 12345)
decstr = '91596559417721901505460351493238411077414937428167'
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_decimal_pl(decstr)), int(decstr, 10))
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_decimal(decstr)), int(decstr, 10))
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_decimal("")), 0)
# For hex, test both upper and lower case digits
hexstr = 'ea7cb89f409ae845215822e37D32D0C63EC43E1381C2FF8094'
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_hex_pl(hexstr)), int(hexstr, 16))
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_hex(hexstr)), int(hexstr, 16))
self.assertEqual(int(mp_from_hex("")), 0)
p2 = mp_power_2(123)
self.assertEqual(int(p2), 1 << 123)
p2c = mp_copy(p2)
self.assertEqual(int(p2c), 1 << 123)
# Check mp_copy really makes a copy, not an alias (ok, that's
# testing the testcrypt system more than it's testing the
# underlying C functions)
mp_set_bit(p2c, 120, 1)
self.assertEqual(int(p2c), (1 << 123) + (1 << 120))
self.assertEqual(int(p2), 1 << 123)
def testBytesAndBits(self):
x = mp_new(128)
self.assertEqual(mp_get_byte(x, 2), 0)
mp_set_bit(x, 2*8+3, 1)
self.assertEqual(mp_get_byte(x, 2), 1<<3)
self.assertEqual(mp_get_bit(x, 2*8+3), 1)
mp_set_bit(x, 2*8+3, 0)
self.assertEqual(mp_get_byte(x, 2), 0)
self.assertEqual(mp_get_bit(x, 2*8+3), 0)
# Currently I expect 128 to be a multiple of any
# BIGNUM_INT_BITS value we might be running with, so these
# should be exact equality
self.assertEqual(mp_max_bytes(x), 128/8)
self.assertEqual(mp_max_bits(x), 128)
nb = lambda hexstr: mp_get_nbits(mp_from_hex(hexstr))
self.assertEqual(nb('00000000000000000000000000000000'), 0)
self.assertEqual(nb('00000000000000000000000000000001'), 1)
self.assertEqual(nb('00000000000000000000000000000002'), 2)
self.assertEqual(nb('00000000000000000000000000000003'), 2)
self.assertEqual(nb('00000000000000000000000000000004'), 3)
self.assertEqual(nb('000003ffffffffffffffffffffffffff'), 106)
self.assertEqual(nb('000003ffffffffff0000000000000000'), 106)
self.assertEqual(nb('80000000000000000000000000000000'), 128)
self.assertEqual(nb('ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff'), 128)
def testDecAndHex(self):
def checkHex(hexstr):
n = mp_from_hex(hexstr)
i = int(hexstr, 16)
self.assertEqual(mp_get_hex(n),
"{:x}".format(i).encode('ascii'))
self.assertEqual(mp_get_hex_uppercase(n),
"{:X}".format(i).encode('ascii'))
checkHex("0")
checkHex("f")
checkHex("00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000")
checkHex("d5aa1acd5a9a1f6b126ed416015390b8dc5fceee4c86afc8c2")
checkHex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff")
def checkDec(hexstr):
n = mp_from_hex(hexstr)
i = int(hexstr, 16)
self.assertEqual(mp_get_decimal(n),
"{:d}".format(i).encode('ascii'))
checkDec("0")
checkDec("f")
checkDec("00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000")
checkDec("d5aa1acd5a9a1f6b126ed416015390b8dc5fceee4c86afc8c2")
checkDec("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff")
checkDec("f" * 512)
def testComparison(self):
inputs = [
"0", "1", "2", "10", "314159265358979", "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
# Test over-long versions of some of the same numbers we
# had short forms of above
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
]
values = [(mp_from_hex(s), int(s, 16)) for s in inputs]
for am, ai in values:
for bm, bi in values:
self.assertEqual(mp_cmp_eq(am, bm) == 1, ai == bi)
self.assertEqual(mp_cmp_hs(am, bm) == 1, ai >= bi)
if (bi >> 64) == 0:
self.assertEqual(mp_eq_integer(am, bi) == 1, ai == bi)
self.assertEqual(mp_hs_integer(am, bi) == 1, ai >= bi)
# mp_{min,max}{,_into} is a reasonable thing to test
# here as well
self.assertEqual(int(mp_min(am, bm)), min(ai, bi))
self.assertEqual(int(mp_max(am, bm)), max(ai, bi))
am_small = mp_copy(am if ai<bi else bm)
mp_min_into(am_small, am, bm)
self.assertEqual(int(am_small), min(ai, bi))
am_big = mp_copy(am if ai>bi else bm)
mp_max_into(am_big, am, bm)
self.assertEqual(int(am_big), max(ai, bi))
# Test mp_{eq,hs}_integer in the case where the integer is as
# large as possible and the bignum contains very few words. In
# modes where BIGNUM_INT_BITS < 64, this used to go wrong.
mp10 = mp_new(4)
mp_copy_integer_into(mp10, 10)
highbit = 1 << 63
self.assertEqual(mp_hs_integer(mp10, highbit | 9), 0)
self.assertEqual(mp_hs_integer(mp10, highbit | 10), 0)
self.assertEqual(mp_hs_integer(mp10, highbit | 11), 0)
self.assertEqual(mp_eq_integer(mp10, highbit | 9), 0)
self.assertEqual(mp_eq_integer(mp10, highbit | 10), 0)
self.assertEqual(mp_eq_integer(mp10, highbit | 11), 0)
def testConditionals(self):
testnumbers = [(mp_copy(n),n) for n in fibonacci_scattered()]
for am, ai in testnumbers:
for bm, bi in testnumbers:
cm = mp_copy(am)
mp_select_into(cm, am, bm, 0)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), ai & mp_mask(am))
mp_select_into(cm, am, bm, 1)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), bi & mp_mask(am))
mp_cond_add_into(cm, am, bm, 0)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), ai & mp_mask(am))
mp_cond_add_into(cm, am, bm, 1)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), (ai+bi) & mp_mask(am))
mp_cond_sub_into(cm, am, bm, 0)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), ai & mp_mask(am))
mp_cond_sub_into(cm, am, bm, 1)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), (ai-bi) & mp_mask(am))
maxbits = max(mp_max_bits(am), mp_max_bits(bm))
cm = mp_new(maxbits)
dm = mp_new(maxbits)
mp_copy_into(cm, am)
mp_copy_into(dm, bm)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), ai)
self.assertEqual(int(dm), bi)
mp_cond_swap(cm, dm, 0)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), ai)
self.assertEqual(int(dm), bi)
mp_cond_swap(cm, dm, 1)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), bi)
self.assertEqual(int(dm), ai)
if bi != 0:
mp_cond_clear(cm, 0)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), bi)
mp_cond_clear(cm, 1)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), 0)
def testBasicArithmetic(self):
testnumbers = list(fibonacci_scattered(5))
testnumbers.extend([1 << (1 << i) for i in range(3,10)])
testnumbers.extend([(1 << (1 << i)) - 1 for i in range(3,10)])
testnumbers = [(mp_copy(n),n) for n in testnumbers]
for am, ai in testnumbers:
for bm, bi in testnumbers:
self.assertEqual(int(mp_add(am, bm)), ai + bi)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_mul(am, bm)), ai * bi)
# Cope with underflow in subtraction
diff = mp_sub(am, bm)
self.assertEqual(int(diff), (ai - bi) & mp_mask(diff))
for bits in range(64, 512, 64):
cm = mp_new(bits)
mp_add_into(cm, am, bm)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), (ai + bi) & mp_mask(cm))
mp_mul_into(cm, am, bm)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), (ai * bi) & mp_mask(cm))
mp_sub_into(cm, am, bm)
self.assertEqual(int(cm), (ai - bi) & mp_mask(cm))
# A test cherry-picked from the old bignum test script,
# involving two numbers whose product has a single 1 bit miles
# in the air and then all 0s until a bunch of cruft at the
# bottom, the aim being to test that carry propagation works
# all the way up.
ai, bi = 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, 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
am = mp_copy(ai)
bm = mp_copy(bi)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_mul(am, bm)), ai * bi)
# A regression test for a bug that came up during development
# of mpint.c, relating to an intermediate value overflowing
# its container.
ai, bi = (2**8512 * 2 // 3), (2**4224 * 11 // 15)
am = mp_copy(ai)
bm = mp_copy(bi)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_mul(am, bm)), ai * bi)
def testAddInteger(self):
initial = mp_copy(4444444444444444444444444)
x = mp_new(mp_max_bits(initial) + 64)
# mp_{add,sub,copy}_integer_into should be able to cope with
# any uintmax_t. Test a number that requires more than 32 bits.
mp_add_integer_into(x, initial, 123123123123123)
self.assertEqual(int(x), 4444444444567567567567567)
mp_sub_integer_into(x, initial, 123123123123123)
self.assertEqual(int(x), 4444444444321321321321321)
mp_copy_integer_into(x, 123123123123123)
self.assertEqual(int(x), 123123123123123)
# mp_mul_integer_into only takes a uint16_t integer input
mp_mul_integer_into(x, initial, 10001)
self.assertEqual(int(x), 44448888888888888888888884444)
def testDivision(self):
divisors = [1, 2, 3, 2**16+1, 2**32-1, 2**32+1, 2**128-159,
141421356237309504880168872420969807856967187537694807]
quotients = [0, 1, 2, 2**64-1, 2**64, 2**64+1, 17320508075688772935]
for d in divisors:
for q in quotients:
remainders = {0, 1, d-1, 2*d//3}
for r in sorted(remainders):
if r >= d:
continue # silly cases with tiny divisors
n = q*d + r
mq = mp_new(max(nbits(q), 1))
mr = mp_new(max(nbits(r), 1))
mp_divmod_into(n, d, mq, mr)
self.assertEqual(int(mq), q)
self.assertEqual(int(mr), r)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_div(n, d)), q)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_mod(n, d)), r)
# Make sure divmod_into can handle not getting one
# of its output pointers (or even both).
mp_clear(mq)
mp_divmod_into(n, d, mq, None)
self.assertEqual(int(mq), q)
mp_clear(mr)
mp_divmod_into(n, d, None, mr)
self.assertEqual(int(mr), r)
mp_divmod_into(n, d, None, None)
# No tests we can do after that last one - we just
# insist that it isn't allowed to have crashed!
def testNthRoot(self):
roots = [1, 13, 1234567654321,
57721566490153286060651209008240243104215933593992]
tests = []
tests.append((0, 2, 0, 0))
tests.append((0, 3, 0, 0))
for r in roots:
for n in 2, 3, 5:
tests.append((r**n, n, r, 0))
tests.append((r**n+1, n, r, 1))
tests.append((r**n-1, n, r-1, r**n - (r-1)**n - 1))
for x, n, eroot, eremainder in tests:
with self.subTest(x=x):
mx = mp_copy(x)
remainder = mp_copy(mx)
root = mp_nthroot(x, n, remainder)
self.assertEqual(int(root), eroot)
self.assertEqual(int(remainder), eremainder)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_nthroot(2*10**100, 2, None)),
141421356237309504880168872420969807856967187537694)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_nthroot(3*10**150, 3, None)),
144224957030740838232163831078010958839186925349935)
def testBitwise(self):
p = 0x3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e03707344a4093822299f31d0082efa98ec4e
e = 0x2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c762e7160f38b4da56a784d9045190
x = mp_new(nbits(p))
mp_and_into(x, p, e)
self.assertEqual(int(x), p & e)
mp_or_into(x, p, e)
self.assertEqual(int(x), p | e)
mp_xor_into(x, p, e)
self.assertEqual(int(x), p ^ e)
mp_bic_into(x, p, e)
self.assertEqual(int(x), p & ~e)
def testInversion(self):
# Test mp_invert_mod_2to.
testnumbers = [(mp_copy(n),n) for n in fibonacci_scattered()
if n & 1]
for power2 in [1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 32, 64, 127, 128, 129]:
for am, ai in testnumbers:
bm = mp_invert_mod_2to(am, power2)
bi = int(bm)
self.assertEqual(((ai * bi) & ((1 << power2) - 1)), 1)
# mp_reduce_mod_2to is a much simpler function, but
# this is as good a place as any to test it.
rm = mp_copy(am)
mp_reduce_mod_2to(rm, power2)
self.assertEqual(int(rm), ai & ((1 << power2) - 1))
# Test mp_invert proper.
moduli = [2, 3, 2**16+1, 2**32-1, 2**32+1, 2**128-159,
141421356237309504880168872420969807856967187537694807,
2**128-1]
for m in moduli:
# Prepare a MontyContext for the monty_invert test below
# (unless m is even, in which case we can't)
mc = monty_new(m) if m & 1 else None
to_invert = {1, 2, 3, 7, 19, m-1, 5*m//17, (m-1)//2, (m+1)//2}
for x in sorted(to_invert):
if gcd(x, m) != 1:
continue # filter out non-invertible cases
inv = int(mp_invert(x, m))
assert x * inv % m == 1
# Test monty_invert too, while we're here
if mc is not None:
self.assertEqual(
int(monty_invert(mc, monty_import(mc, x))),
int(monty_import(mc, inv)))
def testGCD(self):
powerpairs = [(0,0), (1,0), (1,1), (2,1), (2,2), (75,3), (17,23)]
for a2, b2 in powerpairs:
for a3, b3 in powerpairs:
for a5, b5 in powerpairs:
a = 2**a2 * 3**a3 * 5**a5 * 17 * 19 * 23
b = 2**b2 * 3**b3 * 5**b5 * 65423
d = 2**min(a2, b2) * 3**min(a3, b3) * 5**min(a5, b5)
ma = mp_copy(a)
mb = mp_copy(b)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_gcd(ma, mb)), d)
md = mp_new(nbits(d))
mA = mp_new(nbits(b))
mB = mp_new(nbits(a))
mp_gcd_into(ma, mb, md, mA, mB)
self.assertEqual(int(md), d)
A = int(mA)
B = int(mB)
self.assertEqual(a*A - b*B, d)
self.assertTrue(0 <= A < b//d)
self.assertTrue(0 <= B < a//d)
self.assertEqual(mp_coprime(ma, mb), 1 if d==1 else 0)
# Make sure gcd_into can handle not getting some
# of its output pointers.
mp_clear(md)
mp_gcd_into(ma, mb, md, None, None)
self.assertEqual(int(md), d)
mp_clear(mA)
mp_gcd_into(ma, mb, None, mA, None)
self.assertEqual(int(mA), A)
mp_clear(mB)
mp_gcd_into(ma, mb, None, None, mB)
self.assertEqual(int(mB), B)
mp_gcd_into(ma, mb, None, None, None)
# No tests we can do after that last one - we just
# insist that it isn't allowed to have crashed!
def testMonty(self):
moduli = [5, 19, 2**16+1, 2**31-1, 2**128-159, 2**255-19,
293828847201107461142630006802421204703,
113064788724832491560079164581712332614996441637880086878209969852674997069759]
for m in moduli:
mc = monty_new(m)
# Import some numbers
inputs = [(monty_import(mc, n), n)
for n in sorted({0, 1, 2, 3, 2*m//3, m-1})]
# Check modulus and identity
self.assertEqual(int(monty_modulus(mc)), m)
self.assertEqual(int(monty_identity(mc)), int(inputs[1][0]))
# Check that all those numbers export OK
for mn, n in inputs:
self.assertEqual(int(monty_export(mc, mn)), n)
for ma, a in inputs:
for mb, b in inputs:
xprod = int(monty_export(mc, monty_mul(mc, ma, mb)))
self.assertEqual(xprod, a*b % m)
xsum = int(monty_export(mc, monty_add(mc, ma, mb)))
self.assertEqual(xsum, (a+b) % m)
xdiff = int(monty_export(mc, monty_sub(mc, ma, mb)))
self.assertEqual(xdiff, (a-b) % m)
# Test the ordinary mp_mod{add,sub,mul} at the
# same time, even though those don't do any
# montying at all
xprod = int(mp_modmul(a, b, m))
self.assertEqual(xprod, a*b % m)
xsum = int(mp_modadd(a, b, m))
self.assertEqual(xsum, (a+b) % m)
xdiff = int(mp_modsub(a, b, m))
self.assertEqual(xdiff, (a-b) % m)
for ma, a in inputs:
# Compute a^0, a^1, a^1, a^2, a^3, a^5, ...
indices = list(fibonacci())
powers = [int(monty_export(mc, monty_pow(mc, ma, power)))
for power in indices]
# Check the first two make sense
self.assertEqual(powers[0], 1)
self.assertEqual(powers[1], a)
# Check the others using the Fibonacci identity:
# F_n + F_{n+1} = F_{n+2}, so a^{F_n} a^{F_{n+1}} = a^{F_{n+2}}
for p0, p1, p2 in adjtuples(powers, 3):
self.assertEqual(p2, p0 * p1 % m)
# Test the ordinary mp_modpow here as well, while
# we've got the machinery available
for index, power in zip(indices, powers):
self.assertEqual(int(mp_modpow(a, index, m)), power)
# A regression test for a bug I encountered during initial
# development of mpint.c, in which an incomplete reduction
# happened somewhere in an intermediate value.
b, e, m = 0x2B5B93812F253FF91F56B3B4DAD01CA2884B6A80719B0DA4E2159A230C6009EDA97C5C8FD4636B324F9594706EE3AD444831571BA5E17B1B2DFA92DEA8B7E, 0x25, 0xC8FCFD0FD7371F4FE8D0150EFC124E220581569587CCD8E50423FA8D41E0B2A0127E100E92501E5EE3228D12EA422A568C17E0AD2E5C5FCC2AE9159D2B7FB8CB
assert(int(mp_modpow(b, e, m)) == pow(b, e, m))
# Make sure mp_modpow can handle a base larger than the
# modulus, by pre-reducing it
assert(int(mp_modpow(1<<877, 907, 999979)) == pow(2, 877*907, 999979))
def testModsqrt(self):
moduli = [
5, 19, 2**16+1, 2**31-1, 2**128-159, 2**255-19,
293828847201107461142630006802421204703,
113064788724832491560079164581712332614996441637880086878209969852674997069759,
0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF6FFFFFFFF00000001]
for p in moduli:
# Count the factors of 2 in the group. (That is, we want
# p-1 to be an odd multiple of 2^{factors_of_2}.)
factors_of_2 = nbits((p-1) & (1-p)) - 1
assert (p & ((2 << factors_of_2)-1)) == ((1 << factors_of_2)+1)
z = find_non_square_mod(p)
sc = modsqrt_new(p, z)
def ptest(x):
root, success = mp_modsqrt(sc, x)
r = int(root)
self.assertTrue(success)
self.assertEqual((r * r - x) % p, 0)
def ntest(x):
root, success = mp_modsqrt(sc, x)
self.assertFalse(success)
# Make up some more or less random values mod p to square
v1 = pow(3, nbits(p), p)
v2 = pow(5, v1, p)
test_roots = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3*p//4, v1, v2, v1+1, 12873*v1, v1*v2]
known_squares = {r*r % p for r in test_roots}
for s in known_squares:
ptest(s)
if s != 0:
ntest(z*s % p)
# Make sure we've tested a value that is in each of the
# subgroups of order (p-1)/2^k but not in the next one
# (with the exception of k=0, which just means 'have we
# tested a non-square?', which we have in the above loop).
#
# We do this by starting with a known non-square; then
# squaring it (factors_of_2) times will return values
# nested deeper and deeper in those subgroups.
vbase = z
for k in range(factors_of_2):
# Adjust vbase by an arbitrary odd power of
# z, so that it won't look too much like the previous
# value.
vbase = vbase * pow(z, (vbase + v1 + v2) | 1, p) % p
# Move vbase into the next smaller group by squaring
# it.
vbase = pow(vbase, 2, p)
ptest(vbase)
def testShifts(self):
x = ((1<<900) // 9949) | 1
for i in range(2049):
mp = mp_copy(x)
mp_lshift_fixed_into(mp, mp, i)
self.assertEqual(int(mp), (x << i) & mp_mask(mp))
mp_copy_into(mp, x)
mp_lshift_safe_into(mp, mp, i)
self.assertEqual(int(mp), (x << i) & mp_mask(mp))
mp_copy_into(mp, x)
mp_rshift_fixed_into(mp, mp, i)
self.assertEqual(int(mp), x >> i)
mp_copy_into(mp, x)
mp_rshift_safe_into(mp, mp, i)
self.assertEqual(int(mp), x >> i)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_rshift_fixed(x, i)), x >> i)
self.assertEqual(int(mp_rshift_safe(x, i)), x >> i)
def testRandom(self):
# Test random_bits to ensure it correctly masks the return
# value, and uses exactly as many random bytes as we expect it
# to.
for bits in range(512):
bytes_needed = (bits + 7) // 8
with queued_random_data(bytes_needed, "random_bits test"):
mp = mp_random_bits(bits)
self.assertTrue(int(mp) < (1 << bits))
self.assertEqual(random_queue_len(), 0)
# Test mp_random_in_range to ensure it returns things in the
# right range.
for rangesize in [2, 3, 19, 35]:
for lo in [0, 1, 0x10001, 1<<512]:
hi = lo + rangesize
bytes_needed = mp_max_bytes(hi) + 16
for trial in range(rangesize*3):
with queued_random_data(
bytes_needed,
"random_in_range {:d}".format(trial)):
v = int(mp_random_in_range(lo, hi))
self.assertTrue(lo <= v < hi)
class ecc(MyTestBase):
def testWeierstrassSimple(self):
# Simple tests using a Weierstrass curve I made up myself,
# which (unlike the ones used for serious crypto) is small
# enough that you can fit all the coordinates for a curve on
# to your retina in one go.
p = 3141592661
a, b = -3 % p, 12345
rc = WeierstrassCurve(p, a, b)
wc = ecc_weierstrass_curve(p, a, b, None)
def check_point(wp, rp):
self.assertTrue(ecc_weierstrass_point_valid(wp))
is_id = ecc_weierstrass_is_identity(wp)
x, y = ecc_weierstrass_get_affine(wp)
if rp.infinite:
self.assertEqual(is_id, 1)
else:
self.assertEqual(is_id, 0)
self.assertEqual(int(x), int(rp.x))
self.assertEqual(int(y), int(rp.y))
def make_point(x, y):
wp = ecc_weierstrass_point_new(wc, x, y)
rp = rc.point(x, y)
check_point(wp, rp)
return wp, rp
# Some sample points, including the identity and also a pair
# of mutual inverses.
wI, rI = ecc_weierstrass_point_new_identity(wc), rc.point()
wP, rP = make_point(102, 387427089)
wQ, rQ = make_point(1000, 546126574)
wmP, rmP = make_point(102, p - 387427089)
# Check the simple arithmetic functions.
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add(wP, wQ), rP + rQ)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add(wQ, wP), rP + rQ)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_double(wP), rP + rP)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_double(wQ), rQ + rQ)
# Check all the special cases with add_general:
# Adding two finite unequal non-mutually-inverse points
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wP, wQ), rP + rQ)
# Doubling a finite point
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wP, wP), rP + rP)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wQ, wQ), rQ + rQ)
# Adding the identity to a point (both ways round)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wI, wP), rP)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wI, wQ), rQ)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wP, wI), rP)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wQ, wI), rQ)
# Doubling the identity
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wI, wI), rI)
# Adding a point to its own inverse, giving the identity.
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wmP, wP), rI)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_add_general(wP, wmP), rI)
# Verify that point_valid fails if we pass it nonsense.
bogus = ecc_weierstrass_point_new(wc, int(rP.x), int(rP.y * 3))
self.assertFalse(ecc_weierstrass_point_valid(bogus))
# Re-instantiate the curve with the ability to take square
# roots, and check that we can reconstruct P and Q from their
# x coordinate and y parity only.
wc = ecc_weierstrass_curve(p, a, b, find_non_square_mod(p))
x, yp = int(rP.x), (int(rP.y) & 1)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_point_new_from_x(wc, x, yp), rP)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_point_new_from_x(wc, x, yp ^ 1), rmP)
x, yp = int(rQ.x), (int(rQ.y) & 1)
check_point(ecc_weierstrass_point_new_from_x(wc, x, yp), rQ)
def testMontgomerySimple(self):
p, a, b = 3141592661, 0xabc, 0xde
rc = MontgomeryCurve(p, a, b)
mc = ecc_montgomery_curve(p, a, b)
rP = rc.cpoint(0x1001)
rQ = rc.cpoint(0x20001)
rdiff = rP - rQ
rsum = rP + rQ
def make_mpoint(rp):
return ecc_montgomery_point_new(mc, int(rp.x))
mP = make_mpoint(rP)
mQ = make_mpoint(rQ)
mdiff = make_mpoint(rdiff)
msum = make_mpoint(rsum)
def check_point(mp, rp):
x = ecc_montgomery_get_affine(mp)
self.assertEqual(int(x), int(rp.x))
check_point(ecc_montgomery_diff_add(mP, mQ, mdiff), rsum)
check_point(ecc_montgomery_diff_add(mQ, mP, mdiff), rsum)
check_point(ecc_montgomery_diff_add(mP, mQ, msum), rdiff)
check_point(ecc_montgomery_diff_add(mQ, mP, msum), rdiff)
check_point(ecc_montgomery_double(mP), rP + rP)
check_point(ecc_montgomery_double(mQ), rQ + rQ)
zero = ecc_montgomery_point_new(mc, 0)
self.assertEqual(ecc_montgomery_is_identity(zero), False)
identity = ecc_montgomery_double(zero)
ecc_montgomery_get_affine(identity)
self.assertEqual(ecc_montgomery_is_identity(identity), True)
def testEdwardsSimple(self):
p, d, a = 3141592661, 2688750488, 367934288
rc = TwistedEdwardsCurve(p, d, a)
ec = ecc_edwards_curve(p, d, a, None)
def check_point(ep, rp):
x, y = ecc_edwards_get_affine(ep)
self.assertEqual(int(x), int(rp.x))
self.assertEqual(int(y), int(rp.y))
def make_point(x, y):
ep = ecc_edwards_point_new(ec, x, y)
rp = rc.point(x, y)
check_point(ep, rp)
return ep, rp
# Some sample points, including the identity and also a pair
# of mutual inverses.
eI, rI = make_point(0, 1)
eP, rP = make_point(196270812, 1576162644)
eQ, rQ = make_point(1777630975, 2717453445)
emP, rmP = make_point(p - 196270812, 1576162644)
# Check that the ordinary add function handles all the special
# cases.
# Adding two finite unequal non-mutually-inverse points
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eP, eQ), rP + rQ)
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eQ, eP), rP + rQ)
# Doubling a finite point
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eP, eP), rP + rP)
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eQ, eQ), rQ + rQ)
# Adding the identity to a point (both ways round)
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eI, eP), rP)
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eI, eQ), rQ)
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eP, eI), rP)
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eQ, eI), rQ)
# Doubling the identity
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eI, eI), rI)
# Adding a point to its own inverse, giving the identity.
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(emP, eP), rI)
check_point(ecc_edwards_add(eP, emP), rI)
# Re-instantiate the curve with the ability to take square
# roots, and check that we can reconstruct P and Q from their
# y coordinate and x parity only.
ec = ecc_edwards_curve(p, d, a, find_non_square_mod(p))
y, xp = int(rP.y), (int(rP.x) & 1)
check_point(ecc_edwards_point_new_from_y(ec, y, xp), rP)
check_point(ecc_edwards_point_new_from_y(ec, y, xp ^ 1), rmP)
y, xp = int(rQ.y), (int(rQ.x) & 1)
check_point(ecc_edwards_point_new_from_y(ec, y, xp), rQ)
# For testing point multiplication, let's switch to the full-sized
# standard curves, because I want to have tested those a bit too.
def testWeierstrassMultiply(self):
wc = ecc_weierstrass_curve(p256.p, int(p256.a), int(p256.b), None)
wG = ecc_weierstrass_point_new(wc, int(p256.G.x), int(p256.G.y))
self.assertTrue(ecc_weierstrass_point_valid(wG))
ints = set(i % p256.p for i in fibonacci_scattered(10))
ints.remove(0) # the zero multiple isn't expected to work
for i in sorted(ints):
wGi = ecc_weierstrass_multiply(wG, i)
x, y = ecc_weierstrass_get_affine(wGi)
rGi = p256.G * i
self.assertEqual(int(x), int(rGi.x))
self.assertEqual(int(y), int(rGi.y))
def testMontgomeryMultiply(self):
mc = ecc_montgomery_curve(
curve25519.p, int(curve25519.a), int(curve25519.b))
mG = ecc_montgomery_point_new(mc, int(curve25519.G.x))
ints = set(i % p256.p for i in fibonacci_scattered(10))
ints.remove(0) # the zero multiple isn't expected to work
for i in sorted(ints):
mGi = ecc_montgomery_multiply(mG, i)
x = ecc_montgomery_get_affine(mGi)
rGi = curve25519.G * i
self.assertEqual(int(x), int(rGi.x))
def testEdwardsMultiply(self):
ec = ecc_edwards_curve(ed25519.p, int(ed25519.d), int(ed25519.a), None)
eG = ecc_edwards_point_new(ec, int(ed25519.G.x), int(ed25519.G.y))
ints = set(i % ed25519.p for i in fibonacci_scattered(10))
ints.remove(0) # the zero multiple isn't expected to work
for i in sorted(ints):
eGi = ecc_edwards_multiply(eG, i)
x, y = ecc_edwards_get_affine(eGi)
rGi = ed25519.G * i
self.assertEqual(int(x), int(rGi.x))
self.assertEqual(int(y), int(rGi.y))
Refactor generation of candidate integers in primegen. I've replaced the random number generation and small delta-finding loop in primegen() with a much more elaborate system in its own source file, with unit tests and everything. Immediate benefits: - fixes a theoretical possibility of overflowing the target number of bits, if the random number was so close to the top of the range that the addition of delta * factor pushed it over. However, this only happened with negligible probability. - fixes a directional bias in delta-finding. The previous code incremented the number repeatedly until it found a value coprime to all the right things, which meant that a prime preceded by a particularly long sequence of numbers with tiny factors was more likely to be chosen. Now we select candidate delta values at random, that bias should be eliminated. - changes the semantics of the outermost primegen() function to make them easier to use, because now the caller specifies the 'bits' and 'firstbits' values for the actual returned prime, rather than having to account for the factor you're multiplying it by in DSA. DSA client code is correspondingly adjusted. Future benefits: - having the candidate generation in a separate function makes it easy to reuse in alternative prime generation strategies - the available constraints support applications such as Maurer's algorithm for generating provable primes, or strong primes for RSA in which both p-1 and p+1 have a large factor. So those become things we could experiment with in future.
2020-02-23 14:30:03 +00:00
class keygen(MyTestBase):
def testPrimeCandidateSource(self):
def inspect(pcs):
# Returns (pcs->limit, pcs->factor, pcs->addend) as Python integers
return tuple(map(int, pcs_inspect(pcs)))
# Test accumulating modular congruence requirements, by
# inspecting the internal values computed during
# require_residue. We ensure that the addend satisfies all our
# congruences and the factor is the lcm of all the moduli
# (hence, the arithmetic progression defined by those
# parameters is precisely the set of integers satisfying the
# requirements); we also ensure that the limiting values
# (addend itself at the low end, and addend + (limit-1) *
# factor at the high end) are the maximal subsequence of that
# progression that are within the originally specified range.
def check(pcs, lo, hi, mod_res_pairs):
limit, factor, addend = inspect(pcs)
for mod, res in mod_res_pairs:
self.assertEqual(addend % mod, res % mod)
self.assertEqual(factor, functools.reduce(
lcm, [mod for mod, res in mod_res_pairs]))
self.assertFalse(lo <= addend + (-1) * factor < hi)
self.assertTrue (lo <= addend < hi)
self.assertTrue (lo <= addend + (limit-1) * factor < hi)
self.assertFalse(lo <= addend + limit * factor < hi)
pcs = pcs_new(64)
Refactor generation of candidate integers in primegen. I've replaced the random number generation and small delta-finding loop in primegen() with a much more elaborate system in its own source file, with unit tests and everything. Immediate benefits: - fixes a theoretical possibility of overflowing the target number of bits, if the random number was so close to the top of the range that the addition of delta * factor pushed it over. However, this only happened with negligible probability. - fixes a directional bias in delta-finding. The previous code incremented the number repeatedly until it found a value coprime to all the right things, which meant that a prime preceded by a particularly long sequence of numbers with tiny factors was more likely to be chosen. Now we select candidate delta values at random, that bias should be eliminated. - changes the semantics of the outermost primegen() function to make them easier to use, because now the caller specifies the 'bits' and 'firstbits' values for the actual returned prime, rather than having to account for the factor you're multiplying it by in DSA. DSA client code is correspondingly adjusted. Future benefits: - having the candidate generation in a separate function makes it easy to reuse in alternative prime generation strategies - the available constraints support applications such as Maurer's algorithm for generating provable primes, or strong primes for RSA in which both p-1 and p+1 have a large factor. So those become things we could experiment with in future.
2020-02-23 14:30:03 +00:00
check(pcs, 2**63, 2**64, [(2, 1)])
pcs_require_residue(pcs, 3, 2)
check(pcs, 2**63, 2**64, [(2, 1), (3, 2)])
pcs_require_residue_1(pcs, 7)
check(pcs, 2**63, 2**64, [(2, 1), (3, 2), (7, 1)])
pcs_require_residue(pcs, 16, 7)
check(pcs, 2**63, 2**64, [(2, 1), (3, 2), (7, 1), (16, 7)])
pcs_require_residue(pcs, 49, 8)
check(pcs, 2**63, 2**64, [(2, 1), (3, 2), (7, 1), (16, 7), (49, 8)])
# Now test-generate some actual values, and ensure they
# satisfy all the congruences, and also avoid one residue mod
# 5 that we told them to. Also, give a nontrivial range.
pcs = pcs_new_with_firstbits(64, 0xAB, 8)
Refactor generation of candidate integers in primegen. I've replaced the random number generation and small delta-finding loop in primegen() with a much more elaborate system in its own source file, with unit tests and everything. Immediate benefits: - fixes a theoretical possibility of overflowing the target number of bits, if the random number was so close to the top of the range that the addition of delta * factor pushed it over. However, this only happened with negligible probability. - fixes a directional bias in delta-finding. The previous code incremented the number repeatedly until it found a value coprime to all the right things, which meant that a prime preceded by a particularly long sequence of numbers with tiny factors was more likely to be chosen. Now we select candidate delta values at random, that bias should be eliminated. - changes the semantics of the outermost primegen() function to make them easier to use, because now the caller specifies the 'bits' and 'firstbits' values for the actual returned prime, rather than having to account for the factor you're multiplying it by in DSA. DSA client code is correspondingly adjusted. Future benefits: - having the candidate generation in a separate function makes it easy to reuse in alternative prime generation strategies - the available constraints support applications such as Maurer's algorithm for generating provable primes, or strong primes for RSA in which both p-1 and p+1 have a large factor. So those become things we could experiment with in future.
2020-02-23 14:30:03 +00:00
pcs_require_residue(pcs, 0x100, 0xCD)
pcs_require_residue_1(pcs, 65537)
pcs_avoid_residue_small(pcs, 5, 3)
pcs_ready(pcs)
with random_prng("test seed"):
for i in range(100):
n = int(pcs_generate(pcs))
self.assertTrue((0xAB<<56) < n < (0xAC<<56))
self.assertEqual(n % 0x100, 0xCD)
self.assertEqual(n % 65537, 1)
self.assertNotEqual(n % 5, 3)
# I'm not actually testing here that the outputs of
# pcs_generate are non-multiples of _all_ primes up to
# 2^16. But checking this many for 100 turns is enough
# to be pretty sure. (If you take the product of
# (1-1/p) over all p in the list below, you find that
# a given random number has about a 13% chance of
# avoiding being a multiple of any of them. So 100
# trials without a mistake gives you 0.13^100 < 10^-88
# as the probability of it happening by chance. More
# likely the code is actually working :-)
for p in [2,3,5,7,11,13,17,19,23,29,31,37,41,43,47,53,59,61]:
self.assertNotEqual(n % p, 0)
New 'Pockle' object, for verifying primality. This implements an extended form of primality verification using certificates based on Pocklington's theorem. You make a Pockle object, and then try to convince it that one number after another is prime, by means of providing it with a list of prime factors of p-1 and a primitive root. (Or just by saying 'this prime is small enough for you to check yourself'.) Pocklington's theorem requires you to have factors of p-1 whose product is at least the square root of p. I've extended that to support factorisations only as big as the cube root, via an extension of the theorem given in Maurer's paper on generating provable primes. The Pockle object is more or less write-only: it has no methods for reading out its contents. Its only output channel is the return value when you try to insert a prime into it: if it isn't sufficiently convinced that your prime is prime, it will return an error code. So anything for which it returns POCKLE_OK you can be confident of. I'm going to use this for provable prime generation. But exposing this part of the system as an object in its own right means I can write a set of unit tests for this specifically. My negative tests exercise all the different ways a certification can be erroneous or inadequate; the positive tests include proofs of primality of various primes used in elliptic-curve crypto. The Poly1305 proof in particular is taken from a proof in DJB's paper, which has exactly the form of a Pocklington certificate only written in English.
2020-02-23 15:16:30 +00:00
def testPocklePositive(self):
def add_small(po, *ps):
for p in ps:
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_small_prime(po, p), 'POCKLE_OK')
def add(po, *args):
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, *args), 'POCKLE_OK')
# Transcription of the proof that 2^130-5 is prime from
# Theorem 3.1 from http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
po = pockle_new()
p1 = (2**130 - 6) // 1517314646
p2 = (p1 - 1) // 222890620702
add_small(po, 37003, 221101)
add(po, p2, [37003, 221101], 2)
add(po, p1, [p2], 2)
add(po, 2**130 - 5, [p1], 2)
# My own proof that 2^255-19 is prime
po = pockle_new()
p1 = 8574133
p2 = 1919519569386763
p3 = 75445702479781427272750846543864801
p4 = (2**255 - 20) // (65147*12)
p = 2**255 - 19
add_small(po, p1)
add(po, p2, [p1], 2)
add(po, p3, [p2], 2)
add(po, p4, [p3], 2)
add(po, p, [p4], 2)
# And the prime used in Ed448, while I'm here
po = pockle_new()
p1 = 379979
p2 = 1764234391
p3 = 97859369123353
p4 = 34741861125639557
p5 = 36131535570665139281
p6 = 167773885276849215533569
p7 = 596242599987116128415063
p = 2**448 - 2**224 - 1
add_small(po, p1, p2)
add(po, p3, [p1], 2)
add(po, p4, [p2], 2)
add(po, p5, [p4], 2)
add(po, p6, [p3], 3)
add(po, p7, [p5], 3)
add(po, p, [p6, p7], 2)
p = 4095744004479977
factors = [2, 79999] # just enough factors to exceed cbrt(p)
po = pockle_new()
for q in factors:
add_small(po, q)
add(po, p, factors, 3)
# The order of the generator in Ed25519
po = pockle_new()
p1a, p1b = 132667, 137849
p2 = 3044861653679985063343
p3 = 198211423230930754013084525763697
p = 2**252 + 0x14def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed
add_small(po, p1a, p1b)
add(po, p2, [p1a, p1b], 2)
add(po, p3, [p2], 2)
add(po, p, [p3], 2)
# And the one in Ed448
po = pockle_new()
p1 = 766223
p2 = 3009341
p3 = 7156907
p4 = 671065561
p5 = 342682509629
p6 = 6730519843040614479184435237013
p = 2**446 - 0x8335dc163bb124b65129c96fde933d8d723a70aadc873d6d54a7bb0d
add_small(po, p1, p2, p3, p4)
add(po, p5, [p1], 2)
add(po, p6, [p3,p4], 2)
add(po, p, [p2,p5,p6], 2)
# Combined certificate for the moduli and generator orders of
# the three NIST curves, generated by contrib/proveprime.py
# (with some cosmetic tidying)
p256 = 2**256 - 2**224 + 2**192 + 2**96 - 1
p384 = 2**384 - 2**128 - 2**96 + 2**32 - 1
p521 = 2**521 - 1
order256 = p256 - 0x4319055358e8617b0c46353d039cdaae
order384 = p384 - 0x389cb27e0bc8d21fa7e5f24cb74f58851313e696333ad68c
t = 0x5ae79787c40d069948033feb708f65a2fc44a36477663b851449048e16ec79bf6
order521 = p521 - t
p0 = order384 // 12895580879789762060783039592702
p1 = 1059392654943455286185473617842338478315215895509773412096307
p2 = 55942463741690639
p3 = 37344768852931
p4 = order521 // 1898873518475180724503002533770555108536
p5 = p4 // 994165722
p6 = 144471089338257942164514676806340723
p7 = p384 // 2054993070433694
p8 = 1357291859799823621
po = pockle_new()
add_small(po, 2, 3, 5, 11, 17, 19, 31, 41, 53, 67, 71, 109, 131, 149,
157, 257, 521, 641, 1613, 2731, 3407, 6317, 8191, 8389,
14461, 17449, 38189, 38557, 42641, 51481, 61681, 65537,
133279, 248431, 312289, 409891, 490463, 858001, 6700417,
187019741)
add(po, p3, [149, 11, 5, 3, 2], 3)
add(po, p2, [p3], 2)
add(po, p8, [6317, 67, 2, 2], 2)
add(po, p6, [133279, 14461, 109, 3], 7)
add(po, p1, [p2, 248431], 2)
add(po, order256, [187019741, 38189, 17449, 3407, 131, 71, 2, 2, 2, 2],
7)
add(po, p256, [6700417, 490463, 65537, 641, 257, 17, 5, 5, 3, 2], 6)
add(po, p0, [p1], 2)
add(po, p7, [p8, 312289, 38557, 8389, 11, 2], 3)
add(po, p5, [p6, 19], 2)
add(po, order384, [p0], 2)
add(po, p384, [p7], 2)
add(po, p4, [p5], 2)
add(po, order521, [p4], 2)
add(po, p521, [858001, 409891, 61681, 51481, 42641, 8191, 2731, 1613,
521, 157, 131, 53, 41, 31, 17, 11, 5, 5, 3, 2], 3)
New 'Pockle' object, for verifying primality. This implements an extended form of primality verification using certificates based on Pocklington's theorem. You make a Pockle object, and then try to convince it that one number after another is prime, by means of providing it with a list of prime factors of p-1 and a primitive root. (Or just by saying 'this prime is small enough for you to check yourself'.) Pocklington's theorem requires you to have factors of p-1 whose product is at least the square root of p. I've extended that to support factorisations only as big as the cube root, via an extension of the theorem given in Maurer's paper on generating provable primes. The Pockle object is more or less write-only: it has no methods for reading out its contents. Its only output channel is the return value when you try to insert a prime into it: if it isn't sufficiently convinced that your prime is prime, it will return an error code. So anything for which it returns POCKLE_OK you can be confident of. I'm going to use this for provable prime generation. But exposing this part of the system as an object in its own right means I can write a set of unit tests for this specifically. My negative tests exercise all the different ways a certification can be erroneous or inadequate; the positive tests include proofs of primality of various primes used in elliptic-curve crypto. The Poly1305 proof in particular is taken from a proof in DJB's paper, which has exactly the form of a Pocklington certificate only written in English.
2020-02-23 15:16:30 +00:00
def testPockleNegative(self):
def add_small(po, p):
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_small_prime(po, p), 'POCKLE_OK')
po = pockle_new()
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_small_prime(po, 0),
'POCKLE_PRIME_SMALLER_THAN_2')
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_small_prime(po, 1),
'POCKLE_PRIME_SMALLER_THAN_2')
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_small_prime(po, 2**61 - 1),
'POCKLE_SMALL_PRIME_NOT_SMALL')
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_small_prime(po, 4),
'POCKLE_SMALL_PRIME_NOT_PRIME')
po = pockle_new()
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, 1919519569386763, [8574133], 2),
'POCKLE_FACTOR_NOT_KNOWN_PRIME')
po = pockle_new()
add_small(po, 8574133)
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, 1919519569386765, [8574133], 2),
'POCKLE_FACTOR_NOT_A_FACTOR')
p = 4095744004479977
factors = [2, 79997] # not quite enough factors to reach cbrt(p)
po = pockle_new()
for q in factors:
add_small(po, q)
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, p, factors, 3),
'POCKLE_PRODUCT_OF_FACTORS_TOO_SMALL')
p = 1999527 * 3999053
factors = [999763]
po = pockle_new()
for q in factors:
add_small(po, q)
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, p, factors, 3),
'POCKLE_DISCRIMINANT_IS_SQUARE')
p = 9999929 * 9999931
factors = [257, 2593]
po = pockle_new()
for q in factors:
add_small(po, q)
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, p, factors, 3),
'POCKLE_FERMAT_TEST_FAILED')
p = 1713000920401 # a Carmichael number
po = pockle_new()
add_small(po, 561787)
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, p, [561787], 2),
'POCKLE_WITNESS_POWER_IS_1')
p = 4294971121
factors = [3, 5, 11, 17]
po = pockle_new()
for q in factors:
add_small(po, q)
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, p, factors, 17),
'POCKLE_WITNESS_POWER_NOT_COPRIME')
po = pockle_new()
add_small(po, 2)
self.assertEqual(pockle_add_prime(po, 1, [2], 1),
'POCKLE_PRIME_SMALLER_THAN_2')
def testMillerRabin(self):
# A prime congruent to 3 mod 4, so M-R can only do one
# iteration: either a^{(p-1)/2} == +1, or -1. Either counts as
# a pass; the latter also means the number is potentially a
# primitive root.
n = 0xe76e6aaa42b5d7423aa4da5613eb21c3
mr = miller_rabin_new(n)
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 2), "passed+ppr")
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 4), "passed")
# The 'potential primitive root' test only means that M-R
# didn't _rule out_ the number being a primitive root, by
# finding that any of the powers _it tested_ less than n-1
# came out to be 1. In this case, 2 really is a primitive
# root, but since 13 | n-1, the 13th powers mod n form a
# multiplicative subgroup. So 2^13 is not a primitive root,
# and yet, M-R can't tell the difference, because it only
# tried the exponent (n-1)/2, not the actual counterexample
# (n-1)/13.
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 2**13), "passed+ppr")
# A prime congruent to 1 mod a reasonably large power of 2, so
# M-R has lots of scope to have different things happen. 3 is
# a primitive root, so we expect that 3, 3^2, 3^4, ..., 3^256
# should all pass for different reasons, with only the first
# of them returning passed+ppr.
n = 0xb1b65ebe489ff0ab4597bb67c3d22d01
mr = miller_rabin_new(n)
w = 3
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, w), "passed+ppr")
for i in range(1, 10):
w = w * w % n
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, w), "passed")
# A prime with an _absurdly_ large power-of-2 factor in its
# multiplicative group.
n = 0x600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
mr = miller_rabin_new(n)
w = 10
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, w), "passed+ppr")
for i in range(1, 200):
w = w * w % n
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, w), "passed")
# A blatantly composite number. But we still expect to see a
# pass if we give the witness 1 (which will give a maximal
# trailing string of 1s), or -1 (which will give -1 when
# raised to the maximal odd factor of n-1, or indeed any other
# odd power).
n = 0x1010101010101010101010101010101
mr = miller_rabin_new(n)
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 1), "passed")
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, n-1), "passed")
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 2), "failed")
# A Carmichael number, as a proper test that M-R detects
# things the Fermat test would not.
#
# (Its prime factorisation is 26823115100268314289505807 *
# 53646230200536628579011613 * 80469345300804942868517419,
# which is enough to re-check its Carmichaelness.)
n = 0xffffffffffffffffcf8032f3e044b4a8b1b1bf0b526538eae953d90f44d65511
mr = miller_rabin_new(n)
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 16), "passed")
assert(pow(2, n-1, n) == 1) # Fermat test would pass, but ...
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 2), "failed") # ... this fails
# A white-box test for the side-channel-safe M-R
# implementation, which has to check a^e against +-1 for every
# exponent e of the form floor((n-1) / power of 2), so as to
# avoid giving away exactly how many of the trailing values of
# that sequence are significant to the test.
#
# When the power of 2 is large enough that the division was
# not exact, the results of these comparisons are _not_
# significant to the test, and we're required to ignore them!
#
# This pair of values has the property that none of the values
# legitimately computed by M-R is either +1 _or_ -1, but if
# you shift n-1 right by one too many bits (losing the lowest
# set bit of 0x6d00 to get 0x36), then _that_ power of the
# witness integer is -1. This should not cause a spurious pass.
n = 0x6d01
mr = miller_rabin_new(n)
self.assertEqual(miller_rabin_test(mr, 0x251), "failed")
class crypt(MyTestBase):
def testSSH1Fingerprint(self):
# Example key and reference fingerprint value generated by
# OpenSSH 6.7 ssh-keygen
rsa = rsa_bare(65537, 984185866443261798625575612408956568591522723900235822424492423996716524817102482330189709310179009158443944785704183009867662230534501187034891091310377917105259938712348098594526746211645472854839799025154390701673823298369051411)
fp = rsa_ssh1_fingerprint(rsa)
self.assertEqual(
fp, b"768 96:12:c8:bc:e6:03:75:86:e8:c7:b9:af:d8:0c:15:75")
def testSSH2Fingerprints(self):
# A sensible key blob that we can make sense of.
sensible_blob = base64.decodebytes(
b'AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAICWiV0VAD4lQ7taUN7vZ5Rkc'
b'SLJBW5ubn6ZINwCOzpn3')
self.assertEqual(ssh2_fingerprint_blob(sensible_blob, "sha256"),
b'ssh-ed25519 255 SHA256:'
b'E4VmaHW0sUF7SUgSEOmMJ8WBtt0e/j3zbsKvyqfFnu4')
self.assertEqual(ssh2_fingerprint_blob(sensible_blob, "md5"),
b'ssh-ed25519 255 '
b'35:73:80:df:a3:2c:1a:f2:2c:a6:5c:84:ce:48:6a:7e')
# A key blob with an unknown algorithm name, so that we can't
# extract the bit count.
silly_blob = ssh_string(b'foo') + ssh_string(b'key data')
self.assertEqual(ssh2_fingerprint_blob(silly_blob, "sha256"),
b'foo SHA256:'
b'mvfJTB4PaRI7hxYaYwn0sH8G6zW1HbLkbWnZE2YIKc4')
self.assertEqual(ssh2_fingerprint_blob(silly_blob, "md5"),
b'foo '
b'5f:5f:97:94:97:be:01:5c:f6:3f:e3:6e:55:46:ea:52')
# A key blob without even a valid algorithm-name string at the start.
very_silly_blob = b'foo'
self.assertEqual(ssh2_fingerprint_blob(very_silly_blob, "sha256"),
b'SHA256:'
b'LCa0a2j/xo/5m0U8HTBBNBNCLXBkg7+g+YpeiGJm564')
self.assertEqual(ssh2_fingerprint_blob(very_silly_blob, "md5"),
b'ac:bd:18:db:4c:c2:f8:5c:ed:ef:65:4f:cc:c4:a4:d8')
def testAES(self):
# My own test cases, generated by a mostly independent
# reference implementation of AES in Python. ('Mostly'
# independent in that it was written by me.)
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
def vector(cipherbase, key, iv, plaintext, ciphertext):
for cipher in get_implementations(cipherbase):
c = ssh_cipher_new(cipher)
if c is None: return # skip test if HW AES not available
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setkey(c, key)
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, iv)
self.assertEqualBin(
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_encrypt(c, plaintext), ciphertext)
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, iv)
self.assertEqualBin(
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_decrypt(c, ciphertext), plaintext)
# Tests of CBC mode.
key = unhex(
'98483c6eb40b6c31a448c22a66ded3b5e5e8d5119cac8327b655c8b5c4836489')
iv = unhex('38f87b0b9b736160bfc0cbd8447af6ee')
plaintext = unhex('''
ee16271827b12d828f61d56fddccc38ccaa69601da2b36d3af1a34c51947b71a
362f05e07bf5e7766c24599799b252ad2d5954353c0c6ca668c46779c2659c94
8df04e4179666e335470ff042e213c8bcff57f54842237fbf9f3c7e6111620ac
1c007180edd25f0e337c2a49d890a7173f6b52d61e3d2a21ddc8e41513a0e825
afd5932172270940b01014b5b7fb8495946151520a126518946b44ea32f9b2a9
''')
vector('aes128_cbc', key[:16], iv, plaintext, unhex('''
547ee90514cb6406d5bb00855c8092892c58299646edda0b4e7c044247795c8d
3c3eb3d91332e401215d4d528b94a691969d27b7890d1ae42fe3421b91c989d5
113fefa908921a573526259c6b4f8e4d90ea888e1d8b7747457ba3a43b5b79b9
34873ebf21102d14b51836709ee85ed590b7ca618a1e884f5c57c8ea73fe3d0d
6bf8c082dd602732bde28131159ed0b6e9cf67c353ffdd010a5a634815aaa963'''))
vector('aes192_cbc', key[:24], iv, plaintext, unhex('''
e3dee5122edd3fec5fab95e7db8c784c0cb617103e2a406fba4ae3b4508dd608
4ff5723a670316cc91ed86e413c11b35557c56a6f5a7a2c660fc6ee603d73814
73a287645be0f297cdda97aef6c51faeb2392fec9d33adb65138d60f954babd9
8ee0daab0d1decaa8d1e07007c4a3c7b726948025f9fb72dd7de41f74f2f36b4
23ac6a5b4b6b39682ec74f57d9d300e547f3c3e467b77f5e4009923b2f94c903'''))
vector('aes256_cbc', key[:32], iv, plaintext, unhex('''
088c6d4d41997bea79c408925255266f6c32c03ea465a5f607c2f076ec98e725
7e0beed79609b3577c16ebdf17d7a63f8865278e72e859e2367de81b3b1fe9ab
8f045e1d008388a3cfc4ff87daffedbb47807260489ad48566dbe73256ce9dd4
ae1689770a883b29695928f5983f33e8d7aec4668f64722e943b0b671c365709
dfa86c648d5fb00544ff11bd29121baf822d867e32da942ba3a0d26299bcee13'''))
# Tests of SDCTR mode, one with a random IV and one with an IV
# about to wrap round. More vigorous tests of IV carry and
# wraparound behaviour are in the testAESSDCTR method.
sdctrIVs = [
unhex('38f87b0b9b736160bfc0cbd8447af6ee'),
unhex('fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe'),
]
vector('aes128_ctr', key[:16], sdctrIVs[0], plaintext[:64], unhex('''
d0061d7b6e8c4ef4fe5614b95683383f46cdd2766e66b6fb0b0f0b3a24520b2d
15d869b06cbf685ede064bcf8fb5fb6726cfd68de7016696a126e9e84420af38'''))
vector('aes128_ctr', key[:16], sdctrIVs[1], plaintext[:64], unhex('''
49ac67164fd9ce8701caddbbc9a2b06ac6524d4aa0fdac95253971974b8f3bc2
bb8d7c970f6bcd79b25218cc95582edf7711aae2384f6cf91d8d07c9d9b370bc'''))
vector('aes192_ctr', key[:24], sdctrIVs[0], plaintext[:64], unhex('''
0baa86acbe8580845f0671b7ebad4856ca11b74e5108f515e34e54fa90f87a9a
c6eee26686253c19156f9be64957f0dbc4f8ecd7cabb1f4e0afefe33888faeec'''))
vector('aes192_ctr', key[:24], sdctrIVs[1], plaintext[:64], unhex('''
2da1791250100dc0d1461afe1bbfad8fa0320253ba5d7905d837386ba0a3a41f
01965c770fcfe01cf307b5316afb3981e0e4aa59a6e755f0a5784d9accdc52be'''))
vector('aes256_ctr', key[:32], sdctrIVs[0], plaintext[:64], unhex('''
49c7b284222d408544c770137b6ef17ef770c47e24f61fa66e7e46cae4888882
f980a0f2446956bf47d2aed55ebd2e0694bfc46527ed1fd33efe708fec2f8b1f'''))
vector('aes256_ctr', key[:32], sdctrIVs[1], plaintext[:64], unhex('''
f1d013c3913ccb4fc0091e25d165804480fb0a1d5c741bf012bba144afda6db2
c512f3942018574bd7a8fdd88285a73d25ef81e621aebffb6e9b8ecc8e2549d4'''))
def testAESSDCTR(self):
# A thorough test of the IV-incrementing component of SDCTR
# mode. We set up an AES-SDCTR cipher object with the given
# input IV; we encrypt two all-zero blocks, expecting the
# return values to be the AES-ECB encryptions of the input IV
# and the incremented version. Then we decrypt each of them by
# feeding them to an AES-CBC cipher object with its IV set to
# zero.
def increment(keylen, suffix, iv):
key = b'\xab' * (keylen//8)
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
sdctr = ssh_cipher_new("aes{}_ctr_{}".format(keylen, suffix))
if sdctr is None: return # skip test if HW AES not available
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setkey(sdctr, key)
cbc = ssh_cipher_new("aes{}_cbc_{}".format(keylen, suffix))
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setkey(cbc, key)
ssh_cipher_setiv(sdctr, iv)
ec0 = ssh_cipher_encrypt(sdctr, b'\x00' * 16)
ec1 = ssh_cipher_encrypt(sdctr, b'\x00' * 16)
ssh_cipher_setiv(cbc, b'\x00' * 16)
dc0 = ssh_cipher_decrypt(cbc, ec0)
ssh_cipher_setiv(cbc, b'\x00' * 16)
dc1 = ssh_cipher_decrypt(cbc, ec1)
self.assertEqualBin(iv, dc0)
return dc1
def test(keylen, suffix, ivInteger):
mask = (1 << 128) - 1
ivInteger &= mask
ivBinary = unhex("{:032x}".format(ivInteger))
ivIntegerInc = (ivInteger + 1) & mask
ivBinaryInc = unhex("{:032x}".format((ivIntegerInc)))
actualResult = increment(keylen, suffix, ivBinary)
if actualResult is not None:
self.assertEqualBin(actualResult, ivBinaryInc)
# Check every input IV you can make by gluing together 32-bit
# pieces of the form 0, 1 or -1. This should test all the
# places where carry propagation within the 128-bit integer
# can go wrong.
#
# We also test this at all three AES key lengths, in case the
# core cipher routines are written separately for each one.
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for suffix in get_aes_impls():
for keylen in [128, 192, 256]:
hexTestValues = ["00000000", "00000001", "ffffffff"]
for ivHexBytes in itertools.product(*([hexTestValues] * 4)):
ivInteger = int("".join(ivHexBytes), 16)
test(keylen, suffix, ivInteger)
def testAESParallelism(self):
# Since at least one of our implementations of AES works in
# parallel, here's a test that CBC decryption works the same
# way no matter how the input data is divided up.
# A pile of conveniently available random-looking test data.
test_ciphertext = ssh2_mpint(last(fibonacci_scattered(14)))
test_ciphertext += b"x" * (15 & -len(test_ciphertext)) # pad to a block
# Test key and IV.
test_key = b"foobarbazquxquuxFooBarBazQuxQuux"
test_iv = b"FOOBARBAZQUXQUUX"
for keylen in [128, 192, 256]:
decryptions = []
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for suffix in get_aes_impls():
c = ssh_cipher_new("aes{:d}_cbc_{}".format(keylen, suffix))
if c is None: continue
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setkey(c, test_key[:keylen//8])
for chunklen in range(16, 16*12, 16):
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, test_iv)
decryption = b""
for pos in range(0, len(test_ciphertext), chunklen):
chunk = test_ciphertext[pos:pos+chunklen]
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
decryption += ssh_cipher_decrypt(c, chunk)
decryptions.append(decryption)
for d in decryptions:
self.assertEqualBin(d, decryptions[0])
Expose CRC32 to testcrypt, and add tests for it. Finding even semi-official test vectors for this CRC implementation was hard, because it turns out not to _quite_ match any of the well known ones catalogued on the web. Its _polynomial_ is well known, but the combination of details that go alongside it (starting state, post-hashing transformation) are not quite the same as any other hash I know of. After trawling catalogue websites for a while I finally worked out that SSH-1's CRC and RFC 1662's CRC are basically the same except for different choices of starting value and final adjustment. And RFC 1662's CRC is common enough that there _are_ test vectors. So I've renamed the previous crc32_compute function to crc32_ssh1, reflecting that it seems to be its own thing unlike any other CRC; implemented the RFC 1662 CRC as well, as an alternative tiny wrapper on the inner crc32_update function; and exposed all three functions to testcrypt. That lets me run standard test vectors _and_ directed tests of the internal update routine, plus one check that crc32_ssh1 itself does what I expect. While I'm here, I've also modernised the code to use uint32_t in place of unsigned long, and ptrlen instead of separate pointer,length arguments. And I've removed the general primer on CRC theory from the header comment, in favour of the more specifically useful information about _which_ CRC this is and how it matches up to anything else out there. (I've bowed to inevitability and put the directed CRC tests in the 'crypt' class in cryptsuite.py. Of course this is a misnomer, since CRC isn't cryptography, but it falls into the same category in terms of the role it plays in SSH-1, and I didn't feel like making a new pointedly-named 'notreallycrypt' container class just for this :-)
2019-01-14 20:45:19 +00:00
def testCRC32(self):
# Check the effect of every possible single-byte input to
# crc32_update. In the traditional implementation with a
# 256-word lookup table, this exercises every table entry; in
# _any_ implementation which iterates over the input one byte
# at a time, it should be a similarly exhaustive test. (But if
# a more optimised implementation absorbed _more_ than 8 bits
# at a time, then perhaps this test wouldn't be enough...)
# It would be nice if there was a functools.iterate() which
# would apply a function n times. Failing that, making shift1
# accept and ignore a second argument allows me to iterate it
# 8 times using functools.reduce.
shift1 = lambda x, dummy=None: (x >> 1) ^ (0xEDB88320 * (x & 1))
shift8 = lambda x: functools.reduce(shift1, [None]*8, x)
# A small selection of choices for the other input to
# crc32_update, just to check linearity.
test_prior_values = [0, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x45CC1F6A, 0xA0C4ADCF, 0xD482CDF1]
for prior in test_prior_values:
prior_shifted = shift8(prior)
for i in range(256):
exp = shift8(i) ^ prior_shifted
self.assertEqual(crc32_update(prior, struct.pack("B", i)), exp)
Expose CRC32 to testcrypt, and add tests for it. Finding even semi-official test vectors for this CRC implementation was hard, because it turns out not to _quite_ match any of the well known ones catalogued on the web. Its _polynomial_ is well known, but the combination of details that go alongside it (starting state, post-hashing transformation) are not quite the same as any other hash I know of. After trawling catalogue websites for a while I finally worked out that SSH-1's CRC and RFC 1662's CRC are basically the same except for different choices of starting value and final adjustment. And RFC 1662's CRC is common enough that there _are_ test vectors. So I've renamed the previous crc32_compute function to crc32_ssh1, reflecting that it seems to be its own thing unlike any other CRC; implemented the RFC 1662 CRC as well, as an alternative tiny wrapper on the inner crc32_update function; and exposed all three functions to testcrypt. That lets me run standard test vectors _and_ directed tests of the internal update routine, plus one check that crc32_ssh1 itself does what I expect. While I'm here, I've also modernised the code to use uint32_t in place of unsigned long, and ptrlen instead of separate pointer,length arguments. And I've removed the general primer on CRC theory from the header comment, in favour of the more specifically useful information about _which_ CRC this is and how it matches up to anything else out there. (I've bowed to inevitability and put the directed CRC tests in the 'crypt' class in cryptsuite.py. Of course this is a misnomer, since CRC isn't cryptography, but it falls into the same category in terms of the role it plays in SSH-1, and I didn't feel like making a new pointedly-named 'notreallycrypt' container class just for this :-)
2019-01-14 20:45:19 +00:00
# Check linearity of the _reference_ implementation, while
# we're at it!
self.assertEqual(shift8(i ^ prior), exp)
Expose CRC32 to testcrypt, and add tests for it. Finding even semi-official test vectors for this CRC implementation was hard, because it turns out not to _quite_ match any of the well known ones catalogued on the web. Its _polynomial_ is well known, but the combination of details that go alongside it (starting state, post-hashing transformation) are not quite the same as any other hash I know of. After trawling catalogue websites for a while I finally worked out that SSH-1's CRC and RFC 1662's CRC are basically the same except for different choices of starting value and final adjustment. And RFC 1662's CRC is common enough that there _are_ test vectors. So I've renamed the previous crc32_compute function to crc32_ssh1, reflecting that it seems to be its own thing unlike any other CRC; implemented the RFC 1662 CRC as well, as an alternative tiny wrapper on the inner crc32_update function; and exposed all three functions to testcrypt. That lets me run standard test vectors _and_ directed tests of the internal update routine, plus one check that crc32_ssh1 itself does what I expect. While I'm here, I've also modernised the code to use uint32_t in place of unsigned long, and ptrlen instead of separate pointer,length arguments. And I've removed the general primer on CRC theory from the header comment, in favour of the more specifically useful information about _which_ CRC this is and how it matches up to anything else out there. (I've bowed to inevitability and put the directed CRC tests in the 'crypt' class in cryptsuite.py. Of course this is a misnomer, since CRC isn't cryptography, but it falls into the same category in terms of the role it plays in SSH-1, and I didn't feel like making a new pointedly-named 'notreallycrypt' container class just for this :-)
2019-01-14 20:45:19 +00:00
def testCRCDA(self):
def pattern(badblk, otherblks, pat):
# Arrange copies of the bad block in a pattern
# corresponding to the given bit string.
retstr = b""
while pat != 0:
retstr += (badblk if pat & 1 else next(otherblks))
pat >>= 1
return retstr
def testCases(pat):
badblock = b'muhahaha' # the block we'll maliciously repeat
# Various choices of the other blocks, including all the
# same, all different, and all different but only in the
# byte at one end.
for otherblocks in [
itertools.repeat(b'GoodData'),
(struct.pack('>Q', i) for i in itertools.count()),
(struct.pack('<Q', i) for i in itertools.count())]:
yield pattern(badblock, otherblocks, pat)
def positiveTest(pat):
for data in testCases(pat):
self.assertTrue(crcda_detect(data, ""))
self.assertTrue(crcda_detect(data[8:], data[:8]))
def negativeTest(pat):
for data in testCases(pat):
self.assertFalse(crcda_detect(data, ""))
self.assertFalse(crcda_detect(data[8:], data[:8]))
# Tests of successful attack detection, derived by taking
# multiples of the CRC polynomial itself.
#
# (The CRC32 polynomial is usually written as 0xEDB88320.
# That's in bit-reversed form, but then, that's the form we
# need anyway for these patterns. But it's also missing the
# leading term - really, 0xEDB88320 is the value you get by
# reducing X^32 modulo the real poly, i.e. the value you put
# back in to the CRC to compensate for an X^32 that's just
# been shifted out. If you put that bit back on - at the
# bottom, because of the bit-reversal - you get the less
# familiar-looking 0x1db710641.)
positiveTest(0x1db710641) # the CRC polynomial P itself
positiveTest(0x26d930ac3) # (X+1) * P
positiveTest(0xbdbdf21cf) # (X^3+X^2+X+1) * P
positiveTest(0x3a66a39b653f6889d)
positiveTest(0x170db3167dd9f782b9765214c03e71a18f685b7f3)
positiveTest(0x1751997d000000000000000000000000000000001)
positiveTest(0x800000000000000000000000000000000f128a2d1)
# Tests of non-detection.
negativeTest(0x1db711a41)
negativeTest(0x3a66a39b453f6889d)
negativeTest(0x170db3167dd9f782b9765214c03e71b18f685b7f3)
negativeTest(0x1751997d000000000000000000000001000000001)
negativeTest(0x800000000000002000000000000000000f128a2d1)
def testAuxEncryptFns(self):
# Test helper functions such as aes256_encrypt_pubkey. The
# test cases are all just things I made up at random, and the
# expected outputs are generated by running PuTTY's own code;
# this doesn't independently check them against any other
# implementation, but it at least means we're protected
# against code reorganisations changing the behaviour from
# what it was before.
p = b'three AES blocks, or six DES, of arbitrary input'
k = b'thirty-two-byte aes-256 test key'
iv = b'\0' * 16
c = unhex('7b112d00c0fc95bc13fcdacfd43281bf'
'de9389db1bbcfde79d59a303d41fd2eb'
'0955c9477ae4ee3a4d6c1fbe474c0ef6')
self.assertEqualBin(aes256_encrypt_pubkey(k, iv, p), c)
self.assertEqualBin(aes256_decrypt_pubkey(k, iv, c), p)
# same k as in the previous case
iv = unhex('0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10')
c = unhex('9e9c8a91b739677b834397bdd8e70c05'
'c3e2cf6cce68d376d798a59848621c6d'
'42b9e7101260a438daadd7b742875a36')
self.assertEqualBin(aes256_encrypt_pubkey(k, iv, p), c)
self.assertEqualBin(aes256_decrypt_pubkey(k, iv, c), p)
k = b'3des with keys distinct.'
iv = b'randomIV'
c = unhex('be81ff840d885869a54d63b03d7cd8db'
'd39ab875e5f7b9da1081f8434cb33c47'
'dee5bcd530a3f6c13a9fc73e321a843a')
self.assertEqualBin(des3_encrypt_pubkey_ossh(k, iv, p), c)
self.assertEqualBin(des3_decrypt_pubkey_ossh(k, iv, c), p)
k = b'3des, 2keys only'
c = unhex('0b845650d73f615cf16ee3ed20535b5c'
'd2a8866ee628547bbdad916e2b4b9f19'
'67c15bde33c5b03ff7f403b4f8cf2364')
self.assertEqualBin(des3_encrypt_pubkey(k, p), c)
self.assertEqualBin(des3_decrypt_pubkey(k, c), p)
k = b'7 bytes'
c = unhex('5cac9999cffc980a1d1184d84b71c8cb'
'313d12a1d25a7831179aeb11edaca5ad'
'9482b224105a61c27137587620edcba8')
self.assertEqualBin(des_encrypt_xdmauth(k, p), c)
self.assertEqualBin(des_decrypt_xdmauth(k, c), p)
def testSSHCiphers(self):
# Test all the SSH ciphers we support, on the same principle
# as testAuxCryptFns that we should have test cases to verify
# that things still work the same today as they did yesterday.
p = b'64 bytes of test input data, enough to check any cipher mode xyz'
k = b'sixty-four bytes of test key data, enough to key any cipher pqrs'
iv = b'16 bytes of IV w'
ciphers = [
("3des_ctr", 24, 8, False, unhex('83c17a29250d3d4fa81250fc0362c54e40456936445b77709a30fccf8b983d57129a969c59070d7c2977f3d25dd7d71163687c7b3cd2edb0d07514e6c77479f5')),
("3des_ssh2", 24, 8, True, unhex('d5f1cc25b8fbc62decc74b432344de674f7249b2e38871f764411eaae17a1097396bd97b66a1e4d49f08c219acaef2a483198ce837f75cc1ef67b37c2432da3e')),
("3des_ssh1", 24, 8, False, unhex('d5f1cc25b8fbc62de63590b9b92344adf6dd72753273ff0fb32d4dbc6af858529129f34242f3d557eed3a5c84204eb4f868474294964cf70df5d8f45dfccfc45')),
("des_cbc", 8, 8, True, unhex('051524e77fb40e109d9fffeceacf0f28c940e2f8415ddccc117020bdd2612af5036490b12085d0e46129919b8e499f51cb82a4b341d7a1a1ea3e65201ef248f6')),
("aes256_ctr", 32, 16, False, unhex('b87b35e819f60f0f398a37b05d7bcf0b04ad4ebe570bd08e8bfa8606bafb0db2cfcd82baf2ccceae5de1a3c1ae08a8b8fdd884fdc5092031ea8ce53333e62976')),
("aes256_cbc", 32, 16, True, unhex('381cbb2fbcc48118d0094540242bd990dd6af5b9a9890edd013d5cad2d904f34b9261c623a452f32ea60e5402919a77165df12862742f1059f8c4a862f0827c5')),
("aes192_ctr", 24, 16, False, unhex('06bcfa7ccf075d723e12b724695a571a0fad67c56287ea609c410ac12749c51bb96e27fa7e1c7ea3b14792bbbb8856efb0617ebec24a8e4a87340d820cf347b8')),
("aes192_cbc", 24, 16, True, unhex('ac97f8698170f9c05341214bd7624d5d2efef8311596163dc597d9fe6c868971bd7557389974612cbf49ea4e7cc6cc302d4cc90519478dd88a4f09b530c141f3')),
("aes128_ctr", 16, 16, False, unhex('0ad4ddfd2360ec59d77dcb9a981f92109437c68c5e7f02f92017d9f424f89ab7850473ac0e19274125e740f252c84ad1f6ad138b6020a03bdaba2f3a7378ce1e')),
("aes128_cbc", 16, 16, True, unhex('36de36917fb7955a711c8b0bf149b29120a77524f393ae3490f4ce5b1d5ca2a0d7064ce3c38e267807438d12c0e40cd0d84134647f9f4a5b11804a0cc5070e62')),
("blowfish_ctr", 32, 8, False, unhex('079daf0f859363ccf72e975764d709232ec48adc74f88ccd1f342683f0bfa89ca0e8dbfccc8d4d99005d6b61e9cc4e6eaa2fd2a8163271b94bf08ef212129f01')),
("blowfish_ssh2", 16, 8, True, unhex('e986b7b01f17dfe80ee34cac81fa029b771ec0f859ae21ae3ec3df1674bc4ceb54a184c6c56c17dd2863c3e9c068e76fd9aef5673465995f0d648b0bb848017f')),
("blowfish_ssh1", 32, 8, True, unhex('d44092a9035d895acf564ba0365d19570fbb4f125d5a4fd2a1812ee6c8a1911a51bb181fbf7d1a261253cab71ee19346eb477b3e7ecf1d95dd941e635c1a4fbf')),
("arcfour256", 32, None, False, unhex('db68db4cd9bbc1d302cce5919ff3181659272f5d38753e464b3122fc69518793fe15dd0fbdd9cd742bd86c5e8a3ae126c17ecc420bd2d5204f1a24874d00fda3')),
("arcfour128", 16, None, False, unhex('fd4af54c5642cb29629e50a15d22e4944e21ffba77d0543b27590eafffe3886686d1aefae0484afc9e67edc0e67eb176bbb5340af1919ea39adfe866d066dd05')),
]
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for algbase, keylen, ivlen, simple_cbc, c in ciphers:
for alg in get_implementations(algbase):
cipher = ssh_cipher_new(alg)
if cipher is None:
continue # hardware-accelerated cipher not available
ssh_cipher_setkey(cipher, k[:keylen])
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
if ivlen is not None:
ssh_cipher_setiv(cipher, iv[:ivlen])
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_cipher_encrypt(cipher, p), c)
ssh_cipher_setkey(cipher, k[:keylen])
if ivlen is not None:
ssh_cipher_setiv(cipher, iv[:ivlen])
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_cipher_decrypt(cipher, c), p)
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
if simple_cbc:
# CBC ciphers (other than the three-layered CBC used
# by SSH-1 3DES) have more specific semantics for
# their IV than 'some kind of starting state for the
# cipher mode': the IV is specifically supposed to
# represent the previous block of ciphertext. So we
# can check that, by supplying the IV _as_ a
# ciphertext block via a call to decrypt(), and seeing
# if that causes our test ciphertext to decrypt the
# same way as when we provided the same IV via
# setiv().
ssh_cipher_setkey(cipher, k[:keylen])
ssh_cipher_decrypt(cipher, iv[:ivlen])
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_cipher_decrypt(cipher, c), p)
def testRSAKex(self):
# Round-trip test of the RSA key exchange functions, plus a
# hardcoded plain/ciphertext pair to guard against the
# behaviour accidentally changing.
def blobs(n, e, d, p, q, iqmp):
# For RSA kex, the public blob is formatted exactly like
# any other SSH-2 RSA public key. But there's no private
# key blob format defined by the protocol, so for the
# purposes of making a test RSA private key, we borrow the
# function we already had that decodes one out of the wire
# format used in the SSH-1 agent protocol.
pubblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-rsa") + ssh2_mpint(e) + ssh2_mpint(n)
privblob = (ssh_uint32(nbits(n)) + ssh1_mpint(n) + ssh1_mpint(e) +
ssh1_mpint(d) + ssh1_mpint(iqmp) +
ssh1_mpint(q) + ssh1_mpint(p))
return pubblob, privblob
# Parameters for a test key.
p = 0xf49e4d21c1ec3d1c20dc8656cc29aadb2644a12c98ed6c81a6161839d20d398d
q = 0xa5f0bc464bf23c4c83cf17a2f396b15136fbe205c07cb3bb3bdb7ed357d1cd13
n = p*q
e = 37
d = int(mp_invert(e, (p-1)*(q-1)))
iqmp = int(mp_invert(q, p))
assert iqmp * q % p == 1
assert d * e % (p-1) == 1
assert d * e % (q-1) == 1
pubblob, privblob = blobs(n, e, d, p, q, iqmp)
pubkey = ssh_rsakex_newkey(pubblob)
privkey = get_rsa_ssh1_priv_agent(privblob)
plain = 0x123456789abcdef
hashalg = 'md5'
with queued_random_data(64, "rsakex encrypt test"):
cipher = ssh_rsakex_encrypt(pubkey, hashalg, ssh2_mpint(plain))
decoded = ssh_rsakex_decrypt(privkey, hashalg, cipher)
self.assertEqual(int(decoded), plain)
self.assertEqualBin(cipher, unhex(
'34277d1060dc0a434d98b4239de9cec59902a4a7d17a763587cdf8c25d57f51a'
'7964541892e7511798e61dd78429358f4d6a887a50d2c5ebccf0e04f48fc665c'
))
2020-02-26 19:23:03 +00:00
def testMontgomeryKexLowOrderPoints(self):
# List of all the bad input values for Curve25519 which can
# end up generating a zero output key. You can find the first
# five (the ones in canonical representation, i.e. in
# [0,2^255-19)) by running
# find_montgomery_power2_order_x_values(curve25519.p, curve25519.a)
# and then encoding the results little-endian.
bad_keys_25519 = [
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"5f9c95bca3508c24b1d0b1559c83ef5b04445cc4581c8e86d8224eddd09f1157",
"e0eb7a7c3b41b8ae1656e3faf19fc46ada098deb9c32b1fd866205165f49b800",
"ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f",
# Input values less than 2^255 are reduced mod p, so those
# of the above values which are still in that range when
# you add 2^255-19 to them should also be caught.
"edffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f",
"eeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f",
# Input values are reduced mod 2^255 before reducing mod
# p. So setting the high-order bit of any of the above 7
# values should also lead to rejection, because it will be
# stripped off and then the value will be recognised as
# one of the above.
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080",
"0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080",
"5f9c95bca3508c24b1d0b1559c83ef5b04445cc4581c8e86d8224eddd09f11d7",
"e0eb7a7c3b41b8ae1656e3faf19fc46ada098deb9c32b1fd866205165f49b880",
"ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
"edffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
"eeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff",
]
# Same for Curve448, found by the analogous eccref function call
# find_montgomery_power2_order_x_values(curve448.p, curve448.a)
bad_keys_448 = [
# The first three are the bad values in canonical
# representationm. In Curve448 these are just 0, 1 and -1.
'0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000',
'0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000',
'fefffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff',
# As with Curve25519, we must also include values in
# non-canonical representation that reduce to one of the
# above mod p.
'fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff',
'00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff'
# But that's all, because Curve448 fits neatly into a
# whole number of bytes, so there's no secondary reduction
# mod a power of 2.
]
2020-02-26 19:23:03 +00:00
with random_prng("doesn't matter"):
ecdh25519 = ssh_ecdhkex_newkey('curve25519')
ecdh448 = ssh_ecdhkex_newkey('curve448')
2020-02-26 19:23:03 +00:00
for pub in bad_keys_25519:
key = ssh_ecdhkex_getkey(ecdh25519, unhex(pub))
self.assertEqual(key, None)
for pub in bad_keys_448:
key = ssh_ecdhkex_getkey(ecdh448, unhex(pub))
self.assertEqual(key, None)
2020-02-26 19:23:03 +00:00
Replace PuTTY's PRNG with a Fortuna-like system. This tears out the entire previous random-pool system in sshrand.c. In its place is a system pretty close to Ferguson and Schneier's 'Fortuna' generator, with the main difference being that I use SHA-256 instead of AES for the generation side of the system (rationale given in comment). The PRNG implementation lives in sshprng.c, and defines a self- contained data type with no state stored outside the object, so you can instantiate however many of them you like. The old sshrand.c still exists, but in place of the previous random pool system, it's just become a client of sshprng.c, whose job is to hold a single global instance of the PRNG type, and manage its reference count, save file, noise-collection timers and similar administrative business. Advantages of this change include: - Fortuna is designed with a more varied threat model in mind than my old home-grown random pool. For example, after any request for random numbers, it automatically re-seeds itself, so that if the state of the PRNG should be leaked, it won't give enough information to find out what past outputs _were_. - The PRNG type can be instantiated with any hash function; the instance used by the main tools is based on SHA-256, an improvement on the old pool's use of SHA-1. - The new PRNG only uses the completely standard interface to the hash function API, instead of having to have privileged access to the internal SHA-1 block transform function. This will make it easier to revamp the hash code in general, and also it means that hardware-accelerated versions of SHA-256 will automatically be used for the PRNG as well as for everything else. - The new PRNG can be _tested_! Because it has an actual (if not quite explicit) specification for exactly what the output numbers _ought_ to be derived from the hashes of, I can (and have) put tests in cryptsuite that ensure the output really is being derived in the way I think it is. The old pool could have been returning any old nonsense and it would have been very hard to tell for sure.
2019-01-22 22:42:41 +00:00
def testPRNG(self):
hashalg = 'sha256'
seed = b"hello, world"
entropy = b'1234567890' * 100
# Replicate the generation of some random numbers. to ensure
# they really are the hashes of what they're supposed to be.
pr = prng_new(hashalg)
prng_seed_begin(pr)
prng_seed_update(pr, seed)
prng_seed_finish(pr)
data1 = prng_read(pr, 128)
data2 = prng_read(pr, 127) # a short read shouldn't confuse things
prng_add_entropy(pr, 0, entropy) # forces a reseed
data3 = prng_read(pr, 128)
le128 = lambda x: le_integer(x, 128)
Replace PuTTY's PRNG with a Fortuna-like system. This tears out the entire previous random-pool system in sshrand.c. In its place is a system pretty close to Ferguson and Schneier's 'Fortuna' generator, with the main difference being that I use SHA-256 instead of AES for the generation side of the system (rationale given in comment). The PRNG implementation lives in sshprng.c, and defines a self- contained data type with no state stored outside the object, so you can instantiate however many of them you like. The old sshrand.c still exists, but in place of the previous random pool system, it's just become a client of sshprng.c, whose job is to hold a single global instance of the PRNG type, and manage its reference count, save file, noise-collection timers and similar administrative business. Advantages of this change include: - Fortuna is designed with a more varied threat model in mind than my old home-grown random pool. For example, after any request for random numbers, it automatically re-seeds itself, so that if the state of the PRNG should be leaked, it won't give enough information to find out what past outputs _were_. - The PRNG type can be instantiated with any hash function; the instance used by the main tools is based on SHA-256, an improvement on the old pool's use of SHA-1. - The new PRNG only uses the completely standard interface to the hash function API, instead of having to have privileged access to the internal SHA-1 block transform function. This will make it easier to revamp the hash code in general, and also it means that hardware-accelerated versions of SHA-256 will automatically be used for the PRNG as well as for everything else. - The new PRNG can be _tested_! Because it has an actual (if not quite explicit) specification for exactly what the output numbers _ought_ to be derived from the hashes of, I can (and have) put tests in cryptsuite that ensure the output really is being derived in the way I think it is. The old pool could have been returning any old nonsense and it would have been very hard to tell for sure.
2019-01-22 22:42:41 +00:00
key1 = hash_str(hashalg, b'R' + seed)
expected_data1 = b''.join(
hash_str(hashalg, key1 + b'G' + le128(counter))
Replace PuTTY's PRNG with a Fortuna-like system. This tears out the entire previous random-pool system in sshrand.c. In its place is a system pretty close to Ferguson and Schneier's 'Fortuna' generator, with the main difference being that I use SHA-256 instead of AES for the generation side of the system (rationale given in comment). The PRNG implementation lives in sshprng.c, and defines a self- contained data type with no state stored outside the object, so you can instantiate however many of them you like. The old sshrand.c still exists, but in place of the previous random pool system, it's just become a client of sshprng.c, whose job is to hold a single global instance of the PRNG type, and manage its reference count, save file, noise-collection timers and similar administrative business. Advantages of this change include: - Fortuna is designed with a more varied threat model in mind than my old home-grown random pool. For example, after any request for random numbers, it automatically re-seeds itself, so that if the state of the PRNG should be leaked, it won't give enough information to find out what past outputs _were_. - The PRNG type can be instantiated with any hash function; the instance used by the main tools is based on SHA-256, an improvement on the old pool's use of SHA-1. - The new PRNG only uses the completely standard interface to the hash function API, instead of having to have privileged access to the internal SHA-1 block transform function. This will make it easier to revamp the hash code in general, and also it means that hardware-accelerated versions of SHA-256 will automatically be used for the PRNG as well as for everything else. - The new PRNG can be _tested_! Because it has an actual (if not quite explicit) specification for exactly what the output numbers _ought_ to be derived from the hashes of, I can (and have) put tests in cryptsuite that ensure the output really is being derived in the way I think it is. The old pool could have been returning any old nonsense and it would have been very hard to tell for sure.
2019-01-22 22:42:41 +00:00
for counter in range(4))
# After prng_read finishes, we expect the PRNG to have
# automatically reseeded itself, so that if its internal state
# is revealed then the previous output can't be reconstructed.
key2 = hash_str(hashalg, key1 + b'R')
expected_data2 = b''.join(
hash_str(hashalg, key2 + b'G' + le128(counter))
Replace PuTTY's PRNG with a Fortuna-like system. This tears out the entire previous random-pool system in sshrand.c. In its place is a system pretty close to Ferguson and Schneier's 'Fortuna' generator, with the main difference being that I use SHA-256 instead of AES for the generation side of the system (rationale given in comment). The PRNG implementation lives in sshprng.c, and defines a self- contained data type with no state stored outside the object, so you can instantiate however many of them you like. The old sshrand.c still exists, but in place of the previous random pool system, it's just become a client of sshprng.c, whose job is to hold a single global instance of the PRNG type, and manage its reference count, save file, noise-collection timers and similar administrative business. Advantages of this change include: - Fortuna is designed with a more varied threat model in mind than my old home-grown random pool. For example, after any request for random numbers, it automatically re-seeds itself, so that if the state of the PRNG should be leaked, it won't give enough information to find out what past outputs _were_. - The PRNG type can be instantiated with any hash function; the instance used by the main tools is based on SHA-256, an improvement on the old pool's use of SHA-1. - The new PRNG only uses the completely standard interface to the hash function API, instead of having to have privileged access to the internal SHA-1 block transform function. This will make it easier to revamp the hash code in general, and also it means that hardware-accelerated versions of SHA-256 will automatically be used for the PRNG as well as for everything else. - The new PRNG can be _tested_! Because it has an actual (if not quite explicit) specification for exactly what the output numbers _ought_ to be derived from the hashes of, I can (and have) put tests in cryptsuite that ensure the output really is being derived in the way I think it is. The old pool could have been returning any old nonsense and it would have been very hard to tell for sure.
2019-01-22 22:42:41 +00:00
for counter in range(4,8))
# There will have been another reseed after the second
# prng_read, and then another due to the entropy.
key3 = hash_str(hashalg, key2 + b'R')
key4 = hash_str(hashalg, key3 + b'R' + hash_str(hashalg, entropy))
expected_data3 = b''.join(
hash_str(hashalg, key4 + b'G' + le128(counter))
Replace PuTTY's PRNG with a Fortuna-like system. This tears out the entire previous random-pool system in sshrand.c. In its place is a system pretty close to Ferguson and Schneier's 'Fortuna' generator, with the main difference being that I use SHA-256 instead of AES for the generation side of the system (rationale given in comment). The PRNG implementation lives in sshprng.c, and defines a self- contained data type with no state stored outside the object, so you can instantiate however many of them you like. The old sshrand.c still exists, but in place of the previous random pool system, it's just become a client of sshprng.c, whose job is to hold a single global instance of the PRNG type, and manage its reference count, save file, noise-collection timers and similar administrative business. Advantages of this change include: - Fortuna is designed with a more varied threat model in mind than my old home-grown random pool. For example, after any request for random numbers, it automatically re-seeds itself, so that if the state of the PRNG should be leaked, it won't give enough information to find out what past outputs _were_. - The PRNG type can be instantiated with any hash function; the instance used by the main tools is based on SHA-256, an improvement on the old pool's use of SHA-1. - The new PRNG only uses the completely standard interface to the hash function API, instead of having to have privileged access to the internal SHA-1 block transform function. This will make it easier to revamp the hash code in general, and also it means that hardware-accelerated versions of SHA-256 will automatically be used for the PRNG as well as for everything else. - The new PRNG can be _tested_! Because it has an actual (if not quite explicit) specification for exactly what the output numbers _ought_ to be derived from the hashes of, I can (and have) put tests in cryptsuite that ensure the output really is being derived in the way I think it is. The old pool could have been returning any old nonsense and it would have been very hard to tell for sure.
2019-01-22 22:42:41 +00:00
for counter in range(8,12))
self.assertEqualBin(data1, expected_data1)
self.assertEqualBin(data2, expected_data2[:127])
self.assertEqualBin(data3, expected_data3)
def testHashPadding(self):
# A consistency test for hashes that use MD5/SHA-1/SHA-2 style
# padding of the message into a whole number of fixed-size
# blocks. We test-hash a message of every length up to twice
# the block length, to make sure there's no off-by-1 error in
# the code that decides how much padding to put on.
# Source: generated using Python hashlib as an independent
# implementation. The function below will do it, called with
# parameters such as (hashlib.sha256,128).
#
# def gen_testcase(hashclass, maxlen):
# return hashclass(b''.join(hashclass(text[:i]).digest()
# for i in range(maxlen))).hexdigest()
text = """
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do
eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad
minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut
aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in
reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla
pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in
culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.
""".replace('\n', ' ').strip()
def test(hashname, maxlen, expected):
assert len(text) >= maxlen
buf = b''.join(hash_str(hashname, text[:i])
for i in range(maxlen))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname, buf), unhex(expected))
test('md5', 128, '8169d766cc3b8df182b3ce756ae19a15')
test('sha1', 128, '3691759577deb3b70f427763a9c15acb9dfc0259')
test('sha256', 128, 'ec539c4d678412c86c13ee4eb9452232'
'35d4eed3368d876fdf10c9df27396640')
test('sha512', 256,
'cb725b4b4ec0ac1174d69427b4d97848b7db4fc01181f99a8049a4d721862578'
'f91e026778bb2d389a9dd88153405189e6ba438b213c5387284103d2267fd055'
)
def testDSA(self):
p = 0xe93618c54716992ffd54e79df6e1b0edd517f7bbe4a49d64631eb3efe8105f676e8146248cfb4f05720862533210f0c2ab0f9dd61dbc0e5195200c4ebd95364b
q = 0xf3533bcece2e164ca7c5ce64bc1e395e9a15bbdd
g = 0x5ac9d0401c27d7abfbc5c17cdc1dc43323cd0ef18b79e1909bdace6d17af675a10d37dde8bd8b70e72a8666592216ccb00614629c27e870e4fbf393b812a9f05
y = 0xac3ddeb22d65a5a2ded4a28418b2a748d8e5e544ba5e818c137d7b042ef356b0ef6d66cfca0b3ab5affa2969522e7b07bee60562fa4869829a5afce0ad0c4cd0
x = 0x664f8250b7f1a5093047fe0c7fe4b58e46b73295
pubblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-dss") + b"".join(map(ssh2_mpint, [p,q,g,y]))
privblob = ssh2_mpint(x)
pubkey = ssh_key_new_pub('dsa', pubblob)
privkey = ssh_key_new_priv('dsa', pubblob, privblob)
sig = ssh_key_sign(privkey, b"hello, world", 0)
self.assertTrue(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, sig, b"hello, world"))
self.assertFalse(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, sig, b"hello, again"))
badsig0 = unhex('{:040x}{:040x}'.format(1, 0))
badsigq = unhex('{:040x}{:040x}'.format(1, q))
self.assertFalse(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, badsig0, "hello, world"))
self.assertFalse(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, badsigq, "hello, world"))
self.assertFalse(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, badsig0, "hello, again"))
self.assertFalse(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, badsigq, "hello, again"))
def testBLAKE2b(self):
# The standard test vectors for BLAKE2b (in the separate class
# below) don't satisfy me because they only test one hash
# size. These additional tests exercise BLAKE2b's configurable
# output length. The expected results are derived from the
# BLAKE2 reference implementation.
def b2_with_len(data, length):
h = blake2b_new_general(length)
h.update(data)
return h.digest()[:length]
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 1), unhex("29"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 2), unhex("accd"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 3), unhex("980032"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 5), unhex("9baecc38f2"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 8), unhex(
"a7b6eda801e5347d"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 13), unhex(
"6eedb122c6707328a66aa34a07"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 21), unhex(
"c7f0f74a227116547b3d2788e927ee2a76c87d8797"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 34), unhex(
"2f5fcdf2b870fa254051dd448193a1fb6e92be122efca539ba2aeac0bc6c77d0"
"dadc"))
self.assertEqualBin(b2_with_len(b'hello', 55), unhex(
"daafcf2bd6fccf976cbc234b71cd9f4f7d56fe0eb33a40018707089a215c44a8"
"4b272d0329ae6d85a0f8acc7e964dc2facb715ba472bb6"))
def testArgon2LongHash(self):
# Unit-test the Argon2 long hash function H', which starts off
# the same as BLAKE2b, but comes with its own method of
# extending the output length past 64 bytes.
#
# I generated these test values using a test program linked
# against the reference implementation's libargon2.a and
# calling its blake2b_long function.
preimage = b'hello, world'
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(1, preimage), unhex("8b"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(2, preimage), unhex("1ff9"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(63, preimage), unhex(
"e2c997721f1d64aa8c25e588fb8ab19646ce6d5c2a431fa560fcb813e55dd481"
"322d2630d95ca6b1b63317b13d6b111e5816170c80c3ca7d5b4bf894096de4"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(64, preimage), unhex(
"0c7ba7ee6d510b4bb5c9b69ac91e25e0b11aa30dd6234b8e61b0fe1537c037b8"
"8ed5aa59a277e8cc07095c81aff26d08967e4dfdabd32db8b6af6ceb78cf8c47"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(65, preimage), unhex(
"680941abbd8fc80f28c38d623e90903f08709bf76575e2775d4ce01c31b192c8"
"73038d9a31af8991c8b1ad4f2b1991f4d15f73ab0f4f3add415c297a12eb9ddb"
"76"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(95, preimage), unhex(
"4be28c51850fed70d9403e1406b6ba68a83d98cf222a4ee162beef60fd3384df"
"eba3fce9d95f646982eb384ac943ce5263cb03428fd8d261cc41ffdb7ba328fe"
"098526f2b49593f9e7f38188598ce4693b59f4dd32db30c1be9a9d35784fa0"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(96, preimage), unhex(
"20295ea01e822cca113f668f33e5e481ed5879bfd7de6359ea42d497da97be52"
"2cdd518d34ae32c44cabd45249b4e697626b0b14b6a33a2bd138be0a4bceeaf4"
"9528f93acef01b093ee84d8d871d1ee6cf7c10e83ad0619631aed19345166f03"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(97, preimage), unhex(
"d24b31f3ac0baad168d524efc4bafee55fef743fd60b14e28b860d7523e319c7"
"520e2d5457cc3d06dc1044530afdf6990fa12e38d5802eb642f8e77fcfee2c0b"
"1f84a28877f2f2f049ed9299e1e0230f98af3a161185970aad21f0ea0f5184cf"
"90"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(127, preimage), unhex(
"5d1e8380450dbc985418ed1f3700b925ae0719e4486e29131c81bca7083ac6b8"
"f535c3398488e34d3dc1390de44097f1eee498f10ebe85b579e99a7672023b01"
"ca5c20e63c595b640e00d80f113a52e3773719889b266ab4c65269c11fb212e4"
"75f2b769bb26321bb60ecc0d490821e5056d7dfc9def3cd065d3ba90360764"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(128, preimage), unhex(
"be15b316f3483c4d0d00f71a65b974894a2025f441b79b9fe461bc740cb0b039"
"c4fe914f61c05a612d63ebc50a662b2d59b1996091e5e3474340544ea46a46cb"
"25c41ff700fafcd96c4f12ddc698cd2426558f960696837ea8170fd2fe284b54"
"8f585f97919ef14f2b3cbb351eb98872add7ba6d08c1401232df6cc878fbeb22"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(129, preimage), unhex(
"83da464c278dcb12c29b6685fee6d32f0b461337c155369ad0d56b58b0aa5f80"
"9aa7b56bd41b664c8d768957f8f0e40999fb0178eb53cf83f31d725bf92881bc"
"900774bce4cdf56b6386ad3de6891d11a0ccd4564a3431fc4c24105a02d0a6a2"
"434712b9a7471f3223c72a6e64912200d0a3d149a19d06fe9dc8ec09d7ed5a48"
"bb"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(511, preimage), unhex(
"30c0c0d0467e7665368db0b40a2324a61fb569d35172de2df53a9739a8d18e60"
"b4f25d521c8855604be3e24ea56302566074323d94c0bd3a33d08f185d8ba5ac"
"a2bc3fb2e4c4e5ffec5778daea67c6b5913c9cac16f2e5c7b7818e757fa747b3"
"69e586d616010a752762f69c604238ed8738430366fbdb7493454fa02391a76b"
"30f241695b9fa8d3a3116227c6bb6f72d325cf104ab153d15f928b22767d467d"
"4bf7e16176aaa7315954b7872061933c12d548f1f93a8abb9d73791661bee521"
"b2ae51be373a229dfef32787234c1be5846d133563002b9a029178716ad41e70"
"1539d3fad300c77607c5217701e3e485d72c980f3f71d525c8148375a2f8d22c"
"a211ba165330a90b7e0e6baa6073833925c23bdd388ee904f38463c7e6b85475"
"09b810aae5c9ffc5dd902c2ffe049c338e3ae2c6416d3b874d6a9d384089564c"
"0d8e4dce9b6e47e1d5ec9087bf526cc9fa35aab1893a0588d31b77fea37e0799"
"468deacde47629d2960a3519b3bcd4e22364a9cccd3b128cba21cac27f140d53"
"f79c11e4157e4cb48272eecdf62f52084a27e5b0933bbe66ded17e2df6f8d398"
"f6c479c3c716457820ad177b8bd9334cb594e03d09fcc4f82d4385e141eacd7d"
"9ad1e1c4cb42788af70bac0509f0a891e662960955490abf2763373803e8c89c"
"df632579cb9c647634b30df214a3d67b92fd55d283c42c63b470a48a78cd5b"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(512, preimage), unhex(
"79a6974e29a9a6c069e0156774d35c5014a409f5ffc60013725367a7208d4929"
"7d228637751768a31a59e27aa89372f1bcc095a6fa331198a5bd5ad053ba2ebb"
"cbcc501ea55cf142e8d95209228c9ab60cd104d5077472f2a9ecaa071aed6ee9"
"5de29e188b7399d5b6b7ed897b2bc4dd1ea745eb9974e39ca6fb983380cc537a"
"c04dfe6caefe85faf206b1613092ebadf791eaa8a5b814c9a79a73a5733b0505"
"a47163c10a0f7309df6663896df6079a7c88c6879bb591a40abd398c6deda792"
"1cc3986435b1c840a768b2fa507446f2f77a406b1b2f739f7795db24789c8927"
"24b4c84b7005445123154f8cd2ba63a7ede672af5d197f846700732025c9931d"
"1c67c5493417ca394a8f68ba532645815cf7b5102af134ecb4fd9e326f53779a"
"3039dbef6a0880db9e38b6b61d2f9ead969e4224c2d9c69b5897e5eeb7032e83"
"334e192ff50017056ccb84d4cc8eee3ab248d2614643d0174fe18c72186dd967"
"92d8545645ddf4a9b2c7a91c9a71857a399449d7154077a8e9580f1a2d20227d"
"671b455ccb897cba0491e50892120d7877f7776d653cfdb176fa3f64a9e6f848"
"cd681c487b488775aaf698294eec813b2cca90d68d63b5d886d61c1a8e922aaa"
"330fd658ede56e34bcd288048e845eba7b8e2e7cc22ba6c91b523e48017aa878"
"8ce4f91d0e6d6c6706762fb0cc7f465cee3916684fb21e337cfe1b583e0b1e92"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(513, preimage), unhex(
"32243cfbd7eca582d60b3b8ea3ba3d93783537689c7cbcd1d1cbde46200b8c86"
"617fc00e8a9ae991a1e2f91c67e07d5f0a777d982c1461d0c5474e4e164b053c"
"2808559e2b8a5ac4a46a5fcbc825b1d5302c7b0611940194eb494d45ce7113a2"
"3424b51c199c6a5100ab159ff323eda5feffee4da4155a028a81da9d44e4286b"
"ac3dab4ffce43a80b6ce97a47ea0ac51ee16e8b4d3b68942afdc20e1c21747c4"
"94859c3d3883e7dc19ea416a393a3507683d9d03e6a3a91f8f1cb8a7d5d9892e"
"80c8fb0222527a73a1f59b9dd41770982f2af177a6e96093064534803edd0713"
"71ede53024cedc291d768325bb4e4def9af1b5569c349b64816496c37a8787b5"
"4fbe248372ebadb5ce20e03eaa935dc55ff4b8cbe5d6d844c7b71d4656fef22c"
"5a49f13d75a7a8368a2dbc1e78d732b879bfc5c9467eda2bf4918f0c59037ae3"
"dee7880a171409dd1a4e143c814e60301ac77237f261fa7519a04e68000530f9"
"708ed9fda5609d655560a9491f80f5875ad5725e3120686b73319c6a727932e3"
"20a2174422523498c38fea47aeb20d135ff9fd93c6fa6db0005e0001685d7577"
"33a82a4dc9dd6556b938f7b8dafd0d670846780b9931b815063708189b17877b"
"825533bcc250fb576a28be4caa107e6a3a6f7b0c60fb51b0def27008b7e272ac"
"95d610bfa912339799a2e537ce543d7862dddbe31bb224fda4ae283571847a28"
"54"))
self.assertEqualBin(argon2_long_hash(1024, preimage), unhex(
"951252f6fa152124f381266a358d9b78b88e469d08d5fc78e4ea32253c7fc26c"
"3ff1c93529ab4ee6fcf00acf29bbaba934a4014ce2625e0806601c55e6ce70d7"
"121fd82f0904f335c5c7ba07dc6e6adf7582c92f7f255072203ea85844b4fe54"
"817476a20bb742710ffc42750361be94332d0fc721b192309acfa70da43db6ae"
"1d0f0bbe8a3250966a4532b36728162073c9eb3e119ea4c1c187c775dbb25a5d"
"d883e3f65706a5fca897cdc4a8aa7b68ba3f57940c72f3a3396c417e758ba071"
"95be4afba325237c0e2738a74d96fd1350fb623cb2ad40ea8b1e070cf398b98c"
"2865ea40225b81f031f2b405409ca01dc5d9903d3d8e1d6381fbe7ccfc8f3dab"
"eadafd7c976c0ba84a936f78ff7df0f112c089ba88f82bed7f9a6e31a91e5fee"
"f675755454b948de22695660b243b9eca3bcc89608f83d2baa1d73dd6b8bd4f9"
"b995ed9cb0f1edc6e98a49ed841b506c1bf59b43f4b3457a376bbff116c1a4f6"
"07cc62381fc5c19953c68f300c1b51198d40784d812d25810ba404862f04b680"
"6039a074f612ad8b84e0941ba23c915c3e7162c225fbecffdb7dc1ab559b2b54"
"32fe8a498c32e918d8e7e33254ff75077f648827705e987f4d90fba971e78e1a"
"6896b4d775c7359dc950f1e964fa04621aacf3c0988969490f4c72c54caf79e8"
"481053cc0a27ffcd3580aabf9ef1268d498d8a18bd70e9b8402e011753bb7dc7"
"e856c00d988fca924ee7cf61979c38cda8a872e4cc4fbdc90c23a0ded71eb944"
"bb816ab22d9a4380e3e9d1cec818165c2fba6c5d51dcbf452c0cb1779a384937"
"64d695370e13a301eca7be68d4112d2177381514efbb36fe08fc5bc2970301b8"
"06f8e5a57a780e894d5276e2025bb775b6d1861e33c54ab6e3eb72947fbe6f91"
"8174ce24eb4682efbb3c4f01233dc7ce9ef44792e9e876bb03e6751b3d559047"
"d045127d976aa042fc55c690c9048e200065e7b7de19d9353aa9ac9b3e7611f0"
"d1c42d069a300455ca1f7420a352bace89215e705106927510c11b3b1c1486d9"
"f3ab006d2de2ee2c94574f760ce8c246bca229f98c66f06042b14f1fff9a16c0"
"1550237e16d108ce5597299b1eb406a9ee505a29a6e0fa526b3e6beafd336aea"
"138b2f31971586f67c5ffffbd6826d1c75666038c43d0bdff4edfc294e064a49"
"2eed43e2dc78d00abc4e85edcd9563b8251b66f57b0f4b6d17f5a3f35c87c488"
"dbeeb84fd720286197c2dec8290eccf3a313747de285b9cd3548e90cf81b3838"
"3ffcc8c2a7f582feb369d05cb96b9b224d05902b3e39e5b96536032e9dddeb9b"
"9d4f40a9c8f544ca37cf8d39d7c8c6a33880e9184ed017bd642db9590759bd10"
"7362048ede5c0257feecc4984584592c566f37fba8469c064015339fb4f03023"
"56ece37fd3655aae2bfc989b9b4c1384efc3503c8866db901802cb36eda9fb00"))
def testArgon2(self):
# A few tests of my own of Argon2, derived from the reference
# implementation.
pwd = b"password"
salt = b"salt of at least 16 bytes"
secret = b"secret"
assoc = b"associated data"
# Smallest memory (8Kbyte) and parallelism (1) parameters the
# reference implementation will accept, but lots of passes
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('i', 8, 16, 1, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"314da280240a3ca1eedd1f1db417a76eb0741e7df64b8cdf"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('d', 8, 16, 1, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"9cc961cf43e0f86c2d4e202b816dc5bc5b2177e68faa0b08"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('id', 8, 16, 1, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"6cd6c490c582fa597721d772d4e3de166987792491b48c51"))
# Test a memory cost value that isn't a power of 2. This
# checks a wraparound case during the conversion of J1 to a
# block index, and is a regression test for a bug that nearly
# got past me during original development.
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('i', 104, 16, 2, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"a561963623f1073c9aa8caecdb600c73ffc6de677ba8d97c"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('d', 104, 16, 2, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"a9014db7f1d468fb25b88fa7fc0deac0f2e7f27e25d2cf6e"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('id', 104, 16, 2, 24, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"64f3212b1e7725ffcf9ae2d1753d63e763bcd6970061a435"))
# Larger parameters that should exercise the pseudorandom
# block indexing reasonably thoroughly. Also generate plenty
# of output data.
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('i', 1024, 5, 16, 77, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"b008a685ff57730fad0e6f3ef3b9189282c0d9b05303675f43b5f3054724"
"733fcbe8e2639cc2c930535b31b723339041bcd703bf2483455acf86c0e6"
"9ed88c545ad40f1f2068855e4d61e99407"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('d', 1024, 5, 16, 111, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"399ffbcd720c47745b9deb391ed0de7d5e0ffe53aef9f8ef7a7918cfa212"
"53df8cc577affbd5e0c0f8bf6d93c11b2f63973f8fc8f89dccd832fc587e"
"5d61717be6e88ca33eef5d1e168c028bae632a2a723c6c83f8e755f39171"
"5eda1c77c8e2fe06fbdd4e56d35262587e7df73cd7"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('id', 1024, 5, 16, 123, pwd, salt, secret, assoc), unhex(
"6636807289cb9b9c032f48dcc31ffed1de4ca6c1b97e1ce768d690486341"
"2ac84b39d568a81dd01d9ee3ceec6cc23441d95e6abeb4a2024f1f540d56"
"9b799277c4037ddc7195ba783c9158a901adc7d4a5df8357b34a3869e5d6"
"aeae2a21201eef5e347de22c922192e8f46274b0c9d33e965155a91e7686"
"9d530e"))
def testRSAVerify(self):
def blobs(n, e, d, p, q, iqmp):
pubblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-rsa") + ssh2_mpint(e) + ssh2_mpint(n)
privblob = (ssh2_mpint(d) + ssh2_mpint(p) +
ssh2_mpint(q) + ssh2_mpint(iqmp))
return pubblob, privblob
def failure_test(*args):
pubblob, privblob = blobs(*args)
key = ssh_key_new_priv('rsa', pubblob, privblob)
self.assertEqual(key, None)
def success_test(*args):
pubblob, privblob = blobs(*args)
key = ssh_key_new_priv('rsa', pubblob, privblob)
self.assertNotEqual(key, None)
# Parameters for a (trivially small) test key.
n = 0xb5d545a2f6423eabd55ffede53e21628d5d4491541482e10676d9d6f2783b9a5
e = 0x25
d = 0x6733db6a546ac99fcc21ba2b28b0c077156e8a705976205a955c6d9cef98f419
p = 0xe30ebd7348bf10dca72b36f2724dafa7
q = 0xcd02c87a7f7c08c4e9dc80c9b9bad5d3
iqmp = 0x60a129b30db9227910efe1608976c513
# Check the test key makes sense unmodified.
success_test(n, e, d, p, q, iqmp)
# Try modifying the values one by one to ensure they are
# rejected, except iqmp, which sshrsa.c regenerates anyway so
# it won't matter at all.
failure_test(n+1, e, d, p, q, iqmp)
failure_test(n, e+1, d, p, q, iqmp)
failure_test(n, e, d+1, p, q, iqmp)
failure_test(n, e, d, p+1, q, iqmp)
failure_test(n, e, d, p, q+1, iqmp)
success_test(n, e, d, p, q, iqmp+1)
# The key should also be accepted with p,q reversed. (Again,
# iqmp gets regenerated, so it won't matter if that's wrong.)
success_test(n, e, d, q, p, iqmp)
# Replace each of p and q with 0, and with 1. These should
# still fail validation (obviously), but the point is that the
# validator should also avoid trying to divide by zero in the
# process.
failure_test(n, e, d, 0, q, iqmp)
failure_test(n, e, d, p, 0, iqmp)
failure_test(n, e, d, 1, q, iqmp)
failure_test(n, e, d, p, 1, iqmp)
def testKeyMethods(self):
# Exercise all the methods of the ssh_key trait on all key
# types, and ensure that they're consistent with each other.
# No particular test is done on the rightness of the
# signatures by any objective standard, only that the output
# from our signing method can be verified by the corresponding
# verification method.
#
# However, we do include the expected signature text in each
# case, which checks determinism in the sense of being
# independent of any random numbers, and also in the sense of
# tomorrow's change to the code not having accidentally
# changed the behaviour.
test_message = b"Message to be signed by crypt.testKeyMethods\n"
test_keys = [
('ed25519', 'AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIM7jupzef6CD0ps2JYxJp9IlwY49oorOseV5z5JFDFKn', 'AAAAIAf4/WRtypofgdNF2vbZOUFE1h4hvjw4tkGJZyOzI7c3', 255, b'0xf4d6e7f6f4479c23f0764ef43cea1711dbfe02aa2b5a32ff925c7c1fbf0f0db,0x27520c4592cf79e5b1ce8aa23d8ec125d2a7498c25369bd283a07fde9cbae3ce', [(0, 'AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQN73EqfyA4WneqDhgZ98TlRj9V5Wg8zCrMxTLJN1UtyfAnPUJDtfG/U0vOsP8PrnQxd41DDDnxrAXuqJz8rOagc=')]),
('ed448', 'AAAACXNzaC1lZDQ0OAAAADnRI0CQDym5IqUidLNDcSdHe54bYEwqjpjBlab8uKGoe6FRqqejha7+5U/VAHy7BmE23+ju26O9XgA=', 'AAAAObP9klqyiJSJsdFJf+xwZQdkbZGUqXE07K6e5plfRTGjYYkyWJFUNFH4jzIn9xH1TX9z9EGycPaXAA==', 448, b'0x4bf4a2b6586c60d8cdb52c2b45b897f6d2224bc37987489c0d70febb449e8c82964ed5785827be808e44d31dd31e6ff7c99f43e49f419928,0x5ebda3dbeee8df366106bb7c00d54fe5feae85a3a7aa51a17ba8a1b8fca695c1988e2a4c601b9e7b47277143b37422a522b9290f904023d1', [(0, 'AAAACXNzaC1lZDQ0OAAAAHLkSVioGMvLesZp3Tn+Z/sSK0Hl7RHsHP4q9flLzTpZG5h6JDH3VmZBEjTJ6iOLaa0v4FoNt0ng4wAB53WrlQC4h3iAusoGXnPMAKJLmqzplKOCi8HKXk8Xl8fsXbaoyhatv1OZpwJcffmh1x+x+LSgNQA=')]),
('p256', 'AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHkYQ0sQoq5LbJI1VMWhw3bV43TSYi3WVpqIgKcBKK91TcFFlAMZgceOHQ0xAFYcSczIttLvFu+xkcLXrRd4N7Q=', 'AAAAIQCV/1VqiCsHZm/n+bq7lHEHlyy7KFgZBEbzqYaWtbx48Q==', 256, b'nistp256,0x7918434b10a2ae4b6c923554c5a1c376d5e374d2622dd6569a8880a70128af75,0x4dc14594031981c78e1d0d3100561c49ccc8b6d2ef16efb191c2d7ad177837b4', [(0, 'AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAABIAAAAIAryzHDGi/TcCnbdxZkIYR5EGR6SNYXr/HlQRF8le+/IAAAAIERfzn6eHuBbqWIop2qL8S7DWRB3lenN1iyL10xYQPKw')]),
('p384', 'AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBMYK8PUtfAlJwKaBTIGEuCzH0vqOMa4UbcjrBbTbkGVSUnfo+nuC80NCdj9JJMs1jvfF8GzKLc5z8H3nZyM741/BUFjV7rEHsQFDek4KyWvKkEgKiTlZid19VukNo1q2Hg==', 'AAAAMGsfTmdB4zHdbiQ2euTSdzM6UKEOnrVjMAWwHEYvmG5qUOcBnn62fJDRJy67L+QGdg==', 384, b'nistp384,0xc60af0f52d7c0949c0a6814c8184b82cc7d2fa8e31ae146dc8eb05b4db9065525277e8fa7b82f34342763f4924cb358e,0xf7c5f06cca2dce73f07de767233be35fc15058d5eeb107b101437a4e0ac96bca90480a89395989dd7d56e90da35ab61e', [(0, 'AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAABpAAAAMDmHrtXCADzLvkkWG/duBAHlf6B1mVvdt6F0uzXfsf8Yub8WXNUNVnYq6ovrWPzLggAAADEA9izzwoUuFcXYRJeKcRLZEGMmSDDPzUZb7oZR0UgD1jsMQXs8UfpO31Qur/FDSCRK')]),
('p521', 'AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAFrGthlKM152vu2Ghk+R7iO9/M6e+hTehNZ6+FBwof4HPkPB2/HHXj5+w5ynWyUrWiX5TI2riuJEIrJErcRH5LglADnJDX2w4yrKZ+wDHSz9lwh9p2F+B5R952es6gX3RJRkGA+qhKpKup8gKx78RMbleX8wgRtIu+4YMUnKb1edREiRg==', 'AAAAQgFh7VNJFUljWhhyAEiL0z+UPs/QggcMTd3Vv2aKDeBdCRl5di8r+BMm39L7bRzxRMEtW5NSKlDtE8MFEGdIE9khsw==', 521, b'nistp521,0x16b1ad86528cd79dafbb61a193e47b88ef7f33a7be8537a1359ebe141c287f81cf90f076fc71d78f9fb0e729d6c94ad6897e53236ae2b89108ac912b7111f92e094,0xe72435f6c38cab299fb00c74b3f65c21f69d85f81e51f79d9eb3a817dd125190603eaa12a92aea7c80ac7bf1131b95e5fcc2046d22efb860c52729bd5e75112246', [(0, 'AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAACMAAAAQgCLgvftvwM3CUaigrW0yzmCHoYjC6GLtO+6S91itqpgMEtWPNlaTZH6QQqkgscijWdXx98dDkQao/gcAKVmOZKPXgAAAEIB1PIrsDF1y6poJ/czqujB7NSUWt31v+c2t6UA8m2gTA1ARuVJ9XBGLMdceOTB00Hi9psC2RYFLpaWREOGCeDa6ow=')]),
('dsa', 'AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAABhAJyWZzjVddGdyc5JPu/WPrC07vKRAmlqO6TUi49ah96iRcM7/D1aRMVAdYBepQ2mf1fsQTmvoC9KgQa79nN3kHhz0voQBKOuKI1ZAodfVOgpP4xmcXgjaA73Vjz22n4newAAABUA6l7/vIveaiA33YYv+SKcKLQaA8cAAABgbErc8QLw/WDz7mhVRZrU+9x3Tfs68j3eW+B/d7Rz1ZCqMYDk7r/F8dlBdQlYhpQvhuSBgzoFa0+qPvSSxPmutgb94wNqhHlVIUb9ZOJNloNr2lXiPP//Wu51TxXAEvAAAAAAYQCcQ9mufXtZa5RyfwT4NuLivdsidP4HRoLXdlnppfFAbNdbhxE0Us8WZt+a/443bwKnYxgif8dgxv5UROnWTngWu0jbJHpaDcTc9lRyTeSUiZZK312s/Sl7qDk3/Du7RUI=', 'AAAAFGx3ft7G8AQzFsjhle7PWardUXh3', 768, b'0x9c966738d575d19dc9ce493eefd63eb0b4eef29102696a3ba4d48b8f5a87dea245c33bfc3d5a44c54075805ea50da67f57ec4139afa02f4a8106bbf67377907873d2fa1004a3ae288d5902875f54e8293f8c66717823680ef7563cf6da7e277b,0xea5effbc8bde6a2037dd862ff9229c28b41a03c7,0x6c4adcf102f0fd60f3ee6855459ad4fbdc774dfb3af23dde5be07f77b473d590aa3180e4eebfc5f1d94175095886942f86e481833a056b4faa3ef492c4f9aeb606fde3036a8479552146fd64e24d96836bda55e23cffff5aee754f15c012f000,0x9c43d9ae7d7b596b94727f04f836e2e2bddb2274fe074682d77659e9a5f1406cd75b87113452cf1666df9aff8e376f02a76318227fc760c6fe5444e9d64e7816bb48db247a5a0dc4dcf654724de49489964adf5dacfd297ba83937fc3bbb4542', [(0, 'AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAAAo0T2t6dr8Qr5DK2B0ETwUa3BhxMLPjLY0ZtlOACmP/kUt3JgByLv+3g==')]),
('rsa', 'AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAGEA2ChX9+mQD/NULFkBrxLDI8d1PHgrInC2u11U4Grqu4oVzKvnFROo6DZeCu6sKhFJE5CnIL7evAthQ9hkXVHDhQ7xGVauzqyHGdIU4/pHRScAYWBv/PZOlNMrSoP/PP91', 'AAAAYCMNdgyGvWpez2EjMLSbQj0nQ3GW8jzvru3zdYwtA3hblNUU9QpWNxDmOMOApkwCzUgsdIPsBxctIeWT2h+v8sVOH+d66LCaNmNR0lp+dQ+iXM67hcGNuxJwRdMupD9ZbQAAADEA7XMrMAb4WuHaFafoTfGrf6Jhdy9Ozjqi1fStuld7Nj9JkoZluiL2dCwIrxqOjwU5AAAAMQDpC1gYiGVSPeDRILr2oxREtXWOsW+/ZZTfZNX7lvoufnp+qvwZPqvZnXQFHyZ8qB0AAAAwQE0wx8TPgcvRVEVv8Wt+o1NFlkJZayWD5hqpe/8AqUMZbqfg/aiso5mvecDLFgfV', 768, b'0x25,0xd82857f7e9900ff3542c5901af12c323c7753c782b2270b6bb5d54e06aeabb8a15ccabe71513a8e8365e0aeeac2a11491390a720bedebc0b6143d8645d51c3850ef11956aeceac8719d214e3fa4745270061606ffcf64e94d32b4a83ff3cff75', [(0, 'AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAABgrLSC4635RCsH1b3en58NqLsrH7PKRZyb3YmRasOyr8xIZMSlKZyxNg+kkn9OgBzbH9vChafzarfHyVwtJE2IMt3uwxTIWjwgwH19tc16k8YmNfDzujmB6OFOArmzKJgJ'), (2, 'AAAADHJzYS1zaGEyLTI1NgAAAGAJszr04BZlVBEdRLGOv1rTJwPiid/0I6/MycSH+noahvUH2wjrRhqDuv51F4nKYF5J9vBsEotTSrSF/cnLsliCdvVkEfmvhdcn/jx2LWF2OfjqETiYSc69Dde9UFmAPds='), (4, 'AAAADHJzYS1zaGEyLTUxMgAAAGBxfZ2m+WjvZ5YV5RFm0+w84CgHQ95EPndoAha0PCMc93AUHBmoHnezsJvEGuLovUm35w/0POmUNHI7HzM9PECwXrV0rO6N/HL/oFxJuDYmeqCpjMVmN8QXka+yxs2GEtA=')]),
]
for alg, pubb64, privb64, bits, cachestr, siglist in test_keys:
# Decode the blobs in the above test data.
pubblob = base64decode(pubb64.encode('ASCII'))
privblob = base64decode(privb64.encode('ASCII'))
# Check the method that examines a public blob directly
# and returns an integer showing the key size.
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_public_bits(alg, pubblob), bits)
# Make a public-only and a full ssh_key object.
pubkey = ssh_key_new_pub(alg, pubblob)
privkey = ssh_key_new_priv(alg, pubblob, privblob)
# Test that they re-export the public and private key
# blobs unchanged.
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_public_blob(pubkey), pubblob)
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_public_blob(privkey), pubblob)
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_private_blob(privkey), privblob)
# Round-trip through the OpenSSH wire encoding used by the
# agent protocol (and the newer OpenSSH key file format),
# and check the result still exports all the same blobs.
osshblob = ssh_key_openssh_blob(privkey)
privkey2 = ssh_key_new_priv_openssh(alg, osshblob)
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_public_blob(privkey2), pubblob)
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_private_blob(privkey2), privblob)
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_openssh_blob(privkey2), osshblob)
# Test that the string description used in the host key
# cache is as expected.
for key in [pubkey, privkey, privkey2]:
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_cache_str(key), cachestr)
# Now test signatures, separately for each provided flags
# value.
for flags, sigb64 in siglist:
# Decode the signature blob from the test data.
sigblob = base64decode(sigb64.encode('ASCII'))
# Sign our test message, and check it produces exactly
# the expected signature blob.
#
# We do this with both the original private key and
# the one we round-tripped through OpenSSH wire
# format, just in case that round trip made some kind
# of a mess that didn't show up in the re-extraction
# of the blobs.
for key in [privkey, privkey2]:
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_sign(
key, test_message, flags), sigblob)
if flags != 0:
# Currently we only support _generating_
# signatures with flags != 0, not verifying them.
continue
# Check the signature verifies successfully, with all
# three of the key objects we have.
for key in [pubkey, privkey, privkey2]:
self.assertTrue(ssh_key_verify(key, sigblob, test_message))
# A crude check that at least _something_ doesn't
# verify successfully: flip a bit of the signature
# and expect it to fail.
#
# We do this twice, at the 1/3 and 2/3 points along
# the signature's length, so that in the case of
# signatures in two parts (DSA-like) we try perturbing
# both parts. Other than that, we don't do much to
# make this a rigorous cryptographic test.
for n, d in [(1,3),(2,3)]:
sigbytes = list(sigblob)
bit = 8 * len(sigbytes) * n // d
sigbytes[bit // 8] ^= 1 << (bit % 8)
badsig = bytes(sigbytes)
for key in [pubkey, privkey, privkey2]:
self.assertFalse(ssh_key_verify(
key, badsig, test_message))
def testPPKLoadSave(self):
# Stability test of PPK load/save functions.
input_clear_key = b"""\
PuTTY-User-Key-File-3: ssh-ed25519
Encryption: none
Comment: ed25519-key-20200105
Public-Lines: 2
AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIHJCszOHaI9X/yGLtjn22f0hO6VPMQDVtctkym6F
JH1W
Private-Lines: 1
AAAAIGvvIpl8jyqn8Xufkw6v3FnEGtXF3KWw55AP3/AGEBpY
Private-MAC: 816c84093fc4877e8411b8e5139c5ce35d8387a2630ff087214911d67417a54d
"""
input_encrypted_key = b"""\
PuTTY-User-Key-File-3: ssh-ed25519
Encryption: aes256-cbc
Comment: ed25519-key-20200105
Public-Lines: 2
AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIHJCszOHaI9X/yGLtjn22f0hO6VPMQDVtctkym6F
JH1W
Key-Derivation: Argon2id
Argon2-Memory: 8192
Argon2-Passes: 13
Argon2-Parallelism: 1
Argon2-Salt: 37c3911bfefc8c1d11ec579627d2b3d9
Private-Lines: 1
amviz4sVUBN64jLO3gt4HGXJosUArghc4Soi7aVVLb2Tir5Baj0OQClorycuaPRd
Private-MAC: 6f5e588e475e55434106ec2c3569695b03f423228b44993a9e97d52ffe7be5a8
"""
algorithm = b'ssh-ed25519'
comment = b'ed25519-key-20200105'
pp = b'test-passphrase'
public_blob = unhex(
'0000000b7373682d65643235353139000000207242b33387688f57ff218bb639'
'f6d9fd213ba54f3100d5b5cb64ca6e85247d56')
self.assertEqual(ppk_encrypted_s(input_clear_key), (False, comment))
self.assertEqual(ppk_encrypted_s(input_encrypted_key), (True, comment))
self.assertEqual(ppk_encrypted_s("not a key file"), (False, None))
self.assertEqual(ppk_loadpub_s(input_clear_key),
(True, algorithm, public_blob, comment, None))
self.assertEqual(ppk_loadpub_s(input_encrypted_key),
(True, algorithm, public_blob, comment, None))
self.assertEqual(ppk_loadpub_s("not a key file"),
(False, None, b'', None,
b'not a PuTTY SSH-2 private key'))
k1, c, e = ppk_load_s(input_clear_key, None)
self.assertEqual((c, e), (comment, None))
k2, c, e = ppk_load_s(input_encrypted_key, pp)
self.assertEqual((c, e), (comment, None))
privblob = ssh_key_private_blob(k1)
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_private_blob(k2), privblob)
salt = unhex('37c3911bfefc8c1d11ec579627d2b3d9')
with queued_specific_random_data(salt):
self.assertEqual(ppk_save_sb(k1, comment, None,
3, 'id', 8192, 13, 1),
input_clear_key)
with queued_specific_random_data(salt):
self.assertEqual(ppk_save_sb(k2, comment, None,
3, 'id', 8192, 13, 1),
input_clear_key)
with queued_specific_random_data(salt):
self.assertEqual(ppk_save_sb(k1, comment, pp,
3, 'id', 8192, 13, 1),
input_encrypted_key)
with queued_specific_random_data(salt):
self.assertEqual(ppk_save_sb(k2, comment, pp,
3, 'id', 8192, 13, 1),
input_encrypted_key)
# And check we can still handle v2 key files.
v2_clear_key = b"""\
PuTTY-User-Key-File-2: ssh-ed25519
Encryption: none
Comment: ed25519-key-20200105
Public-Lines: 2
AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIHJCszOHaI9X/yGLtjn22f0hO6VPMQDVtctkym6F
JH1W
Private-Lines: 1
AAAAIGvvIpl8jyqn8Xufkw6v3FnEGtXF3KWw55AP3/AGEBpY
Private-MAC: 2a629acfcfbe28488a1ba9b6948c36406bc28422
"""
v2_encrypted_key = b"""\
PuTTY-User-Key-File-2: ssh-ed25519
Encryption: aes256-cbc
Comment: ed25519-key-20200105
Public-Lines: 2
AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIHJCszOHaI9X/yGLtjn22f0hO6VPMQDVtctkym6F
JH1W
Private-Lines: 1
4/jKlTgC652oa9HLVGrMjHZw7tj0sKRuZaJPOuLhGTvb25Jzpcqpbi+Uf+y+uo+Z
Private-MAC: 5b1f6f4cc43eb0060d2c3e181bc0129343adba2b
"""
self.assertEqual(ppk_encrypted_s(v2_clear_key), (False, comment))
self.assertEqual(ppk_encrypted_s(v2_encrypted_key), (True, comment))
self.assertEqual(ppk_encrypted_s("not a key file"), (False, None))
self.assertEqual(ppk_loadpub_s(v2_clear_key),
(True, algorithm, public_blob, comment, None))
self.assertEqual(ppk_loadpub_s(v2_encrypted_key),
(True, algorithm, public_blob, comment, None))
self.assertEqual(ppk_loadpub_s("not a key file"),
(False, None, b'', None,
b'not a PuTTY SSH-2 private key'))
k1, c, e = ppk_load_s(v2_clear_key, None)
self.assertEqual((c, e), (comment, None))
k2, c, e = ppk_load_s(v2_encrypted_key, pp)
self.assertEqual((c, e), (comment, None))
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_private_blob(k1), privblob)
self.assertEqual(ssh_key_private_blob(k2), privblob)
self.assertEqual(ppk_save_sb(k2, comment, None,
2, 'id', 8192, 13, 1),
v2_clear_key)
self.assertEqual(ppk_save_sb(k1, comment, pp,
2, 'id', 8192, 13, 1),
v2_encrypted_key)
def testRSA1LoadSave(self):
# Stability test of SSH-1 RSA key-file load/save functions.
input_clear_key = unhex(
"5353482050524956415445204B45592046494C4520464F524D415420312E310A"
"000000000000000002000200BB115A85B741E84E3D940E690DF96A0CBFDC07CA"
"70E51DA8234D211DE77341CEF40C214CAA5DCF68BE2127447FD6C84CCB17D057"
"A74F2365B9D84A78906AEB51000625000000107273612D6B65792D3230323030"
"313036208E208E0200929EE615C6FC4E4B29585E52570F984F2E97B3144AA5BD"
"4C6EB2130999BB339305A21FFFA79442462A8397AF8CAC395A3A3827DE10457A"
"1F1B277ABFB8C069C100FF55B1CAD69B3BD9E42456CF28B1A4B98130AFCE08B2"
"8BCFFF5FFFED76C5D51E9F0100C5DE76889C62B1090A770AE68F087A19AB5126"
"E60DF87710093A2AD57B3380FB0100F2068AC47ECB33BF8F13DF402BABF35EE7"
"26BD32F7564E51502DF5C8F4888B2300000000")
input_encrypted_key = unhex(
"5353482050524956415445204b45592046494c4520464f524d415420312e310a"
"000300000000000002000200bb115a85b741e84e3d940e690df96a0cbfdc07ca"
"70e51da8234d211de77341cef40c214caa5dcf68be2127447fd6c84ccb17d057"
"a74f2365b9d84a78906aeb51000625000000107273612d6b65792d3230323030"
"3130363377f926e811a5f044c52714801ecdcf9dd572ee0a193c4f67e87ab2ce"
"4569d0c5776fd6028909ed8b6d663bef15d207d3ef6307e7e21dbec56e8d8b4e"
"894ded34df891bb29bae6b2b74805ac80f7304926abf01ae314dd69c64240761"
"34f15d50c99f7573252993530ec9c4d5016dd1f5191730cda31a5d95d362628b"
"2a26f4bb21840d01c8360e4a6ce216c4686d25b8699d45cf361663bb185e2c5e"
"652012a1e0f9d6d19afbb28506f7775bfd8129")
comment = b'rsa-key-20200106'
pp = b'test-passphrase'
public_blob = unhex(
"000002000006250200bb115a85b741e84e3d940e690df96a0cbfdc07ca70e51d"
"a8234d211de77341cef40c214caa5dcf68be2127447fd6c84ccb17d057a74f23"
"65b9d84a78906aeb51")
self.assertEqual(rsa1_encrypted_s(input_clear_key), (False, comment))
self.assertEqual(rsa1_encrypted_s(input_encrypted_key),
(True, comment))
self.assertEqual(rsa1_encrypted_s("not a key file"), (False, None))
self.assertEqual(rsa1_loadpub_s(input_clear_key),
(1, public_blob, comment, None))
self.assertEqual(rsa1_loadpub_s(input_encrypted_key),
(1, public_blob, comment, None))
k1 = rsa_new()
status, c, e = rsa1_load_s(input_clear_key, k1, None)
self.assertEqual((status, c, e), (1, comment, None))
k2 = rsa_new()
status, c, e = rsa1_load_s(input_clear_key, k2, None)
self.assertEqual((status, c, e), (1, comment, None))
with queued_specific_random_data(unhex("208e")):
self.assertEqual(rsa1_save_sb(k1, comment, None), input_clear_key)
with queued_specific_random_data(unhex("208e")):
self.assertEqual(rsa1_save_sb(k2, comment, None), input_clear_key)
with queued_specific_random_data(unhex("99f3")):
self.assertEqual(rsa1_save_sb(k1, comment, pp),
input_encrypted_key)
with queued_specific_random_data(unhex("99f3")):
self.assertEqual(rsa1_save_sb(k2, comment, pp),
input_encrypted_key)
class standard_test_vectors(MyTestBase):
def testAES(self):
def vector(cipher, key, plaintext, ciphertext):
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for suffix in get_aes_impls():
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
c = ssh_cipher_new("{}_{}".format(cipher, suffix))
if c is None: return # skip test if HW AES not available
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setkey(c, key)
# The AES test vectors are implicitly in ECB mode,
# because they're testing the cipher primitive rather
# than any mode layered on top of it. We fake this by
# using PuTTY's CBC setting, and clearing the IV to
# all zeroes before each operation.
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, b'\x00' * 16)
self.assertEqualBin(
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_encrypt(c, plaintext), ciphertext)
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, b'\x00' * 16)
self.assertEqualBin(
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_decrypt(c, ciphertext), plaintext)
# The test vector from FIPS 197 appendix B. (This is also the
# same key whose key setup phase is shown in detail in
# appendix A.)
vector('aes128_cbc',
unhex('2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c'),
unhex('3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734'),
unhex('3925841d02dc09fbdc118597196a0b32'))
# The test vectors from FIPS 197 appendix C: the key bytes go
# 00 01 02 03 ... for as long as needed, and the plaintext
# bytes go 00 11 22 33 ... FF.
fullkey = struct.pack("B"*32, *range(32))
plaintext = struct.pack("B"*16, *[0x11*i for i in range(16)])
vector('aes128_cbc', fullkey[:16], plaintext,
unhex('69c4e0d86a7b0430d8cdb78070b4c55a'))
vector('aes192_cbc', fullkey[:24], plaintext,
unhex('dda97ca4864cdfe06eaf70a0ec0d7191'))
vector('aes256_cbc', fullkey[:32], plaintext,
unhex('8ea2b7ca516745bfeafc49904b496089'))
def testDES(self):
c = ssh_cipher_new("des_cbc")
def vector(key, plaintext, ciphertext):
key = unhex(key)
plaintext = unhex(plaintext)
ciphertext = unhex(ciphertext)
# Similarly to above, we fake DES ECB by using DES CBC and
# resetting the IV to zero all the time
Merge the ssh1_cipher type into ssh2_cipher. The aim of this reorganisation is to make it easier to test all the ciphers in PuTTY in a uniform way. It was inconvenient that there were two separate vtable systems for the ciphers used in SSH-1 and SSH-2 with different functionality. Now there's only one type, called ssh_cipher. But really it's the old ssh2_cipher, just renamed: I haven't made any changes to the API on the SSH-2 side. Instead, I've removed ssh1_cipher completely, and adapted the SSH-1 BPP to use the SSH-2 style API. (The relevant differences are that ssh1_cipher encapsulated both the sending and receiving directions in one object - so now ssh1bpp has to make a separate cipher instance per direction - and that ssh1_cipher automatically initialised the IV to all zeroes, which ssh1bpp now has to do by hand.) The previous ssh1_cipher vtable for single-DES has been removed completely, because when converted into the new API it became identical to the SSH-2 single-DES vtable; so now there's just one vtable for DES-CBC which works in both protocols. The other two SSH-1 ciphers each had to stay separate, because 3DES is completely different between SSH-1 and SSH-2 (three layers of CBC structure versus one), and Blowfish varies in endianness and key length between the two. (Actually, while I'm here, I've only just noticed that the SSH-1 Blowfish cipher mis-describes itself in log messages as Blowfish-128. In fact it passes the whole of the input key buffer, which has length SSH1_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH == 32 bytes == 256 bits. So it's actually Blowfish-256, and has been all along!)
2019-01-17 18:06:08 +00:00
ssh_cipher_setkey(c, key)
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, b'\x00' * 8)
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_cipher_encrypt(c, plaintext), ciphertext)
ssh_cipher_setiv(c, b'\x00' * 8)
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_cipher_decrypt(c, ciphertext), plaintext)
# Source: FIPS SP PUB 500-20
# 'Initial permutation and expansion tests': key fixed at 8
# copies of the byte 01, but ciphertext and plaintext in turn
# run through all possible values with exactly 1 bit set.
# Expected plaintexts and ciphertexts (respectively) listed in
# the arrays below.
ipe_key = '01' * 8
ipe_plaintexts = [
'166B40B44ABA4BD6', '06E7EA22CE92708F', 'D2FD8867D50D2DFE', 'CC083F1E6D9E85F6',
'5B711BC4CEEBF2EE', '0953E2258E8E90A1', 'E07C30D7E4E26E12', '2FBC291A570DB5C4',
'DD7C0BBD61FAFD54', '48221B9937748A23', 'E643D78090CA4207', '8405D1ABE24FB942',
'CE332329248F3228', '1D1CA853AE7C0C5F', '5D86CB23639DBEA9', '1029D55E880EC2D0',
'8DD45A2DDF90796C', 'CAFFC6AC4542DE31', 'EA51D3975595B86B', '8B54536F2F3E64A8',
'866ECEDD8072BB0E', '79E90DBC98F92CCA', 'AB6A20C0620D1C6F', '25EB5FC3F8CF0621',
'4D49DB1532919C9F', '814EEB3B91D90726', '5E0905517BB59BCF', 'CA3A2B036DBC8502',
'FA0752B07D9C4AB8', 'B160E4680F6C696F', 'DF98C8276F54B04B', 'E943D7568AEC0C5C',
'AEB5F5EDE22D1A36', 'E428581186EC8F46', 'E1652C6B138C64A5', 'D106FF0BED5255D7',
'9D64555A9A10B852', 'F02B263B328E2B60', '64FEED9C724C2FAF', '750D079407521363',
'FBE00A8A1EF8AD72', 'A484C3AD38DC9C19', '12A9F5817FF2D65D', 'E7FCE22557D23C97',
'329A8ED523D71AEC', 'E19E275D846A1298', '889DE068A16F0BE6', '2B9F982F20037FA9',
'F356834379D165CD', 'ECBFE3BD3F591A5E', 'E6D5F82752AD63D1', 'ADD0CC8D6E5DEBA1',
'F15D0F286B65BD28', 'B8061B7ECD9A21E5', '424250B37C3DD951', 'D9031B0271BD5A0A',
'0D9F279BA5D87260', '6CC5DEFAAF04512F', '55579380D77138EF', '20B9E767B2FB1456',
'4BD388FF6CD81D4F', '2E8653104F3834EA', 'DD7F121CA5015619', '95F8A5E5DD31D900',
]
ipe_ciphertexts = [
'166B40B44ABA4BD6', '06E7EA22CE92708F', 'D2FD8867D50D2DFE', 'CC083F1E6D9E85F6',
'5B711BC4CEEBF2EE', '0953E2258E8E90A1', 'E07C30D7E4E26E12', '2FBC291A570DB5C4',
'DD7C0BBD61FAFD54', '48221B9937748A23', 'E643D78090CA4207', '8405D1ABE24FB942',
'CE332329248F3228', '1D1CA853AE7C0C5F', '5D86CB23639DBEA9', '1029D55E880EC2D0',
'8DD45A2DDF90796C', 'CAFFC6AC4542DE31', 'EA51D3975595B86B', '8B54536F2F3E64A8',
'866ECEDD8072BB0E', '79E90DBC98F92CCA', 'AB6A20C0620D1C6F', '25EB5FC3F8CF0621',
'4D49DB1532919C9F', '814EEB3B91D90726', '5E0905517BB59BCF', 'CA3A2B036DBC8502',
'FA0752B07D9C4AB8', 'B160E4680F6C696F', 'DF98C8276F54B04B', 'E943D7568AEC0C5C',
'AEB5F5EDE22D1A36', 'E428581186EC8F46', 'E1652C6B138C64A5', 'D106FF0BED5255D7',
'9D64555A9A10B852', 'F02B263B328E2B60', '64FEED9C724C2FAF', '750D079407521363',
'FBE00A8A1EF8AD72', 'A484C3AD38DC9C19', '12A9F5817FF2D65D', 'E7FCE22557D23C97',
'329A8ED523D71AEC', 'E19E275D846A1298', '889DE068A16F0BE6', '2B9F982F20037FA9',
'F356834379D165CD', 'ECBFE3BD3F591A5E', 'E6D5F82752AD63D1', 'ADD0CC8D6E5DEBA1',
'F15D0F286B65BD28', 'B8061B7ECD9A21E5', '424250B37C3DD951', 'D9031B0271BD5A0A',
'0D9F279BA5D87260', '6CC5DEFAAF04512F', '55579380D77138EF', '20B9E767B2FB1456',
'4BD388FF6CD81D4F', '2E8653104F3834EA', 'DD7F121CA5015619', '95F8A5E5DD31D900',
]
ipe_single_bits = ["{:016x}".format(1 << bit) for bit in range(64)]
for plaintext, ciphertext in zip(ipe_plaintexts, ipe_single_bits):
vector(ipe_key, plaintext, ciphertext)
for plaintext, ciphertext in zip(ipe_single_bits, ipe_ciphertexts):
vector(ipe_key, plaintext, ciphertext)
# 'Key permutation tests': plaintext fixed at all zeroes, key
# is a succession of tweaks of the previous key made by
# replacing each 01 byte in turn with one containing a
# different single set bit (e.g. 01 20 01 01 01 01 01 01).
# Expected ciphertexts listed.
kp_ciphertexts = [
'95A8D72813DAA94D', '0EEC1487DD8C26D5', '7AD16FFB79C45926', 'D3746294CA6A6CF3',
'809F5F873C1FD761', 'C02FAFFEC989D1FC', '4615AA1D33E72F10', '2055123350C00858',
'DF3B99D6577397C8', '31FE17369B5288C9', 'DFDD3CC64DAE1642', '178C83CE2B399D94',
'50F636324A9B7F80', 'A8468EE3BC18F06D', 'A2DC9E92FD3CDE92', 'CAC09F797D031287',
'90BA680B22AEB525', 'CE7A24F350E280B6', '882BFF0AA01A0B87', '25610288924511C2',
'C71516C29C75D170', '5199C29A52C9F059', 'C22F0A294A71F29F', 'EE371483714C02EA',
'A81FBD448F9E522F', '4F644C92E192DFED', '1AFA9A66A6DF92AE', 'B3C1CC715CB879D8',
'19D032E64AB0BD8B', '3CFAA7A7DC8720DC', 'B7265F7F447AC6F3', '9DB73B3C0D163F54',
'8181B65BABF4A975', '93C9B64042EAA240', '5570530829705592', '8638809E878787A0',
'41B9A79AF79AC208', '7A9BE42F2009A892', '29038D56BA6D2745', '5495C6ABF1E5DF51',
'AE13DBD561488933', '024D1FFA8904E389', 'D1399712F99BF02E', '14C1D7C1CFFEC79E',
'1DE5279DAE3BED6F', 'E941A33F85501303', 'DA99DBBC9A03F379', 'B7FC92F91D8E92E9',
'AE8E5CAA3CA04E85', '9CC62DF43B6EED74', 'D863DBB5C59A91A0', 'A1AB2190545B91D7',
'0875041E64C570F7', '5A594528BEBEF1CC', 'FCDB3291DE21F0C0', '869EFD7F9F265A09',
]
kp_key_repl_bytes = ["{:02x}".format(0x80>>i) for i in range(7)]
kp_keys = ['01'*j + b + '01'*(7-j)
for j in range(8) for b in kp_key_repl_bytes]
kp_plaintext = '0' * 16
for key, ciphertext in zip(kp_keys, kp_ciphertexts):
vector(key, kp_plaintext, ciphertext)
# 'Data permutation test': plaintext fixed at all zeroes,
# pairs of key and expected ciphertext listed below.
dp_keys_and_ciphertexts = [
'1046913489980131:88D55E54F54C97B4', '1007103489988020:0C0CC00C83EA48FD',
'10071034C8980120:83BC8EF3A6570183', '1046103489988020:DF725DCAD94EA2E9',
'1086911519190101:E652B53B550BE8B0', '1086911519580101:AF527120C485CBB0',
'5107B01519580101:0F04CE393DB926D5', '1007B01519190101:C9F00FFC74079067',
'3107915498080101:7CFD82A593252B4E', '3107919498080101:CB49A2F9E91363E3',
'10079115B9080140:00B588BE70D23F56', '3107911598080140:406A9A6AB43399AE',
'1007D01589980101:6CB773611DCA9ADA', '9107911589980101:67FD21C17DBB5D70',
'9107D01589190101:9592CB4110430787', '1007D01598980120:A6B7FF68A318DDD3',
'1007940498190101:4D102196C914CA16', '0107910491190401:2DFA9F4573594965',
'0107910491190101:B46604816C0E0774', '0107940491190401:6E7E6221A4F34E87',
'19079210981A0101:AA85E74643233199', '1007911998190801:2E5A19DB4D1962D6',
'10079119981A0801:23A866A809D30894', '1007921098190101:D812D961F017D320',
'100791159819010B:055605816E58608F', '1004801598190101:ABD88E8B1B7716F1',
'1004801598190102:537AC95BE69DA1E1', '1004801598190108:AED0F6AE3C25CDD8',
'1002911498100104:B3E35A5EE53E7B8D', '1002911598190104:61C79C71921A2EF8',
'1002911598100201:E2F5728F0995013C', '1002911698100101:1AEAC39A61F0A464',
]
dp_plaintext = '0' * 16
for key_and_ciphertext in dp_keys_and_ciphertexts:
key, ciphertext = key_and_ciphertext.split(":")
vector(key, dp_plaintext, ciphertext)
# Tests intended to select every entry in every S-box. Full
# arbitrary triples (key, plaintext, ciphertext).
sb_complete_tests = [
'7CA110454A1A6E57:01A1D6D039776742:690F5B0D9A26939B',
'0131D9619DC1376E:5CD54CA83DEF57DA:7A389D10354BD271',
'07A1133E4A0B2686:0248D43806F67172:868EBB51CAB4599A',
'3849674C2602319E:51454B582DDF440A:7178876E01F19B2A',
'04B915BA43FEB5B6:42FD443059577FA2:AF37FB421F8C4095',
'0113B970FD34F2CE:059B5E0851CF143A:86A560F10EC6D85B',
'0170F175468FB5E6:0756D8E0774761D2:0CD3DA020021DC09',
'43297FAD38E373FE:762514B829BF486A:EA676B2CB7DB2B7A',
'07A7137045DA2A16:3BDD119049372802:DFD64A815CAF1A0F',
'04689104C2FD3B2F:26955F6835AF609A:5C513C9C4886C088',
'37D06BB516CB7546:164D5E404F275232:0A2AEEAE3FF4AB77',
'1F08260D1AC2465E:6B056E18759F5CCA:EF1BF03E5DFA575A',
'584023641ABA6176:004BD6EF09176062:88BF0DB6D70DEE56',
'025816164629B007:480D39006EE762F2:A1F9915541020B56',
'49793EBC79B3258F:437540C8698F3CFA:6FBF1CAFCFFD0556',
'4FB05E1515AB73A7:072D43A077075292:2F22E49BAB7CA1AC',
'49E95D6D4CA229BF:02FE55778117F12A:5A6B612CC26CCE4A',
'018310DC409B26D6:1D9D5C5018F728C2:5F4C038ED12B2E41',
'1C587F1C13924FEF:305532286D6F295A:63FAC0D034D9F793',
]
for test in sb_complete_tests:
key, plaintext, ciphertext = test.split(":")
vector(key, plaintext, ciphertext)
def testMD5(self):
MD5 = lambda s: hash_str('md5', s)
# The test vectors from RFC 1321 section A.5.
self.assertEqualBin(MD5(""),
unhex('d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e'))
self.assertEqualBin(MD5("a"),
unhex('0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661'))
self.assertEqualBin(MD5("abc"),
unhex('900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72'))
self.assertEqualBin(MD5("message digest"),
unhex('f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0'))
self.assertEqualBin(MD5("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"),
unhex('c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b'))
self.assertEqualBin(MD5("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"),
unhex('d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f'))
self.assertEqualBin(MD5("1234567890123456789012345678901234567890"
"1234567890123456789012345678901234567890"),
unhex('57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a'))
def testHmacMD5(self):
# The test vectors from the RFC 2104 Appendix.
self.assertEqualBin(mac_str('hmac_md5', unhex('0b'*16), "Hi There"),
unhex('9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d'))
self.assertEqualBin(mac_str('hmac_md5', "Jefe",
"what do ya want for nothing?"),
unhex('750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738'))
self.assertEqualBin(mac_str('hmac_md5', unhex('aa'*16), unhex('dd'*50)),
unhex('56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6'))
def testSHA1(self):
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for hashname in get_implementations("sha1"):
if ssh_hash_new(hashname) is None:
continue # skip testing of unavailable HW implementation
# Test cases from RFC 6234 section 8.5, omitting the ones
# whose input is not a multiple of 8 bits
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname, "abc"), unhex(
"a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname,
"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"),
unhex("84983e441c3bd26ebaae4aa1f95129e5e54670f1"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str_iter(hashname,
("a" * 1000 for _ in range(1000))), unhex(
"34aa973cd4c4daa4f61eeb2bdbad27316534016f"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname,
"01234567012345670123456701234567" * 20), unhex(
"dea356a2cddd90c7a7ecedc5ebb563934f460452"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname, b"\x5e"), unhex(
"5e6f80a34a9798cafc6a5db96cc57ba4c4db59c2"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname,
unhex("9a7dfdf1ecead06ed646aa55fe757146")), unhex(
"82abff6605dbe1c17def12a394fa22a82b544a35"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname, unhex(
"f78f92141bcd170ae89b4fba15a1d59f"
"3fd84d223c9251bdacbbae61d05ed115"
"a06a7ce117b7beead24421ded9c32592"
"bd57edeae39c39fa1fe8946a84d0cf1f"
"7beead1713e2e0959897347f67c80b04"
"00c209815d6b10a683836fd5562a56ca"
"b1a28e81b6576654631cf16566b86e3b"
"33a108b05307c00aff14a768ed735060"
"6a0f85e6a91d396f5b5cbe577f9b3880"
"7c7d523d6d792f6ebc24a4ecf2b3a427"
"cdbbfb")), unhex(
"cb0082c8f197d260991ba6a460e76e202bad27b3"))
def testSHA256(self):
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for hashname in get_implementations("sha256"):
if ssh_hash_new(hashname) is None:
continue # skip testing of unavailable HW implementation
# Test cases from RFC 6234 section 8.5, omitting the ones
# whose input is not a multiple of 8 bits
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname, "abc"),
unhex("ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223"
"b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname,
"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijk""ijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"),
unhex("248d6a61d20638b8e5c026930c3e6039"
"a33ce45964ff2167f6ecedd419db06c1"))
self.assertEqualBin(
hash_str_iter(hashname, ("a" * 1000 for _ in range(1000))),
unhex("cdc76e5c9914fb9281a1c7e284d73e67"
"f1809a48a497200e046d39ccc7112cd0"))
self.assertEqualBin(
hash_str(hashname, "01234567012345670123456701234567" * 20),
unhex("594847328451bdfa85056225462cc1d8"
"67d877fb388df0ce35f25ab5562bfbb5"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname, b"\x19"),
unhex("68aa2e2ee5dff96e3355e6c7ee373e3d"
"6a4e17f75f9518d843709c0c9bc3e3d4"))
self.assertEqualBin(
hash_str(hashname, unhex("e3d72570dcdd787ce3887ab2cd684652")),
unhex("175ee69b02ba9b58e2b0a5fd13819cea"
"573f3940a94f825128cf4209beabb4e8"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str(hashname, unhex(
"8326754e2277372f4fc12b20527afef0"
"4d8a056971b11ad57123a7c137760000"
"d7bef6f3c1f7a9083aa39d810db31077"
"7dab8b1e7f02b84a26c773325f8b2374"
"de7a4b5a58cb5c5cf35bcee6fb946e5b"
"d694fa593a8beb3f9d6592ecedaa66ca"
"82a29d0c51bcf9336230e5d784e4c0a4"
"3f8d79a30a165cbabe452b774b9c7109"
"a97d138f129228966f6c0adc106aad5a"
"9fdd30825769b2c671af6759df28eb39"
"3d54d6")), unhex(
"97dbca7df46d62c8a422c941dd7e835b"
"8ad3361763f7e9b2d95f4f0da6e1ccbc"))
def testSHA384(self):
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for hashname in get_implementations("sha384"):
Hardware-accelerated SHA-512 on the Arm architecture. The NEON support for SHA-512 acceleration looks very like SHA-256, with a pair of chained instructions to generate a 128-bit vector register full of message schedule, and another pair to update the hash state based on those. But since SHA-512 is twice as big in all dimensions, those four instructions between them only account for two rounds of it, in place of four rounds of SHA-256. Also, it's a tighter squeeze to fit all the data needed by those instructions into their limited number of register operands. The NEON SHA-256 implementation was able to keep its hash state and message schedule stored as 128-bit vectors and then pass combinations of those vectors directly to the instructions that did the work; for SHA-512, in several places you have to make one of the input operands to the main instruction by combining two halves of different vectors from your existing state. But that operation is a quick single EXT instruction, so no trouble. The only other problem I've found is that clang - in particular the version on M1 macOS, but as far as I can tell, even on current trunk - doesn't seem to implement the NEON intrinsics for the SHA-512 extension. So I had to bodge my own versions with inline assembler in order to get my implementation to compile under clang. Hopefully at some point in the future the gap might be filled and I can relegate that to a backwards-compatibility hack! This commit adds the same kind of switching mechanism for SHA-512 that we already had for SHA-256, SHA-1 and AES, and as with all of those, plumbs it through to testcrypt so that you can explicitly ask for the hardware or software version of SHA-512. So the test suite can run the standard test vectors against both implementations in turn. On M1 macOS, I'm testing at run time for the presence of SHA-512 by checking a sysctl setting. You can perform the same test on the command line by running "sysctl hw.optional.armv8_2_sha512". As far as I can tell, on Windows there is not yet any flag to test for this CPU feature, so for the moment, the new accelerated SHA-512 is turned off unconditionally on Windows.
2020-12-24 11:40:15 +00:00
if ssh_hash_new(hashname) is None:
continue # skip testing of unavailable HW implementation
# Test cases from RFC 6234 section 8.5, omitting the ones
# whose input is not a multiple of 8 bits
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha384', "abc"), unhex(
'cb00753f45a35e8bb5a03d699ac65007272c32ab0eded163'
'1a8b605a43ff5bed8086072ba1e7cc2358baeca134c825a7'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha384',
"abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmn"
"hijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu"),
unhex('09330c33f71147e83d192fc782cd1b4753111b173b3b05d2'
'2fa08086e3b0f712fcc7c71a557e2db966c3e9fa91746039'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str_iter('sha384',
("a" * 1000 for _ in range(1000))), unhex(
'9d0e1809716474cb086e834e310a4a1ced149e9c00f24852'
'7972cec5704c2a5b07b8b3dc38ecc4ebae97ddd87f3d8985'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha384',
"01234567012345670123456701234567" * 20), unhex(
'2fc64a4f500ddb6828f6a3430b8dd72a368eb7f3a8322a70'
'bc84275b9c0b3ab00d27a5cc3c2d224aa6b61a0d79fb4596'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha384', b"\xB9"), unhex(
'bc8089a19007c0b14195f4ecc74094fec64f01f90929282c'
'2fb392881578208ad466828b1c6c283d2722cf0ad1ab6938'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha384',
unhex("a41c497779c0375ff10a7f4e08591739")), unhex(
'c9a68443a005812256b8ec76b00516f0dbb74fab26d66591'
'3f194b6ffb0e91ea9967566b58109cbc675cc208e4c823f7'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha384', unhex(
"399669e28f6b9c6dbcbb6912ec10ffcf74790349b7dc8fbe4a8e7b3b5621"
"db0f3e7dc87f823264bbe40d1811c9ea2061e1c84ad10a23fac1727e7202"
"fc3f5042e6bf58cba8a2746e1f64f9b9ea352c711507053cf4e5339d5286"
"5f25cc22b5e87784a12fc961d66cb6e89573199a2ce6565cbdf13dca4038"
"32cfcb0e8b7211e83af32a11ac17929ff1c073a51cc027aaedeff85aad7c"
"2b7c5a803e2404d96d2a77357bda1a6daeed17151cb9bc5125a422e941de"
"0ca0fc5011c23ecffefdd09676711cf3db0a3440720e1615c1f22fbc3c72"
"1de521e1b99ba1bd5577408642147ed096")), unhex(
'4f440db1e6edd2899fa335f09515aa025ee177a79f4b4aaf'
'38e42b5c4de660f5de8fb2a5b2fbd2a3cbffd20cff1288c0'))
def testSHA512(self):
Break up crypto modules containing HW acceleration. This applies to all of AES, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512. All those source files previously contained multiple implementations of the algorithm, enabled or disabled by ifdefs detecting whether they would work on a given compiler. And in order to get advanced machine instructions like AES-NI or NEON crypto into the output file when the compile flags hadn't enabled them, we had to do nasty stuff with compiler-specific pragmas or attributes. Now we can do the detection at cmake time, and enable advanced instructions in the more sensible way, by compile-time flags. So I've broken up each of these modules into lots of sub-pieces: a file called (e.g.) 'foo-common.c' containing common definitions across all implementations (such as round constants), one called 'foo-select.c' containing the top-level vtable(s), and a separate file for each implementation exporting just the vtable(s) for that implementation. One advantage of this is that it depends a lot less on compiler- specific bodgery. My particular least favourite part of the previous setup was the part where I had to _manually_ define some Arm ACLE feature macros before including <arm_neon.h>, so that it would define the intrinsics I wanted. Now I'm enabling interesting architecture features in the normal way, on the compiler command line, there's no need for that kind of trick: the right feature macros are already defined and <arm_neon.h> does the right thing. Another change in this reorganisation is that I've stopped assuming there's just one hardware implementation per platform. Previously, the accelerated vtables were called things like sha256_hw, and varied between FOO-NI and NEON depending on platform; and the selection code would simply ask 'is hw available? if so, use hw, else sw'. Now, each HW acceleration strategy names its vtable its own way, and the selection vtable has a whole list of possibilities to iterate over looking for a supported one. So if someone feels like writing a second accelerated implementation of something for a given platform - for example, I've heard you can use plain NEON to speed up AES somewhat even without the crypto extension - then it will now have somewhere to drop in alongside the existing ones.
2021-04-19 05:42:12 +00:00
for hashname in get_implementations("sha512"):
Hardware-accelerated SHA-512 on the Arm architecture. The NEON support for SHA-512 acceleration looks very like SHA-256, with a pair of chained instructions to generate a 128-bit vector register full of message schedule, and another pair to update the hash state based on those. But since SHA-512 is twice as big in all dimensions, those four instructions between them only account for two rounds of it, in place of four rounds of SHA-256. Also, it's a tighter squeeze to fit all the data needed by those instructions into their limited number of register operands. The NEON SHA-256 implementation was able to keep its hash state and message schedule stored as 128-bit vectors and then pass combinations of those vectors directly to the instructions that did the work; for SHA-512, in several places you have to make one of the input operands to the main instruction by combining two halves of different vectors from your existing state. But that operation is a quick single EXT instruction, so no trouble. The only other problem I've found is that clang - in particular the version on M1 macOS, but as far as I can tell, even on current trunk - doesn't seem to implement the NEON intrinsics for the SHA-512 extension. So I had to bodge my own versions with inline assembler in order to get my implementation to compile under clang. Hopefully at some point in the future the gap might be filled and I can relegate that to a backwards-compatibility hack! This commit adds the same kind of switching mechanism for SHA-512 that we already had for SHA-256, SHA-1 and AES, and as with all of those, plumbs it through to testcrypt so that you can explicitly ask for the hardware or software version of SHA-512. So the test suite can run the standard test vectors against both implementations in turn. On M1 macOS, I'm testing at run time for the presence of SHA-512 by checking a sysctl setting. You can perform the same test on the command line by running "sysctl hw.optional.armv8_2_sha512". As far as I can tell, on Windows there is not yet any flag to test for this CPU feature, so for the moment, the new accelerated SHA-512 is turned off unconditionally on Windows.
2020-12-24 11:40:15 +00:00
if ssh_hash_new(hashname) is None:
continue # skip testing of unavailable HW implementation
# Test cases from RFC 6234 section 8.5, omitting the ones
# whose input is not a multiple of 8 bits
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha512', "abc"), unhex(
'ddaf35a193617abacc417349ae20413112e6fa4e89a97ea20a9eeee64b55'
'd39a2192992a274fc1a836ba3c23a3feebbd454d4423643ce80e2a9ac94f'
'a54ca49f'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha512',
"abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmn"
"hijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu"),
unhex('8e959b75dae313da8cf4f72814fc143f8f7779c6eb9f7fa17299'
'aeadb6889018501d289e4900f7e4331b99dec4b5433ac7d329eeb6dd26'
'545e96e55b874be909'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str_iter('sha512',
("a" * 1000 for _ in range(1000))), unhex(
'e718483d0ce769644e2e42c7bc15b4638e1f98b13b2044285632a803afa9'
'73ebde0ff244877ea60a4cb0432ce577c31beb009c5c2c49aa2e4eadb217'
'ad8cc09b'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha512',
"01234567012345670123456701234567" * 20), unhex(
'89d05ba632c699c31231ded4ffc127d5a894dad412c0e024db872d1abd2b'
'a8141a0f85072a9be1e2aa04cf33c765cb510813a39cd5a84c4acaa64d3f'
'3fb7bae9'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha512', b"\xD0"), unhex(
'9992202938e882e73e20f6b69e68a0a7149090423d93c81bab3f21678d4a'
'ceeee50e4e8cafada4c85a54ea8306826c4ad6e74cece9631bfa8a549b4a'
'b3fbba15'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha512',
unhex("8d4e3c0e3889191491816e9d98bff0a0")), unhex(
'cb0b67a4b8712cd73c9aabc0b199e9269b20844afb75acbdd1c153c98289'
'24c3ddedaafe669c5fdd0bc66f630f6773988213eb1b16f517ad0de4b2f0'
'c95c90f8'))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha512', unhex(
"a55f20c411aad132807a502d65824e31a2305432aa3d06d3e282a8d84e0d"
"e1de6974bf495469fc7f338f8054d58c26c49360c3e87af56523acf6d89d"
"03e56ff2f868002bc3e431edc44df2f0223d4bb3b243586e1a7d92493669"
"4fcbbaf88d9519e4eb50a644f8e4f95eb0ea95bc4465c8821aacd2fe15ab"
"4981164bbb6dc32f969087a145b0d9cc9c67c22b763299419cc4128be9a0"
"77b3ace634064e6d99283513dc06e7515d0d73132e9a0dc6d3b1f8b246f1"
"a98a3fc72941b1e3bb2098e8bf16f268d64f0b0f4707fe1ea1a1791ba2f3"
"c0c758e5f551863a96c949ad47d7fb40d2")), unhex(
'c665befb36da189d78822d10528cbf3b12b3eef726039909c1a16a270d48'
'719377966b957a878e720584779a62825c18da26415e49a7176a894e7510'
'fd1451f5'))
def testSHA3(self):
# Source: all the SHA-3 test strings from
# https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-standards-and-guidelines/example-values#aHashing
# which are a multiple of 8 bits long.
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_224', ''), unhex("6b4e03423667dbb73b6e15454f0eb1abd4597f9a1b078e3f5b5a6bc7"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_224', unhex('a3')*200), unhex("9376816aba503f72f96ce7eb65ac095deee3be4bf9bbc2a1cb7e11e0"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_256', ''), unhex("a7ffc6f8bf1ed76651c14756a061d662f580ff4de43b49fa82d80a4b80f8434a"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_256', unhex('a3')*200), unhex("79f38adec5c20307a98ef76e8324afbfd46cfd81b22e3973c65fa1bd9de31787"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_384', ''), unhex("0c63a75b845e4f7d01107d852e4c2485c51a50aaaa94fc61995e71bbee983a2ac3713831264adb47fb6bd1e058d5f004"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_384', unhex('a3')*200), unhex("1881de2ca7e41ef95dc4732b8f5f002b189cc1e42b74168ed1732649ce1dbcdd76197a31fd55ee989f2d7050dd473e8f"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_512', ''), unhex("a69f73cca23a9ac5c8b567dc185a756e97c982164fe25859e0d1dcc1475c80a615b2123af1f5f94c11e3e9402c3ac558f500199d95b6d3e301758586281dcd26"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('sha3_512', unhex('a3')*200), unhex("e76dfad22084a8b1467fcf2ffa58361bec7628edf5f3fdc0e4805dc48caeeca81b7c13c30adf52a3659584739a2df46be589c51ca1a4a8416df6545a1ce8ba00"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('shake256_114bytes', ''), unhex("46b9dd2b0ba88d13233b3feb743eeb243fcd52ea62b81b82b50c27646ed5762fd75dc4ddd8c0f200cb05019d67b592f6fc821c49479ab48640292eacb3b7c4be141e96616fb13957692cc7edd0b45ae3dc07223c8e92937bef84bc0eab862853349ec75546f58fb7c2775c38462c5010d846"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('shake256_114bytes', unhex('a3')*200), unhex("cd8a920ed141aa0407a22d59288652e9d9f1a7ee0c1e7c1ca699424da84a904d2d700caae7396ece96604440577da4f3aa22aeb8857f961c4cd8e06f0ae6610b1048a7f64e1074cd629e85ad7566048efc4fb500b486a3309a8f26724c0ed628001a1099422468de726f1061d99eb9e93604"))
def testBLAKE2b(self):
# Test case from RFC 7693 appendix A.
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('blake2b', b'abc'), unhex(
"ba80a53f981c4d0d6a2797b69f12f6e94c212f14685ac4b74b12bb6fdbffa2d1"
"7d87c5392aab792dc252d5de4533cc9518d38aa8dbf1925ab92386edd4009923"))
# A small number of test cases from the larger test vector
# set, testing multiple blocks and the empty input.
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('blake2b', b''), unhex(
"786a02f742015903c6c6fd852552d272912f4740e15847618a86e217f71f5419"
"d25e1031afee585313896444934eb04b903a685b1448b755d56f701afe9be2ce"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('blake2b', unhex('00')), unhex(
"2fa3f686df876995167e7c2e5d74c4c7b6e48f8068fe0e44208344d480f7904c"
"36963e44115fe3eb2a3ac8694c28bcb4f5a0f3276f2e79487d8219057a506e4b"))
self.assertEqualBin(hash_str('blake2b', bytes(range(255))), unhex(
"5b21c5fd8868367612474fa2e70e9cfa2201ffeee8fafab5797ad58fefa17c9b"
"5b107da4a3db6320baaf2c8617d5a51df914ae88da3867c2d41f0cc14fa67928"))
# You can get this test program to run the full version of the
# test vectors by modifying the source temporarily to set this
# variable to a pathname where you downloaded the JSON file
# blake2-kat.json.
blake2_test_vectors_path = None
if blake2_test_vectors_path is not None:
with open(blake2_test_vectors_path) as fh:
vectors = json.load(fh)
for vector in vectors:
if vector['hash'] != 'blake2b':
continue
if len(vector['key']) != 0:
continue
h = blake2b_new_general(len(vector['out']) // 2)
ssh_hash_update(h, unhex(vector['in']))
digest = ssh_hash_digest(h)
self.assertEqualBin(digest, unhex(vector['out']))
def testArgon2(self):
# draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2-12 section 5
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('d', 32, 3, 4, 32, b'\x01' * 32, b'\x02' * 16,
b'\x03' * 8, b'\x04' * 12),
unhex("512b391b6f1162975371d30919734294"
"f868e3be3984f3c1a13a4db9fabe4acb"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('i', 32, 3, 4, 32, b'\x01' * 32, b'\x02' * 16,
b'\x03' * 8, b'\x04' * 12),
unhex("c814d9d1dc7f37aa13f0d77f2494bda1"
"c8de6b016dd388d29952a4c4672b6ce8"))
self.assertEqualBin(
argon2('id', 32, 3, 4, 32, b'\x01' * 32, b'\x02' * 16,
b'\x03' * 8, b'\x04' * 12),
unhex("0d640df58d78766c08c037a34a8b53c9"
"d01ef0452d75b65eb52520e96b01e659"))
def testHmacSHA(self):
# Test cases from RFC 6234 section 8.5.
def vector(key, message, s1=None, s256=None):
if s1 is not None:
self.assertEqualBin(
mac_str('hmac_sha1', key, message), unhex(s1))
if s256 is not None:
self.assertEqualBin(
mac_str('hmac_sha256', key, message), unhex(s256))
vector(
unhex("0b"*20), "Hi There",
"b617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00",
"b0344c61d8db38535ca8afceaf0bf12b881dc200c9833da726e9376c2e32cff7")
vector(
"Jefe", "what do ya want for nothing?",
"effcdf6ae5eb2fa2d27416d5f184df9c259a7c79",
"5bdcc146bf60754e6a042426089575c75a003f089d2739839dec58b964ec3843")
vector(
unhex("aa"*20), unhex('dd'*50),
"125d7342b9ac11cd91a39af48aa17b4f63f175d3",
"773ea91e36800e46854db8ebd09181a72959098b3ef8c122d9635514ced565FE")
vector(
unhex("0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819"),
unhex("cd"*50),
"4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235da",
"82558a389a443c0ea4cc819899f2083a85f0faa3e578f8077a2e3ff46729665b")
vector(
unhex("aa"*80),
"Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First",
s1="aa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112")
vector(
unhex("aa"*131),
"Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First",
s256="60e431591ee0b67f0d8a26aacbf5b77f"
"8e0bc6213728c5140546040f0ee37f54")
vector(
unhex("aa"*80),
"Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and "
"Larger Than One Block-Size Data",
s1="e8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91")
vector(
unhex("aa"*131),
"This is a test using a larger than block-size key and a "
"larger than block-size data. The key needs to be hashed "
"before being used by the HMAC algorithm.",
s256="9B09FFA71B942FCB27635FBCD5B0E944BFDC63644F0713938A7F51535C3A35E2")
def testEd25519(self):
def vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature):
x, y = ecc_edwards_get_affine(eddsa_public(
mp_from_bytes_le(privkey), 'ed25519'))
self.assertEqual(int(y) | ((int(x) & 1) << 255),
int(mp_from_bytes_le(pubkey)))
pubblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-ed25519") + ssh_string(pubkey)
privblob = ssh_string(privkey)
sigblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-ed25519") + ssh_string(signature)
pubkey = ssh_key_new_pub('ed25519', pubblob)
self.assertTrue(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, sigblob, message))
privkey = ssh_key_new_priv('ed25519', pubblob, privblob)
# By testing that the signature is exactly the one expected in
# the test vector and not some equivalent one generated with a
# different nonce, we're verifying in particular that we do
# our deterministic nonce generation in the manner specified
# by Ed25519. Getting that wrong would lead to no obvious
# failure, but would surely turn out to be a bad idea sooner
# or later...
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_key_sign(privkey, message, 0), sigblob)
# A cherry-picked example from DJB's test vector data at
# https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/python/sign.input, which is too
# large to copy into here in full.
privkey = unhex(
'c89955e0f7741d905df0730b3dc2b0ce1a13134e44fef3d40d60c020ef19df77')
pubkey = unhex(
'fdb30673402faf1c8033714f3517e47cc0f91fe70cf3836d6c23636e3fd2287c')
message = unhex(
'507c94c8820d2a5793cbf3442b3d71936f35fe3afef316')
signature = unhex(
'7ef66e5e86f2360848e0014e94880ae2920ad8a3185a46b35d1e07dea8fa8ae4'
'f6b843ba174d99fa7986654a0891c12a794455669375bf92af4cc2770b579e0c')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
# You can get this test program to run the full version of
# DJB's test vectors by modifying the source temporarily to
# set this variable to a pathname where you downloaded the
# file.
ed25519_test_vector_path = None
if ed25519_test_vector_path is not None:
with open(ed25519_test_vector_path) as f:
for line in iter(f.readline, ""):
words = line.split(":")
# DJB's test vector input format concatenates a
# spare copy of the public key to the end of the
# private key, and a spare copy of the message to
# the end of the signature. Strip those off.
privkey = unhex(words[0])[:32]
pubkey = unhex(words[1])
message = unhex(words[2])
signature = unhex(words[3])[:64]
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
def testEd448(self):
def vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature):
x, y = ecc_edwards_get_affine(eddsa_public(
mp_from_bytes_le(privkey), 'ed448'))
self.assertEqual(int(y) | ((int(x) & 1) << 455),
int(mp_from_bytes_le(pubkey)))
pubblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-ed448") + ssh_string(pubkey)
privblob = ssh_string(privkey)
sigblob = ssh_string(b"ssh-ed448") + ssh_string(signature)
pubkey = ssh_key_new_pub('ed448', pubblob)
self.assertTrue(ssh_key_verify(pubkey, sigblob, message))
privkey = ssh_key_new_priv('ed448', pubblob, privblob)
# Deterministic signature check as in Ed25519
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_key_sign(privkey, message, 0), sigblob)
# Source: RFC 8032 section 7.4
privkey = unhex('6c82a562cb808d10d632be89c8513ebf6c929f34ddfa8c9f63c9960ef6e348a3528c8a3fcc2f044e39a3fc5b94492f8f032e7549a20098f95b')
pubkey = unhex('5fd7449b59b461fd2ce787ec616ad46a1da1342485a70e1f8a0ea75d80e96778edf124769b46c7061bd6783df1e50f6cd1fa1abeafe8256180')
message = b''
signature = unhex('533a37f6bbe457251f023c0d88f976ae2dfb504a843e34d2074fd823d41a591f2b233f034f628281f2fd7a22ddd47d7828c59bd0a21bfd3980ff0d2028d4b18a9df63e006c5d1c2d345b925d8dc00b4104852db99ac5c7cdda8530a113a0f4dbb61149f05a7363268c71d95808ff2e652600')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
privkey = unhex('c4eab05d357007c632f3dbb48489924d552b08fe0c353a0d4a1f00acda2c463afbea67c5e8d2877c5e3bc397a659949ef8021e954e0a12274e')
pubkey = unhex('43ba28f430cdff456ae531545f7ecd0ac834a55d9358c0372bfa0c6c6798c0866aea01eb00742802b8438ea4cb82169c235160627b4c3a9480')
message = unhex('03')
signature = unhex('26b8f91727bd62897af15e41eb43c377efb9c610d48f2335cb0bd0087810f4352541b143c4b981b7e18f62de8ccdf633fc1bf037ab7cd779805e0dbcc0aae1cbcee1afb2e027df36bc04dcecbf154336c19f0af7e0a6472905e799f1953d2a0ff3348ab21aa4adafd1d234441cf807c03a00')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
privkey = unhex('cd23d24f714274e744343237b93290f511f6425f98e64459ff203e8985083ffdf60500553abc0e05cd02184bdb89c4ccd67e187951267eb328')
pubkey = unhex('dcea9e78f35a1bf3499a831b10b86c90aac01cd84b67a0109b55a36e9328b1e365fce161d71ce7131a543ea4cb5f7e9f1d8b00696447001400')
message = unhex('0c3e544074ec63b0265e0c')
signature = unhex('1f0a8888ce25e8d458a21130879b840a9089d999aaba039eaf3e3afa090a09d389dba82c4ff2ae8ac5cdfb7c55e94d5d961a29fe0109941e00b8dbdeea6d3b051068df7254c0cdc129cbe62db2dc957dbb47b51fd3f213fb8698f064774250a5028961c9bf8ffd973fe5d5c206492b140e00')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
privkey = unhex('258cdd4ada32ed9c9ff54e63756ae582fb8fab2ac721f2c8e676a72768513d939f63dddb55609133f29adf86ec9929dccb52c1c5fd2ff7e21b')
pubkey = unhex('3ba16da0c6f2cc1f30187740756f5e798d6bc5fc015d7c63cc9510ee3fd44adc24d8e968b6e46e6f94d19b945361726bd75e149ef09817f580')
message = unhex('64a65f3cdedcdd66811e2915')
signature = unhex('7eeeab7c4e50fb799b418ee5e3197ff6bf15d43a14c34389b59dd1a7b1b85b4ae90438aca634bea45e3a2695f1270f07fdcdf7c62b8efeaf00b45c2c96ba457eb1a8bf075a3db28e5c24f6b923ed4ad747c3c9e03c7079efb87cb110d3a99861e72003cbae6d6b8b827e4e6c143064ff3c00')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
privkey = unhex('d65df341ad13e008567688baedda8e9dcdc17dc024974ea5b4227b6530e339bff21f99e68ca6968f3cca6dfe0fb9f4fab4fa135d5542ea3f01')
pubkey = unhex('df9705f58edbab802c7f8363cfe5560ab1c6132c20a9f1dd163483a26f8ac53a39d6808bf4a1dfbd261b099bb03b3fb50906cb28bd8a081f00')
message = unhex('bd0f6a3747cd561bdddf4640a332461a4a30a12a434cd0bf40d766d9c6d458e5512204a30c17d1f50b5079631f64eb3112182da3005835461113718d1a5ef944')
signature = unhex('554bc2480860b49eab8532d2a533b7d578ef473eeb58c98bb2d0e1ce488a98b18dfde9b9b90775e67f47d4a1c3482058efc9f40d2ca033a0801b63d45b3b722ef552bad3b4ccb667da350192b61c508cf7b6b5adadc2c8d9a446ef003fb05cba5f30e88e36ec2703b349ca229c2670833900')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
privkey = unhex('2ec5fe3c17045abdb136a5e6a913e32ab75ae68b53d2fc149b77e504132d37569b7e766ba74a19bd6162343a21c8590aa9cebca9014c636df5')
pubkey = unhex('79756f014dcfe2079f5dd9e718be4171e2ef2486a08f25186f6bff43a9936b9bfe12402b08ae65798a3d81e22e9ec80e7690862ef3d4ed3a00')
message = unhex('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')
signature = unhex('c650ddbb0601c19ca11439e1640dd931f43c518ea5bea70d3dcde5f4191fe53f00cf966546b72bcc7d58be2b9badef28743954e3a44a23f880e8d4f1cfce2d7a61452d26da05896f0a50da66a239a8a188b6d825b3305ad77b73fbac0836ecc60987fd08527c1a8e80d5823e65cafe2a3d00')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
privkey = unhex('872d093780f5d3730df7c212664b37b8a0f24f56810daa8382cd4fa3f77634ec44dc54f1c2ed9bea86fafb7632d8be199ea165f5ad55dd9ce8')
pubkey = unhex('a81b2e8a70a5ac94ffdbcc9badfc3feb0801f258578bb114ad44ece1ec0e799da08effb81c5d685c0c56f64eecaef8cdf11cc38737838cf400')
message = unhex('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')
signature = unhex('e301345a41a39a4d72fff8df69c98075a0cc082b802fc9b2b6bc503f926b65bddf7f4c8f1cb49f6396afc8a70abe6d8aef0db478d4c6b2970076c6a0484fe76d76b3a97625d79f1ce240e7c576750d295528286f719b413de9ada3e8eb78ed573603ce30d8bb761785dc30dbc320869e1a00')
vector(privkey, pubkey, message, signature)
def testMontgomeryKex(self):
# Unidirectional tests, consisting of an input random number
# string and peer public value, giving the expected output
# shared key. Source: RFC 7748 section 5.2.
rfc7748s5_2 = [
('curve25519',
'a546e36bf0527c9d3b16154b82465edd62144c0ac1fc5a18506a2244ba449ac4',
'e6db6867583030db3594c1a424b15f7c726624ec26b3353b10a903a6d0ab1c4c',
0xc3da55379de9c6908e94ea4df28d084f32eccf03491c71f754b4075577a28552),
('curve25519',
'4b66e9d4d1b4673c5ad22691957d6af5c11b6421e0ea01d42ca4169e7918ba0d',
'e5210f12786811d3f4b7959d0538ae2c31dbe7106fc03c3efc4cd549c715a493',
0x95cbde9476e8907d7aade45cb4b873f88b595a68799fa152e6f8f7647aac7957),
('curve448',
'3d262fddf9ec8e88495266fea19a34d28882acef045104d0d1aae121700a779c984c24f8cdd78fbff44943eba368f54b29259a4f1c600ad3',
'06fce640fa3487bfda5f6cf2d5263f8aad88334cbd07437f020f08f9814dc031ddbdc38c19c6da2583fa5429db94ada18aa7a7fb4ef8a086',
0xce3e4ff95a60dc6697da1db1d85e6afbdf79b50a2412d7546d5f239fe14fbaadeb445fc66a01b0779d98223961111e21766282f73dd96b6f),
('curve448',
'203d494428b8399352665ddca42f9de8fef600908e0d461cb021f8c538345dd77c3e4806e25f46d3315c44e0a5b4371282dd2c8d5be3095f',
'0fbcc2f993cd56d3305b0b7d9e55d4c1a8fb5dbb52f8e9a1e9b6201b165d015894e56c4d3570bee52fe205e28a78b91cdfbde71ce8d157db',
0x884a02576239ff7a2f2f63b2db6a9ff37047ac13568e1e30fe63c4a7ad1b3ee3a5700df34321d62077e63633c575c1c954514e99da7c179d),
]
for method, priv, pub, expected in rfc7748s5_2:
with queued_specific_random_data(unhex(priv)):
ecdh = ssh_ecdhkex_newkey(method)
key = ssh_ecdhkex_getkey(ecdh, unhex(pub))
self.assertEqual(int(key), expected)
# Bidirectional tests, consisting of the input random number
# strings for both parties, and the expected public values and
# shared key. Source: RFC 7748 section 6.
rfc7748s6 = [
('curve25519', # section 6.1
'77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a',
'8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a',
'5dab087e624a8a4b79e17f8b83800ee66f3bb1292618b6fd1c2f8b27ff88e0eb',
'de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f',
0x4a5d9d5ba4ce2de1728e3bf480350f25e07e21c947d19e3376f09b3c1e161742),
('curve448', # section 6.2
'9a8f4925d1519f5775cf46b04b5800d4ee9ee8bae8bc5565d498c28dd9c9baf574a9419744897391006382a6f127ab1d9ac2d8c0a598726b',
'9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0',
'1c306a7ac2a0e2e0990b294470cba339e6453772b075811d8fad0d1d6927c120bb5ee8972b0d3e21374c9c921b09d1b0366f10b65173992d',
'3eb7a829b0cd20f5bcfc0b599b6feccf6da4627107bdb0d4f345b43027d8b972fc3e34fb4232a13ca706dcb57aec3dae07bdc1c67bf33609',
0x07fff4181ac6cc95ec1c16a94a0f74d12da232ce40a77552281d282bb60c0b56fd2464c335543936521c24403085d59a449a5037514a879d),
]
for method, apriv, apub, bpriv, bpub, expected in rfc7748s6:
with queued_specific_random_data(unhex(apriv)):
alice = ssh_ecdhkex_newkey(method)
with queued_specific_random_data(unhex(bpriv)):
bob = ssh_ecdhkex_newkey(method)
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_ecdhkex_getpublic(alice), unhex(apub))
self.assertEqualBin(ssh_ecdhkex_getpublic(bob), unhex(bpub))
akey = ssh_ecdhkex_getkey(alice, unhex(bpub))
bkey = ssh_ecdhkex_getkey(bob, unhex(apub))
self.assertEqual(int(akey), expected)
self.assertEqual(int(bkey), expected)
Expose CRC32 to testcrypt, and add tests for it. Finding even semi-official test vectors for this CRC implementation was hard, because it turns out not to _quite_ match any of the well known ones catalogued on the web. Its _polynomial_ is well known, but the combination of details that go alongside it (starting state, post-hashing transformation) are not quite the same as any other hash I know of. After trawling catalogue websites for a while I finally worked out that SSH-1's CRC and RFC 1662's CRC are basically the same except for different choices of starting value and final adjustment. And RFC 1662's CRC is common enough that there _are_ test vectors. So I've renamed the previous crc32_compute function to crc32_ssh1, reflecting that it seems to be its own thing unlike any other CRC; implemented the RFC 1662 CRC as well, as an alternative tiny wrapper on the inner crc32_update function; and exposed all three functions to testcrypt. That lets me run standard test vectors _and_ directed tests of the internal update routine, plus one check that crc32_ssh1 itself does what I expect. While I'm here, I've also modernised the code to use uint32_t in place of unsigned long, and ptrlen instead of separate pointer,length arguments. And I've removed the general primer on CRC theory from the header comment, in favour of the more specifically useful information about _which_ CRC this is and how it matches up to anything else out there. (I've bowed to inevitability and put the directed CRC tests in the 'crypt' class in cryptsuite.py. Of course this is a misnomer, since CRC isn't cryptography, but it falls into the same category in terms of the role it plays in SSH-1, and I didn't feel like making a new pointedly-named 'notreallycrypt' container class just for this :-)
2019-01-14 20:45:19 +00:00
def testCRC32(self):
self.assertEqual(crc32_rfc1662("123456789"), 0xCBF43926)
self.assertEqual(crc32_ssh1("123456789"), 0x2DFD2D88)
# Source:
# http://reveng.sourceforge.net/crc-catalogue/17plus.htm#crc.cat.crc-32-iso-hdlc
# which collected these from various sources.
reveng_tests = [
'000000001CDF4421',
'F20183779DAB24',
'0FAA005587B2C9B6',
'00FF55111262A032',
'332255AABBCCDDEEFF3D86AEB0',
'926B559BA2DE9C',
'FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF',
'C008300028CFE9521D3B08EA449900E808EA449900E8300102007E649416',
'6173640ACEDE2D15',
]
for vec in map(unhex, reveng_tests):
# Each of these test vectors can be read two ways. One
# interpretation is that the last four bytes are the
# little-endian encoding of the CRC of the rest. (Because
# that's how the CRC is attached to a string at the
# sending end.)
#
# The other interpretation is that if you CRC the whole
# string, _including_ the final four bytes, you expect to
# get the same value for any correct string (because the
# little-endian encoding matches the way the rest of the
# string was interpreted as a polynomial in the first
# place). That's how a receiver is intended to check
# things.
#
# The expected output value is listed in RFC 1662, and in
# the reveng.sourceforge.net catalogue, as 0xDEBB20E3. But
# that's because their checking procedure omits the final
# complement step that the construction procedure
# includes. Our crc32_rfc1662 function does do the final
# complement, so we expect the bitwise NOT of that value,
# namely 0x2144DF1C.
expected = struct.unpack("<L", vec[-4:])[0]
self.assertEqual(crc32_rfc1662(vec[:-4]), expected)
self.assertEqual(crc32_rfc1662(vec), 0x2144DF1C)
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Run the tests, suppressing automatic sys.exit and collecting the
# unittest.TestProgram instance returned by unittest.main instead.
testprogram = unittest.main(exit=False)
# If any test failed, just exit with failure status.
if not testprogram.result.wasSuccessful():
childprocess.wait_for_exit()
sys.exit(1)
# But if no tests failed, we have one last check to do: look at
# the subprocess's return status, so that if Leak Sanitiser
# detected any memory leaks, the success return status will turn
# into a failure at the last minute.
childprocess.check_return_status()